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BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION

Upon the inception of the new civilian administration on May 29'
2000, after almost twenty years of military rule, President Olusegun
Obasanjo set up, inter alia, an eight-member Human Rights violation
Investigation Commission. This Commission is headed by a retired
Supreme Court Justice, Chukwudifu Oputa, and was empowered to
investigate and report to the government human rights abuses against
Nigerians by successive regimes between January 15, 1966 and May 28,
1999.
The Commission has since received several thousands of memoranda
by members of the public and other interest groups, which demonstrates
the magnitude of human rights violations within this period. While the
Commission appreciates the need to right past human rights abuses, it
realizes, also, that for the process to result in genuine national
reconciliation, there must be something more. It would require situating
incidents of human rights abuses within the context of national history.'
This was the justification for expanding the scope of the Commission to
include ascertaining or establishing the causes, nature and extent of all
gross violations committed in Nigeria from the advent of the first military
coup d'etat.2 This article is the result of a sociological investigation into
environment and human rights abuses in the Niger Delta of Nigeria.
This article sets out eight major Parts. Part One is the background
and introduction. Part Two states the scope, purpose and methodology of
the paper. Parts Three and Four deal with historical antecedence of human
rights abuses. In Part Five, the case studies are examined. Part Six is on
observations relevant to the cases stated. The analyses is undertaken in
Part Seven, while Part Eight concludes the paper with a body of
recommendations.
This article serves three main purposes: first, to bring forth the
nature and extent of environment and human rights abuses in the Niger
Delta of Nigeria to the international community; second, to fill an existing
gap in the methodology of environment and human rights jurisprudence by
adopting a sociological approach; and third, to prescribe possible solutions
1. See generally Background Paper on the Investigation of Human Rights Violations in
the South-South Zone, 1966-1999 prepared for the Meeting of Researchers at CASS on July 27,
2000.
2. WILLIAM TORDOFF, GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN AFRICA (London) (1984). A. R.
BALL, MODERN POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT 22-233. (London: Macmillan) (1983); M. Ayua,
Military Regimes and Constitutionalism in Nigeria 2 LAW SOc'Y REv.90, 90-94(1993) This
paper is an adaptation of a paper undertaken under the auspices of the Centre for Advanced
Social Science (CASS), whose services were engaged by the Commission to collaborate with it in
clarifying the history of the country with particular reference to incidents of human rights abuses.
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to the vexing issue of environment and human rights violations in the Niger
Delta of Nigeria.
II. SCOPE, PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY
The broad areas the research focuses on are community/group rights
deprivations, comprising environment, and human rights, which
encompass social, political, economic, cultural/linguistic rights as well as
access to justice. In particular, the following communities in the Niger
Delta of Nigeria form the subject of this article: 1) the Ogonis; 2) the
Ijaws of Bonny/Finima; 3) the Egi clan in Ogbaland.
Occasionally, however, some aspects of personal deprivations and
destitution were considered in relation to the communities of Ogoni and
Egi in Ogbaland.
The methodology adopted for this article is essentially a combination
of community case studies and comparative theoretical analyses. Its
investigative tool combines field survey and the use of questionnaires and
personal interviews. In addition, there was desktop research to acquire
secondary information for the purpose of analyzing human rights abuses
resulting from oil and gas exploration and exploitation activities with
particular reference to their environmental sustainability and quality of
human life. These are all carried out within a descriptive, analytical, and
prescriptive framework developed in seven major steps that have been
outlined in the background to this article.
III. PERIODIZATION
Generally speaking, the period covered by this article is between
January 1966 and May 28, 1999. This period is reflects the expanded
scope of the Commission. January 1966 to July 1966 witnessed Nigeria's
first military government with Major Aguiyi Ironsi as head of the country's
government. The second, which overthrew the first, was the counter-coup
of July 1966 by young officers from the North and Middle Belt led by Lt.
Colonel Gowon. This regime repealed Decree No. 34 of the Ironsi
administration which sought a unitary system of government for the
country. Gowon restored the federal constitutional framework and, when
faced with the threat of secession by the then Eastern Region led by Lt.
Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu, he responded by creating twelve states with a
view to undermining the secessionists' enclave.
Between May 1967 and 1969, the country was at war with itself.
Human rights observance or violation during the civil war years, especially
in the East and South-South geopolitical zones, can only be imagined.
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Gowon's refusal to relinquish power to usher in civilian rule and his
ineffectiveness in controlling his Lieutenants, especially Military
Governors, were some of the reasons given for his overthrow in a
bloodless coup in 1975. It is impossible in an article of this nature to
recount all of the nation's history. 3 It suffices to say that the nation
witnessed thirteen years of military rule, which was only broken by the
General Olusegun Obasanjo's administration's decision to hand over power
to civilians in 1979. Because military regimes are generally antithetical to
constitutionalism, complaints about human rights abuses during these dark
ages of the nation's history were not uncommon.
The new civilian regime did not last long. It was quickly terminated
by the duo of Generals Mohammadu Buhari and Tunde Idiagbon. Alhaji
Shehu Shagari's administration was toppled on the 31st of December 1983
after he had won a controversial second term. Nigerians thus witnessed
their second regimented journey in military rule with all its attendant
implications for human rights. This military regime was itself short-lived.
It was unexpectedly overthrown by General Ibrahim Babangida in what is
popularly described as "a palace coup" in 1985. Babangida held the reigns
of power from 1985 to 1993, the longest reign by any particular ruler.
This regime also witnessed the first palpable discontent from the oilproducing areas of the Niger Delta.
IV. THE NIGER DELTA
The Niger Delta of Nigeria is one of the world's largest wetlands,
covering an area of approximately 70,000 square kilometers. It comprises
a number of characteristic ecological zones ranging from the sandy coastal
ridge barriers, brackish or saline mangroves, fresh water permanent and
seasonal swamp forest, to lowland rain forest. This area is also completely
traversed and criss-crossed by a number of tributaries and distributaries to
the main River Niger, forming along its course, streams, rivulets and
canals.
The tides of the Atlantic Ocean and the flood waters of the River
Niger are the most influential variables in determining the hydrology of the
Niger Delta. Accordingly, the area is highly sensitive to changes in water
quality (salinity and pollution) and quantity (flooding).
The population of the Niger Delta is estimated to be between seven
and twelve million people, most of whom are heterogeneous. They are the
Izons (Ijaws), Isokos, Urhobos, Itsekiris, the Ilajes, Ogonis, Andonis,
3. Limitations of time and space coupled with the fact that such historical account is only
relevant for the purposes of situating human rights abuses have made such detailed exclusive
account of the nation's history unnecessary.
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Ibibios, Orons, Efiks, Anangs, Ekpeyes, Ikwerres, and others. These
people depend for the most part on fishing and small-scale subsistence
farming for their livelihood. The Niger Delta is also very richly endowed
in oil and gas deposits. However, unsustainable industrial activities such
as chemical, manufacturing, and the oil and gas industries, especially the
last, have combined to exacerbate the stress on the already fragile natural
environment. This situation is further compounded by the unwillingness of
the federal government and its foreign joint venture partners to sincerely
integrate environmental concerns into their development projects.
The Environmental Impact Assessment Act 1992 appears to be
observed more in breach than in compliance. The recent controversy
surrounding the proposed dredging of the River Niger without adequate
recourse to the environmental impact on the Niger Delta is demonstrable of
the federal government's doublespeak.
Also worthy of mention is
Obasanjo's desire to actualize his own blueprint for the development of the
Niger Delta on his own terms and in the face of overwhelming opposition
from the peoples' elected representatives as well as that of other interest
groups in the Niger Delta.
The problems of the Niger Delta can, indeed, be summed up in three
Ds: deprivation, despoliation and destitution. The various ethnic groups
in the Niger have long been deprived of their natural resources by the
federal government, which has literally seized the oil and gas deposits
within their territory for itself.
It has achieved this through the
instrumentality of the Petroleum Act of 1969, the Land Use Act of 1978,
and the Nigerian Constitution of 1999. The recent decision by the SouthSouth Governors to control and own their resources also demonstrates the
extent to which Niger Deltaians have been pushed to the wall. For this
same reason, Ken Saro-Wiwa, an Ogoni environmental activist, was
taunted, vilified, and subsequently hanged under some spurious charges
before a tribunal whose constitution left much to be desired.
The Niger Delta, which is otherwise rich in flora and fauna including
some rare species of wild flowers, birds, ants, aquatic and wild animals,
now hosts an increasing variety of heavily polluting industries. The
intricate processes of aerial survey, exploration drilling, appraisal drilling,
and production of oil and gas characteristic of the petroleum industry, for
instance, have impacted negatively on the Niger Delta environment. The
effects include soil degradation, water contamination and pollution,
deforestation resulting from oil infrastructural damage, air and noise
pollution, distortion of the ecology and loss of biodiversity, and general
despoliation of the environment.
The combined effects of deprivation and despoliation is destitution.
The Niger Delta is now synonymous with poverty resulting from social,
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economic and environmental dislocation. The impact of frequent oil spills,
gas flares and other chemicals introduced into the Niger Delta environment
is to render the soil infertile and at the same time polluting the creeks,
rivers and rivulets. The people's basic livelihood of farming and fishing is
thereby undermined, a situation that further impacts their morale, including
their spiritual and ethical values, especially when juxtaposed with the
affluence exhibited by oil and gas industry workers. It is no wonder that
the Niger Delta's teeming unemployed youths have become increasingly
restive.
The federal government's response has always been to threaten fire
and brimstone and actually carry out such threats. The destruction of
Umuechem by the Nigerian Mobile Force in the early 1990s, the siege on
Ogoniland by the then Rivers State Internal Security Task Force in the
mid- to late 1990s, the frequent clashes between MOPOL 19 squad and Egi
youths, the land battle between federal troops and Egbesu youths in Ijaw
land, and the recent devastation of Odi all lend credence of the federal
government's arn-twisting tactics.
The significance of oil to the nation's economy has, however, not
been lost on the indigenous peoples of the Niger Delta, especially the
Ogonis, Ijaws, Ikwerres Efik, Ibibios, and Urhobos. They have often felt
a certain sense of marginalisation as their "God-given" resources have
been and continue to be exploited without a commensurate regard for the
environmental impact of oil and gas operations, a situation compounded by
the lack of basic social amenities.
The Babangida regime's answer to this was the creation of the Oil
Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) in
1992. Babangida 'stepped aside' sometime in 1993 after setting up an
Interim National Government (ING) headed by Chief Ernest Shonekan.
The ING was itself toppled by General Sani Abacha in December 1993.
Many of the human rights abuses associated with oil exploration and
exploitation and their negative environmental impact became noticeable
during the reign of General Sani Abacha, presumably because the Nigerian
State decided to meet resentment and opposition with crude force. General
Babandida was, perhaps, much more subtle in dealing with such issues.
Abacha died on the 8h of June, 1997, the first Nigerian leader to die while
still in office. His successor, General Abdulsalami Abubakir, enthroned
the new civilian regime under General Olusegun Obasanjo's Presidency.
Though this article covers the period from January 1966, many of the
issues highlighted and discussed were manifestations of the early 1970s
right up to the late 1990s, more particularly in the latter period.
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V.

CASE STUDIES

A. Ogoni
Ogoni is located within Rivers State in the Niger Delta region. Ogoni
people are surrounded by other minority ethnic groups: the Wakirike
(Okirika), Andoni, Opobo, and Ndoki. It is about 404 square miles in size
and consists basically of six kingdoms: Eleme, Tai, Nyo-Khanna, KenKhana, Gokana and Babbe. They are said to contain about 500,000
people, representing roughly one half percent of the total Nigerian
population. Ogoniland is endowed with a relatively spacious and fertile
landmass and creeks, as well as with oil and gas deposits. The Ogoni
economy is basically driven by subsistence farming and fishing.
Although Ken Saro Wiwa and his Movement for the Survival of the
Ogoni People (MOSOP) had been at the vanguard in the campaign against
environmental devastation by Shell in Ogoniland prior to 1995, it was not
until he was hanged (along with nine other Ogoni activists) by the Abacha
administration that the Ogoni issue took on an added international
dimension. The global outrage over the executions of the Ogoni Nine
resulted in the suspension of Nigeria from the Commonwealth of Nations,
the resignation of Claude Ake from the Niger Delta Environmental Survey,
and a continuing siege on Ogoniland by soldiers of what became known as
the Rivers State Internal Security Task Force.
This research investigated the nature and extent of human rights
violations in Ogoniland.4 A total of about thirty questionnaires were
distributed. Of this number, twenty-five were later collected from
respondents. The results of the questionnaire survey were quite revealing.
B. Bonny/Finima
Bonny is one of the riverine communities within the Niger Delta. It is
situated south of Ogoniland at the fringes of the Atlantic ocean. Its
immediate neighbors are the Andonis, Okrika, and Opobo peoples.
Bonny also serves as host to the over $3.8 billion (N360.54 billion)
Nigerian liquefied Natural Gas Project (LNG), for which the people of
Finima had to be relocated from the old Finima to the new site also
4.

I discussed this with Chief Letam Duba of Bori in the Rivers State of Nigeria, who

encouraged me to contact the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People [hereinafter MOSOP]
headquarters in Port-Harcourt. I then got in touch with Mr. Ledum Mitee, President of
MOSOP, who posted a guard, to accompany me to Ogoniland. Next we chartered a taxi cab and
did an on site inspection of some of the notable environment and human rights violation sites:
Ejamah-Ebube in Eleme local government area; Kaa in Gokana Local Government Area, Biara
also in Gokana Local Governmnent Area; Yorla; and Bori. Having been to Kono, Tai, and NyoKhana, it was considered unnecessary to repeat those trips.
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situated on the Island. Human rights violations in Bonny came to light in
1999 when the people protested on the 19th of September against the LNG
management for its alleged refusal to implement the terms of an earlier
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). The MOU was entered into
between the community and the principal partners to the LNG project for
the provision of social amenities like pipe-borne water, good roads,
schools, hospitals, and electricity on the island. The protesters then
stopped the operation of the LNG for three days. The invitation of the
military to the scene made matters worse: one Mr. Emmanuel Liblama was
shot dead and several others were seriously injured and taken to various
hospitals in the debacle. One Jack Adams, an expatriate, was said to have
taken part in the shooting of the protesting youths.
The newly elected democratic government saw events unfolding in
Bonny to be capable of sending wrong signals to foreign investors, a
situation that informed the decision of the President to fly into the Island to
broker peace with the youths. Olusegun Obasanjo also said the Federal
Government would deal ruthlessly with any form of activity directed at
creating problems for the economy. The youths allege that they were not
given an opportunity to state their own case.,
C. Egiland
Egiland is a clan comprising about seventeen fairly large communities
in Ogba/Egbema/Ndoni Local Government Area of Ahoada in the northern
part of Rivers State. The area is mostly dominated by farmers with a wellorganized social system. This was before 1962, when Safrap (now ELF
Petroleum Nigeria Limited, a French company) discovered oil in the area.
It discovered its first oil well at Obangi (code named OB 58) sometime in
1962.6 Oil has since been produced in this area, which also hosts a giant
flow station. Other oil servicing companies in the area include Saipem
Nigeria Limited and Ponticelli Nigeria Limited, both contracting firms to
ELF.
Events that brought Egiland into the limelight occurred sometime on
or about October 4th, 1993, when some aggrieved members of the
community staged a protest against ELF (Nigeria) over what was perceived
as the total neglect of the area. The security forces were invited at the
instance of the company, and what started as an ordinary protest turned out
5. My guard, Sotonye Allison, an indigine of Bonny, took me to Bonny for a site
inspection and distribution of questionaires (ten in number). We chartered a taxicab and went to
the LNG site as well as the new settlement of Finima and asked relevant questions.
6. Currently, there are said to be over 62 oil wells. See Oil: Turmoil in the Niger Delta,
2 HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDER, No. 8, at 13 (1999).
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to be one of the bloodiest in the Niger Delta. Many were either injured or
killed. Since then, there have been sporadic and intermittent protests by
members of Egi clan, which often result into the shutting-down of ELF
operations in the area.,
VI.

OBSERVATIONS

A. Ogoni
Human rights violations in Ogoniland are intertwined with
environmental devastation resulting from over thirty years of oil and gas
exploration and exploitation. Since most Ogonis depend on their land for
subsistence agriculture including farming and fishing, it stands to reason
that any environmental devastation is likely to impact negatively on the
peoples' social, economic and cultural rights. While such oil and gas
exploration and exploitation activities are not peculiar to Ogonilandevidence abounds of similar activities in other Niger Delta communitiesthe Ogoni issue is unique in the sense that they had the vision and nerve to
challenge Shell and the Federal Government of Nigeria, while at the same
time taking the issue unto the international arena. Consequently, they have
suffered disproportionate stress: severe repression, killings, intimidation,
detention, rapes and military occupation of their land.
At Eleme, environmental devastation is noticeable in the gas flares
from the petrochemical complex, the Eleme flowstation, as well as from
the Port-Harcourt Refinery Company (PHRC). In the same Eleme, the
environmental degradation from Ejaimah-Ebubu oil spill of 1970, said to
be caused by a mortar bomb blast on the Trans-Niger pipeline of Shell
petroleum carrying crude oil to Bonny Terminal, can still be seen. It is
indeed instructive that even after about thirty years after the spillage, the
remnants of the spill as well as the contamination of farmlands can still be
seen today.'
At K-Dere, where fifty-seven of the ninety-six oil well-heads were
located, pipelines criss-cross the village.
7
I discussed the Egi issue with two Egi sons, one in the Rivers State University of
Science and Technology, the other in the University of Port-Harcourt, both of whom, however,
preferred to remain anonymous.
One of these persons assisted me in distributing the
questionnaires (fifteen were distributed, ten were returned). I also had extensive discussions with
a Human rights activist, Azibaola Robert Esq, a lawyer, whose non-government organisation
[hereinafter NGO], Niger Delta Human and Environmental Rescue Organisation [hereinafter
ND-HERO] had also done extensive field work in respect of the Egi crisis. The questionnaires
returned were particularly revealing.
8. We observed that there is a Federal Environmental Protection Agency [hereinafter
FEPA] technical van situated on the oil-spill site. It was not clear what this van was doing. The
guards at the site said the van was sampling the texture of the soil with a view to remediation.
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At Yorla, where a spill that occured in 1994 after Shell was said to
have ceased operation in Ogoniland, there's an appalling site showing the
effects of oil spills and blowouts, and valuable land in Ogonis had been
laid to waste.
At Kaa, houses have been riddled with bullets, vandalized, and laid to
waste as a result of the operations of the Rivers State Internal Security
Task Force.
At Biara-Gokana, a woman by the name of Kagbara Kalalolo is a
living testimony to the sadism exhibited by members of the Rivers State
Internal Security Task Force, who shot her left arm during one of their
operations in the area.
Of the twenty-five questionnaire survey respondents, fourteen were
males and eleven were females.
All respondents were Ogoniland
residents. They were all agreed that there were oil/gas installations in their
communities for over twenty years. They all described the relationship
between the Company (Shell Petroleum Company (Nigeria) Limited) and
their respective communities as either "poor" or "very poor."
The
elaborations on this answer were varied, but the thrust was that Shell was
highly insensitive to the developmental needs of their host communities.
On the question, "What sector of your community's life has the
presence of the Company affected or impacted the most?," twenty of the
twenty five respondents checked all of "Economic," "Social," "Cultural,"
"Infrastructure," and "Education."
The remaining five checked all of
these and added "Environmental." They all said that the impact referred
to above was negative.
On the possible consequences of the continued operation or presence
of the Company, their answers were varied. But, in summary, they all
said it was going to deteriorate their environment and reduce their quality
of life. They all believed that their individual or communal rights had
been violated. On the nature of the violation, physical violence/abuse,
rape and killings topped the list by a whopping twenty. Three others noted
physical displacement and relocation, while two specifically said their
houses were destroyed.
On the question of who violated their individual and communal rights,
Military Personnel topped the list at seventeen. Some of these respondents
also ticked "Company Staff" (12), while Government Officials,"
"Company Contractors," and "Fellow Villagers" were listed in that order.
All the respondents said they made attempts at seeking redress, the thrust
of which consisted of a non-violent protest aimed at drawing the
Government and Company's attention to their plight. They were all
equally emphatic that nothing came out of their efforts.
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B. Bonny/Finima
It takes about an hour to get to Bonny from Bonny waterside off
Creek Road in Port-Harcourt. At the NLNG site, the area has an unusual
military presence and closed-circuit monitoring security system all over the
jetty and its environs. For every ten persons in Bonny at least three are
security men. This is lost on the visitor because the security men are
usually in plain clothes.
These security men are said to have been intimidating and harassing
the entire people, not sparing the old and the very young, thus posing a
concentration camp scenario. The newly built police station is also said to
be one of the most fortified in the country now. There are also plans to
build a naval base, which is intended to serve as additional security against
threat by the villagers to the LNG project located there. Furthermore,
because of the disproportionate military presence in Bonny, the arrest and
detention of youths is quite common, and the police usually release their
suspects only at very high and illegal monetary bail bonds.
True, I saw the military or mobile police presence in Bonny and it
was quite obvious that we were being monitored especially at the jetty.
But no questions were asked or arrests made. We were careful not to let
them know that we were taking photographs of the LNG site together with
the flare site. It is not certain what would have happened if the military
men actually saw us taking pictures. I decided to take photographs of the
flare site because my survey respondents complained generally of acid rain
and poor quality of the drinking water.
C. Egiland
My investigations as well as observations confirm that ELF has been
flaring gas into the Egi environment at very proximate distance to the
diverse communities that make up Egi. This had been the case since the
discovery of crude oil in the area. For instance, Obagi and Ogbogu
communities are less than 100 meters away from the company's flow
station. Around this same area are two horizontal gas flare stacks that emit
an average of 1.5 million cubic meters of gas into the atmosphere daily.
The Obite gas plant is situated right in the heart of the Obite
community, a distance of about twenty-five meters away from the last
building in the community. The environmental impact assessment on this
project was belated., The gas well heads (Obewa cluster of nine gas wells)
9. A firm, Oasons Nigeria Limited was commissioned to embark on an EIA after strong
reactions from the Egi people by which time the project was already being executed. Its paper
was even more controversial and subsequently rejected by the Egi people. See generally, Efi in,
Natives Out: Egi Clan, No One is Safe, A joint paper of human rights and environmental justice
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are also situated about 100 meters from the Obiyebe community. There
are also pipelines that crisscross the entire community.
My investigations also revealed that sometime in June 1998, the trio
of ELF, Seipem and Ponticelli did actually unleash a regime of terror and
violence on the people of Egi with the active connivance of one Joseph
Wehabe, a project manager to Ponticelli, the then-commander of the
Rivers State Internal Security Task Force (RSISTF) and the commanding
officer of Mobile 19 Squad.'0 Some of the victims of these various human
rights abuses include the following persons: Mr. Nnandi Igila, Gideon
Amadi, Romeo Ordu, Chidi Joshua, Princewill Obulor, Gospel Ogbuikwu,
Confidence Igwe, Uche Victor, Bright Uchendu, Prince Ugo, John Ejah.
These persons had at various times protested against the continued neglect
of the community, its environment, and oits human resources by ELF and
its subcontractors.
Egi women have also in the past demonstrated against ELF and its
subcontractors. Their specific demands included the protection of their
environment from oil and gas pollution damage, employment of their
husbands and children in the companies working in Egi, and the provision
of social amenities in the community. In one protest, some of the women
were violently dispersed by officers and men of the Nigerian Mobile
Police. One Mr. Ozuroke was incidentally stabbed by a Mobile Police
Officer in the process of urging one of the policemen to exercise restraint
in dispersing the women, some of whom were forcibly shoved into gutters.
Against this backdrop, it was not therefore surprising that all ten
respondents in Egiland-Shadrach Nnamdi, Nwaeremah George, Monday
Udo, Amadike Okechukwu, Prince Chukwurundah Obuah, Ogu Evans 0.,
Chief Hycenth Amakiri Ajie, Emejor N. Igwe, and two others who prefer
anonymity-were of the view that the relationship between the company
operating the oil/gas installations in their community and members of their
communities can be described as either "Poor" or "Very Poor." They
were not, however, unanimous on the sector of their community's life that
the oil/gas company's operations has impacted the most. Some thought it
was social, others felt it was economic, and some others felt it was cultural
or infrastructure. But all were convinced that the impact has been
"Negative." Again, they all agreed that their individual or communal
rights were violated. They disagreed on the nature of the violation. Some

monitoring groups of the ND-HERO on the state of transnational repression of human rights of
the Egi people in the Northern Rivers State, at 4-5.
10. My investigation also revealed that the Mobile 19 squad was the same outfit used to
terrorize some parts of Ogoni land together with officers and men of the Rivers State Internal
Security Task Force [hereinafter RSISTF].
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felt it involved physical violence/abuse. Others said it included rape.
Others said it included all of the above, including killings and physical
displacement. Half of the respondents felt the perpetrators of these human
rights violations were company staff (ELF was particularly mentioned) in
connivance with fellow villagers and law enforcement agents. Eight of the
ten respondents said that they made attempts to seek redress, and that this
consisted of making representations to the Companies and Government, but
that nothing came out of it.
VII. ANALYSIS
A. Introduction
All the cases investigated clearly indicate that the alleged human
rights violations were offshoots of environmental degradation resulting
from oil and gas exploration and development. Environmental degradation
inexorably led to the loss of economic livelihood in the form of farming or
fishing. Oil and gas exploration and exploitation then led to social and
cultural dislocation. This was, however, not surprising, as Ved Nanda
predicted that environment and human rights will become another big issue
on the international law agenda in the next century." In Africa generally
and especially in Nigeria, linkages between environmental protection and
the promotion of human rights have become too glaring.,'
Beginning more effectively at Stockholm in 1972, environmental
activism has been on the ascendancy, and has shown no signs of abating.
While it is plausible to attribute this rise in global environmental awareness
to the disasters of the 1980s, of which Africa has had its share," the
unsustainable practices of industrial development may have triggered
environmental consciousness in the first place.
In recent times, environmental activism has taken on an a new
dimension: the human rights component. What, however, is the nature
and scope of the linkage between environment and human rights? How
can environmental resources such as oil and gas deposits be explored and
11. VED P. NANDA, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY 61 (1995) (stating
"the next century," he meant this millennium).
12. The linkages between environment and human rights were first recognized and
acknowledged in a UN resolution as far back as in 1968. See G.A. Res. 2398 a XXII U.N Doc.
A/L553/Add. 1-4 (1968). This resolution was adopted without objection of the fifty five member
countries, including fifteen African countries (Algeria, Nigeria, Cameroon, the Congo,
Brazzaville, Ethiopia, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia,
Sudan and Zambia), in UnitedNations Year Book (U.N. Y.B), vol. 22, pp. 473-474.
13. See generally A. King, AFRICA BEYOND FAMINE: A PAPER TO THE CLUB OF ROME 335 (1991) (citing L. TIMBERLAKE, AFRICA IN CRISIS: THE CAUSES, THE CURES OF
ENVIRONMENTAL BANKRUPTCY (1985).
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exploited without violating the human rights of locals? More particularly,
how can such rights be enforced?1
B. Nature, Scope and Genesis of the Linkage between the
Environment and Human Rights
The nature of petroleum exploration and development, with its
concomitant environmental impact, the fact that exploitation takes place
mostly within countries with dictatorial central governments who are
hesitant to concede a measure of autonomy to local oil bearing
communities, recent developments in international human rights as well as
environmental law and policy-including the activists role of nongovernmental organisations-have all combined in varying degrees to
reinforce the linkages between environmental protection and human
rights. 11
In Nigeria, the linkage between environment and human rights issues
is intertwined with developments on the international scene.
The
Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment was, perhaps, the first
authoritative instrument which recognised the environment as an aspect of
human rights. Principle 1 of that Declaration states that "man has the
fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life in an
environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and wellbeing, and
he bears a solemn responsibility to protect and improve the environment
for present and future generations." 6 This declaration actually falls short
of proclaiming a right to the environment." Besides, there was neither
state practice nor opiniojuris at the time in support of such proclamation.' 8

14.

This debate has become significant as it may determine the premium to be placed on

environmental and human rights issues in Africa's quest for economic self-sustenance through
upstream petroleum investments. On the other hand, it could also enable upstream petroleum
investors to appreciate the role they would have to play in order to continue to remain relevant in
Africa's developmental efforts.

15. On the environmental impact of upstream petroleum investments and the problem of
undemocratic governments controlling upstream petroleum investments in Africa, see chapter 3
supra. The vexed issue of granting some measure of autonomy to local oil producing
communities is particularly noticeable in the Ogoni grieviance against the Nigerian federal
government. A parallel can be drawn in this respect with environmental and human rights
incidents in Papau New Guinea (PNG), Ecuador, Colombia and Brazil. See G. S.Akpan, The
Rise in Environmental and Human Rights Issues and Implications for Petroleum and Mineral
Investments, Dissertation submitted for the Award of the Degree of Master in Law, CEPMLP,
University of Dundee, Dundee, 1996/97 Academic Session, Chapter 4, at. 39-55.
16. Declaration of the UN Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc.
AICONF.48141Rev. 1 (1972), reprintedin 11 l.L.M. 1416 (1972).
17.

A. KISS & D. SHELTON, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (1991).

18.

V. P. Nanda, supra note 11, at 62.
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Again, considering that international attention at the time was focused on
economic development and the cold war, it is not difficult to see why the
right to the environment was not incorporated into the corpus juris of
international law.
Even then, at the global level, there has been a growing body of
evidence pointing to the recognition of the environment as a human right."
As of 1990, the United Nations General Assembly had adopted a resolution
on the "[n]eed to ensure a healthy environment for the well-being of
Proposals were even submitted at the preparatory
individuals".2
Committee meetings for UNCED, to include recognition of the right to a
healthy environment in the final document. 2' However, Principle 1 of the
Rio Declaration simply states that "[Hu]man beings are at the centre of the
concerns for sustainable development. They are entitled to a healthy and
productive life in harmony with nature."2 Some commentators see this as
a regressive step in the development of the linkage between the
environment and human rights in the international fora. 23 Even if the Rio
Declaration had taken a progressive step by recognizing the right to a
healthful and clean environment, declarations and resolutions are weak
sources of international law. They are not binding in character. While
they may be useful in identifying common aspirations of the international

19. In 1986, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights proposed a draft
Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights, adopted in 1988 and has a
provision recognizing the right "to live in a healthy environment." See Additional Protocol to
the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
of 14 November 14, 1988 (Protocol of San Salvador) art. 11, reprinted in 28 J.L.M 161, 165
(1989). The Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly adopted a recommendation, which
provided for a human right to an environment "conducive to goodhealth, well-being, and full
development of the human personality." Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
Recommendation 1130 (1990) (1) on the formulation of European Charter and a European
Convention on Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development, adopted September 28,
1990 (Art. I in the European Charter and the Convention on the Environment and Sustainable
Development), reprintedin 1 Y.B. INT'L L. 484 (1990).
20. This was at the sixty-eighth plenary meeting of the forty-fifth session. See G. A. Res.
45/94 (1990).
21. UN Prop. Com. for UNCED, Working Group III, informal consolidated Draft No. 2,
UN Doc. A/CONF.151/PC/No. 9, Principle 3 reprinted in AGENDA 21 AND THE UNCED
PROCEEDINGS at cxix-cxx, N. A. Robinson, ed., (1991).
22. Rio Declaration on the Environment and Development, Principle 1 in Paper of the
UNCED Rio de Janeiro, 3-14 July 1992, at 3; UN Doc. A/CONF. 151/26/Rev. 1 (1993).
23. D. Shelton, What Happened at Rio to Human Rights? Y.B. INT'L. 82-93 (1993)
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community and may gradually crystallize into binding international law
norms, they could equally be discarded into the dustbin of history. 2'
Against this backdrop, some commentators are of the view that a
human right to a "decent," "healthful," and "safe" environment must be
recognized, if we are to address more seriously the problems of
environmental degradation. 21 In a nutshell, their proposition is that the
right to the environment is one of the emerging "third generation" rights or
"solidarity" rights? 6 Weiss argues that this adds a temporal dimension to
the environmental debate, and brings the concepts of intergenerational and
intragenerational equity into sharper focus. 2' Others think it would provide
the framework necessary to encourage co-operation between private actors
and governments of states.23
Having had their experience of slavery and colonialism, the
immediate concern of African states shortly after independence was the
eradication of all forms of racial discrimination and right to selfdetermination within the framework of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.2
Subsequently, matters of economic self-sufficiency,
cooperation, and development became high on the agenda?6 Consequently,
24. The NIEO was perhaps one of the resolutions that has been drowned by the wave of
globalisation and liberalisation. Arguably, NIEO is still in the water and appears to have
metamorphosised into environmentalism and sustainable development.
25. V. P. Nanda, supra note 11, at 61. See S. Weber, Environmental Information and the
European Convention on Human Rights, Hum. Rts L.J. 177-185 (31 May, 1991). D. Shelton
supra note 23. A. KISS AND D. SHELTON, supra note 17, at 21-31.
26. "First generation" rights are said to be civil and political rights, defining personal
liberties and fundamental freedoms. "Second generation" rights are economic and social rights
requiring government's affirmative action. "Third generation" rights combine both first and
second generation rights, and may be invoked against the state and demanded of it. Stephen. P.
Marks, Emerging Human Rights: A New Generationfor the 1980s? 33 Rutgers L. Rev. 435, 441
(1981). J. Donelly, Third Generation Rights, C. Brolman, R. Lefeber and M. Zeick Eds.,
PEOPLES AND MINORITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1993), pp. 125-131.
27. Edith B. Weiss, Our Rights and Obligations to Future Generations for the
Environment, AM. J. INT'L L , No. 84.
28. Experts Group on Environmental Law of the WCED, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 40 (1987).
29. See, e.g, the First Conference of Independent African States, held at Accra, (Apr. 1522, 1958). The Declaration and Certain of the resolutions of the Conference . The Second
Conference of Independent African States, held at Addis Ababa, (June 15-24, 1960).
Resolutions of the First Assembly of the Heads of State and Government of the Organisation of
African Unity (OAU), 1964 met in Cairo in July 1964. All these instruments can be found
reproduced in BASIC DOCUMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS, 3rd ed, I. Brownlie ed., Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1992, at 540-550.
30. See, e.g., the African Declaration on Co-operation, Development and Economic
Independence, OAU Document CM/ST. 12 (XXI) of May 12, 1973, reprinted in 12 I.L.M. 996
(1973).
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throughout the 1960s, right through the 1970s, the emphasis was on both
first and second generation rights. By 1981, these rights were reaffirmed
and, in addition, the environment as a human right was recognized in
article 24 of the African Charter of Human and Peoples Rights, which
provides that "[a]ll peoples shall have the right to a general satisfactory
environment favorable to their development." 3 ,
Shelton suggests that the language of the charter reflects a general
focus on collective economic and social conditions rather than individual
rights. While this may well stem from Africa's communal societies, the
preamble provides that, "the reality and respect of peoples rights should
necessarily guarantee human rights. "32
Despite the lofty goal of this charter, it is instructive that it was not
until the latest constitutional experiment of Nigeria that the right to a safe
environment was recognized. Section 20 of the 1999 Constitution of the
Federal Republic of Nigeria States that "[tihe State shall protect and
improve the environment and safeguard the water, air and land, forest and
wild life of Nigeria. " " Even at that, it is important to note that this
provision is non-justicable because it forms part of the fundamental
objectives and directive principles of state policy in Chapter II of the
constitution. No Nigerian citizen can go to court to enforce his/her right in
respect of a violation or threatened violation of such provision. The fear
of enshrining human and environmental rights in Nigeria is in the
possibility of multiple suits against the federal government, or any of the
tiers of government, by aggrieved individuals and communities. Yet in
trying not to be categorical on it, the Nigerian government gives the
erroneous impression that environment and human rights concerns are not
fundamental in the policy thrust of the administration, whether civilian or
military. As Ogolla submits, "the constitution of a country constitutes the
Constitutional
first and primary level in its hierarchy of norms.
provisions, inter alia, underline national priorities and hence determines
the direction and nature of future legislative policies and executive
actions. "34

31. Basil Documents on Human Rights supra note 29, at. 554.
32. Id.
33. This was obviously an improvement on the 1979 Constitution as amended, which
stipulates that, "exploitation of human or natural resources for reasons other than the good of the
community shall be prohibited," Nig. Cost. ChlI, Art. 18.
34. B. D. Ogolla, Environmental Law in Africa: Status and Trends 23(9) International
Business Lawyer 414-5 (IBY).
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C. From Environmental law to Environment and Human Rights in
Africa?
Shortly after independence, petroleum-resource-rich African nations
began the process of economic reconstruction and development by granting
extensive oil concessions to multinational oil companies. Beyond doubt,
petroleum exploration and development have become the mainstay of the
economies of Angola, Algeria, Egypt, Libya and Nigeria, and have
brought development to major cities in these countries. It has in equal
measure brought untold hardship to oil producing communities, where the
plague of oil pollution over the years has persistently threatened the
environment, health and well being of the inhabitants.
In many states of Africa, effective regulation of the oil industry has
been either nonexistent, piecemeal, fragmented, or devoid of effectiveness,
leaving the inhabitants of oil producing communities to the vagaries of
legal remedy. Environmental and human rights dimensions of petroleum
exploration and development in Africa are particularly acute in the densely
populated Niger Delta of Nigeria, where the bulk of Nigeria's onshore
petroleum operations takes place.'5 Oil-producing communities in Nigeria
complain bitterly of their land and "God-given" resources taken away from
them without adequate compensation?4 This would appear to be contrary
to the basic provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights under
article 17 which provide, "1. Everyone has the right to own property
alone as well as in association with others [and] 2. No one shall be
" 3
arbitrarily deprived of his property.

7

Now, on access to justice, Nigeria's inherited colonial common law of
torts enables victims of oil pollution damage to seek limited judicial
remedies. 38 Following a denial of liability, a claimant is left with the

35. There are several manifestations of abuse of environmental and human rights, which is
not just limited to environmental degradation. Discrimination and deprivation of inhabitants of
oil producing communities by both, the government, and the oil industry, overt and covert
suppression and repression of dissent in these communities, which may eventually lead to death.
See World Council of Churches, OGONI: THE STRUGGLE CONTINUES (1996). On the accusations

of

causing

environmental

devastation

in

the

Niger

Delta,

see

http://www.shellnigeria.com/issues/environ.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2001).
36.

Section 1 of the Land Use Act 1978 vests all land within the territory of each state in

the governor to be held in trust for the benefit of all Nigerians and, provides for compensation
only in respect of the unexhausted improvements on the land under section 29(1).
37. In this respect, the environmental and human rights issues have some semblance with
the abandoned property issue: they both deal with property deprivation. The only distinction is
that the former is accompanied by environmental pollution, while the latter is not.
38. These are trespass to land, nuisance, negligence, and the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher.
For a stimulating commentary on these remedies, see J. F. Fekumo, Civil Liability for Oil
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option of pursuing these civil remedies, which are, to say the least,
difficult to establish. 9 Against this backdrop, a learned commentator has
called for a human rights approach to the environment.- ° This in turn
raises several critical issues which were identified by Shelton: are human
rights and environmental protection based on fundamentally divergent
values? Would' more conflicts and confusion arise from attempts to
accomplish them? On the other hand, do they represent complimentary
4
social values that serve to further the other's objective? '
In terms of objectives, it is obvious that whereas the promotion and
protection of human rights can enhance freedom, justice and peace, the
goals of environmental law are not so clear. Gormley suggests that the
purpose of environmental law is to benefit mankind. 2 Shelton is, however,
skeptical of such a human centered approach, which is bound to view the
environment only from its economic utility to humans.' 3 The argument is
that the environment is an end in itself, requiring protection for its own
sake and that existing human rights law do not provide adequately for the
environment.
In practical terms, African countries have participated actively in the
promotion of international human rights and environmental law. In the
former, they have achieved limited successes in the areas of the right to
self-determination, and against racial discrimination, although there is still
a deep chasm between oratorical rhetoric and practical reality. In the
latter, their collective and respective positions are far from understood.
As developing countries, the argument that environmentalism is an
orchestrated master plan by some interest groups in the North to continue

Pollution Damage, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS IN NIGERIA INCLUDING COMPENSATION 235-255

(J. 0. Omotola, ed., 1990).
39. A claimant is usually required to discharge a formidable burden of proof with respect
to causation, foreseability, and damage. Even where he succeeds, the amount of compensation
often awarded by the Nigerian courts is, more often than not, inadequate. In addition, injuries
arising from denial of property rights, peaceable enjoyment of property, family life, diminution
of economic well-being, threat to life, and damage to the environment are either under assessed,
or completely overlooked.

40. See, e.g., P. D. Okomah, Right to a Clean Environment: The Casefor the People of
Oil-ProducingCommunities in the NigerianDelta, 41 J. AFR. L. 43-67.

41. Dianah Shelton, Human Rights, Environmental Rights and the Right to Environment,
28 STAN. J. INT'L L. 103, at 104 (1991).

42. W. P. Gormley, The Legal Obligations of the International Community to Guarantee a
Pure and Decent Environment: The Expansion of Human Rights, 3 GEO.INT'L ENV. L. REV. 85

(1990).
43.

Id.
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to stultify their economic growth must be appealing." Besides, the fact
that the North has contributed in no small measure to the global
environmental crisis has diluted the resolve of the less economically
advanced nations (LEANs), including Nigeria, to advance environmental
causes. Moreover, implementing environmental measures-whether at the
global, continental, regional, or national level-entails economic cost,
which most African countries cannot afford. Against this backdrop, it is
not difficult to appreciate why environmental concerns in developing
countries are considered to be hypocritical.43
It would appear though that environmental concern is a luxury only
rich industrialized countries of the North can conveniently afford. Besides,
strong environmental activism only emerged in these countries long after
they had become industrialized, a stage which most African countries have
yet to attain. What is even more puzzling is that many of the industrialized
world's environmental concerns have very little or nothing to do with
imminent threats to its inhabitants' well-being,41 much less environmental
and human rights problems of developing countries of Africa. This is the
more reason why environmentalists of the North are accused of naivet6 in
their campaigns against pollution in developing countries.
Incidentally, no amount of criticism would eliminate the potential
global ecological crisis. Ironically, the consequences of such crisis would
not be proportionately spread among nations on the basis of their
contribution to the environmental problem in the first place. Furthermore,
developing countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America are worst-placed
financially and technically to tackle any such ecological crisis and, as such,
should be concerned about taking preventative measures. Granted that in
Africa, economic development should take precedence over environmental
protection, such development could still be achieved in an environmentally
sustainable manner. The only other alternative appears to be a "vicious
circle of stunted economic growth as a result of environmental

degradation. ""7

44. See e.g., T. Waelde, Environmental Laws Towards Mining in Developing Countries,
10 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 340 (1992). Also, a Channel 4 documentary serial
entitled Against Nature, transmitted 30/11/97, 17/12/97 and 14/12/97 in three parts, altogether
running into three hours, justified this view. See also the illuminating article, Development and
the Environment: Dirt Poor, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 19, 1998), at 1.
45.

Id.

46. People worry about whether carbon-dioxide might lead to a warmer climate next
century, or whether genetically engineered crops might have unforeseen consequences for the
ecosystem. THE ECONOMIST, supra note 44, at 1.
47. P. D. Okonmah, supra note 40, at 60.
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Some commentators have nevertheless been very critical about the
proliferation and almost anarchic manner in which the province of human
rights is being expanded. 48 However, considering that at the time of the
Universal Declaration it would not have been possible for mankind to
anticipate all the manifest possibilities and future impact of industrial
development on the environment, there seems to be no justification to
refuse a logically deducible solution that is practically implementable to a
teething problem on the simple ground that it has been "conjured up. "4
There are other queries.
For instance, the foundation of
environmental protection suggests broader interests than human rights.
How then would the former ambit be properly delineated? Would it also
include those of future generations? Environmental protection would seem
to surpass the mere protection of human rights, as it most certainly
includes nature and the entire ecosystem.
But the recognition that
mankind's survival depends upon a clean, safe and healthful environment
equally places the claim to a clean environment on the human rights
agenda.-° Besides, the fact that the environment does suggest broader
interests should not detract from the legitimacy of a right to a clean
environment.
Furthermore, while some may quarrel with the idea of
operationalizing future generations' right to the environment," the
Philippines Supreme Court had no difficulty whatsoever in recognising this
right in Minors Oposa v. Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR).- 2 This was a class action brought by minors
for and on behalf of themselves and generations yet unborn, claiming a
violation of their right to a healthful ecology. In associating this right with
48. "Reason for serious concern with respect to current trends arises not so much from the
proliferation of new rights but rather from the haphazard, almost anarchic manner in which this
expansion is being achieved." P. Alston, Conjuring Up New Human Rights: A Proposal for
Quality Control, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 607. See also J. Donelly, Third Generation Rights, in C.
Brolmann, R. Lefeber, and M. Zeick, eds., PEOPLES AND MINORMES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
123-24 (1993).
49. That is being "brought into existence as if by magic," P. Alston, Id.,quoting The
Concise Oxford Dictionary (1976) at 214. Contrast the reasoning of K. Cuomo, Human Rights
and the Environment: Common Ground, 18 YALE J. INT'L L 227 (1993), who argues that our

forebears "did not foresee the enormity of our ecological degradation and the consequent
necessity for human rights norms to encompass environmental considerations."
50. D. Shelton, supra, note 23, at 133.
51. A. D'Amato, Agora: What Obligation Does Our Generation Owe to the Next? An
Approach to Global Environmental Responsibility, 84 AM. J. INT'L L 191-194 (1990), (using

Parfits thesis, which maintains that every single person alive 100 years from now will be an
entirely different individual from the person he or she would have been had we not intervened in

the environment).
52.

Reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 173 (1994).
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the twin concepts of intragenerational responsibility and intergenerational
justice, the plaintiffs urged the court to cancel all existing timber licenses
in the country and for an injunction restraining the DENR "from receiving,
accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements," 3 which they claimed were responsible for "a host of
environmental tragedies," such as drought, flooding, water shortages,
massive erosion, salinization of the water table, and the disappearance of
the indigenous Filipino cultures.? The Supreme Court had no difficulty in
reversing the lower court's order, after a careful consideration of the
relevant Philippine legislation, and holding that the petitioners had the
"locus standi necessary to sustain the bringing and maintenance of this
suit. "
However, this case must be distinguished on its merits. With the
possible exceptions of Angola, Congo and Ethiopia, it is very doubtful
whether, if similar facts were to present themselves in other major African
petroleum-producing counties and especially in Nigeria, the same decision
would have been reached. This is because, unlike the Philippines, Nigeria
has no express constitutional provision on the right to a clean or healthful
environment' The problem is further compounded by the fact that even at
the continental level, the African Commission on Human Rights, Africa's
equivalent of the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American
Human Rights Commission do not give any binding decisions on human
rights violations. Against this background, how would aggrieved Africans
enforce the right to a healthful environment?57 This would be the basis of
recommendations in the next section.
53. Id. at 177.
54. Id. at 177-78.
55. Id. at 200.
56. See Phil. Cost., Art II., Sec. 16, which explicitly provides that, "The state shall
protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accordance
with the rhythm and harmony of nature," id. at 187. Although Nigeria has formerly ratified the
Banjul Charter in the African Charter of Human and Peoples Rights Ratification and
Enforcement Act, L.F.N. 1990, it would require an imaginative and bold judiciary to come to
the same conclusion in the absence of a justiceable constitutional entrenchment.
57. Admittedly, this presumes that, the "aggrieved Africans" would be easily identified.
When the chips are down, this may turn out to be one of the most contentious of issues. Should
they be "indigenous" to the oil producing communities? It is instructive that, no precise and
universally acceptable definition of the term currently exists, despite the efforts of the World
Bank, United Nations Development Programme [hereinafter UNDP] and the ILO at
endeavouring to provide a definition. While some commentators consider it significant, to have a
provisional reference that would enable international organizations to easily identify beneficiary
groups, and thereby improve the targeting of their activities, others question the possibility or
desirability of arriving at a universal definition, which can hardly capture the diversity of
indigenous peoples around the world. For the former view see K. Karl, The EU Listens to the
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VIII.
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
A. General Recommendations
In view of the current predicament, in which the Banjul Charter
makes no provision for the enforcement of environmental rights guaranteed
under Article 24 of the charter, efforts would have to be co-extensive at
the international and national levels if this right is to be realized.
The first logical step would be to create an African Court of Human
Rights on the continent, similar to the European and American models.m
Interestingly, a draft protocol prepared by experts on the establishment of
such an African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights was considered in
December, 1997.11 The protocol, which has been adopted, "defines the
Indigenous Peoples, THE COURIER, No. 169 May-June 1998, at 65-66. For the latter, see the
views of Chairperson-Rapporteur, Ms. Erica-Irene Daes in Human Rights of Indigenous Peoples,
Paper of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations on its Fifteenth Session, Geneva, 28
July-ll Aug., 1997, F/CN 4/Sub 2/1997/14 cited in A. K. Dias, International Standard-Setting
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Implications for Mineral Development in Africa, paper
presented at the Biennial Conference on Petroleum, Minerals, Energy & Resources Law, Cape
Town, South Africa, 15-20 Mar., 1998, at 3. Although Africans tend to regard themselves as
indigenous to the countries of which they are citizens, existing definitions do not encapsulate all
of Africans. In the circumstances, Date-Bah suggests the alternative perspective of "local
people" to the current "indigenous people." See S.K. Date-Bah, Rights of Indigenous People in
Relation to Natural Resources Development: An African's Perspective, paper presented at the
13th Biennial Conference on Petroleum, Minerals, Energy & Resources Law of the Section on
Energy and Natural Resources Law of the IBA in Cape Town, South Africa, Mar. 1998. It is
submitted that while local or indigenous people of a particular community may possess certain
land rights over and above those enjoyed by other residents, this should not preclude those others
from enforcing their right to a clean and healthful ecology, where they have suffered
environmental and human rights abuses. Besides, the Banjul Charter makes no distinction
between "indigenous", "local", or indeed "minority" peoples. Its use of the word, "peoples"
should cover all these various categorizations, and should be sufficient for African purposes. At
any rate, it is felt that, once there is a clear enforcement machinery at the continental level, every
other thing should fall in place.
58. The European Court of Human Rights was established under article 19(2) of the
European Convention on Human Rights signed on 22 Nov., 1969, while the American
Convention on Human Rights signed on 22 Nov., 1969 provided for both a Commission and a
Court under Article 33 of the Convention. See I. Brownlie, supra note 165, at 332, 508. On the
arguments in favor of the establishment of an equivalent African court, see A. E. Anthony,
Beyond the Paper Tiger: The Challenge of a Human Rights Court in Africa, TEX. INT'L L. J.
519-523 (1997).
59. The proposal for establishing an African Court on human and peoples' rights was
endorsed at the 1994 summit in Tunis, Tunisia. A draft Protocol was subsequently adopted in
Dec. 1997 by an OAU Ministerial Conference, which recommended the draft Protocol for
adoption by the OAU Council of Ministers and Heads of State and Governments. See generally,
Human Rights Is A Major Concern In Africa, Dec. 12, 1997, Panafrican News Agency,
[hereinafter
PANA]
at.
http://search.nando.net/plwebcg.t%20of%2OHuman%2ORights%29%3ATEXT; p. 1 of 2. African Leaders Elect Human
Rights Commission Members, June 30, 1997, PANA, http://search.nando.net/plwebcg.t%20of%2OHuman%2oRights%29%3ATEXT, p. 1 of 1. African Summit Draft Agenda
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organization, jurisdiction and function of the African Court of human and
peoples' rights. It also enumerates those entitled to submit cases to the
court, the composition of the 11 judges of the court to be elected for a sixyear term."0 It is not now certain what has become of this protocol, as
nothing has been said or heard about it after the adoption of the protocol.
Even when such a court is finally established, there would be a
perennial need for the UN Commission on Human Rights to complement
efforts at the continental level. Indeed, developments at the international
level may have given further impetus to the efforts on the continent. The
paper of the linkage between environmental and human rights by the
Special Rapporteur, Madam Fatma Zhora Ksentini, and her final paper (to
which is annexed) a Draft Declaration of Principles on Human Rights and
the Environment is evidence of both the legitimacy and legality of the need

for effective enforcement
in order to safeguard environmental rights from
6

incessant violation. '
Again, until such a time when most African countries shall become
parties to the Optional Protocol to the international convention on civil and
political rights," another plausible option would be to continue to rely on
the local judiciary within states to give a purposive construction to existing
civil and political rights enshrined in all national constitutions.63 What this
Adopted,
May
30,
1997,
PANA,
http://search.nando.net/plwebcg.t%20of%20Human%2ORights%29%3ATEXT, p. 1 of 2.
60. Conference Adopts Protocol On African Human Rights Court December 13, 1997,
PANA, http://search.nando.net/plebe-cg.t%20of%20Human%20Rights%29%3ATEXT, p. 1 of
1.
61. The paper was prepared pursuant to resolution 1995/14 entitled, Human Rights and the
Environment, adopted by the Commission on Human Rights at its fifty-first session, in which the
Commission recognized that environmental damage had potentially negative effects on human
rights and the enjoyment of life, health and a satisfactory standard of living. See internet: Paper
of
the
Secretary
General
on
Human
Rights
and
the
Environment.
http://www.unhcr.chlhtml/menu4/chrrep/2396.htm at p. 2 of 13. For the 1994 Draft Declaration
of
Principles
on
Human
Rights
and
the
Environment,
see
Internet:
http://worldpolicy.org/americas/environment/envright.html, pp. 1-4.
62. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights concluded 16 December,
1966 in New York, was signed by sixteen African states including Egypt, Gabon, Libya and
Tunisia. See G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess.,Supp. No.16, at 49, U.N. Doc,
reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 368 (1967). However, when it came to the Optional Protocol, which
enables individuals to petition the Human Rights Committee, alleging breaches of the covenant,
only 5 became parties (Central African Republic, Madagascar, Mauritius, Senegal, and Zaire).
See M. J. Bowman and D. J. Harris, eds., MULTILATERAL TREATIES: INDEX AND CURRENT
STATUS 304-05 (1984).
63. In this regard, African courts could borrow a leaf from the Constitutional Court of
India, which found that: "The right to life is a fundamental right under article 21 of the
constitution and it includes the right of enjoyment of pollution-free water and air for full
enjoyment of life. If anything endangers or impairs that quality of life in derogation of laws, a
citizen has the right to have recourse to article 32 of the constitution for removing the pollution
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means in practical terms is to hold that the right to life, which is
guaranteed in all African constitutions, is itself dependent on many other
elements of the environment, such as clean water, food and shelter, and
that environmental quality is directly related to the full enjoyment of this
right. A corollary to this is to hold that the right to privacy may be
endangered by a high level of intolerable noise or air pollution." Critics
would be quick to point out that such an activist judiciary is likely to
extend the scope and nature of civil and political rights beyond those
originally contemplated.61 Richard Desgagne examined European case law,
which all pointed to the fact that the ambit of environmental protection
achievable through human rights litigation is narrow because
environmental damage was not itself a cause of action, but is linked to a
protected right.Understandably, human rights and environmental
protection share common objectives, but not all environmental issues can
be formulated in terms of human rights violations.
Even then, strengthening the scope of certain procedural rights could
aid the enforcement of environmental rights. These procedural rights
include the right to information about activities that may adversely affect
the environment for persons who are likely to be affected by such
activities, the right to participate in the decision-making process for actions
likely to result into environmental harm, and the right of recourse before
administrative or judicial agencies. 6' Clearly, this would simply be an
attempt to translate Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration into the domestic
legislative framework by Nigeria.'
of water or air which may be detrimental to the quality of life." Sub-Commission on Prevention
of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Human Rights and the Environment: Second
ProgressPaper,UN Doc. EICN.4Sub.21199317 at p. 18 (quoting Kumar v. State of Bihar).

64. In Powell and Raynor v. UK 61 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A), in which the applicant lodged
a complaint against noise pollution from aircraft, the Court ruled that there had been interference
in the applicant's private life because, "in each case, albeit to greatly differing degrees, the
quality of the applicant's private life and the scope for enjoying the amenities of his home had
been adversely affected by the noise generated by aircraft using Heathrow Airport," at 40.
65. See, e.g., R. S. Pathak, The Human Rights System as a Conceptual Framework for
EnvironmentalLaw, in E. B. Weiss, ed., ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

205, 218 (1992), where the author queries whether the right to life does not envisage the classic
approach of the right to physical life.
66. Richard Desgagne, Integrating Environmental Values into the European Convention on
Human Rights, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 282-83 (1995).

67. Dinah Shelton, Human Rights, Environmental Rights and the Right to Environment,
STAN. J. INT'L L 117. Currently, the scope of such procedural rights is limited in Africa owing,
perhaps, to the apprehension that, they may constitute an obstacle to foreign investments.
68. Principle 10 provides that, "At the national level, each individual shall have
appropriate access to information concerning the Environment, that is held by public authorities,
including information on hazardous materials and activities in their communities, and the

26

ILSA Journal of International & ComparativeLaw

[Vol. 8:1

However, considering the difficulties associated with enforcement of
the human right to the environment, coupled with the fact that there are
limits to what the law can achieve, reliance would also have to be placed
on the social responsibilities of international oil companies.6 Among the
factors which make this a necessity are that (a) they have enormous
resources, which could easily be used to neutralize attempts to effectively
control their behavior; (b) their secretive tendency makes information
about possible emissions of hazardous substances difficult to ascertain; (c)
even when reliable information is forthcoming, they have the capacity to
stall criminal proceedings and pay punitive fines, or indeed to retain the
best legal experts; (d) on the other hand, imposition of heavy fines would
make final consumers and the local economy worse-off. 70 These and other
7
hindrances militate against confidence in the national judicial systems. '
The Draft United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational
Corporation (UNCCTC) was partly an attempt by the international
community to infuse in industry this sense of social responsibility toward
their host states on the one hand, and on the other, to regulate the
treatment of multinational corporations by host states. 2 Clauses 41-43 deal
with environmental protection, requiring transnational corporations (TNCs)
to comply with host state regulations and policies on environmental
protection, due regard being given to relevant international standards.
TNCs are to make available to host governments environmental
information relating to their operations and products, and to be responsive
to efforts to develop and promote national and international standards for
the protection of the environment. Admittedly, the idea of good corporate
citizenship is not sacrosanct, as it may be an avenue to indulge in matters
wholly extraneous and of no direct or indirect benefit to the company.
opportunity to participate in decision making process. States shall facilitate and encourage public
awareness and participation by making information widely available. Effective access to judicial
and administrative proceedings, including redress and remedy shall be provided," 31 I.L.M. 878
(1992).
69. See 0. A. Osunbor, Corporate Social Responsibility: The Limits of Law, in J. A.

Omotola, ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS IN NIGERIA INCLUDING COMPENSATION 76-80 (1990).
70. Id. at 79.
71. See P. MenelI, The Limitations on Legal Institutions for Addressing Environmental
Risks, 5 1. ECON. PERSP. 93-113 (1995).

72. See in particular, clauses 12 and 13, 41-43, respectively, dealing with social and
cultural objectives and then environmental protection. United Nations Draft Code of Conduct on
Transnational Corporations, Commission on Transnational Corporations, Paper on the Special
Session (7-18 March and 9-21 May 1983) Official Records of the Economic and Social Council,

1983, Supplement No. 7 (E/1983/17/Rev. 1), Annex II, reprinted in United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development, [hereinafter UNCTAD],
INSTRUMENTS: A COMPENDIUM VOL. 1 161-180 (1996).

INTERNATIONAL
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However, the concept of enlightened self-interest may be relevant in
enabling shareholders to appreciate the long-run benefits of good corporate
citizenship. In the words of Sir Arvi Pabo, "[s]uch an approach does not
empower managers to indulge in their own whims, powers or privileges at
the expense of owners, nor does it indulge in the 'greed is good' brigade
for whom social responsiveness is an irrelevancy. " 71 In fairness, some oil
companies in Africa have made some commendable efforts at discharging
their social responsibilities, which they have not been shy to advertise.'
However, these token gestures are not always regular, consistent, or done
in a coordinated way with adequate and enlightened communal
participation. Besides, when they are done grudgingly, this has a negative
75
effect on communal appreciation.

Furthermore, a social impact assessment (SIA) must be
76
contemporaneous with the EIA at the beginning of oil and gas operations. '
Along with effective communal participation," it would be difficult if not
73. C. Burnup, Beyond Compliance: A Corporate Response to Environmental Ethics, in
BUSINESS ETHICS AND THE LAW 172-73 (C. A. J. Coady and C. J. G. Sampford, eds., 1993),
(citing Sir Arvi Parbo, The Sir Wallace Kyle Oration, Business Council Bulletin, No. 88, July
1992 at 23).
74. Chevron, Mobil, Agip, and Shell have, through their Health, Safety and Environment
or Public Relations departments, engaged local communities in some social services such as
providing scholarships, building hospitals, providing pipe-borne water, renovating schools etc.
See e.g., Shell in Society 1995, a publication of the Group External Affairs (SLBPA).
75. Such responsibilities may be said to be discharged grudgingly when the company
makes it plain that it is not its responsibility to provide such service, thereby 'rubbing-in' the
impression that, the community should be grateful for any token gesture.
76. Both government and industry could further explore the possibility of a social
management plan (SMP), a social monitoring, papering and provision of information as well as a
social audit at the conclusion of operations. In the alternative, these should be expressly
integrated into the prevailing EIA requirements in existing legislation for the avoidance of doubt.
On the factors supporting the integration of social concerns into the planning and implementation
of privately financed projects within developing countries, see K. McPhail and A. Davy,
Integrating Social Concerns into Private Sector Decisionmaking, The World Bank Discussion
Paper No. 384, 1998, pp. 1-58.
77. Effective communal participation can be equated with the participatory rural appraisal
(PRA) schemes in India, Pakistan and the far east currently being undertaken under the auspices
of the WWF and the Institute of Development Studies (IDS). It involves enabling rural
communities to take charge of their own affairs with minimum direct interference, save for the
purposes of supervision. Even such supervision is undertaken in a very respectful and
coordinated way, taking into consideration the sensitivities of the rural communities. See the 25minute video, Who Holds the Stick: Behaviour and Attitudes in PRA, by the Development
Perspectives for the WWF and the IDS. This should be contrasted with the unsuccessful attempt
by the Nigerian federal government to establish an Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development
Commission (OMPADEC) for the purposes of developing the oil producing areas. One of the
criticisms against the Commission was that it was controlled by the federal government which
funded it, instead of allowing local communities to take charge of their own affairs.
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impossible to allege that industry has been negligent in incorporating the
social dimensions of its investment operations.

B. Specific Recommendations
These recommendations are based on the results of a questionnaire
survey conducted in Ogoniland, Bonny/Finima and Egiland, as well as on
interviews and the results of the focus group discussion. 8
1. Ogoniland
Thirty questionnaires were altogether distributed in Ogoniland. Of
this number, twenty five were returned. Twenty of the respondents (eighty
percent) were emphatic that the state should identify those who perpetuated
the human rights abuses in Ogoniland, prosecute and punish them
accordingly. In particular, the commanders of the then Rivers State
Internal Security Task Force, officers and men of Mobile Force 19 who
carried out those horrible incidents of human rights abuses, were
mentioned in the focus group.
Respondents recommended that all those who suffered one form of
physical abuse or the other should be compensated by the Nigerian State.
Where the victims are dead, their relations should be compensated as a
token of government's concern and sympathy for the plight of the
oppressed Ogonis. It was also suggested that the paper of the United
Nations Human Rights Commission special repertoire on Ogoni land be
adopted and implemented by the Nigerian federal government as a
demonstration of its sincerity to right the wrongs inflicted on the Ogonis.
It was also suggested that Shell should carry out an environmental audit of
its operations in Ogoniland to determine the level of environmental
degradation suffered by the Ogoni peoples and, compensate adequately
before returning to Ogoniland. Finally, respondents suggested that this
development project in Ogoniland should not be undertaken without an
environmental impact assessment to determine the suitability of the project
in question, and also that popular participation of the indigenous people of
Ogoni should be internalized as an aspect of project execution.
2. Bonny/Finima
Six out of the ten respondents in Bonny/Finima believe that the human
rights situation in Bonny has improved and described the relationship
between the community and the companies operating in Bonny, more
78. The focus group discussion comprised two lawyers, one environmental scientist, one
administrator, an accountant and two social scientists. The discussion was held at the Faculty of
Law, of the Rivers State University of Science and Technology Common room.
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particularly NLNG and Mobil, as satisfactory. But this contrasted rather
sharply with the impressions from the focus group discussion. Those
present felt that Bonny is saturated with plain-clothes policemen from the
State Security Service (SSS), and that one in every five people in Bonny is
a policeman. The recommendations therefore tended towards remedying
this situation: first, that the State should reduce the presence of its security
apparatus and operatives on the Island as everyone suspect every other
person as belonging to the SSS. The implication of such heavy security
presence is to give the impression that the Island is under siege, thus
confining the freedom of movement of innocent persons.
Second, following the stoppage of the first shipment of the LNG from
Bonny by the youths over what they perceived as a reneging by the
company of the terms of the MOU undertaken between the companies and
Bonny community, a Bonny youth was killed by a foreign worker said to
be a white man in the company of the police. Thereafter, three other
youths were shot by the Nigerian Police. Respondents say the families of
these youths should be compensated adequately. Further, respondents say
those who shot at the youths should be prosecuted and punished, including
the expatriate worker said to be one Mr. Jack Adams.
Further, respondents claim that there should be even development at
Bonny. Current development, especially roads, are too narrow and only
serve as links to the companies' operational sites.
Finally, it is recommended that natives of Bonny should be employed
at all levels by the companies. The current situation where even cleaners
are employed from one or more of Nigeria's major ethnic groups when
Bonny youths are unemployed does not augur well for a harmonious
relationship.
3. Egiland
Due to some unavoidable reasons, it was not possible to retrieve most
of the questionnaires (about fifteen) distributed in Egi clan. However, these
recommendations are based on interviews of Egi sons and daughters, onsite inspection and the focus group discussion: a proper Environmental
Impact Assessment of the Obite Gas Plant should be undertaken with the
participation of CBOs and NGOs in the Rivers State. An Environmental
Audit should be undertaken for of all other Egi communities with ELF and
Agip facilities. ELF should create an enabling environment for genuine
dialogue with the Egi people with other NGOs in Rivers State in
attendance. Adequate compensation should be paid to the families and
79. Contrast this with the statement of the photographer who accompanied me, who stated
that at least two out of every ten persons in Bonny are spies from the State.
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communities whose land had been "compulsorily acquired" by ELF and its
sub-contractors. Basic social amenities like quality pipe-borne water,
electricity, and good roads, schools and hospitals should be provided for
the Egi people.
There should be resettlement of the communities hosting the Obite
Gas Plant like Finima in Bonny. The 1993 agreement between ELF and
the Egi clan should be implemented. EPNL should stop the divide and
rule tactics in Egiland while evolving a proper consultation and channel of
communication between it and the communities.
Finally, for all three communities, those who have suffered personal
distress, humiliation or assault to their persons must necessarily be
compensated. The recent hearings of petitions before the Oputa Panel on
Human Rights Violations would seem to be tailored along the lines of
compensating those who have suffered grave personal violations. This is
to be encouraged to deter continuing human rights violations in the future.
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INTRODUCTION

Knowledge of the history of conflict of laws in Nigeria, the ideas
behind its development, and the numerous problems that beset the
application of its principles, is in itself the history of the socio-economic
structure of the society, between feudalism and capitalism. Conflict of
laws often found more fertile soil for germination in societies with
capitalist tendencies, like the Italian city-states of the fourteenth and
fifteenth centuries. Its historical context identifies the themes that matter
in the development of laws in Nigeria.
In Egypt, Rome and the Greek city-states, citizens had dealings,
contacts and commercial intercourse with foreigners which ought to have
raised the question of conflict of laws in disputes arising from such
intermingling and transactions. The Egyptians traded with the Greeks; the
Romans traded with most parts of their world, e.g., the Carthaginians and
Europeans; and the Greek city-states traded among themselves and with
their neighbors. What was the law applied by the courts of each of these
ancient peoples in the settlement of disputes which had foreign elements?
It does not seem that clear choice of law rules as known today were
developed and applied by the courts of these ancient states. However, it
appears that disputes which arose from intercourse with foreigners were
settled in a peculiar manner by means of treaties and bilateral agreements'
*
LL.M. (Manitoba); Doctor of Juridical Science (Candidate), Faculty of Law,
University of Toronto, Canada. Email: remyl35@hotmail.com. I thank DeLloyd J. Guth,
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under which the application of the local legal system was extended to
foreigners. For instance, under the bilateral agreement between Rome
and Carthage, law applicable to Roman citizens alone, jus civile, was
In addition, Rome appointed a special
extended to Carthaginians.
magistrate, the praetorperegrinus, to adjudicate disputes between Romans
and foreigners or between two foreigners in Rome. However, the praetor
peregrinus did not settle such disputes on the basis of rules analogous to
contemporary choice of law rules in conflict of laws, but relied on general
notions of fairness and justice. The body of law emanating from the
praetorperegrinus's decisions formed the part of Roman law known as jus
gentium.
But it was in the Italian city-states in the Middle Ages that a scientific
approach was adopted toward the solution of disputes arising from
transactions and intercourse with foreigners. They had separate courts,
laws and magistrates for that purpose. The city-states were legally and
politically independent and had huge trading transactions and intercourse
among themselves. A citizen of Bologna would conclude a contract in
Padua, with a citizen of Modena, to be performed in Florence. Such
transactions had contacts with four city-states whose laws were not
necessarily identical with respect to issues arising from the contract. The
question became, "what law was applicable to such disputes?" The Roman
jurists of this period, the glossators of whom Accursius is an example,
tried to answer such questions by means of glosses on the Justinian Code.
However, this approach was fictitious because that Code did not have
choice of law rules. 2

Ph.D., Professor of Law and History, Faculty of Law, University of Manitoba, Canada, for

discussing the initial draft of this paper with me and for all his helpful comments and
suggestions, without which this paper would have been much poorer.
1.
RUDOLPH SOHM, THE INSTITUTES: A TEXT BOOK OF THE HISTORY AND SYSTEM OF
ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 65-66 (2d ed. 1940). P. VINOGRADOFF, THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF
PAUL VINOGRADOFF, VOL. II: JURISPRUDENCE 260-61 (1928).

2. A celebrated seventeenth century writer stated:
It often happens that transactions entered into in one place have force and effect in the
territories of a different state, or have to be adjudicated upon in another place.
Moreover, it is well known that the laws of every nation differ in many respects, for
since the breaking up of the provinces of the Roman Empire, Christendom has been
divided into almost innumerable nations, not subject to one another and not sharing the
same system of government. It is not surprising that there is nothing on the subject in
Roman law, for since the sovereignty of Rome extended to all parts of the world and
was regulated by a uniform law it could hardly give rise to a conflict of different laws.
ULRICH HUBER, DE CONFLICTu LEGUM DIVERSARUM IN DIVERSIS IMPERUS: PRAELECTIONES
1707, translated and reprintedin D.J. Llewelyn, The Influence of Huber'sDe Conflicu Legun on
English PrivateInternationalLaw, 1937 BRIT Y.B. INT'L L. 64-78.
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The post-glossators, e.g., Bartolus, approached the question of
applicable law engendered by intercourse with foreigners from the
perspective of statutory doctrine. A statute was used by the post-glossators
to refer to all laws of a city, whether the laws emanated from custom,
legislative enactment, or executive acts. 3 Under statutory doctrine, a
statute was real if things were mentioned first, and personal if persons
were mentioned first.' Real statutes applied to all things within the
territory of the sovereign who enacted the statute and had no force outside
the territory of that enacting sovereign. Personal statutes followed a
person everywhere and had force within and outside the territory of the
enacting sovereign. By this analysis, a court in Modena, for instance,
could apply the personal statute of Padua but not its real statute. It was
often a matter of great controversy whether a statute was real or personal.
Is a statute on conveyance of land to minors real because it mentions land,
or personal because it mentions persons?
This statutory doctrine approach continued in France in the sixteenth
century. France also had the problem of conflict of laws arising from its
diversity of regional laws, i.e., coutume, mainly written, which varied
from province to province and had to apply to inter-provincial trade. The
foremost exponents of the statutory doctrine in France were Charles
Dumoulin (1500-1566), who established the principle that the law mutually
intended by the parties, or presumed to have been intended by them,
should apply to disputes arising from their contract; and D'Argentre (15191590), who added a third class of statute: mixed statutes, i.e., statutes that
mentioned both persons and things. He considered mixed statutes to be in
the nature of real statutes which did not have extra-territorial application.
This statutory doctrine-adopted in the Italian city-states, in France,
in Germany, and later in America by Samuel Livermore-bears close
resemblance to modem choice of law rules. Choice of law rules, e.g., lex
domicilii, lex contractus, and lex loci delicti, ensure that in certain
circumstances the court of a country could apply foreign law as providing
the rule of decision. Likewise, the statutory doctrine gave extra-territorial
effect to foreign law where such law was personal, as defined above. In
the same way that a modem court can hold that legitimation is governed by
lex domicilii, and therefore should apply foreign law if it is the law of
domicile, a court in Padua would apply the statute of Modena if it dealt
with the legitimation of Modena citizens, i.e., was a personal statute and
gave effect to it.
3.

A. K. KUHN, COMPARATIVE COMMENTARIES ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 4

(1937).
4.

BARTOLUS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 45-46 (J.H. Beale ed., 1914).
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However, the Dutch theorists in the seventeenth century, notably Paul
Voet (1619-1677), Ulrich Huber (1636-1694) and Johannes Voet (16471714), did not base the solution for conflict of law problems on the
statutory doctrine. They resorted to the comity doctrine as the basis of
their solution to disputes arising from international transactions or
intercourse. The Netherlands, like France, were divided into independent
provinces with their own separate legal systems. Intercourse among these
provinces and between them and other countries ensured the emergence of
conflict of laws problems. The Dutch jurists tried to respond to such
problems on the basis of the comity doctrine, under which foreign law was
applied by reason of the comity or friendly relations existing between
nations., The implication seems to be that a Dutch province applied a
foreign law, e.g., English law, not on the basis of lucid choice of law rules
but solely on the ground of whether or not friendly relations existed
between the province and England. What happened when, for instance,
the relationship between it and England became frosty? Would English
law then be inapplicable? We know today that courts give recognition to
foreign law in order to obviate the injustice that would arise by doing the
contrary. When courts apply foreign law, it is not out of any courtesy or
respect to the foreign country. For instance, when a court holds that a
marriage celebrated in a foreign country would be determined, as to its
formal validity, by the foreign law, it so holds not because of any friendly
relationship or respect for that foreign country but because of the injustice
that might arise if the local law was applied to determine the validity of
that marriage. It could be that under the local law the marriage is formally
invalid, though formally valid by the foreign law under which it was
celebrated. The result could be that the children of the marriage might be
legitimate, i.e., by virtue of valid celebration of the parents' marriage

.5.
Huber writes:
For the purpose of unfolding the difficulty of this particularly intricate subject we shall
formulate three maxims which, being accepted as undoubtedly it appears they should
be, seem to clear the way for us for the solution of the remaining questions. They are
these:
1. The laws of every sovereign authority have force within the boundaries of its state,
and bind all subject to it, but not beyond.
2. Those are held to be subject to a sovereign authority who are found within its
boundaries whether they be there permanently or temporarily.
3.

Those who exercise sovereign authority so act from comity that the laws of each

nation having been applied within its own boundaries should retain their effect
everywhere so far as they do not prejudice the power or rights of another state or its
subjects.
HUBER, supra note 2.
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under the foreign law, but illegitimate under a local law which had no
connection with the celebration of the marriage in a foreign country.
The point is that in The Netherlands the comity doctrine was
employed in a way similar to the modem function of choice of law rules,
i.e., used as the basis for the application of a foreign law to a case having
a foreign element.
It was in England and America in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries that choice of law. rules as we know them today were developed
for conflict of laws. Instead of approaching the question of conflict of
laws from the perspectives of the statutory and comity doctrines, the judges
in these countries applied judicially developed rules of selection, i.e.,
choice of law rules, to such questions. For instance, in Holman v.
Johnson, Lord Mansfield observed:
There can be no doubt, but that every action tried here
must be tried by the law of England; but the law of
England says, that in a variety of circumstances with
regard to contracts legally made abroad, the laws of the
6
country where the cause of action arose shall govern.
Thus, lex loci contractus as a choice of law rule was recognized and
applied in that case. Some of the jurists responsible for the formation of
conflict of laws rules, both in England and America, include J. Story, C.
Kent, A. V. Dicey, G. Cheshire, J. Westlake, and F. Harrison.'

II.

PRE-COLONIAL NIGERIA

Where then is Nigeria in this configuration of conflict of laws history?
As an independent nation on October 1, 1960, Nigeria gained its
sovereignty from British colonial rule.8 In 1914, the northern and southern
parts of the country, hitherto separately administered by British colonial
government, were amalgamated by Sir Frederick Lugard.
Before
colonialism the amalgamated territories consisted of politically and legally
independent tribes. Earlier, about 1898, Flora Shaw, who later became

6.

98 Eng. Rep. 1120, 1121 (K.B. 1775).

7.

Works by these jurists include: COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1834);

COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW (1873); THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (Acollina et. al. eds.,
1993); PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (P.M. North & J.J. Fawcett eds., 12th ed.1992);
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (N. Bentwich ed., 7th ed. 1925), JURISPRUDENCE AND
CONFLICT OF LAWS (1919).
8.

Nigeria Independence Act, 1960, 8 & 9 Elizabeth II, c. 55.
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Lady Lugard, had suggested in an article for The Times that the several
British protectorates on the Niger be known collectively as Nigeria.'
Long before the arrival of the British colonists on the territory now
known as Nigeria, and the subsequent colonization of the people thereof,
the geographical area now called Nigeria had been the abode of strong and
independent kingdoms. As Crowder put it:
Within its frontiers were the great kingdom of KanemBorno, with a known history of more than a thousand
years; the Sokoto Caliphate which for nearly a hundred
years before its conquest by Britain had ruled most of the
savannah of northern Nigeria; the kingdom of Ife and
Benin, whose art had become recognized as amongst the
most accomplished in the world; the Yoruba Empire of
Oyo, which had once been the most powerful of the states
of the Guinea Coast; and the city-states of the Niger Delta,
which had grown partly in response to European demands
for slaves and later palm oil; the largely politically
decentralized Igbo-speaking peoples of the south-east, who
had produced the famous Igbo-Ukwu bronzes and
terracottas; and the small tribes of the Plateau, some of
whom are descendants of the people who created the
famous Nok terracottas."'
In Nigeria, the history of the legal science known as conflict of laws
has been largely neglected by the few Nigerian jurisprudential writers on
the subject." Their discussion of the subject starts from the date when
English law was received into Nigeria:' 2 1863 for Lagos and 1900 for the
rest of the country. No serious inquiry has been made on the position
before the reception statutes. Nigerian writers seem to content themselves
with an a priori conclusion that the Nigerian pre-colonial legal regime did
not have conflict of laws rules" and, by extension, such problems. It
seems therefore a Sisyphean task for the legal historian to attempt a
construction or exposition of conflict of laws in pre-colonial Nigeria.

9.
M. CROWDER, THE STORY OF NIGERIA 11(1962) (quoting A.H.M. KIRK-GREENE,
WHO COINED THE NAME NIGERIA? (1956)).
10.

CROWDER, supra note 9, at 11.

11. See generally I. 0. AGBEDE, THEMES ON CONFLICT OF LAWS (1989); A. YAKUBU,
HARMONISATION OF LAWS INAFRICA (1999).
12.

A.E.W. PARK, THE SOURCES OF NIGERIAN LAW 16-20 (1963).

13.

AGBEDE, supra note 11, at 28; YAKUBU, supra note 11, at 25.
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Our initial survey of the general history of conflict of laws teaches us
that two factors must be simultaneously present before any issue of conflict
of laws can arise: social and economic interaction by people of different
sovereign states, and a diversity of legal regimes. The whole history of
conflict of laws is intertwined with these factors. Until people begin to
cross their national, state, local, or tribal boundaries and intermingle with
one another, there can be no foreign element in disputes. As Merrill
noted:
The introduction of steam power for purposes of
locomotion by sea as well as by land, and the employment
of telegraph wires and submarine cables, have led to a
marvelous increase in travel and commercial intercourse,
and to corresponding increase and complexity in the
relations existing between numerous individuals, and the
governments and laws of states other than their own. The
vast immigration from almost all parts of Europe to
America, with a view to permanent settlement and
naturalization, the establishment by thousands of
individuals of their residences in foreign countries without
any transfer of allegiance, and the extra-territorial
operations of numerous corporations, have given rise to
many interesting and important questions growing out of
the conflict of laws.14
The ius gentium in ancient Rome was the product of transnational
movements. Such movements, and the subsequent intermixture between
people of different legal backgrounds, gave birth to conflict of laws in the
Italian city-states of the fourteenth century and later in France, The
Netherlands, Germany, England, and the United States and Canada.
According to the recent authors of Cheshire and North: "The raison d'etre
of private international law is the existence in the world of a number of
separate municipal systems of law-a number of separate legal units that
differ greatly from each other in the rules by which they regulate the
various legal relations arising in daily life."" Pavel Kalensk ' echoed the
same sentiment:
It is generally known that most textbooks and systems raise
as the conditions of the origin and existence of private
international law on the one hand the fact that there exist in
14. GEORGE MERRILL, STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE JURISPRUDENCE AND THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS 1 (1886).
15.

CHESHIRE & NORTH, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (12th ed. 1992).
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the world parallel to each other many sovereign states with
different legal systems and, on the other hand, that the
citizens of these states, who are non-sovereign subjects,
i.e., natural and legal persons, establish contacts and
relations of civil law [or family law], labour law or
procedural character. Of course, it should be seen that the
two aforesaid preconditions are far from being static and
that in the past decades they have undergone a very
.
dynamic development '

6

Many questions arise in the application of the above principles to the
Nigerian situation: first, were there contacts and dealings between the
various independent primordial and pre-colonial Nigerian tribes? Second,
were those tribes regulated by different and divergent legal rules or
customary laws? Third, if the answer to both of the above is yes, then
how was the ensuing conflict of laws resolved? Here, we shall explore
possible answers to the above questions.
Within the northern part of Nigeria, there had flourished the KanemBornu Empire, the Sokoto Caliphate, and the Hausa states of Gobir,
Katsina, Rano, Daura, Kano, Zaria, Kebbi, Zamfara, Nupe, and Gwari.
There were intermingling, communication and contacts among these
groups. There was from earliest times intensified commercial intercourse
among these northern Nigerian kingdoms and states, and between them and
the outside world, especially with Algeria and Morocco through the Sahara
desert. The corollary was the introduction of Islam to the northern part of
Nigeria in about the eleventh century. According to Crowder:
West Africans participated eagerly in the growing transSaharan trade, which brought them much needed salt from
the desert, as well as clothes, weapons, horses and beads.
The new states of the Western and Central Sudan also
traded among themselves. Kano cloth, for instance, was to
become much prized throughout the Western and Central
Sudan. One of the most extraordinary achievements of
these empires, from the accounts of Arab travelers, was
their maintenance of security of trading conditions over
vast areas of West Africa. Probably the most important
results of the Sahara trade were the penetration of the
Sudan by Islam and the introduction of writing. 7

16.

PAVEL KALENSKY, TRENDS OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 28 (1971).

17.

CROWDER, supra note 9, at 25.
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The introduction of Islam to the northern part of Nigeria meant the
regime of Islamic law,'" as both are axiomatically inseparable. Even today,
Islamic law is the personal law of Moslems in the northern part of
Nigeria.' 9 The common application of Islamic law in northern Nigeria left
no room for choice of law problems. The legal system was a monistic
one, analogous to the Unitary legal system in England, which, in the
formative stage of conflict of laws, frustrated the doctrine's growth and
development in that country.
Even before the introduction of Islam in northern Nigeria, about 1080
A.D.,2° trading contacts had existed among the various tribes in the
northern part of Nigeria, and between each of them and the outside world.
The trade was by means of barter. In this pre-Islamic period, one would
expect that the commercial intercourse amongst these northern Nigeria
tribes and the outside world must have engendered some conflict of laws
problems. However, that was not to be. The economic system of
exchange, i.e., barter, left little room for substantial disputes requiring
choice of law considerations.
There were also trading contacts between the tribes in the northern
region of Nigeria and the kingdoms of the forest in the southern part of
Nigeria, especially the Yoruba kingdom. According to a leading authority
on Yoruba history:
Light and civilisation with the Yorubas came from the
north with which they have always retained connection
through the Arabs and Fulanis. The centre of life and
activity, of large populations and industry was therefore in
the interior, whilst the coast tribes were scanty in number,
ignorant and degraded not only from their distance from
the centre of light, but also through their demoralizing
intercourse with Europeans, and the transactions connected
-2
with the oversea slave trade
Crowder made the same point when he said that "[i]ndeed there is
strong reason to suppose that from an early stage Hausa and Yoruba traded
with each other."2 Again, the trade was by barter. As argued below, the
18.

POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT:

AN INTRODUCTORY AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

164 (A.O. Ikelegbe eds., 1995).
19.

Usman v. Umaru, 7 NIGERIAN WKLY. L. REPS. 377 (Part 254) (1992).

20. That was the year a Kanem king, Mai Hume, converted to the Islamic faith. Islam was

introduced into the neighboring Hausa states in the fourteenth century.
21.

SAMUEL JOHNSON, THE HISTORY OF THE YORUBAS 40 (1921).

22.

CROWDER, supra note 9, at 43.
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barter system did not yield disputes that warranted the application of
conflict of laws rules.
Thus far, the indigenous legal system, i.e., customary laws of these
tribes and kingdoms, had no occasion to ponder conflict of laws problems.
Economic activities carried on by a system of barter where, presumably,
the goods were exchanged on the boundary lines, and which could hardly
have given rise to substantial disputes in the area of conflict of laws. As
Diamond noted, "barter presupposes something of an objective standard of
values, a preliminary stipulation as to the form which the return is to take,
and an instantaneous return."21 The inability of this medium of exchange to
raise disputes which would have necessitated a discussion of choice of law
in pre-colonial Nigeria is evidenced by Diamond's postulation:
To sum up, the only commercial transactions of
importance, except among tribes who possess currency,
are ready barter and credit barter, and among the few
tribes who use currency, cash sale and loan of money are
added. There is little else. Of these transactions, ready
barter and cash sale produce little litigation.Y4
Thus, in the northern part of Nigeria, the barter system and the
subsequent unitary legal system resulting from the introduction of Islam
hindered growth and development for rules of conflict of laws.
However, this conclusion presupposes that the barter transaction went
on smoothly and successfully, that the parties involved in the exchange
were mutually satisfied with their bargains, and that no objections were
raised by any of them after the barter transaction. For instance, a Kano
man in pre-colonial Nigeria subject to Islamic law as his customary law
exchanged his horse for the gold of a Gao man in Western Sudan who was
subject to Gao customary law. The Kano man was happy with the gold
and the Gao man was happy with his horse. No dispute arose, and
therefore no question of whether Islamic law or Gao customary law was
applicable to that transaction arises.
However, if we complicate these facts, a lot of difficulties interpose.
Assume that the Kano man subsequently discovered that the gold he
received in exchange for his horse was not genuine, and that he felt
cheated and wanted his horse back. His Islamic law, in furtherance of our
assumption, allowed him to get back his horse in the circumstances. On
the other hand, the Gao man was not inclined to return the horse and relied
on his customary law which, for instance, provided that after an exchange
23.

A.S. DIAMOND, PRIMITIVE LAW 393 (1935).

24. Id. at400-01.
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of the goods in a barter transaction, the parties were automatically
discharged from any liabilities arising from the contract, and goods already
exchanged could not be returned.
The above facts face two conflicting systems of law: Islamic law and
Gao customary law. Also, the parties involved in the case were subject to
these two divergent legal systems. Whether the action was brought in
Kano or Gao, there would be the same question: which of the two systems
of customary law would provide the rule of decision? If the barter
transaction had taken place in a third tribal territory, e.g., the Yoruba
Kingdom of Oyo, the complexity would double because the question would
be whether it is the Yoruba customary law, Gao customary law, or Islamic
law that should govern the case. There is no doubt that the type of barter
we are analyzing is of a litigable nature and could raise questions within
the province of conflict of laws, i.e., the question of choice of law.
It is not clear how these pre-colonial tribes and kingdoms resolved the
type of questions raised by the above hypothetical case. In other words,
there seems to be no evidence that specific choice of law rules, or other
ascertainable rules of selection of the applicable law, were applied. The
absence of this evidence suggests that barter transactions giving rise to
litigable disputes must have been few in those pre-colonial times. This can
only be explained on the basis that the actual exchange in a barter
transaction must have been preceded by long and detailed negotiations
between the parties, during which they tried to ascertain the quality of their
individual goods, terms of exchange, and allowances for unexpected or
latent defects.
This level of circumspection and wisdom on the part of the traders is
expected, knowing that one or both of the traders involved in the barter
transaction might have come from a long distance that involved travel for
weeks or months. For instance, it was likely that the man from Gao
(present day Ghana in West Africa) must have traveled for several weeks
or months on the back of a camel, the only means of transportation at that
time, across the Sahara desert before getting to Kano (in the present day
Nigeria). It is therefore not unexpected that such a man would try to
obtain the most favorable bargain and take care of the most minute aspect
of the contract, especially with respect to latent defects in the articles of
exchange. For instance, if he reasoned that the horse might have a latent
disease, and that returning it after the barter exchange might be legally and
practically impossible because of the distance involved, he might decide
only to accept the horse in exchange for an inferior merchandise in his
store instead of his gold, and then take the horse as he found it.
The Kano man would likely operate on the same reasoning. He knew
that his customer came from Gao, a faraway land, and that getting back his
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exchanged horse, if things went wrong, might be practically impossible in
the circumstances. He would then take care to bargain in such a way that,
if the gold turned out to be fake, he would not lose completely. For
instance, he could subject the gold to the strictest examination and could
even hire local experts to examine it for him. If he had doubts he could
refuse to accept the gold in exchange. But if he decided to take the risk,
then he could accept the gold only in exchange for an inferior article of
his, other than his horse, and live with the consequences of his bargain.
The above type of circumspection naturally would leave little room
for litigable disputes arising from barter. However, where this level of
prudence was not exercised, the scenario changes and the problem of the
applicable system of law comes to the fore. We have already said that
there seems to be no evidence that any rules of selection of the applicable
law were applied by these tribes, but we can speculate that such disputes
might have been settled on the basis of the local law, i.e., the lexfori. In
other words, the court where the action was brought would apply the
customary law of the tribe to which that court belonged. This hypothesis
is based on the fact that in pre-colonial times, the legal systems of the
above tribes were elementary. The means of communication and travel
were at the rudimentary stage, mainly by horses and camels. In fact, the
camel was metaphorically called "the ship of the desert."
The judicial system was also basic. Some, like the Hausas and
Yorubas, had something like formal courts, while the Ibos lacked any
formal court structure and settled disputes democratically. These early
legal systems, without law reporting, juristic writing, or publication and
distribution of legal commentaries, coupled with the difficulties in
communication and travel, must have inhibited cross-fertilization of legal
ideas and were unlikely to have generated adequate knowledge of legal
systems obtainable in other tribes. Proof of other tribal or customary laws
must have been difficult, if not impossible, in the circumstances. Even in
modem times, judges do not envy legal situations requiring proof of a
foreign law.25 One can then guess how absurd it must have been to expect
25. In a situation that required an English judge to establish what was thp law of Spain on
a particular point, the judge lamented:
It would be difficult to imagine a harder task than that which faces me, namely, of
expounding for the first time either to this country or to Spain the relevant law of
Spain as it would be expounded by the Supreme Court of Spain, which up to the
present time has made no pronouncement on the subject, and having to base that
exposition on evidence which satisfies me that on this subject there exists a profound
cleavage of legal opinion in Spain and two conflicting decisions of courts of inferior
jurisdiction.
DUKE OF WELLINGTON, GLENTAR V. WELLINGTON AND OTHERS 515 (1947).
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a court of one tribe to establish by proof the customary law of another
tribe, probably in a faraway land.
Consequently, one would imagine that the court of each tribe applied
its tribal or customary law to disputes between a member of its tribe and a
foreigner or between one foreigner and another. That was the law with
which it was most familiar. Therefore, if such a local court ever assumed
jurisdiction in the matter, it would apply its tribal law. On this postulation,
one could generally say that litigable disputes arising from barter
transactions in the pre-colonial period must have been rare, and must have
been settled on the basis of the lexfori: the local law of the tribe in which
the action was brought.
The Ibos in the eastern part of Nigeria also had contacts with their
neighbors in the Middle Belt and the various city-states of the Niger Delta.
These contacts were mainly by way of trade carried on by barter.
According to Dr. Osmund Anigbo:
The Hausa\Yoruba traders can be regarded as the oldest
settlers in the Ibagwa community [Ibo tribe].
Oral
tradition traces the permanent settlement to the history of a
long war fought between Ibagwa Aka on the one hand and
a combined force of Obukpa, lheakpu Awka and Itchi on
the other.
The Hausa and Yoruba tribes had been
frequenting the Nkwo market, bringing with them horses,
dried fish and talismen. The market offered palm oil in
exchange.26
On the relationship between the Ibos and the city-states of the Niger
Delta in the south southern part of Nigeria, Obaro Ikime stated, "The
mode of life of the Itsekiri people (one of the tribes on the Niger Delta) has
been determined by their environment.
The Itsekiri are primarily
fishermen and, like their Ijo neighbours, are known as suppliers of fish and
'crayfish' to the peoples of the hinterland (i.e., the Ibos). "21 And Crowder
added that, "the Ijo traded with the peoples of the hinterland, who were
mainly Igbo and Ibibio . . . . The Ijo exported dried fish and salt, which
they panned in the salt water creeks, to the peoples of the hinterland, in
exchange for vegetables and tools, particularly those made of iron. "2

26.

OSMUND ANIGBO, COMMENSALITY AND HUMAN RELATIONSHIP AMONG THE IGBO:

AN ETHNOGRAPHIC STUDY OF IBAGWA AKA, IGBOEZE L.G.A. ANAMBRA STATE NIGERIA 47

(1987).
27.

OBARO IKIME, MERCHANT PRINCE OF THE NIGER DELTA 1 (1968).

28.
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As we have already noted, this type of trading contact based on the
barter system could not, generally speaking, generate conflict of laws
problems. However, this is subject to the misgivings expressed on the
litigable aspects of barter, based on the hypothetical case above.
Generalizing on the socialization pattern in pre-colonial Nigeria, Dr. Eteng
opined, "Periodic markets, themselves symbolizing the underdevelopment
of the pre-colonial distributive and exchange systems, provided occasions
for barter and information and diplomatic exchanges among contiguous
communities. "2

We can now posit that for problems of conflict of laws to arise from
inter-tribal or trans-boundary contacts, such contacts must be of such
quality and intensity as to affect personal or family status or profoundly
entail commercial contracts of a litigable nature. These factors were
seemingly absent in the tribal contacts we have so far examined. Kalenslo
rightly points out:
[I]n order for private international law to progress further,
it was necessary for the initial, sporadic contacts between
non-sovereign subjects subordinated to the laws of
different states and juridically exceeding the boundaries of
a single jurisdiction to grow to a certain level both
quantitatively and as regards the general and essential
character of such contacts for the life of society -10
Obviously, this required a level of contact lacking in pre-colonial
Nigerian societies. Because the prevailing economic system of barter
entailed an instantaneous exchange and gave little room for disputes, there
was no question, for instance, of a contract concluded in the Yoruba
kingdom between Hausa and Yoruba merchants being litigated in the local
courts of Kanem-Bornu or Benin Kingdom. However, this is only with
respect to simple barter transactions that were concluded successfully
without disputes thereafter.
Though we have reasoned above that most barter transactions in the
pre-colonial period must have belonged to this class, i.e., raised nonlitigable disputes, it is entirely possible that some barter transactions might
have given rise to litigable disputes. In that case, the analysis above on the
suggested method of solution is also germane here.
There is no
authoritative evidence that at this period people from one tribe domiciled
or permanently resided in another tribe, e.g., a Yoruba man in the
29. I.A. ETENG, CHANGING PATrERNS OF SOCIALIZATION AND THEIR IMPACT ON
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 348 (1980).

30. KALENSKO, supra note 16, at 29.
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thirteenth century or earlier taking up permanent residence in the Ibo area.
The insularity of the Nigerian pre-colonial tribal societies, the difficulties
in communication and travel, and the differences in language, manners,
culture, and political organizations, must have made inter-tribal residence
As such, intercourse among pre-colonial
or settlement unattractive.
Nigerian tribes must have been superficial and transitory. Concomitantly,
the local jurists of these tribes never had the opportunity to ponder the
application of their local or customary laws to foreigners. Equally untested
was the resourcefulness of Nigerian customary laws in resolving cases with
foreign elements. However, one writer has confidently asserted, to the
contrary, that Nigeria's customary law has rules of conflict of laws:
The problem of choice of law arises in court where citizens
have relations or transactions with foreigners. It also
arises where this arises extra-territorially. The solution is
often found in established rules of conflict of laws or what
is sometimes called private international law. There is
even here a greater problem of this kind because
customary laws mainly vary from place to place and as
between families or kindred. There are however areas of
common ground. Nonetheless it cannot be suggested that
customary law is devoid or [sic] rules for solving issues of
conflict of laws-3'
This is quintessential a priori reasoning. Suffice it to say that the
analysis thus far challenges Onyechi's postulation. But he might well be
right with respect to some barter transactions that could actually give rise
to disputes, as shown in the above hypothetical case of a barter exchange
between a Kano man and Gao man.
However, Onyechi did not tell us how customary law resolved such
disputes with multi-tribal contacts. What were those customary law "rules
for solving issues of conflict of laws?" Is there any evidence of them?
These points were not addressed by him but, as already examined in detail,
insofar as litigable disputes arose from barter transactions it seems that
such disputes were settled by the customary law on the basis of lex fori. It
is for the reasons canvassed above that we agree with P.C. Lloyd's
conclusion:
With each Yoruba group claiming that its own customary
law differs from that of its neighbours there seems to be

31. AFRICAN INDIGENOUS LAWS 292 (T.O. Elias, S.N. Nwabara et a)., eds. 1974)
(proceedings of workshop held in Nsukka, Nigeria, on August 7-9, 1974).
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scope for conflicts of laws. In fact such conflict does not
seem to have arisen. This is partly because the alleged
differences in law between the traditional kingdoms refer
often to variant customs and not to any differences in the
basic legal system. Land cases are always heard by the
court within whose area of jurisdiction the land is situated
and they are judged according to the local law. It is
conceivable, though I recollect no case, that a stranger
might claim that in his home town a grant of land similar
to that he gained in his new settlement would confer
greater rights; but the rights granted to a stranger are those
usual in the grantor's town, and the stranger well knows
this. Cases involving the divorce or inheritance laws are
almost invariably taken by strangers to their home towns
for settlement.

2

It remains to add that the legal situation did not change even with
exploration of the River Niger and the emergence of the British merchants
on the coast of Nigeria about the sixteenth century, which led to trading
relationship between members of the coastal tribes of Nigeria and the
British traders. This relationship ultimately resulted in the political
subjugation of the Nigerian people.
III.

CHRONICLE EVIDENCE FOR COMMERCE AND CONFLICTS

During the era of slave trade, which reached its peak about the
seventeenth and early nineteenth centuries, and its Victorian replacement
with legitimate trade, the British merchants maintained the economic system
of trade by barter. The implication of this system for conflict of laws in
Nigeria has already been noted, and justifies the lengthy quotation of James
Barbot, describing the operation of the barter system between the British
merchants and Nigerian coastal middlemen:
The king had on an old fashion'd scarlet coat, laced with
gold and silver, very rusty, and a fine hat on his head, but
bare-footed; all his attendants showing great respect to him
and, since our coming hither, none of the natives have
dared to come aboard of us, or sell the least thing, till the
king had adjusted trade with us.

32.

P. C. LLOYD, YORUBA LAND LAW 26 (1962).
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We had again a long discussion with the king and Pepprel
his brother, concerning the rates of our goods and his
customs. This Pepprel, being a sharp blade, and a mighty
talking Black, perpetually making objections against
something or other, and teasing us for this or that Dassy,
or present, as well as for drams, etc., it were to be wish'd
that such a one as he were out of the way, to facilitate
trade ....
Thus, with much patience, all our matters were adjusted
indifferently, after their way, who are not very scrupulous
to find excuses or objections, for not keeping literally to
any verbal contract; for they have not the art of reading
and writing, and therefore we are forced to stand to their
agreement, which often is no longer than they think fit to
hold it themselves . . . . We adjusted with them the
reduction of our merchandize into bars of iron, as the
standard coin, viz: one bunch of beads, one bar ....
The
price of provisions and woods was also regulated.
Sixty king's yams, one bar; one hundred and sixty slave's
yams, one bar; for fifty thousand yams to be delivered to
us. A butt of water, two rings. For the length of wood,
seven bars, which is dear; but they were to deliver it ready
cut into our boat. For a goat, one bar. A cow, ten or
eight bars, according to its bigness. A hog, two bars. A
calf, eight bars. A jar of palm oil, one bar and a quarter 33

The last clause of the first paragraph above, "or sell the least thing,
till the king had adjusted trade with us," is explained by the detailed
examples which show that Barbot was not referring to conflict between the
customary laws of the Nigerian tribes on the coast and English law.
Barbot was just describing the nature of the barter transaction between the
English merchants and Africans, which a further passage from him will
illustrate.
Barbot's account herein generally shows that the trading system, if it
was limited to the type of instantaneous exchange implied in the passage,
was immune to commercial disputes of any litigable nature. This is
evident from the fact that actual exchange in the barter transaction referred
to by Barbot was preceded by days of negotiations during which every
33. James Barbot, An Abstract of a Voyage to New CalabarRiver or Rio Real in the Year
1699, in CHURCHILL: A COLLECTION OF VOYAGES AND TRAVELS 459-60 (3d ed).
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aspect and detail of the contract were mutually agreed by the parties.
Barbot recounted:
On the twenty fifth in the morning, we saluted the Black
King of Great Bandy, with seven guns; and soon after fired
as many for captain Edwards, when he got aboard, to give
us the most necessary advice concerning the trade we
designed to drive there. At ten he returned ashore, being
again saluted with seven guns; we went ashore also to
compliment the King, and make him overtures of trade,
but he gave us to understand, he expected one bar of iron
for each slave more than Edwards had paid for his; and
also objected much against our bafons, [sic] tankards,
yellow beads, and some other merchandise, as of little or
no demand there at that time.
The twenty sixth, we had a conference with the King and
principal natives of the country, about trade, which lasted
from three a-clock till night, without any result, they
insisting to have thirteen bars of iron for a male, and ten
for a female; objecting that they were now scarce, because
of the many ships that had exported vast quantities of late.
The King treated us at supper, and we took leave of him.
The twenty seventh the King sent for a barrel of brandy of
thirty five gallons, at two bars of iron per gallon; at ten we
went ashore, and renewed the treaty with the Blacks, but
concluded nothing at all, they being full of same mind as
before.
The twenty eight, we sent our pinnace up the river to
Dony, for provisions and refreshments; that village being
about twenty-five miles from Bandy. Transacted nothing
with Blacks of Bandy all this day.
The twenty ninth, had three jars of palm-oil, and being
foul weather, did not go ashore.
The thirtieth, being ashore, had a new conference which
produced nothing; and then Pepprell, the King's brother,
made us a discourse, as from the King, importing, He was
sorry we would not accept of his proposals; that it was not
his fault, he having a great esteem and regard for the
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Whites, who had enriched him by trade. That what he so
earnestly insisted on thirteen bars for male, and ten for
female slaves, came from the country people holding up
the price of slaves at their inland markets, seeing so many
large ships resort to Bandy for them; but to moderate
matters, and encourage trading with us, he would be
content with thirteen bars for males, and nine bars and two
brass rings for females. Upon which we offered thirteen
bars for men, and nine for women, and proportionably for
boys and girls, according to their ages; after this we
parted, without concluding anything farther.
On the first day of July, the King sent for us to come
ashore, we staid there till four in the afternoon, and
concluded the trade on the terms offered them the day
before; the King promising to come the next day aboard to
regulate it, and be paid his duties. 3'

The above apparently shows that Barbot was describing the trading
conditions of barter between the European merchants and African traders.
That transaction carried with it the potentiality of conflict of laws problems
because the two groups, Europeans and Africans, were subject to at least
two different systems of law. There is no doubt that disputes arising from
such transactions would have raised the question of choice of law: is it the
African system of law or the system to which the European merchants
were subject that would provide the rule of decision? But it seems that the
occurrence of the above type of problem or dispute was mitigated by the
detailed and lengthy negotiations that preceded the actual barter exchange.
With the type of transaction described by Barbot, in which the parties
mutually came to satisfactory terms before the actual exchange, disputes
which would have necessitated conflict of laws problems were practically
avoided. If the entire barter transaction on the Nigerian coast was carried
on solely on the basis of Barbot's description, i.e., with mutually accepted
negotiated terms followed by instantaneous exchange of goods, one would
have been tempted to conclude that conflict problems did not arise.
However, things did not remain entirely as Barbot described. He gave
another side of the barter transaction: credit barter, which was full of
potentialities for conflict of laws problems.
According to Barbot, the European merchants gave credits in the form
of goods to the African Kings and merchants. The Africans paid back the
34.

Id. at 459.
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credit with slaves and other commodities needed by the Europeans. The
credit system existed probably to facilitate trade and ensure that the
European merchants spent less time on the African coast; with the credits
the Africans would keep the slaves and other goods ready before the
Europeans made a return trip. Barbot described the credit system:
We also advanced to the King, by way of loan, the value
of a hundred and fifty bars of iron, in sundry goods; and to
his principal men, others, as much again, each in
proportion of his quality and ability.
To captain forty, eighty bars.
others, twenty each.

To another, forty.

To

This we did, in order to repair forthwith to the inland
markets, to buy yams for greater expedition; they
employing usually nine to ten days in each journey up the
country, in their long canoes up the river.3
The questions then become: did the Africans pay back the credits or
fulfil their own obligations under the credit barter? If not, how did the
European merchants react or enforce payments? If so, did the method of
enforcement generate disputes? How were those disputes settled? Which
legal system was applied to the settlement of such disputes? Barbot's
account did not answer most of the above questions, but he described the
method of repayment:
It is customary here for the King of Bandy to treat the
officers of every trading ship, at their first coming, and the
officers return the treat to the King, some days before they
have their compliment of slaves and yams aboard.
Accordingly, on the twelfth of August, we treated the
King, and his principal officers, with a goat, a hog, and a
barrel of punch; and that is an advertisement to the Blacks
ashore, to pay in to us what they owe us, or to furnish with
all speed, what slaves and yams they have contracted to
supply us with, else the King compels them to it. At that
time also such of the natives as have received from us a
present, use to present us, each with a boy or girl-slave in
requittal. According to this custom we treated the Blacks
ashore on the fifteenth of August, and invited the

35. Id. at 460.
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Portuguese master to it, as also the Black ladies; the King
lending us his musick, to the noise of which we had a long
diversion of dances and sports of both sexes, some not
unpleasing to behold ....
On the twenty second, we let fly our colours, and fired a
gun, for a signal to the Blacks, of our being near ready to
sail, and to hasten aboard with the rest of the slaves, and
quantity of yams contracted for23
Barbot has just described the custom by which the Africans paid back
their loans or discharged their own obligations under the credit barter
transaction. According to him, the African King ensured that the African
merchants paid back their loans and in fact enforced repayment in that he,
"compels them to it." That is clear.
But what of the loan given to the African King himself? How was
repayment by the King enforced and by whom? Where the African King
refused to pay back his loan and a dispute naturally resulted, what law was
applied to the resolution of that dispute? Barbot did not give any clue to
the answers for the above questions. His silence on the point may well
mean that the African King himself was not found wanting in repaying his
own loan. Otherwise, he would have recorded such an important event
which would have had the effect of disrupting trade and adversely affecting
the relationship between the European and African merchants. One thing
seems to be clear: disputes which resulted or would have resulted from
such credit transactions involving people from different legal and political
backgrounds obviously belonged to the field of conflict of laws. As we
shall see later, the frequency of similar disputes in the nineteenth century
led to establishment of a special type of court called "the court of equity,"
not in any way connoting the Chancery Court in England which developed
its principles of equity.
Again, during this era, the British merchants merely conducted their
transactions on the Nigerian coast without any settlement or intention to
settle in the Nigerian territory. This is particularly true in the early
periods of their presence in Nigeria, i.e., about the fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries. The African land, its peoples and cultures, were strange to
them. Malaria resulting from mosquito bites ensured a very high mortality
rate on the part of the foreigners. This was such a serious impediment to
settlement that most parts of West Africa, including Nigeria, were
euphemistically called the "white man's grave." It was not until the
36. Id. at 463.
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British merchants started residing in Nigeria on a more permanent basis,
probably following the discovery of the malaria prophylactic chloroquine
in the early nineteenth century, that serious and full disputes of a conflict
of laws nature began to arise.
Trade disputes between Nigerian merchants and British traders led to
the latter's call to their home government for help and protection. The
British government reacted by appointing a first British Consul, John
Beecroft, to Nigeria in 1849. He was himself a British merchant and
already familiar with the trade and politics of the Niger Delta.3 '

The

consul's primary duty was to protect the lives and property of the British
traders.m We shall presently discuss how the conflicts between the British
and Nigerian merchants were settled.
Having described, as the primary evidence allows, the extent and
effect of social and economic interaction in Nigeria to the period of the
arrival of European traders, mainly British, the next step is to establish the
existence of the diversity of tribal or customary laws in pre-colonial
Nigeria.
IV. CUSTOMARY LAW AND SYSTEMS

There is no doubt that each of the various pre-colonial Nigerian tribes
had, and still has, its own tribal, native, or customary law which
exclusively applied to it, and was different in some ways from the
customary legal system applicable in another tribe. Even today one speaks
of Yoruba customary law, Ibo customary law, and the Islamic law that is
applicable in the northern part of Nigeria. According to Justice A.G.
Karibi-Whyte, "the various customary laws are indigenous to the ethnic
groups and were formulated by them to meet the different social challenges
in their development over the ages. Islamic law does not enjoy the same
natal origin, and like English law is exotic." 3' Similarly, then-Justice Dan
Ibekwe stated extra-judicially:
In the beginning, the various communities which made up
what is today known as Nigeria were developing in their
own simple ways. It is however, correct to say that . . .
those communities were not integrated as is the case now.
In the process of time, each community had evolved into

37.
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an organized society. Each had its customary law and, in
many cases, there were sanctions behind such law .' 0

Since different social, political and even religious structures obtained
in these tribes, the customary laws emanating therefrom were bound to
diverge. As Yntema put it:
In early times, when the legal order was intimately
connected with actual or supposed kinship groups and was
part of the peculiar religious and social structure of the
particular community, law was inalienably personal. It
was inconceivable, for example, that the ius civile, the
common law of the Roman citizenry, should be available
to a peregrine in Rome or, vice versa, that an Athenian in
Attica should claim the protection of some barbarian
custom. This identification of local law with the interests
of the social group has by no means disappeared."
Similarly, Ezra Zubrow opined that "[t]his universality of legal
systems is probably matched only by their diversity. They range from
systems based on kinship to property, from secular to religious principles,
and from consensual to dictatorial impositions. Different societies have,
differing mixes at various times."' 2 Finally on this point, Professor
Nwabueze has stated, "It should be explained that customary law is not a
single body of law throughout the country. Far from that being the case,
customary law is as various as the number of independent communities
3
comprised in Nigeria.-,
It should be emphasized that the existence of a multiplicity of tribal or
customary laws in pre-colonial Nigeria, and the exclusive application in a
Legal
tribe of its customary law, did not generate legal pluralism.
pluralism implies the simultaneous existence and interaction of two or
more different systems of law, one of which is superior to the others." In
pre-colonial Nigeria, where the customary law of a tribe was the only

40. D. 0. Ibekwe, Conflict of Cultures and our Customary Law, in AFRICAN INDIGENOUS
LAWS 297 (T.O. Elias, S.N. Nwabara et al., eds. 1974) (proceedings of workshop held in
Nsukka, Nigeria, on August 7-9, 1974).
41. Hessel. E. Yntema, The Historic Bases of Private InternationalLaw, 2 AM. J. COMP.
L297, 298 (1953).
42. THE IMPACT OF FOLK LAW ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EARLY STATE, paper from
the 11th International Congress of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences, Canada 334
(1983).
43.

B. 0. NWABUEZE, THE MACHINERY OF JUSTICE INNIGERIA 3 (1963).

44. M.B. HOOKER, LEGAL PLURALISM 6 (1975).
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applicable law, the question of interaction with or subservience to any
other law did not naturally arise.
Although the pre-colonial Nigerian societies had their different
customary laws, i.e., existence of legal diversity, the emergence of conflict
problems of choice of law depends on the view one takes of the apparently
superficial social and economic interaction, and on the impact of the barter
based economic system. In other words, if one takes the view that the
barter system actually led to disputes, that is a strong argument for the
existence of conflict of laws problems at that period; but a contrary view of
barter may mean that conflict of laws problems did not exist. We have
already examined both perspectives. However, whatever dispute arose, be
it between individuals from different tribes or between natives and
European traders, it was settled in a clearly identifiable pattern and without
45
reference to any judicial process.

This naturally takes us to the last question: what was the mode of
resolution of disputes, if any, arising from inter-tribal contacts? The first
approach will be to tackle the mode of dispute resolution before the advent
of Europeans. Thereafter, we shall examine the style of dispute resolution
in the colonial era.
The argument here on dispute resolution in pre-colonial Nigeria is
without prejudice to the earlier suggestion that the lex fori was likely
applied to disputes of a conflict of laws nature. The following is in the
nature of an alternative argument. In pre-colonial Nigeria, disputes that
resulted from the superficial inter-tribal contacts were not referred to any
adjudicatory body. This might have been due to the ethnic and tribal
nature of the different customary laws. During this period, violence was
usually and freely resorted to in the settlement of such disputes. Few
references will suffice. Professor Obaro Ikime stated:
The development of the palm oil trade had another effect
on Itsekiri-Urhobo relations. Although through the system
of pledges and 'diplomatic marriages' it was often possible
to maintain friendly relations between the middlemen and
the producers, disputes between the Urhobo and the
Itsekiri were not always resolved peacefully. Sometimes
the Itsekiri traders, offended by the non-fulfillment of
promises made by their Urhobo customers sent their
slaves, usually described as their 'boys' to raid the villages
of the offenders concerned; the idea was that slaves taken
45. For traditional judicial process, see E.K. Quashigah, Reflections on the Judicial
Process in TraditionalAfrica, 4 NIGERIAN JURIDICAL REV. 1 (1990).
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during such a raid would, by working f or the Itsekiri,
eventually make good the loss sustained by the nonfulfillment of the obligations previously agreed on. Once
under way such raids tended to become indiscriminate,
since the 'boys' did not always confine their depredations
to specific individuals or villages. This practice usually
referred to as 'chopping' was to be frowned upon by the
British administration in the years after 1891 .4'
Violence and self-help as dispute resolution methods were
characteristic of "primitive" law. They were equally employed by the
Greeks, as Vinogradoff noted:
As frequently happens in ancient law, distress was used as
a means of obtaining justice by self-help. Another feature
of the procedure was that distress or reprisals are not
necessarily directed against one's opponent, but might be
leveled against relatives of his or even against his
countrymen at large. Such cases were considered as a
justified taking of hostages."
Gluckman added that "[iun polysegmentary societies there may be no
authoritative means of settling disputes between opposed segments and
hence there is resort to vengeance or self-help. "43
The advent of colonialism, at least initially, did not alter the above
mode of dispute resolution. The Europeans naturally refused to submit to
legal regulation by customary law, which was considered alien. However,
Nwabueze submitted: "At first these foreign traders resorted to the
traditional tribunals for the settlement of their disputes with the natives. "4
No authority was cited for this proposition. What he said could have been
true of Canada, but definitely not Nigeria. The Canadian position has been
stated by Bradford W. Morse: "There is in fact a wealth of information
indicating that early travellers, traders and colonists willingly chose to
accept local Indian law as governing their affairs in the Canadian

46. IKIME, supra note 27, at 7.
47. P. Vinogradoff, Historical 7ypes of InternationalLaw, in THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF
PAUL VINOGRADOFF 260 (1928).
48.
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Prairies. "" Certainly this was not the position in Nigeria, because the
prevailing barter system entailed instantaneous' return which, generally
speaking, hardly generated litigable dispute.
Again, this point is substantiated by the account of James Barbot:
"they [Africans] have not the art of reading and writing, and therefore we
are forced to stand to their agreement, which often is no longer than they
think fit to hold it themselves." 52 Thus, with this unequal bargaining
power, the question of resort by the European traders to the customary
laws or traditional tribunals did not arise and could not have arisen.
Professor Crowder clearly made the same point:
The palm-oil traders were as rough a lot as the old slave
traders, and well deserved their title 'palm oil Ruffians.'
The African chiefs could not actually bring these traders
before their own courts, so they resorted to the expedient
of imposing collective punishment on the European
community through the banning of trade. This was fairly
effective, since conditions on the coast were such that most
traders were very anxious to get back to Europe as quickly
as possible, and could stomach no delays. The ban on
trade was always absolute because of the strict control
African chiefs exercised over their subjects. There was no
'scabbing' on the African part, to use a modem tradeunion term. On the other hand, the Europeans found it
difficult to combine effectively, since whenever a
European community stuck out for lower prices, there was
usually one of their number willing to trade at the
African's price .53
The imperative of some form of adjudicatory body to resolve disputes
between African and European traders did not arise until the latter began to
settle on a more permanent basis in the larger territory that became
Nigeria. Consequent upon this settlement, disputes between Nigerian and
British merchants increased. These disputes were clearly of the nature of
conflict of laws since they naturally involved the question of which legal
system, English or customary law, was applicable. Because the British
50.
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merchants were reluctant to employ the traditional process of dispute
resolution, they appealed to their home government for help. This, as we
have already noted, led to the appointment of the first consul, John
Beecroft, whose primary responsibility, was the protection of the lives and
property of British traders in the Niger Delta.
The various consuls did not apply any judicial form of inquiry or
technical rules of justice. Rather, they resorted to intimidation and
violence against the Nigerian traders whenever there was a dispute between
them and their British counterparts. The modus operandi of the British
consul was graphically captured in the account of Ikime:
But while he [John Beecroft] was actually in the district,
the people of the town of Bobi, led by their chief Tsanomi,
attacked and looted Horsfall's factory. The cause of the
attack is not known but, judging from subsequent
incidents, it is unlikely that it was undertaken out of sheer
desire for loot. Beecroft was filled with great indignation.
In a note to the naval authorities, he requested that a
gunboat be sent to the Benin River to mete out condign
punishment: 'the sooner a man of war arrives the more
pleasing it will be for me, for these scoundrels must be
well chastised with powder and shot.'
This was
characteristic. Beecroft was determined to leave no doubts
as to the power and authority which the consul could bring
to bear on these perennial disputes between white traders
and the delta peoples. The gunboat requested did arrive,
and Beecroft proceeded to bombard and burn down Bobi,
thereby establishing the pattern of Afro-British relations in
this as in other parts of the delta: whenever a dispute arose
between British traders and the delta middlemen, the latter
had almost invariably to face punishment irrespective of
the rights and wrongs of the casei'
No doubt, dispute settlement based on gunboat diplomacy hindered
trade, and even social intercourse between Africans and Europeans. Both
parties set out to find a formula for the resolution of such disputes with
traces of foreign elements. This search resulted in establishment of a
"Court of Equity" in 1854 for the adjudication of disputes between
Africans and Europeans. It was composed of African middlemen and
European supercargoes, the "foreign traders" as they were known, and
presided over by the latter in monthly rotation. Its judgment was
54.
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confirmed by the African king." The Court of Equity was described by
Dr. Baikie, who explored the River Niger up to Lokoja in Nigeria:
A commercial or mercantile association was, by the
exertions of captain Witt and others formed, the members
being the chief white and black traders in the place, and
the chair is occupied by the white supercargoes in monthly
rotation. All disputes are brought before this court, the
merits of the opponents are determined, and with the
consent of the king, fines are levied on defaulters. If any
one refuses to submit to the decision of the court or
ignores its jurisdiction, he is tabooed, and no one trades
with him. The natives stand in awe of it, and readily pay
their debts when threatened with it.1'
Disputes before the Court of Equity obviously had a foreign element
and were most likely to have involved the question of choice of law. Was
it English law or African customary law that would provide the rule of
decision? However, the Court of Equity did not decide disputes before it,
based on any ascertainable pattern or system of law. Rather, it based its
decisions on general notions of justice.'
The emergence of these courts of equity in various parts of Nigeria
after 1854, though they entertained problems in the nature of conflict of
laws, did not lead to the introduction of a full system of conflict of laws or
its rules in Nigeria. This is because the Court of Equity did not decide
disputes before it on the basis of choice of law, i.e., by asking which of
the potentially applicable laws would provide the rule of decision. It was
historically in the nature of pure equity, as employed in the English court
of Chancery, that the judge's "conscience" ruled according to reason and
fairness.
On 30 July 1861, King Dosunmu of Lagos ceded Lagos to Acting
Consul McKoskry, in return for a yearly payment of one thousand and
thirty pounds sterling. Consequently, a governor was appointed for the
newly-acquired colony of Lagos in the person of Henry Stanhope Freeman.
This appointment marked the beginning of a permanent British colonial
administration in Nigeria. Obviously, an administration of this nature
required a complete legal system for effective operation. This led to the
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introduction of English law in the colony of Lagos in 1863,-" subsequently
extended to the rest of the country. 9 By the Supreme Court Ordinance of
1863,60 the first Supreme Court was established for the colony of Lagos.
This Ordinance was subsequently repealed and replaced with the Supreme
Court Ordinance of 1876.61 This statute received into the colony of Lagos
the common law of England, the doctrines of equity, and statutes of
general application in force in England on 24 July 1874.
In 1900, both northern and southern Nigeria were declared British
protectorates and a Supreme Court was established for each.6
The
common law of England, doctrines of equity and statutes of general
application in force in England on 1 January 1900 were received into each
protectorate. The reception of English law was continued and confirmed
by many statutes passed after Nigeria's independence. 3
Thus, the reception of English law into the colony of Lagos in 1863
and the rest of the country in 1900 marked the introduction in Nigeria of
complete and mature rules of conflict of laws derived from England.
V. CONCLUSION
This legal historical reconstruction has concentrated on the state of
conflict of laws in Nigeria from the pre-colonial period to establishment of
full British administration in Nigeria in 1863. The existence of conflict of
laws during this period can be mirrored from the barter economic system
and was conditioned by it. There were two arguments on the impact of
barter: first, that barter was preceded by such circumspection, prudence
and detailed negotiation that disputes of a conflict of laws nature which
might have arisen were practically averted; and second, that the barter
system, especially the credit barter, actually resulted, or was likely to have
resulted, in disputes which belonged to conflict of laws. Disputes which
came before the court of equity in the nineteenth century were clearly of a
conflict of laws nature. To the extent that conflict of laws problems
existed during the period under review, there was no clear evidence of the
rules which were adopted in the resolution thereof. Apart from the
58. Ordinance No. 3 of 1863.
59. A.N. Allott, The Common Law of Nigeria in Nigerian Law: Some Recent
Developments, in A REPORT FROM THE BRITISH INSTITUTE OF INT'L AND COMP. L. 31(1964).
60. Ordinance No. 11 of 1863.
61. Ordinance No. 4 of 1876.
62. Supreme Court Proclamation No. 6 of 1900 (for Southern Nigeria), and Protectorates
Court Proclamation No. 4 of 1900 (for Northern Nigeria).
63. Nigerian Tobacco Co. Ltd. v. Alloysius Olumba Agunanne (1995) 5 NIGERIAN WKLY.
L. REPS. 541, 580-81 (Part 397) (decision of Supreme Court of Nigeria).
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traditional settlement by war; reprisals; gunboat diplomacy; and reference
to the Court of Equity, which did not apply any systematic body of
principles or rules, disputes of a conflict of laws nature were likely settled
by application of the lex fori, because of the peculiar difficulty of proving
foreign law during that period.
We conclude that a full system of conflict of laws, as we know it
today, was introduced into Nigeria in 1863. The primary evidence for
conflict of laws in Nigeria during the colonial period, which are still valid
sources today, were the reception of English common law, doctrines of
equity, and statutes of general application.

THE TELEBANKING CONTRACT IN SWISS LAW*
Cidric J. MagninI.

INTRODUCTION ........................................................

63

II.

DESCRIPTION ...........................................................
A.
What is Telebanking? ........................................
1.
Definition ...............................................
2.
History ...................................................
3.
The Offer is Available in Switzerland
Today .....................................................
B.
MaterialRequired ................................................
1.
Bank Account ..........................................
2.
Telebanking Contract ..................................
3.
Provider of Internet Accesses ........................
4.
Computer ...............................................

65
65
65
66

C.

70

Security .........................................................
1.
2.
3.
4.

67
69
69
69
69
69

Coded Transmission Between the

Bank and its Customer ................................

70

Verification of User's Identity .......................
Risks of Fraudulent Use of the
Telebanking Account ..................................
Tax Risk .................................................

73
74
80

D.

Services Offered ................................................

81

E.

Advantages/Disadvantages...................................

82

*
Editor's note: This article was translated from the French original in November 2000.
Several of this article's Internet sources may be found on World Wide Web servers located in
both the United States and Switzerland. Where possible, Uniform Resource Locator (URL)
citations point to documents located on servers accessible from the United States. Where site
security prohibits site access by Internet users located in the United States (as discussed in
Section VI.A.4.b. of this Article) a notation has been made and the source may be obtained from
the author.

** C&lric J. Magnin was born on May 3rd, 1973, in Geneva, Switzerland. In 1998, he
graduated from the University of Geneva Law School with a J.D. in Swiss law. In 2000, he
graduated from Santa Clara University Law School in California with an LL.M. in hightechnology law. He speaks French, English, German, Spanish and Portuguese. He is an expert
in technology law, particularly in international cybercrime. He is presently a research assistant
in Biotechnology Law at the University of Geneva and may be contacted at
cedric.magnin@email.com.

62

ILSA Journalof International& ComparativeLaw
1.
2.

III.

[Vol. 8:61

Advantages ............................................. 82
Disadvantages .............................................. 83

FORMATION OF THE CONTRACT .......................................

84

In General....................................................... 84
Chronology of the Signature of a
Telebanking Contract......................................... 85
C.
General Conditions............................................ 85
Concept ................................................. 85
1.
2.
The Inclusion of General Conditions
in a Contractual Banking Relationship ................ 86
3.
General Conditions within the
Framework of the Telebanking
Contract ................................................. 86
D.
Offer ............................................................. 87
1.
Definitions and Concepts ............................. 87
Contents ................................................. 87
2.
3.
Form ..................................................... 90
E. Acceptance ..................................................... 91
1.
Definitions and Concepts ............................ 91
Contents ................................................. 91
2.
3.
Form ..................................................... 92
QUALIFICATION OF THE CONTRACT .............................. 92
A.
Is the Telebanking Contracta Production
Contract?....................................................... 92
1.
Essential Elements of the Production
Contract ................................................. 92
2.
Possible Applications to the
Telebanking Contract .................................. 93
3.
Exclusion of the Production contract ............... 93
B. The Mandate Contract........................................ 95
1.
Sources ................................................... 95
Definition ............................................... 96
2.
96
3.
Characteristic Elements ..............................
4.
Form ..................................................... 97
5.
End of the Contract .................................... 98
A.
B.

IV.

V.

TELEBANKING-RELATED SERVICES .................................

A.

101

The Giro Banking Contract................................... 101
101
1.
Definition .................................................
2.
Legal Nature ............................................. 102

2001]

Magnin
B.

VI.

63

FactorageContract............................................. 102
1.
Definition ................................................. 102
2.
Legal Nature ............................................. 102

OBLIGATIONS OF THE PARTIES ........................................

103

A.

103
103
105
107
109
111
113
113
113
114
115

B.

Obligations of the Assignee ...................................
1.
Obligation to Render Service ..........................
2.
Obligation of Diligence ................................
3.
Obligation of Fidelity ...................................
4.
The Duty of Discretion .................................
5.
Other Obligations ......................................
Obligationsof the Employer ..................................
1.
In G eneral .................................................
2.
The Refunding of the Expenditures ..................
3.
Compensation for Damage ............................
4.
Payment of Fees .........................................

VII. RESPONSIBILITY OF THE BANK ASSIGNEE ......................... 116

A.

In General........................................................
1.
Principles .................................................
2.
Individual Liability ......................................
3.
Third Party Liabilities ..................................
Analysis of Clauses of Exclusion of
Responsibility in Swiss Telebanking
Contracts Currently in Force .................................
1.
Current Supply ...........................................
2.
Comparison of Cases of Exclusion of
Responsibility ............................................

116
116
117
119

VIII. CONCLUSION ............................................................

128

B.

I.

121
121
121

INTRODUCTION

Telebanking is a means of communicating with one's bank with the
aid of a computer connected to the Internet at any hour, day or night,
anywhere in the world. It enables a customer to consult their account or
transmit banking orders via the Internet. When a customer transmits a
banking order via the internet, it is directly stored in the data processing
system of the bank and then transmitted to the qualified person in order to
carry it out. This method avoids a human intermediary that would
normally redirect the orders within the bank to the appropriate person to be
carried out.

64

ILSA Journal of International& ComparativeLaw

[Vol. 8:61

Telebanking is financially interesting for both the bank and the
customer, but it is not risk free. For example, in 1994, two Russians set
up a fictitious bank, the European Union Bank Ltd., and stole
approximately ten million American dollars. All the funds put under
deposit were never found after the closing of the bank by the authorities of
Antigua in August 1997.'
The first Swiss company to offer a telebanking service was Cr6dit
Suisse (Cr6dit Suisse Group AG). Other finance companies such as the
Post Office and the Union of Swiss Banks (UBS AG) then followed suit.
In the next two to three years, the majority of the major financial
establishments will propose even more telebanking services at a reduced
cost. The low cost of these services is the principal driving force of their
development. For example, the use of the data processing department is in
itself free, and the underlying contracts (the commission in the event of
stock exchange operations and giro banking in the event of payments) are
proposed at very competitive prices if they are carried out via the bank's
telebanking Internet site.
These competitive prices are possible because of the drastic reduction
in costs.
Specifically, a central computer has replaced human
intermediaries or assignees within the bank.
Statistics show evidence that the electronic banking industry is still
growing globally. In March 2001, the largest bank of Switzerland, UBS
AG, had 586,000 customers under a telebanking contract, an increase from
the last survey in December 2000 which reported 555,000 contracts.
Moreover, 23 % of all banking orders in Switzerland were placed online,
and 13.8% of all stock exchange transactions booked in Switzerland were
2
routed through e-banking transactions.
Moreover, the UBS server experienced 1.5 million logins per month,
30 000 to 40 000 users per day, and 350 to 600 parallel sessions per day.
This trend is likely to continue at an exponential speed because
everyone finds telebanking to be in their best interest. First, the banks
save costs and gain new customers who are interested in technology, or
simply eager to open up an account in a Swiss bank; second, customers
pay much less for their banking services, and can place their orders or

1. Gambling Magazine, Money Laundering in Antigua a Risky Business-A Caribbean
Bank with Numbered Accounts, available at http://www.gamblingmagazine.com/articles/21/21144.htm (1999).
2. See UBS Switzerland, E-Channels and Products, at http://193.41.97.55/pdf/chech-l.pdf (citing BlueSky Internet Marketing Inc., E-banking Ratings Survey) (last visited Oct.
4, 2001).
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consult their accounts at will, without having to telephone a manager who
is absent or busy, or having to place an order at the window of the bank.
Moreover, the current trend is data processing, and particularly the
Internet. According to a survey carried out by Nielsen Research Media
and Commerce Net (NRM)3 , among the seventy-nine million Americans
who have been using the network for longer than sixteen years, more than
twenty million say they buy products, and services on the network. On a
worldwide scale, the number of Net surfers was approximately 242
millions in January 2000. Thus, there is an increasingly strong trend to
move the services on this network, particularly banking services.
However, these new means of communication with banks pose many
legal problems. For example, is bank secrecy maintained? Is the network
properly protected to make it possible for transactions to be completed
without being intercepted? Will a new form of electronic "hold-up" be
developed, that creates a new race of criminals, commonly known as
"hackers" or "data-processing tapers?" How can we qualify the network?
What are the principal obligations of a bank to the customers in this new
type of relationship? Is the customer or the bank legally protected from
these new problems when the bank does not want to extend a guarantee,
and shields itself from responsibility should problems arise? This is
precisely what we will try to analyze while studying this new relationship,
and the rights and obligations contained in a telebanking contract.
II.

DESCRIPTION

A. What is Telebanking?
1. Definition
As its name indicates, telebanking makes it possible to conduct
banking operations ("banking") from a distance ("tele"). This concept
should etymologically indicate the various ways of conducting banking
operations from a distance. For example, by telephone, by mail, by fax or
by data processing and data exchange over the Internet, or another dataprocessing network. These practices have restricted the use of the word
"telebanking" to mean primarily banking operations conducted from a
distance by means of a computer connected to a data-processing network,
the most significant of these being the Internet. Thus, today the word
"electronic banking" or "e-banking" is more widely used than
"telebanking".

Industry Statistics Worldwide
3. CommerceNet,
http://www.commerce.net/research/stats/wwstats.html (2001).

Internet

Population,

at
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2. History
a. The Eighties
The first experiments with telebanking were conducted in the early
1980s.
These experiments used national telematics data-processing
networks like the Minitel in France, Compuserve in the United States and
the Videotex in Switzerland. Some of the problems plaguing the system
were attributed to these networks being slow, incompatible, and not being
very user-friendly. Thus, these networks did not accommodate the needs
of the standard user during this time period who sought a fast, sure, and
financially interesting banking service that would make it possible to
conduct banking operations from various countries.
b. 1995: The Birth and Development of the Internet
In 1995, everything changed with the advent of the Internet. As a
result, telebanking services became faster, more user-friendly (complete
with color and images), and internationally accessible.
However,
telebanking was still missing one crucial component to complete the
evolution of the telebanking system- adequate security.
c. 1998: The Boom of Electronic Trade
It was not until 1998 that electronic trade started to attract a
significant number of users. Until that date, only a marginal number of
people "dared" to transmit their credit card numbers to a virtual store to
make purchases or pay for a service. The increasing confidence of users
in the security of the network did not start becoming visible until late 1998.
During this period, there was an explosion of "online" credit card
purchases during the holiday seasons. However, because these were not
significant, it still did not appear that Internet users were ready to use the
Internet to conduct significant banking operations.
d. November 1999: Massive Growth of the Offer of Telebanking
Today, we are watching the development of telebanking services at
increasingly interesting prices. This is in response to the keen demand.
This demand seems to be imminent, due to a combination of various
factors. The most significant factor is the awareness, by the increasing
number of Net users of the security of the network. Another factor is the
unprecedented development of an economic sector, close to that of
telebanking: electronic trade. Electronic trade is becoming a habit for
most Net users. As a result, there are numerous companies that have
specialized in the sale of items or services through the Internet. For

Magnin

2001]

example, in 1998, amazon.com4 published a quarterly turnover of eighty
million American dollars.5 One year later, during the same period, the
turnover was 290 million dollars. 6 In only one year, sales increased by
350%. In the year 2000, sales were predicted to border the billion dollar
mark. This growing development of electronic trade for items of nominal
value made it possible to compile statistics that reflected a very small
proportion of cases of fraud involving credit card numbers when they are
transmitted to a protected site. In addition, because credit card companies
receive a commission on each transaction, they each have created a special
fund which, in the event of fraud, will compensate fraud victims in order
to encourage the consumer to communicate his number online.
As a result, potential telebanking customers can feel confident that use
of their credit card to buy products, and services on the Internet, through a
protected site, does not involve great risk. This contributed to convincing
them that this would also be applicable to the banking services offered by
telebanking means. In addition, the end of the economic crisis, and the
explosion of the financial markets linked telebanking to technology, and
Internet transactions. The constant increase in the number of small
investors who are potential customers of "online banks" have strongly
contributed to the development of telebanking, which appears to have a
bright future.
3. The Offer is Available in Switzerland Today
This trend is reflected in Switzerland where there has been a sharp
increase in the number of banking services, and Internet telebanking sites
that were opened in the spring of 1999. For example, the Post Office
opened the site www.yellownet.ch in the Spring of 1999; Cr6dit Suisse
began offering its service www.youtrade.ch in the Summer of 1999; and
the
Union de Banques
Suisses
(UBS)
started
"tradepac"
www.ubs.ch\tradepac in Fall of 1999. These three companies already had
a functional telebanking service for quite some time, and they have
constantly improved over the years. However, these three new Internet

4.
See generally Amazon.com, at http://www.amazon.com (last visited Nov. 29, 2001).
Amazon.corn is the world's largest virtual shop. It sells books, music, toys and various other

new or used items through its auction department.
5.

See

Amazon.com,

Inc.

Form

10-K405

(Mar.

30,

1998)

available

at

www.freeedgar.com. The Form 10-K405 is a report to the United States Securities and
Exchange Commission.
6. See Amazon.com, Inc. Form 10-K405 (Mar. 5, 1999) available at
www.freeedgar.com.
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sites represent a considerable improvement in tariffs,7 ease of use' and
speed. Because of their aggressive marketing operations, 9these three new
Internet sites also show the will of their management to quickly convince a
great number of potential customers to use their services. In addition, it
should be noted that the banks now make a distinction between the
traditional telebanking type service (accessible through the official and
global server of the bank"), and the specialized telebanking service
(equipped with a proper name and without a direct relationship with the
bank), which is accessible through a distinct Internet address."
Traditional telebanking makes it possible to inquire about one's
account, to make transfers, to place Stock Exchange orders, and to inquire
about courses or stock exchange information. Specialized telebanking
makes it possible to carry out specific transactions: For example, to buy
or sell in the stock exchange, to make transfers, and to apply for loans. It
was created partly in reaction to the very competitive American banks
2
which offer these services.

7. See generally UBS, Welcome to UBS Financial Services Group, at
http://www.ubs.com (last visited Mar. 27, 2000) [hereinafter Welcome to UBSJ.
8. UBS is the first Swiss bank to offer a telebanking service not requiring the prior
installation of any software. See generally id.
9. They are not bothered to buy full-page adverts in financial magazines and also in
popular dailies such as Le Temps, Le Matin, or Tribune de Gen~ve. Bill-posting campaigns in
front of the universities like that of Geneva show these companies' intentions of reaching a very
wide audience.
10. See, e.g., UBS, Meinen Enkel aufwachsen sehen, at http://www.ubs.com (last visited
Feb. 14, 2001); UBS, Willkommen be: UBS, at http://ubs.ch (last visited Feb. 14, 2001); La
Poste Suisse, Postefinance lance ne nouvelle plate-forme financiere, at http://www.poste.ch.
(last visited Feb. 14, 2001).
11. See, e.g., Crhlit Suisse, Welcome to youtrade, at http://www.youtrade.ch. (last visited
Feb. 14, 2001); Yellownet, Yellow Net: Zahlen mit dem Gelben Konto im Internet [Payments via
Internet], at http://www.yellownet.ch. [Parts of this World Wide Web site may be inaccessible
due to site security. Document may be obtained from the author. -Ed.]
12. As an example, the American online broker E'trade enables its customers to buy
shares and stock coded for example at the NASDAQ stock market for a token price of $19.95
(except for stock options) per transaction. Datek has a token price of $9.95 per transaction and
even offers the latter free of charge to its customers if the order is not executed the minute after
it is sent by the customer. Meanwhile, Credit Suisse continue to receives very high commissions
with regards to American companies; about 1.8% with the Federal stamp duties for small
amounts. However, with its telebanking service, the commission amount dropped by about 50%,
moving to 0.8% if the transaction is made on the Internet. This drop is significant but may not
be enough to counter competition from American banks, which, on a transaction of $100,000
carried out at the NASDAQ, still offer an eighty times better value than a Swiss bank.

2001]

Magnin

B. MaterialRequired
The person wishing
prerequisites.

to use telebanking

must fulfill certain

1. Bank Account
Initially, he must have a bank account in the bank that is providing
him with this service. Therefore, all the usual checks, such as the identity
of economic beneficiary, the origin of the funds, are made in order to
prevent the deposit of proceeds from criminal activity.
2. Telebanking Contract
Secondly, he must sign a telebanking contract with his bank which
sets out the rights and obligations of the customer, and limits the
responsibility of the bank in the event of any loss that is suffered by the
customer. This standard contract is available in all the branches of these
banks or can be downloaded from the Internet.
3. Provider of Internet Accesses
Third, he must have a contract with an Internet access provider which
will allow him to connect to the network either by telephone, cable,
electricity or satellite. However, this condition is not necessary if the user
does not wish to utilize his banking operations from his residence.
Otherwise, he will still be able to use an Internet connection at his place of
business or in an Internet cafe.
4. Computer
Fourth, he should have a computer that has a basic configuration,
which can be different with each connection. Each bank announces, and
sets its own general conditions, and terms. However, Internet telebanking
sites are constantly being improved.
They require tools that are
increasingly more powerful and complex, to guarantee the security and to
develop the range of banking services offered. The figures published
under the general conditions of the banks at the time the telebanking
contract is executed can only have an indicative value and must constantly
be modified.
Currently, the Telebanking user of UBS., Cr&lit Suisse or the Post
Office must have, at minimum, the following:
9 a Pentium processorl3 (for a PC)14 or Power PC (for a
Macintosh15 computer);
13.

It is the brain of the computer, which controls and runs all its operations.
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0 10 Mbl6 of space on the hard diskl7 in order to back up the
encoding software. However, this is no longer necessary for the last
version of telebanking offered by UBS, which is the first Swiss bank
to offer an access to telebanking services without preliminary

software;
* 32 Mb of RAM18 to be able to correctly view the Internet pages
of the telebanking site;
* A current operating system'9 (Windows 95\98\2000\Me\XP,
Windows NT 4.0 service pack 4, Mac OS 8.x, Unix or Linux); and
* A modemn° with the fastest possible speed so that communication
with the Internet site of the bank is quick, and Internet navigation
software as recent as possible to be able to follow the trend of the
telebanking sites (Netscape 4.0 or superior, Microsoft Internet
Explorer 4.0 or superior).

C. Security
1. Coded Transmission Between the Bank and its Customer
Swiss banks have a particular obligation to respect bank secrecy that

the majority of the banks in foreign countries do not have. However, bank
secrecy or not, information transmitted between a bank and its customer is
highly personal and any bank, whether it is Swiss or not, must seek
powerful software allowing it to cipher information passing through the

14. Abbreviation of "Personal Computer": the single link between these computers is
their inter-compatibility regardless of their label and account for about 90% of the computer
market.
15. These computers are not compatible with PCs except for some specific applications
having special "pathways." They account for about 10% of the computer market.
16. Abbreviation of "Mega Bytes," computer unit equivalent to one million 'bytes', each
'byte' being itself made up of a combination of eight figures composed by zero and by one. A
minimum space enabling to safeguard eighty million (=8*10*1.000.000) figures in the hard
drive of the computer.
17. Name given to a computer devise used to store data in the computer.
18. Abbreviation of Random Access Memory.
19. Computer program running and presenting the software used by the computer in a
specific way (e.g. Windows has a very friendly presentation in the form of windows, which is
not the case for Unix, which is more appropriate for professionals).
20. Common name given to the apparatus that transforms the data which the user wants to
transmit on the internet network in a format that enables it to travels on lines or on any other
medium (modulator) and retransform data its receives in a format that is readable by the
computer (demodulator).
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network and to ensure its customers of the confidentiality of the
information exchanged.
a. Encoding Software to be Installed on the Computer of the User
The first experiments in telebanking required the installation of
special software to cipher the data on the user's computer. 2 However, this
solution is not very practical because it does not make it possible to carry
out banking transactions on any other computer other than the one on
which the software is installed. This is why banks are all replacing this
software with an autonomous system of coding.
b. An Autonomous Encoding System: SSL
UBS was the first Swiss bank to propose to its customers a system of
autonomous coding not requiring the installation of software on the
computer of the user for it to function. 2 The majority of the American
banks offering the service of telebanking adopted it for a considerable
time, and it is about to become the model for computer security. This
system of coding, called Secure Socket Layer (SSL), is a public protocol
which ciphers data passing between the Internet navigator used by the
customer (Netscape, Explorer), and the server of the bank. The banks
maintain that the "coding used currently enjoys a very high level of
security", and "Protection obtained is an obstacle to professional hackers".
"Generally, the Internet Banking system is safer than the usual procedures
of sending payments, and orders through the post office". "It is a coding
with 128 bytes (IDEA\RC4) or 168 bytes (3DES)." 14 SSL is so powerful
that the American authorities require government authorization for its
export.
This authorization is only granted to specific companies.
Exportation of SSL, without authorization from the proper authorities, is
considered, by the United States, to be exportation of an illicit weapon
carrying a punishment of two years of imprisonment.Y Indeed, by using
SSL in a communication system, it enables these types of criminals to
communicate among themselves by using the code, while it provides some
21. This is still the case with Cr&iit Suisse's and the Post office's telebanking site.
22. See generally Welcome to UBS, supra note 7.
23. Based on an interview realized in October 1999 with UBS and Credit Suisse legal
departments.
24.

UBS,

Why

UBS

e-banking

classic

is

so

secure,

at

http://www.ubs.com/e/ebanking/classic/security info.html (2001) [hereinafter Why UBS ebanking classic is so secure].
25. This American law, which is not applied with flexibility, has been used to convict
people.
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certainty, and assurance the police could not intercept their conversations.
This is precisely why the United States tries to ensure that terrorists or
other criminals cannot use SSL for dubious purposes.
c. FinancialCertificates

A "Financial Certificate" is a certificate which grants accreditation to
the server. 6 The Financial Certificate was established by an accreditation
and certification office. The Financial Certificate certifies that the server
to which the user is connected is authorized to use a system of coding (SSL
or other), and the Financial Certificate attests the level of security
employed by this system (40, 56, 128 or 168 bytes for principal coding
which is currently used). The goal of the Financial Certificate is to prove
to the user that he is actually communicating with his bank, and not with a
pirate site. Additionally, each Financial Certificate has a "fingerprint"
which is unique to it, and which can be checked by the user each time he is
connected. Upon getting information from his bank or from the office of
accreditation and certification, each user will know the official fingerprint
of the telebanking site. This will enable the user to compare the
fingerprint of the telebanking site with the fingerprint on the Financial
Certificate to ensure that they match.
There are several offices of accreditation in the Internet sector, but
one of the most recognized accreditation offices is the American company,
Verisign. 27 Verisign is mostly used by Swiss banks. When a customer
connects himself to an Internet Telebanking site, the bank will send the
customer a certificate issued by Verisign. The Telebanking site's Internet
navigator will then display information related to this certificate, and will
ask the customer if he accepts it or not. The customer will be able to make
his decision by comparing "the fingerprint" on the certificate sent with the
official Financial Certificate, and particularly, the fingerprint on the bank's
Internet site.28 If they are identical, this means that the customer is
confident that he will communicate, and send information directly to his
bank, and not to the site of a professional hacker. He will be able to
accept the certificate as soon as the user "clicks" on the icon labeled
"Accept". The communication will then be ciphered and the Internet
navigator will code all information sent and will decode all information
received.
The customer is thereby given assurance that he is

26.
27.

See Why UBS e-banking classic is so secure, supra note 24.

See Verisign, Verisign, at http://www.verisign.com (2001).
28. See, e.g., UBS, UBS e-banking classic FAQ Authenticity of the server and the service,
at http://www.ubs.com/e/ebanking/classic/faq/authenticity.html (2001).
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communication with his bank and that the information transmitted will
remain confidential. However, can the bank trust the user?
2. Verification of User's Identity
For the banks to be sure that the person connected to their protected
Internet Telebanking site is the account holder, or an authorized user of the
account, the banks must verify his identity. For verification purposes,
most banks will request that an individual customer provide three pieces of
identifying information, and a corporate customer provide four pieces of
identifying information.
a. ContractNumber
The contract number is sent to the customer by registered mail after
execution of the Telebanking contract. This ensures the bank that the user
is a member of the circle of people who know that the contract number will
be sent by mail. Obviously, this circle includes the customer of the bank;
however, it also includes his spouse, children, the cleaning lady, a
workman working in the house, or a robber.
b. Password
The bank also sends a password to it's customer with a request that he
modify the password immediately to a word of his choice. This will make
it possible to ensure that the bank now communicates only with it's
customer or someone who knows him and was able to guess his password.
This person could be his wife, one of his children, or a hacker. However,
if the customer chooses a random password, memorizes it, and does not
write the password anywhere, the risks of "hacking" this password are
greatly reduced.
c. List of Numbers or Numbers on Secur ID Card
A number is placed on a list of ninety numbers 9 or on cards called
Secur ID cards'O. Both are sent to the customer through the mail. Using
the number list, the customer will be able to validly connect to the
Telebanking site. The customer will then cross out the number used for
his current connection off the list, and use the next number on the list for
the next session. However, because the numbers are contained on a list, it

29. Contrary to UBS that only uses the list of numbers to be crossed out, Credit Suisse
allows its customers to choose between either system.
30. It has the format of a credit card and has a liquid crystal screen, which displays a
number.
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is easy to photocopy it, enabling several to have the same number at the
same time.
If the customer chooses to use the Secur ID cards, he will not be
required to do anything once he is connected. The system will only
display one number at a time and will change automatically every minute.
This allows the bank to be sure that it is communicating with the person
who holds that particular number. If the customer chooses a Secur ID
card, only the person who is in possession of the card at the time of the
connection has access to the number required for connection to the bank.
However, if the customer loses his card, he can immediately request that
UBS send him a new one. A potential thief would have to also know the
customer's personal password, and contract number in order to use the
customer's account without his knowledge.
3. Risks of Fraudulent Use of the Telebanking Account
The bank itself can be a fraud as seen in the notorious case of
European Bank of Antigua 31 . The European Bank of Antigua enabled two
Russians to gain more than ten million dollars in 1997 to the detriment of
the unfortunate customers who opened an account at this bank. 32 Thus,
before signing a telebanking contract with a bank, and sending funds to a
bank, it is wise to investigate the quality of the bank. If this investigation
is not carried out, the user connected to the protected Internet telebanking
site runs the risk of an unauthorized third party using his account without
his knowledge. This situation can occur through the actions of the
following three types of individuals: the staff of the bank, a computer
hacker (hacker), and the user (if he is negligent by not taking the proper
precautions to ensure that each session is confidential).
a. Bank Staff
The people who are at risk on the bank staff are the data-processing
specialists who are responsible for the telebanking service because it is
possible for them to connect themselves to the account of the customer.

31. See Savona, supra note 1.
32. This massive fraud culminated in August 1997, in the collapse of the European Union
Bank (EUB). The police at the time discovered that two mafiosi known to the police services,
Alexandre Konanykhine and Mikehail Khodorkoueky were the developers of the world's leading
virtual bank as they had declared through aggressive advertising campaigns proposing tax-free
interest rates of 9.91 %. The target customers were money launderers, as well as, people wishing
to evade taxes. The bank of England and the American Bank of Idaho went into action and in
August 1997, the Anti-gang authorities opened investigations for fraud. It was however late for
the two criminals had already dismissed the banks' five man staff and safely stashed away the ten
million dollars which have never been recovered.
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Crime statistics indicate that there is a rise in the attacks that are carried
out with the help of an internal contact in the company. This is why data
processing specialists must be supervised by a sufficiently dissuasive
internal police system. While it is relatively easy for the data processing
specialists of a bank to enter the account of the customer, and divert funds
therefrom; it is also easy for the police to analyze the network and identify
any fraudulent conduct on the part of data processing specialists. This is
why only an effective monitoring of the data processing specialists makes it
possible to prevent internal fraud, and creates a situation of a "cold war"
that dissuades any fraud.
There are several ways that a data processing specialist within a bank
can assume the customer's identity in order to use his account fraudulently.
For example, he could enter the hard drive of the bank's computers which
stores the contract numbers, passwords, and the algorithms that are used to
generate the numbers "randomly chosen" for the number list or Secur ID
cards of customers without the bank's computer being able to identify who
hacked into it's hard drives. However, this is almost impossible because
the bank's computers would have identified him before he was able to
penetrate the hard drives. The machine will keep track of the person's
identity by recording his name, the hour and the connection time, as well
as the type of action that he takes. If such an action is automatically
transmitted to and stored in a safe place, the trail of the fraud will be
indelible and usable by the police. The only way to avoid being identified,
would require the hard drives to be physically removed, and then analyzed
from a computer that is not connected to the bank. However, if the
security system that is in place is adequate, the removal of the hard drive
will leave traces in the central computer of the bank, or in the designated
safe place. The data processing monitoring systems, as well as the internal
police devices of the bank, seem to be sufficiently dissuasive for the
moment, and make these type of acts very rare. The prospect of the
perpetrator being identified in the event of fraud effectively dissuades the
data processing specialists who could be tempted to commit such an
offense.
Major Swiss banks affirm that they have never been attacked to date"
However, other sources have reported contrary information; specifically,
that the banks would prefer to bear the burden of any damages, 3 by
33. Based on October 1999 interview with UBS and Cr&lit Suisse legal departments.
34. There is one central point for carrying out a 'hold-up' the bank's computer server.
Before the Internet, gangsters could choose their bank counter. In the event of a hold-up,
customers avoided such a bank for a certain time and went to another to carry out their
transactions. Today with Internet, in the event of fraud at the 'electronic counter' i.e., the
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choosing not to publicly reveal the theft as opposed to tarnishing the image
of the bank. Consequently, the banks which have a sufficiently dissuasive
internal police mechanism in place, are less likely to be penetrated, and
suffer fraud losses by means of an internal contact within the bank.
b. ProfessionalHackers
i. Decoding of the Transmission and Algorithm Discovery
As for the professional hackers, they work to "break" the encoding
keys currently used by the banks in order to decode the SSL coding, and to
intercept the data-processing keys authenticating the user.35 These hackers
have the greatest computing power in the world called "CRAY" or
"Supercomputer", and recently spent more than one month, working at full
capacity, to decode such a key. The user does not usually communicate
for more than one hour, and often only for a few minutes with his bank to
transmit his orders, and that the keys change each time (numbers on list to
cross out or Secur ID cards). Thus, the ability to use the Telebanking
account of a customer, without his knowledge, requires the hacker to
record the "conversation" between the customer's computer, and that of
the bank, and then succeed in decoding it. This will give the hacker the
customer's contract number, and password.
Finally, the hacker obtains, through the contact from the bank, the
algorithm which "randomly" generates the numbers on the list to cancel or
that was displayed every minute on the Secur ID card. This enables the
hacker to have all the data-processing keys of the customer. However,
under such a theoretically possible option, the hacker would spend so much
money to get the hardware necessary for the "hacking" that only the
tapping of very significant bank accounts (of at least ten million dollars,6)
would be profitable. Thus, the accounts with lower balances run a
substantially lower risk of being the subject of such fraud.

Internet telebanking site, there is no alternative for there is just one choice. The damage to the
bank's security through press revelations of such a case of fraud would therefore be greater and
would thus provide a strong incentive for the latter to silently pay the victim in order to hush the
matter.

35. The film 'Entrapment' released in the spring of 1999 acted out such a scenario: virtual
'hold-up' of a huge sum of money carried out using very expensive computer equipment.
36. Estimated minimum cost of the baseline equipment a hacker should have.
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ii. Usurpation of the Identity of the Bank by Creatingan Internet Mirror
Site with an Official Fingerprint
A simpler means to obtain the data-processing keys of the customer of
a bank is to set a data-processing trap to the bank.
a) The Printis Differentfrom that of the Bank
Under this scheme, an Internet site identical to that of the bank would
be created but would have a different fingerprint. A customer of the
genuine bank would be requested to go to the trap site. While the
customer is connected to the trap site, the trap site will communicate the
data-processing keys to the hacker.
It is very easy for a hacker to completely recopy the site of a bank.
All that the hacker has to do is: go to the bank's site, copy all the,
displayed pages and then paste them on his trap site. Moreover, in order
to reassure the customer of the security of his information, the trap site of
the hacker will have a fingerprint, and certification of server obtained at
Verisign. [In order to the simulate Verisign certificate, the hacker is only
required to give the impression that his site wants to make an unspecified
electronic trade requiring the use of coded transmissions, and to receive
the credit card number.] Based on this information, Verisign will grant
him the necessary certificate. As soon as the site is installed, the hacker
will be able to send an electronic mail to the target customer of the bank
informing the customer that the address of the Telebanking site has
changed: for example, www.ubs.net instead of www.ubs.ch. If the
customer accepts this electronic mail as true, he will then be connected to
the trap site of the hacker which appears to be the official site of the bank.
The customer will, in all confidence, then transmit his data processing keys
through the trap site when he tries to access the Telebanking service.
Then, the hacker only has to memorize these data-processing keys as they
are being sent. This will give the hacker the ability to immediately use the
data processing keys to connect to the genuine Telebanking site of the
bank.
If the customer uses the number lists, the hacker will not even need to
know the algorithm that generated the information. However, the hacker
will only be able to connect to the Internet site of the bank. The next time
the following number on the list of numbers will be required, and the
hacker will not have access to this information unless he repeats the
operation of the trap site, or obtains the algorithm that generated this
figure. This would be almost impossible unless the hacker has a contact
within the bank. On the other hand, if the customer uses a Secur ID card,
the number obtained will be valid for only one minute. After this time
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period passes, a new number will be generated. This will force the hacker
to get the algorithm of the bank. Yet, in one minute, it is completely
possible to memorize the number, and be immediately connected to the
legitimate bank site. An easily programmable data processing program can
even perform this function automatically. However, this hacking operation
is based on one assumption, that the customer will fail to check the
fingerprint of his bank, and the fingerprint which is communicated by
Verisign during each connection. If the customer regularly verifies this
information, he will realize immediately that he is not communicating with
his bank. The customer will then refuse to communicate his dataprocessing keys, because he detects that he is communicating with a trap
site.
b) When the Fingerprinton the Trap Site is Identical to that of the Bank
If the fingerprint on the trap site is identical to the fingerprint on the
bank's site, the hacker would have a higher success rate in convincing the
customer to transmit his data processing keys through the trap site, because
the customer would have no means of detecting the data processing trap.
In order to get a
This is theoretically possible, but not practical.
fingerprint identical to that of the bank, there are only few means available
to the hacker:
• To "break" into the Internet navigation program of the bank's
customer so that the customer will consider the pirate fingerprint as
genuine; and the bank's customer will see the same certification of the
server when he is connected to the Internet trap site, as that published
officially by the bank. Theoretically possible, this seems difficult.
One should realize technically, Internet navigators are well designed
and not easily modifiable.
* To "break" into the Verisign system itself requires the hacker to
obtain from Verisign an authentic certificate that has the same
fingerprint as the bank. This process seems technically improbable to
the average person because it would require the hacker to have
considerable means. Thus, it is very difficult to "break" the Verisign
system.
iii. Placing Spy Data Processing Virus in the Customer's Computer
A third means of obtaining the bank's customer's information would
be to place a data-processing virus in the customer's computer. This virus
would track the "hidden" memory of the Internet navigator, and then back
up the data-processing keys of the customer in a non-standard file which is
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sent back to the hacker. This is the easiest plan to develop. However, this
plan has problems. This plan would only put the hacker in possession of
two of the three keys necessary: the contract number, and the password.
The numbers intercepted by the data-processing virus would not be useful
to the hacker because they could not be used during the next connection to
the bank since the number changes each time. Thus, the hacker must get
the algorithm generating the number, (a difficult operation, as previously
discussed), and photocopy the list of numbers, or steal a Secur ID card.
These operations are very risky for the data-processing hacker.
Additionally, if the customer erases his "hidden" memory after each
session, as recommended by the bank, it largely decreases the risks of
infection by such a virus.
c. The Customer is Negligent in Taking the Minimum Necessary
Precautions
Lastly, the customer himself represents the largest risk. Indeed, it is
much simpler to steal the data-processing keys of the customer than to try
to guess them, penetrate the hard drive of the bank, or "break" the
encoding system transporting them. Consequently, by choosing an easily
imaginable password; by writing it on any medium; by leaving a trail of
information (such as his contract number or his list of numbers to cross
out, or his Secur ID Card); by not verifying that the official fingerprint of
the bank corresponds with that sent by the Internet site certificate during
each session; or, lastly, by not erasing his hidden memory after each
session, the customer runs a higher risk that his account will be used
without his knowledge.
d. The Small Non-Negligent CustomerRuns Almost No Risk of Fraud
In conclusion, a non-negligent customer of the bank, who takes all the
necessary precautions to ensure his data-processing keys are not
discovered, and checks the fingerprint of the bank during each session has
a very small risk that his account will be subjected to unauthorized use.
While the probability that a hacker will penetrate the account of a nonnegligent customer or that a bank clerk will use his data-processing keys
without his knowledge is very low, the possibility still exists.38

37. Meaning having assets in account lower than the cost of the material needed by a
hacker to pirate one's account. This amount always change depending on the technological
breakthroughs in new increasingly sophisticated hacking gadgets.
38. This is why UBS set up a special security team responsible for constantly analyzing
trends in encryption techniques and the means at the disposal of hackers.
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However, given the high cost of these "hacking" operations, it is
likely that only larger accounts, which contain balances higher than the
cost of the hardware that is necessary for the hacking operations, could be
affected. On the other hand, if the customer is negligent, he runs a
significant risk that his bank account will be used without his knowledge.
4. Tax Risk
A very distinct risk is that tax authorities can discover an undeclared
account of one of their taxpayers. The authorities do not have a significant
budget to commission good hackers, and to provide the hackers with the
necessary hardware to allow them to successfully carry out the hacking
operation.
Thus, the risk that an administration can intercept a
communication between a bank and its customer, and decode if the
communication was ciphered with some powerful coding system such as
SSL is eliminated. This type of operation is illegal as declared in the
Swiss Penal Code in Section 144ss.3 9
However, while the administrations cannot learn the content of the
communication, they can determine the identity of those who are making
the communication with little effort. [With this information, they can
conclude, for example, that Mr. X, living in Zoug, declaring an income,
and a fortune of 0. - - SFr., connects everyday between 2:30 p.m. and
10:00 p.m.' 0 to the Telebanking site of the UBS.] If phone-tapping is
authorized by an examining magistrate due to suspicion that there has been
a tax offense," it would be possible, through phone-tapping, to record the
IP numbers 2 and then question the Internet access provider as to the
identity of its customer. Upon ascertaining the identification of the
customer, the tax authorities can order the customer to request from the
bank they suspect of having an account, a certificate attesting that he is not
the economic beneficiary of any funds. If the customer does not comply
with this request, the tax authorities will threaten the customer with

39. Code penal suisse [Swiss Penal Code], Recueii syst~matique du droit f&lral
[Systematic Collection of the Federal Right] [RS] 311.0 art. 144(a), available at
http:lwww.admin.chlchlflrsl311 0/a144.html [hereinafter Swiss Penal Code, RS 311.0].
40. Opening hour of the American stock exchange.
41. Without the authorization of such a judge, it would be impossible to obtain these
numbers through other means (for example civil procedure) since the federal law on
telecommunication forbids the communication of IP numbers in order to protect the private life
of individuals connected to the Internet.
42. No attribution for each Internet connection and through which can be determined
which customer of the access provider is connected to the Internet, when, where, and for how
long?
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automatic taxation, or other any other measures needed to compensate for
the damage caused by the commission of any tax offense.
Telebanking does not increase this type of a tax risk; on the contrary,
it decreases it. A customer who attempts to defraud the tax department
through facsimile or telephone orders to his bank, or his account manager,
will also be controlled by tax inspectors. These types of transactions make
it easier for the tax inspectors to trace the customer's accounts than if the
customer conducts his Telebanking through the Internet. These types of
transactions will allow tax inspectors to intercept the contents of the
transactions that the customer transmits to his bank by facsimile or
telephone. Normally, the tax inspectors would only be able to determine
the sending, and receiving points of the communication if the customer
places his banking orders through the Internet. Consequently, the tax risk
remains, but is mitigated with Telebanking because the confidentiality of
the information transmitted between the bank, and its customer is almost
guaranteed, which makes only the identity of the recipient, and the sender

discoverable .41

D. Services Offered
Banks currently offer a whole range of services that are accessible via
Telebanking. In the future, all the services offered by a normal bank will
be available on-line, including the following: loan services, leasing
services, financial transactions analysis, Stock Exchange orders, transfers
between accounts, blocking of credit card services, the ability to change
personal information on the account, and the ability to order banknotes.M
This evolution is inevitable for banks in order to prevent losing market
shares in these fields.
However, to date, banks offer the following services:
0 Account information: balance, recent transactions, summaries,
evaluation of deposits, etc.;

43. This also stands out clearly in Credit Suisse's general conditions in telebanking.
Article. 6.2 states, "although data is transmitted in coded package form, those of the sender and
addressee are however not coded.. .consequently, it is possible for a third party to draw
conclusions therefore regarding the existence of a banking relation." Credit Suisse, Application
for

Use

of

Direct

Net

from

Cridit

Suisse,

available

at

http://www.cspb.com/enlonlinebanking/documents/cspbprivatvertrage.pdf (last visited Oct.
19, 2001) (Credit Suisse form no. 114703, version 1.00) [hereinafter Credit Suisse Application].
The last update of the agreement can be downloaded from Credit Suisse website,
http://www.credit-suisse.com, by clicking on "private clients," then "online services," then
"directnet" or *online brokerage" and then by clicking on "download agreement."
44. See generally Yellownet, Yellownet, at http://www.yellownet.ch (last visited Nov. 14,
2001).

82

ILSA Journal of International& ComparativeLaw

[Vol. 8:61

* Payments: Transfer of accounts to bank or postal account in
Switzerland or abroad;
* Stock Exchange: Immediate transmission of purchase orders, and
sales of securities (shares, bonds, and on certain markets, options or
warrants). Generally, the covered stock exchanges are the United
States, London, Milan, and the Swiss stock exchange. In the long
run, all stock exchanges will be covered;
0 File transfer: Banks authorize transmission of global orders
(transfers, Stock Exchange orders, check orders, etc.) written "offline" by means of specific financial software, and then transferred to
the bank in one block in the form of a coded file;
• Quotes: Raw materials, exchange, and stock exchange price
(free). Warning by e-mail or through an SMS message sent on the
natel5 as soon as the price reaches a predefined lower or higher limit;
* News: Financial information published (free) by specialized
agencies on the matter: Reuters, Bloomberg; and
* Support (Hotline): In the event of problems that occur in use,
breakdown or technical disturbances, the banks usually provide the
customer with a special telephone that is permanently accessible.
This provides the customer with reassurance, and assists him in
solving any possible problems.
E. Advantages/Disadvantages
1. Advantages
a. Cost
The advantageous cost of the operations is incontestably the most
solid argument supporting the development of Telebanking. The overhead
is low and all the commissions are reduced substantially (50% on the
transfers and a percentage of reduction increasing proportionally with the
amount of the transaction for the Stock Exchange orders).
b. Speed
Secondly, it is undeniable that a transaction transmitted through
Telebanking will be carried out more quickly than a normal transaction
because it removes a human being from the intermediary role, and replaces
him with a computer that transmits the order directly to the trader's
45

Swiss word for cellular telephone.
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assignee. Except in the case of a computer breakdown, the customer will
find it beneficial to place his order through a Telebanking service because
this will enable him to avoid any delays due to the fault of the intermediary
[receipt of several orders at the same time from several different customers
by the intermediary, or absence of the intermediary at the time of receipt
of the order, or at the time the order is transmitted].
c. Independence
Telebanking allows the customer to place his orders from anywhere.
In most countries today, there is a computer within the vicinity that the
customer can use to connect to the Internet; and which has the basic
configuration necessary to place these orders.
d. Time Flexibility
Lastly, the customer can place orders at his convenience, even outside
the normal business hours of the bank. This gives the customer the ability
to conduct day trading on markets like the United States (open between
2:30 p.m. and 10:00 p.m., Swiss time) or Japan. Telebanking allows the
customers to make stock exchange transactions professionally.47 Before
telebanking, this ability was reserved only to the large account holders of
the bank; now, this service is accessible to both large and small account
holders.
2. Disadvantages
a. Customers Who Lack Minimum Data-ProcessingKnowledge
In order to use a Telebanking service, it is necessary for a customer to
know how to use a computer, a mouse and to have minimum knowledge
about browsing. Sometimes, this can block many potential customers
interested in telebanking, because they are afraid of the idea of using a
computer. However, most banks try to facilitate access to this service by
simplifying, to the extent possible, the operations in order to allow all
potential customers to use this service.

46.

Buying and reselling the same day.

47. Before telebanking, "small customers" of the bank needed to call the bank during
business hours to place their orders unless they had a special "phone banking" contract offered
recently as an intermediate and supplementary measure to telebanking. The closing hour varied
between 4:00 p.m. and 5:00 p.m., so it was virtually impossible for the customer to place an
order while studying the market at the time of planning the order given that the American market
opened its doors at 3:30 p.m. (Swiss time).
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b. Security
It is clear that a risk of unauthorized use of a customer's bank account
by an unauthorized third party will exist either, through a Telebanking
transaction, or during a transaction carried out by normal means.
However, if the customer follows the instructions of the bank by taking the
necessary precautions, this risk will be greatly reduced. Additionally, it
should not be forgotten that when one communicates with his bank through
traditional means, such as the telephone, fax or mail, there is also a risk of
interception of the transaction. No transmission system is completely
secure. The hold-up of the Post Office of Fraumunster in Zurich, the
recent attack of a mail train in French-speaking Switzerland, and the many
scandals related to illegal tapping demonstrate that there is always a risk of
interception. Lastly, it is obvious that the telephone networks where words
are exchanged are more exposed to phone-tapping than those where coded
information (with a very high degree of security) is exchanged. Yet, the
banks try to limit, or even try to exclude any responsibility in the event of
hacking. We will analyze further the validity of the general conditions of
the banks used to limit their responsibility in the event of hacking. In my
opinion, certain limitations of responsibility are highly subject to criticism,
are disproportionate, and thus, make them illegal.
Il.

FORMATION OF THE CONTRACT

A. In General
Generally, offer and acceptance form a contract.
One of the
protagonists presents to the other party an offer, i.e. the firm proposal to
create a contract. This requires the recipient of the offer to accept the
offer, refuse the offer or formulate a counter-offer. The conjunction of the
offer, and acceptance creates the assent,43 which results in the formation of
a contract. This practice introduced the system of the "request for offers" 9
or "the invitation to make an offer" ° into this procedure. The "request for
offer" proceeds in the following manner: one of contracting parties sends
to the other a pre-formulated contract. If the recipient of this "request of
offer" signs it, and returns it to the sender, the party will have tendered an
offer for the acceptance of the other contracting party.

48. PIERRE ENGEL, TRAITI DE DROIT DES OBLIGATIONS [CONTRACTS LAW], p. 192s
(1997)
49. DANIEL GUGGENHEIM, 1 LE DROIT SUISSE DES CONTRACTS: PRINCIPES GINIRAUX
[GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF SWISS CONTRACT LAW]105 (1991).

50. PIERRE TERCIER, 469 LE DROrr DES OBLIGATIONS [CONTRACTS LAW] 89 (1996).
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B. Chronology of the Signature of a Telebanking Contract
Initially, the customer receives a "request of offer" from his bank
containing the general conditions which are pre-formulated by the bank.
The "request for offer" can be in response to a request from the customer,
or the result of a marketing campaign of the bank. At this stage, the
parties are not legally bound under the terms of 7 al.11 CO1. Secondly, the
prospective customer signs, and returns to the bank the document, which
constitutes an offer, and legally binds him within the meaning of the
Article. Thirdly, the bank signs the contract, and returns it to the
customer with the data-processing keys that will enable him to start using
the telebanking service. This represents the bank's acceptance and forms a
legal contract.
C. General Conditions
1. Concept
According to a concept retained by the Swiss legislature of 1881, a
contract is negotiated, and discussed point by point. This practice often
corresponds to reality. However, this practice has developed a new legal
concept known as "contracts of adhesion": one of the parties proposes a
pre-formatted contract to which the other can only adhere. These contracts
contain general provisions.
These provisions are pre-formulated
contractual clauses that describe in a general way, all, or part of the
provisions contained in possible contracts. These provisions are not, in
themselves, a source of the law of the contract; they are autonomous rules
that have meaning only if the parties decide to integrate them into their
contract. They are written in an abstract way, and have value only if they
are accepted.
This hybrid character raises inherent difficulties, particularly in their
interpretation. It should be noted that these general provisions can possibly
be used to describe usual practices. The judge could be inspired to
interpret, or supplement, a contract, provided that the contract is not the
expression of a unilateral design. 2 However, the introduction of these
general provisions limits contractual freedom, since the customer's

51. See Loi f~ddrale compltant le Code civil suisse, Livre cinquitme: Droit des
obligations [Federal Law Supplementing the Swiss Civil Code, Fifth Book:
Code of
Obligations], Recueil systdmatique du droit f6ddral [Systematic Collection of the Federal Right]
[RS) 220 art. 2, available at http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/rs/220/a2.html [hereinafter Code of
Obligations].
52. PIERRE TERCIER, 468 LE DROIT DES OBLIGATIONS [CONTRACTS LAW] 116 (1996)
[hereinafter 468 LE DROIT DE OBLIGATIONS].
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contract contain provisions which were not discussed."3 For this reason,
general provisions will not receive an extensive interpretation; instead,
these provisions will be given a rather restrictive interpretation. Because
of their function in the economic life of the customer, the general
provisions should not be interpreted literally. It is necessary to examine,
on a case-by-case basis, the meaning, and goal of the provision in
question. If, after such an interpretation, the disputed provision still
remains unclear, this lack of clarity will be interpreted to the detriment of
the contracting party who wrote the provision.51
2. The Inclusion of General Conditions in a Contractual Banking
Relationship
To protect the party forced to adhere completely to the general
provisions of a telebanking contract, without being able to negotiate them,
Swiss Law stated that there is a need for the integration of these general
provisions into the contract. Indeed, in order for it to be legally valid,
both parties must agree that the general provisions supplement are
integrated in the agreement which they made, thereby forming an integral
part of the contract. There is total integration when the parties accept the
general provisions' conditions without them ("in block"), even if they have
taken note of them. This process is, per se, illicit: it is not necessary that
the parties knew of the contents of the provisions. The only requirement is
that the text be available, and accessible to the parties. However, this
process involves increased risks. 5
3. General Conditions within the Framework of the Telebanking
Contract
The general provisions of the telebanking contract are completely
formulated by the bank, and they will be interpreted against the bank by
the judge in the event of a dispute. Moreover, since the customer does not
have the possibility of discussing the general provisions with the bank,
there is total integration of the provisions. This increases risks for the
customer who is forced to accept these provisions, that are sometimes very
unfavorable to him, if he wants to carry out his banking operations via
telebanking. The validity of the contents of these general provisions will

53.

DANIEL GUGGENHEIM, LES CONTRACTS DE LA PRATIQUE BANCAIRE SUISSE [SWISS

BANKING CONTRACTS LAW] 58 (2d ed. 1993); 468 LE DROIT DE OBLIGATIONS, supra note 52,

at 59.

54. 468 LE DROIT DE OBLIGATIONS, supra note 52, at 61.
55.

PIERRE TERCIER, 646 LE DROrr DES OBLIGATIONS [CONTRACTS LAW] 117 (1996).
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be addressed during the analysis of the responsibility of the bank contained
in chapter VI of this article.
D. Offer
1. Definitions and Concepts
The offer is the first demonstration of will, regardless of the author.
It is characterized by the fact that a person, the "pollicitant," proposes to
another a contract, making its creation dependent only on the acceptance of
the other party.5' One characteristic of an offer is that it binds its author.
The term describing this characteristic is the "obligatory rule of the offer."
The offeror puts the recipient in a position to create a contract by
acceptance, which is the exercise of a general formative right."
The offer comprises three distinct features:
* It is addressed to the recipient, i.e. to a determined or unspecified
person;
" It expresses a legal will to create contract; and
* It should contain all the essential terms of the proposed
contract.58
2. Contents
a. Reciprocal and Concordant
The offer and acceptance are governed by Article 3 of the Obligation
Code [CO] and must be reciprocal and concordant, which results from
Article 1 CO. 9 They are reciprocal when the recipient of both the offer
and acceptance is the author of the other. They are concordant when they
express the assent of the parties to the same contract terms.b. Essential Elements of the Contract
For there to be assent, the first necessary element is that the two
parties must have agreed on the essential points of the contract. The
56. PIERRE TERCIER, 467 LE DROIT DES OBLIGATIONS [CONTRACTS LAW] 89 (1996).
57. PIERRE ENGEL, 42 TRAITI DE DROIT DES OBLIGATIONS [CONTRACTS LAW] 194
(1997).
58. Id. at 193.
59. See

generally

Code

of

http:lwww.admin.ch/ch/f/rs/220/al.html.

Obligations,

available at http:llwww.admin.ch/ch/f/rs/220/a3.html.
60.

Id. at 194.

RS

220

art.

1,

available

at

See also Code of Obligations, RS 220 art. 3,
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essential points of the contract are those that must be understood in the
"spirit of the parties" so that one is presented with a homogeneous, and
autonomous agreement.
There are two kinds of essential elements: Objectively essential
elements, and subjectively essential elements.
1) Objectively essential elements:
a) Definition
Objectively essential elements are the elements that should be included
to individualize the contract. It is a matter of ascertaining the parties
involved in the transaction, and the services that each will promise to
perform. If an agreement cannot be reached, there is no contract and the
judge cannot find that there is a contract when there clearly is a lack
thereof.
b) Telebanking Contract
Whether the telebanking contract contains the essential elements
which make the contract sufficient is determined as follows:
(i) Determination of the parties concerned
A link must exist between Mr. X and bank Y. If this link is not
established, then the parties are not defined. Consequently, Mr. X must be
a customer of bank Y; and to obtain this status, he must have opened an
account, and have deposited a minimum amount of funds in that bank.
(ii) The essential obligations of the two parties
The bank:
(1) Has an obligation to communicate and process, within a
reasonable time, the orders placed by its customer through the
Internet or to a qualified person within the bank.
(2) Has an obligation to take the necessary steps to secure as much of
the data-processing network of the bank receiving the orders of the
customer.
(3) Has an obligation to use the most advanced techniques of
encoding, and to update them regularly in order to communicate with
the customer in a private, and confidential way.
The customer:
(1) Has an obligation to agree to be bound by the orders transmitted
to his bank through the Internet.
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(2) Has an obligation to be quick in transmitting the data-processing
keys given to him by the bank in order to prevent their fraudulent use
by an unauthorized third party to the detriment of the customer or the
bank, which will occur if there is discovery of the coding algorithm.
2) Subjectively essential elements
Subjectively essential elements in a contract are secondary elements,
but are elements which the parties have, from the start, considered as a
condition of their agreement. Although subjectively essential elements are
not a necessary element of the contract, one party, or both, can make them
a condition of their contract. If they cannot agree, there is no assent and
the judge cannot make a finding that there was assent. In order to be part
of the agreement between the parties, the contents of the contract must be
sufficiently defined, or at least, sufficiently determinable. The debtor must
be able to identify the commitment that he is undertaking. As for
determinability, it can rise from objective criteria (e.g. the stock exchange
price on a given date) or the choice of a third party, or a party to the
contract, insofar as the method does not constitute an excessive restraint on
the freedom of the debtor (cf. Article 27 Civil Code [CC])61 . It goes
without saying that the parties can never predict, and regulate, all the
elements of their contract. Should a dispute occur, the terms of the
contract will be reviewed to attempt to resolve the dispute, and it will be
up to the judge whether to supplement the contract. The absence, of
subjectively essential provisions in telebanking contracts is explained by
the procedure of request for offers, which does not give room for
negotiation of any other possible additional provisions desired by one of
the parties. However, it is theoretically possible to consider a situation
where there is an individualized telebanking contract for each customer
allowing the customer to remove or add the clauses. This would make it
possible for the contract to have the subjectively essential clauses desired
by the bank's customer. However, this possibility is not easy in practice,
because it would considerably burden the bank with additional work, and
costs in order to offer this option. This conflicts with the prime function
of telebanking, which is to reduce the bank's costs and the customer's
costs. Moreover, this practice would also make it necessary to create a
specialized legal department equipped with many lawyers who are able to
analyze, and address the possible disputes that could arise under each
contract.
61. Cf. Code civil suisse [Swiss Civil Code], Recueil syst6matique du droit f&lral
[Systematic Collection of the Federal Right] [RS] 210 art. 27,
available at
http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/rs/210/a27.html [hereinafter Swiss Civil Code].
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3. Form
The form of the offer should comply with the format provided for by
Swiss Law (Article 11 through 16 of the Obligation Code [CO]).6 Swiss
Law confirms the principle of the freedom of the parties to choose the
form of the contract. This means that, except when contrary legal
provisions exist, the parties are free to select the form that they wish to
give to their contract.
However, Article 16 CO provides that when parties have agreed to
use a specific contract form, which is not required by law, the parties will
only be bound after the specific contract form is created.63 If a written
form is required, without a more precise indication, the parties must
observe any provisions relating to written contracts, when the law so
requires.
Moreover, according to Article 13 of the CO, the telebanking
contract, which is required by law to be in written form, must be signed by
all parties upon whom it imposes obligations.64 If the law does not provide
otherwise, a letter or a telegram is equivalent to a written contract,
provided that the letter or telegram contains the signature of the parties to
the contract.
Lastly, according to Article 14 CO, the signature must be handwritten
by the parties to the contract.65 A signature that proceeds from some
mechanical means will be considered sufficient only in cases where it is
allowed by usage, such as when it entails signing written value papers in
great numbers. We think for the moment, there is no usage in banking
matters obliging to use the written form. However, the procedures
required within the framework of the telebanking contract confirm the
principle of the requirement that the contract be in the written form. In
fact, the bank sends to its customer a pre-formulated contract containing
general provisions to be signed and returned to the bank.
It is interesting to note that although a "request for offer" is
considered not to have any legal consequences, as long as it is not quoted,
it considerably restricts the freedom of the contracting party's choice as to
the form of the contract.

62. See generally Swiss Civil Code, RS 210 arts. 11-16, available at
http:lwww.admin.chlchlflrsl21l0index.html; see also Engel, supra note 57, at 196.
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E. Acceptance
1. Definitions and Concepts
Acceptance is an affirmative response to an offer or an act by which
the recipient of the offer expresses the will to create a contract in
accordance with the offer. The acceptor, in our case, the customer of the
bank, has the will to declare and sign the contract. In order to be valid,
the acceptance must be addressed to the offeror (or to its representative),
i.e. at the bank, under the terms, or the requirement, of the reciprocity of
the declarations of the will to create a contract. Because the acceptance is
an act subject to approval, it is not required to state the essential points of
the contract, since it corresponds exactly to the offer that will contain such
points."
2. Contents
The acceptance must have the same contents as the offer. If not, the
acceptance will not be an acceptance, but a new offer, provided that the
acceptance contains the essential elements of a new contract. 7 This
situation is, however, not very probable in a telebanking contract. Indeed,
it is the bank that wrote the offer, and the customer cannot modify the
offer. The customer must agree "in block" to all the terms of the contract
and does not have the ability to negotiate them. This means that the
customer, through acceptance, is restricted to agreeing to the offer made to
him by the bank. Consequently, the telebanking contract is created as soon
as the acceptance is forwarded (Article 10 al. I CO).68
In a telebanking contract, the bank sometimes receives an offer from a
potential customer. If the bank is interested in contracting with the
potential customer, it must return a copy of the contract signed by the
authorized individuals, along with the data-processing keys that will make
it possible for the customer to use the bank's telebanking services. There
can be a time lapse between the mailing of the contract by the offeror, and
the reception of the data-processing keys. Crddit Suisse and UBS take
between two and three weeks to complete the process.
However, United States banks like E-trade, Schwab, or Datek offer a
free service without having accepted the contract, as a whole. For
example, at these banks the customer must print the "request for offer"

66.
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and then the bank will instantly give to him the data-processing keys,
through the Internet. This will make it possible to access the site
immediately, and profit from its free services (stock exchange price on
line, information of Reuters, etc.). At this point, the bank has not yet
formally accepted the contract, it must still receive the contract, review it
and sign it, then return it to the customer. Prior to formal acceptance of
the contract, the bank provides free services to the customer.
However, if a Swiss bank, governed by Swiss law, decided to do the
same, the fact that the bank offered services without having received the
offer of its customer, is not enough to perfect the telebanking contract. At
this point, the customer has not yet given any funds to the bank, which is
an essential element of the contract. Consequently, the contract would be
perfect only when the bank has received funds from the customer, and
accepted the customer's offer by sending a signed document to the
customer.
This is why, in practice, the banks communicate to the customer their
banking coordinates, as well as his new account number, only so the
customer can deposit funds only after they have received an offer, and
accepted it. From that point, there is only one element lacking to create a
valid contract: the surrender of the customer's funds to the bank.
3. Form
We have seen that Swiss Law confirms the principle of freedom to
choose the contractual form. Consequently, unless a special form is
imposed or reserved, acceptance can be given in any form (see Article 1 11
of the CO).69
Since a telebanking contract is a contract of adhesion, which requires
it to be in writing, the offer and acceptance must also be made in writing.
IV. QUALIFICATION OF THE CONTRACT
A. Is the Telebanking Contracta Production Contract?
1. Essential Elements of the Production Contract
According to Article 363 CO, a production contract is a contract by
which one of the parties (the Contractor) pledges to carry out work, for a
price that the other party (the Contracting authority) promises to pay him.'0

69. PIERRE TERCIER, 478 LE DROIT DES OBLIGATIONS [THE LAW OF CONTRACTS] 90
(1996) [hereinafter 478 LE DROIT DES OBLIGATIONS]. See also Code of Obligations, RS 220 art.
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Thus, the contract necessarily supposes:
0 That a party pledges to pay a remuneration; if the contract is
made on a purely free basis, we depart from the purview of the
production contract; and
* that the other party will pledge to produce and deliver work; this
7
is the characteristic of the service. '
Indeed, according to a ruling of the federal Swiss court on February
16, 1938, the contract by which a person hires an architect to work out
projects, and plans for remuneration, without entrusting him with another
later activity is, in general, a production contract. When work is provided
free, it can be a question of a mandate only. The main aspect of a
production contract is that the contractor promises work, that is the result
of an activity; however, to the characteristics of the mandate, allows the
assignee to only commit himself to manage a business, or render services:
a result which is not guaranteed. The mandate relates to the contractual
relations, presupposing a great reciprocal confidence between parties
throughout its duration; so much, that one party cannot impose on the
other an undesired continuation of the contract. On the contrary, the
production contract, which cannot be canceled at any time by the
contractor, though it can be by the Contracting Authority, in general, takes
into account the legitimate interest that the contractors have with respect to
their commitments for the long term execution of a work.
2. Possible Applications to the Telebanking Contract
One could think that the telebanking contract is a production contract.
Indeed, if the transmission of the data is free today, it may perhaps change
tomorrow. Moreover, one could expect that the bank guarantees the
execution of the orders, which are transmitted to it, and consequently, it
pledges a result. Lastly, one could think that another principal function of
the bank would be to guarantee security at the time of the communication
of information through the Internet. However we will see in the following
paragraph why we consider that improbable.
3. Exclusion of the Production contract
a. Absence of the Obligation of Price
The telebanking contract does not meet the first essential condition of
the production contract. It is, indeed, not possible to have a production
contract which is free. The telebanking contract being per definition free,
71.
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does not meet the requirements for a production contract and, this is not
likely to change in the future.
Indeed, the bank encourages it's customers to use telebanking. This
service enables it to save money. Especially, because the bank does not
need to pay employees to act as an intermediary between the customer and
the orderer. However, this service would be less enticing to the customer
if the service became a paid service.
Moreover, historically the first experiments of telebanking in
Switzerland were a failure because this service, called Videotex, was paid.
On the other hand the, Minitel in France which also promotes telebanking,
and the Internet today, succeeded in gaining the enthusiasm of the public
by the simple fact that the Videotex terminals were given to the public. A
marketing strategy, which incorporated free distribution of minitel, led to
the success of this type of service in France.
Consequently, this essential condition of a production contract is not
met today, and does not appear that it will be in the future. Because this
condition is necessary, it is enough to disallow the finding of a production
contract. However, in order to buttress the argument for the improbable
case where telebanking would become a paid service in the future, we will
analyze the second condition, obligation of results.
b. Absence of the Obligation of Results
First, the telebanking contract merely regulates the transmission of the
customer's commands to the bank, and fails to regulate the execution of the
commands controlled by specific contracts, such as the allocation for credit
transfer or the factorage contract on Stock Exchange orders. Moreover
since these are mandated contracts, they do not involve the obligation of
results.
Secondly, the bank cannot, for technical reasons, guarantee total
security at the time of the data-processing communication with it's
customer through the Internet. All kinds of problems can, occur, such as:
deformation leading to false information on the network; a breakdown
linked, for example, to the Year 2000 "bug"; or another type of virus.
This is why banks usually deny any responsibility for the possibility
of poor functioning of their data-processing network at the time of
execution of the telebanking contract. This article will determine whether
this total exemption is contrary to Article 20 CO;1 2 and whether too much
liability is being shifted to the customer, who is responsible for any
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problems that occur, through no fault of the customer. The banks do not
want to take the risk of incurring the obligation to make its electronic
communications with it's customer safer. As a result, there is no
obligation in the telebanking contract. This also disqualifies the cbntract as
a production contract.

B. The Mandate Contract
a.

1. Sources
Code of Obligations

The mandate contract is governed by Art. 394-418v CO 3
b. General Conditions
Moreover, the legal rules applicable to the mandate apply primarily to
the enacting of instruments, and the parties may take exception to it. For
example, they can do this by adopting general conditions. This is a
common practice, especially in the banking sector.7'
c. Banking Customs
Lastly, insofar as the law refers thereto, the practices and customs are
also an indirect source of law. These references are comparatively
numerous in mandate law.75
Customs are an integral part of the contract because the parties either
refer to it expressly or tacitly, or simply by taking part in an activity which
is dominated by such customs. Customs make it possible to interpret, and
supplement the contract entered into with the bank. In practice, this forms
a part of the normal banking operations. Thus, one must admit that there
is a procedure for handling the payments of a customer, who opens an
account in a bank. Similarly, there also exists a practice that forces the
bank, within the framework of a contract of deposit of titles, to undertake
routine administrative acts.76 Thus, by signing a telebanking contract, the
bank, and the customer tacitly allow the integration of these customs in the
contract.

73. See generally Code of Obligations, RS 220 art. 394-418, available at
http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/rs/220/index2.html (discussing definitions, effects of the contract,
repudiation, revocation, and other contractual governing principles).
74. PIERRE TERCIER, 3920 LES CONTRACTS SPtCIAUX [SPECIFIC CONTRACTS LAW] 479
(1995).
75.

Id. at 480.

76. DANIEL GUGGENHEIM, LES CONTRACTS DE LA PRATIQUE BANCAIRE SUISSE [SWISS
BANKING CONTRACTS] (2d ed. 1993).
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2. Definition
The mandate is a contract where a person agrees to render services
for the interest of another in accordance with their will insofar as the
conditions of another contract are not carried out."

According to the Swiss definition, the mandate is an obligationsgenerating contract that is subject to cases where the mandate refers to only
one specified service and is a contract similar to a duration contract. In
theory, the mandate contract is formed, subject to payment. Therefore, it
becomes a bilateral contract because two services are offered in an
exchange-type relationship. Because of the mandate's origin, it is viewed
as a "bare contract." Therefore, it is an imperfected bilateral contract,
because the assignee alone assumes the principal obligation; and, the
78
employer is bound only to secondary duties.

3. Characteristic Elements
Its definition reveals that, within the framework of the telebanking
contract, the mandate contract is comprised of three characteristic
elements. The bank has the duty to:
* Take all necessary steps in order to communicate, within a
reasonable time, the orders transmitted by its customer, through the
Internet, to the computer, or to the person in the bank who is
qualified to handle them;
o Take all necessary steps to provide the highest security to the
Bank's data-processing network, which receives the customer's
commands; and
* Use the most advanced techniques of encoding, and update them
frequently in order to communicate with the customer in a private,
and confidential manner.
These three elements highlight the obligations of the bank, which
is a feature of the mandate contract, and an essential element of the
production contract.
a. Transmission of Orders to the Executant within a Reasonable Time
Another essential characteristic of the telebanking contract concerns
the orders transmitted to the bank. It is crucial that the operation requested
77.
(1995).

PIERRE TERCIER, 3923 LES CONTRACTS SPkCIAUX [SPECIFIC CONTRACTS LAW] 480

78. See generally PIERRE TERCIER, 3926-3928 LES CONTRACTS SPPCIAUX [SPECIFIC
CONTRACTS LAW] 480 (1995).
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by the customer, whether it be a sale or purchase order for quoted stock or
a simple payment, be received correctly, and that it be carried out within
an acceptable time frame by either the computer 9, or the person
responsible for carrying out.
b. Security of the Bank's Data-ProcessingNetwork
The bank must do everything possible to guarantee its customer a
maximum-security data-processing network through continuous investment
However, it would be
in systems with state-of-the-art technology.
unrealistic to require a guarantee of absolute security simply because such
a degree of security does not exist. Research advances at exponential
speeds, making it always possible to open new horizons in "foolproof
systems."
Security of the Encoded Communication between the Bank and its
Customer
The bank must permanently update the encoding technique that is used
to communicate with it's customer in order to try to provide the most
confidential communication possible. However, total confidentiality is
impossible to guarantee. The laws limiting encoding that have been
adopted in a growing number of countries, could prevent the bank from
following technological developments as closely as may be desired. If a
law prohibiting the encoding of data higher than a certain figure were
adopted in Switzerland,80 the banks would be bound by this higher legal
standard; and could only adapt their encoding upon the whims of
legislative developments, which are lagging in relation to technological
developments.
c.

4. Form
There is no special provision regulating the form of the mandate
contract. Consequently, the mandate contract is not subject to any special
form,"1 even when the mandate requires the completion of a legal document
subjected to a particular form. A mandate contract is subjected to the

79. Orders transmitted by the customer linked to NASDAQ, the United States stock
market shall be entered into his bank's computer system and then transmitted automatically to the
stock exchange computer system via the bank's computer system, thereby eliminating the human
execution.
80. This type of law exists in France, New Zealand, Singapore, the United States and
other countries.
at
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The telebanking

5. End of the Contract
a. In General
In ordinary cases, the contract ends when the assignee has rendered
all the required services. The execution of the contract is, therefore, the
extinction of the contract. The parties can provide for separate extinction
clauses in their contract; they can subject it to the expiration of a time
period, or to a term, or condition. In Articles 404 and 405, the
Obligations Code [CO] outlines some extraordinary clauses, the most
significant being a termination without reasons.Y
b. Termination without Reasons
Under the marginal note "Revocation and repudiation," Article 404 al
I CO provides that the mandate may be repudiated or revoked at any
time. 13 This text remains one of the most discussed in contract law, and
recently, a new reading of it was proposed. The original reading was
drawn from the origin of the rule, and comparison with foreign law. This
unconditional right of cancellation draws its prime significance from the
fact that each party has the capacity to terminate the contract. That means
that the debtor may not be forced to render the service by resorting to the
rules of forcible distraint. This principle is dictated by the nature of the
obligation, which implies a personal activity.? Consequently, the bank and
customer can revoke the mandate at any time.
c. Problem of Compensation
Under the terms of Article 404 al. II CO, "the party which revokes or
repudiates the contract at an inappropriate time, must compensate the other
for the damage that it causes him."85 The idea is that, in certain
circumstances, the party who terminates the contract should compensate
the other party to correct for the termination's effects. This compensation
depends on the condition that the cancellation interferes with at an
inopportune moment. The formula is too restrictive because it utilizes only
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art.
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the time factor. The federal Court admits that, in situations where the
cancellation causes the other party particular disadvantages, the condition
must be carried out as soon as the cancellation without a valid reason is
given. Consequently, the following two conditions must be met:
(1) Termination causes a damage because of the time when it
intervenes, and because of the measures taken by the other party. For
the assignee, it is a question of measures taken and expenses incurred
to execute a given mandate. For the employer, it is a question of
new, and unexpected expenditures that he must incur to look for a
new assignee."
(2) The party terminating the contract did not give the other any valid
reason for doing so. In other words, if there is a just reason for
cancellation, repair or compensation is excluded.'
When these conditions are met, the party which terminates the
contract must repair the damage caused by the inappropriate cancellation,
and not by the termination as such. The federal Court concluded that the
question must be more broad than one of repairing unnecessarily incurred
expenditures and expenses. On the other hand, it is out of the question to
claim an allowance for loss of profit. However, in practice, parties
frequently decide, contractually and in advance, to fix the amount of the
compensation due. This is acceptable, but the amount selected must be
commensurate with the damage which can be repaired. Otherwise, the
provision places an excessive restriction on the right to terminate.
d. Other ExtraordinaryCauses
The contract can end for other extraordinary causes. A contract for
personal services, for example, may become extinct through one of these
events:
0 the death of one of the parties, is a situation which should be
likened to the dissolution of a legal entity. When the mandate must be
executed after the death of the assignee, this poses a particular
problem: whether it would be necessary as an extension of Article
245 II of the CO to respect the forms of the provisions on account of
death;88

86. See generally PIERRE TERCIER, 4149-4157 LES CONTRACTS SPICIAUX [SPECIFIC
CONTRACTS LAW] 507 (1995).
87.

Id.

88. 478 LE DROIT DES OBLIGATIONS, supra note 69, at 90. See also Code of Obligations,
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100 ILSA Journalof International& ComparativeLaw

[Vol. 8:61

0

incapacity, as of the moment when the party loses the exercise of
its civil rights; and
*

bankruptcy of a party, even if the procedure is later suspended.
It will be recalled that each party may, in addition, terminate the
contract if he has a just reason-in particular, if his partner committed a
fault which destroys the relationship of confidence. The precision is
hardly worth anything in this field because the right of termination
provided for in Article 404 CO applies only to the conditional obligation to
compensate the party.89
e. Liquidation of the Contract
At the moment when a clause of extinction intervenes, the contractual
relationship ends. The parties are released from any obligation and can no
longer claim any rights. The law reserves two cases that produce a kind of
temporary extension of the contract. First, by virtue of Article 405 al. II
CO, "If the extinction of the mandate jeopardizes the interests of the
employer, the assignee, his heirs or his representatives are bound to
continue management until the employee, his heirs or his representative are
able to supply it themselves. "9 When an extraordinary clause of extinction
(other than termination) intervenes, the contract ends automatically. Such
a situation could be prejudicial to the employer because the rules of good
faith obligate the assignee or his rightful claimants to take precautionary
This is business
measures independent of any contractual relation.
management (Article 419 CO) imposed by the law, and entirely subject to
the rules of the mandate. 9' Second, under the terms of Article 406 CO,
"the employer or his rightful claimant shall be bound as though the
mandate still existed, to the operations which the assignee performed
before being informed of the extinction of the mandate."92
Because termination takes effect in the future, the parties are bound
by all the obligations resulting from the contract. The assignee must
account for, and restore what he received (Article 400 of the CO).91 The
employer must pay, in accordance with the contract, the fees he owes for

89. See Code of Obligations, RS 220 art. 404(D)(I)(1)(2).
90. Code of Obligations, RS 220 art. 405(2)(2).
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the operations which were carried out9 insofar as the mandate is not free.
Within the framework of the telebanking contract, the bank could not
rightfully liquidate the contract knowing that the contract's extinction
would imperil the interests of the customer or his heirs.
For example, take the case of a transfer order transmitted by a
The customer dies shortly
customer to his bank via telebanking.
thereafter. The bank will not be able to refuse to make the transfer to the
executant, because the customer is deceased. More importantly, since
such a situation has little chance of occurring. The transmission of the
orders to the executant, directed by the bank's computer, is generally done
very quickly.
V.

TELEBANKING-RELATED SERVICES

The telebanking contract deals exclusively with the exchange of
During their
instructions between the customer, and his bank.
implementation, such instructions shall be governed by the usual contracts,
such as those in the giro banking and in the commission business. The
number of services proposed by the bank should be expected to increase
markedly in the future. Indeed, we do not see why the bank would refuse
to further profit by eliminating middlemen: for example, in the areas of
credit (loan agreement), and consulting (factorage contract). If during the
transmission of instructions, the bank or the customer breaches the
contract, the provisions of the mandate related to telebanking shall apply.
However, if the trader erroneously carries out the order in which he
receives the applicable provisions, the special contract rubric applies to any
analysis of bank, and customer responsibility. We will, however, briefly
analyze the two types of contracts involved, along with the telebanking
procedures that are conducted after transactions have been transmitted to
the bank.

A. The GiroBanking Contract
1. Definition
When a customer opens an account with a bank, and deposits money
on this account, he may wish to make only one deposit. He may also like
the bank to service payments. In that case, the customer will open a
current account. This establishes a tacit contract in which the bank will
handle the customer's payments through commercial documents instead of

94. See PIERRE TERCIER, 4159-4167 LES CONTRACTS SP-CIAUX [SPECIFIC CONTRACTS

LAW] 508-509 (1995).
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cash. This is the giro-banking contract, to be distinguished from the
current account itself.
2. Legal Nature
Thus, the concluded contract thus concluded should be referred to as a
long duration general mandate. The bank must accept, and carry out the
customer's instructions. The interventions of the customer, called payment
order or transfer order allowance in the banking practice, are not a new
contract. They are merely instructions the customer gives the bank to
carry out a giro banking contract.
In other words, the customer's
instructions are classified under the giro banking contract framework.
When the customer makes out a payment order, he is asking his bank
to pay a certain sum of money to a third party. The third party can be
either a customer of this bank, or a customer of another bank. The
recipient of the payment order will be able to receive this amount in his
own name. The legal situation will be somewhat different depending on
whether the recipient is a customer of the same bank, or of another bank.
B. FactorageContract
1.. Definition
When the customer asks his bank to buy or sell stock certificates, the
bank deducts a factorage charge. The charge may be fixed," or it may be
proportional to the amount of the transaction.'6
2. Legal Nature
The factorage contract, on the sale side, is the contract where a
person undertakes in his name, but on" behalf of another, to sell or
purchase movable or bills, with entitlement to a fee." This definition
reveals that such a contract has the following three characteristics:
The service promised by the commission assignee shall
consist of the sale, purchase, and possibly the exchange of
certain goods. The sale shall relate to movable goods or
bills. Where other goods are involved, the ordinary rules
of the mandate shall be applied. The commission assignee
shall make this purchase or this sale in his own name, and

95.
96.
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not in that of the principal.
representative .8
VI.

He is thus an indirect

OBLIGATIONS OF THE PARTIES

A. Obligations of the Assignee
The obligations of the assignee (the bank) with respect to the principal
(the customer) within the framework of the telebanking contract are of
three main types:
(1) To provide the customer the widest possible access to the bank's
protected data-processing network by guaranteeing the highest possible
confidentiality of communication (thanks to the permanent update of
the encoding technique used).
(2)

To transmit the customer's orders, within a reasonable time, to the
bank staff qualified to carry them out.

(3)

To inform the customer as quickly as possible of any disturbance of
service: stoppage, slow down in activity, interruption, modification of
tariffs, or addition of new services.
To use the general terminology of the mandate contract business,
these three principal obligations are distributed as follows:
1. Obligation to Render Service
a. Principles
According to Article 396 I of the CO, the scope of the mandate shall,
unless otherwise expressly fixed by the convention, be determined by the
nature of the business to which it relates."
b. Obligationsarisingfrom a Convention
The scope of the contract is initially determined by the convention,
reserved by Article 396 1 of the CO. Thus, the substance of the contract is
crucial. In this context, the full import of the assignee's obligation to
follow his principal's instructions stands out.'1° This is the case with the
current telebanking contracts concluded by the intermediary of a
convention. The bank is obligated to render the services stipulated in the
convention it has concluded with the customer. However, none of the four
98.
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documents governing the telebanking contract concluded with UBS makes
mention of the bank's obligations. UBS contents itself with stating in the
main document, titled Declaration of Affiliation with UBS 24hr-Banking,
that "the customer thus has access to UBS Phone banking, and telebanking
via Videotex or the Internet, depending on the technical device chosen, and
the network used."' 0', The same applies to the telebanking contract of the
Post Office entitled "Yellow Net."
On the other hand, Cr6dit Suisse "DirectNet" claims that "Anyone
who has legitimized himself can access, and use its services" and
"whoever has earned legitimacy according to figure 1.1 is considered by
the bank authorized to use the Direct Net/Telebanking services. Within
the limits of the services, and the mechanism opted for in the user's
application, the bank can enable the customer to consult the deposit
accounts indicated in the application via Direct Net / or Telebanking. On
the other hand, the bank can allow the customer to prepare or accept
orders and communications .... -,o
Credit Suisse undertakes:
* authorization of general access to its telebanking services to
whoever has been legitimized;
*

allowing consultation of the relevant deposit accounts; and

" accepting the orders and the communications transmitted by its
customer.
These are the three services that the bank undertook to render pursuant to
the convention signed with its customer. Consequently, if the bank fails to
specify all its obligations under the convention, such obligations will be
determined by the nature of the business.
c. ObligationsArising from the Nature of the Business
In the absence of a convention, the scope of the mandate shall be
fixed, in accordance with Article 396 1 of the CO, by the nature of the
business. 0 3 This analysis is governed by the parties' objectives, in
particular the result expected by the principal. The question must be
examined on a case by case basis. If need be, reference could be made to
the practices and Customs of the bank to which the assignee's activity is

101. The agreements can be downloaded from the UBS website: http://www.ubs.com.

102. The
agreements
can
be
downloaded
from
www.cspb.com/en/onlinebanking/documents/noralvertroge.pdf.

Credit-Suisse

website:

103. PIERRE TERCIER, 3983 LES CONTRACTS SPECIAUX [SPECIAL CONTRACTS] 487 (1995);
see also Code of Obligations, RS 220 art. 396(C)(I)(1).
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attached. If it goes beyond the contents of the mandate, the assignee shall
not be entitled to fees, and unless the business management conditions are
met (Article 419ss of the CO); he may even have to repair the resulting
damage.10
Since the banks crafted none (UBS, Yellow Net) or only some (Cr6dit
Suisse) obligations that fall within the framework of conditions governing
the telebanking contract, the nature of the business will determine the
contract terms. The bank is obliged to render the following services:
0 To give to customer such access to the bank's data-processing
network as will allow him to make banking operations. This service
will be opened to the customer as soon as he receives the dataprocessing keys;
0 To transmit the customer's orders to the bank staff qualified to
treat them; and
* To ensure maximum security in any communication between the
bank and the customer.

2. Obligation of Diligence
a. In General
Under the terms of Article 398 al. II CO, the assignee is responsible
for proper, and faithful execution of the mandate. 0° This is the general
principle which comprises the obligation of diligence. The rule indicates
the extent of diligence needed. The mandate shall define the contents of
the contract, and set objectives. The obligation of diligence determines
how the assignee will carry it out it. The assignee must act as any diligent
person would under the same situation, i.e., in an objective manner. This
by no means, excludes his adaptation to specific cases. This standard of
diligence governs the question of whether the assignee has failed to meet
his obligation pursuant to Article 398 I of the CO.1'0 This standard is often
fixed in a set of ethical or general rules called a code of practice. The
rules correspond to the general applied standards in the profession.
However, the judge may draw inspiration from them without being limited

104. PIERRE TERCIER, 3983 LES CONTRACTS SPECIAUX [SPECIAL CONTRACTS] 487 (1995);
see also Code of Obligations, RS 220 art. 419 (discussing a manager's rights and obligations).
105. Code
of
Obligations,
RS
http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/rs/220/a398.html.

220

ari.

398(2)(a),

available

at

106. PIERRE TERCIER, 4013 LES CONTRACTS SPtCIAUX [SPECIFIC CONTRACTS LAW] 490491 (1995); PIERRE TERCIER, 4015 LES CONTRACTS SPCIAUX [SPECIFIC CONTRACTS LAW]
490-491 (1995).
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to them.'0 ' We did not find guidelines issued by a serious banking
association such as the Swiss Association of Bankers. However, banks
should examine this matter in the near future, given the growing upsurge in
telebanking. Guidelines should judge the level of the requirements, take
account of all circumstances (in particular the mandate), reflect
adjustments for available time, and reflect the importance of the business,
and the qualification of the parties.
A telebanking contract is first a banking mandate, that involves
significant, and risky services. The time available for the execution is very
short since the bank must promptly transmit the customer's orders for them
to be properly carried out. This is particularly true for Stock Exchange
orders. Lastly, the assignee (banks) must be particularly qualified to
handle the customer's order in an appropriate, and secure manner. We can
deduce from this, that the degree of diligence required from the assignee is
particularly high.
b. Role of Instructions
The law appears to subject the assignee to the unilateral instructions
of the principal. Indeed, according to Article 397 al. I CO, the assignee
that received precise instructions cannot, in theory, deviate from them.' °
There are two types of instructions:
(1) Instructions
Instructions are only demonstrations of will, subject to reception. The
principal indicates to the assignee, how to perform the services promised in
the contract. According to Article 397 al. I CO, the instructions are in
theory compelling; thus, the assignee cannot deviate from them except for
the following:'0
(i) Urgent measures
If it is necessary for the assignee to act in order not to jeopardize the
interests of the principal, shall he have the right to do so even without
instruction? For this, refer to Article 397 al. I CO.1"° The assignee may
have the right to do so if the situation was not anticipated by the parties, if
circumstances do not allow the assignee to request further instructions from

107. PIERRE TERCIER, 4020 LES CONTRACTS SPICIAUX [SPECIFIC CONTRACTS LAW] 491

(1995).
108. Code

of

Obligations,

RS

220

art.

397(II)(1)(1),

available

http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/rs/220/a397.html.
109. See generally id.
110. See generally Code of Obligations, RS 220 art. 404 (governing termination).

at
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the principal, and if the course of action chosen by the assignee
corresponds to the hypothetical will of the principal.
(ii) Unreasonable instructions
If the assignee feels that the instructions given to him are
unreasonable, he shall be bound to draw attention thereto. This is part of
the duty of diligence, also found in the production contract. If the Master
persists, the assignee may divest himself from his responsibility, and even
terminate the mandate (see Article 404 of the CO).
(iii) Illicit or socially improper instructions
It goes without saying that the assignee should not follow instructions
which would violate the rights of others, or infringe on moralities.' His
compliance with such instructions is no defense for any civil or criminal
liabilities he might incur.
(iv) Instructions contrary to the contract
If the mutual agreement defines the contract framework with
precision, the assignee shall have the right not to carry out the different
instructions that the principal may subsequently give him. This actually
places a restriction on the scope of instructions.
(2) Agreements on the execution
In all the other areas, the "instructions" that the principal may give
are only instructions for an offer made to the assignee for the execution of
the mandate. The latter shall be bound only if he has accepted these terms.
It is sufficient in itself that the parties agree on the general framework of
the mandate. It will be incumbent on the assignee to carry it out according
to terms, and conditions that he deems appropriate.
3. Obligation of Fidelity
a. In General
By virtue of Article 398 al. II CO, "the assignee shall be answerable
to the principal for.. .the faithful execution of the mandate. "112 This
complements the obligation of diligence. It compels the assignee to act in
all the circumstances in the supposed interest of the principal. The
assignee must do everything that can be reasonably required of him to

111. See
Code
of
Obligations,
RS
220
art.
19,
available at
http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/rs/220/a19.html (freedom to contract within limits of the law); see
also id. at art. 20, available at http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/rs/220/a20.html (illegal contracts are
null).
112. Code of Obligations, RS 220 art. 398(2)(a).
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uphold the mandate, and abstain from all action that could in some way be
detrimental to it.13
b. Some Applications
This obligation has many applications, which can also be deduced
from the general obligation of diligence. Three of them follow:
(1) Obligationto Inform
The assignee shall regularly inform the employer of the progress of
the contract, and notify him of any significant incidents, particularly when
those are likely to affect the instructions given. For example, when UBS
decides to modify its general conditions, it has the duty to notify its
customers of the change (see also Article 17 of the G.C.)." When it
introduces new credit or other services, it is obliged to give customers this
new information.
(2) Obligation to Advise
The assignee shall be bound to regularly advise the principal on the
choice of the measures to be taken in the principal's interest. The assignee
must dissuade the principal when the principal intends to give or maintain
instructions that could be prejudicial to the principal. For example, under
the telebanking contract, the bank is bound to advise it's customer to
regularly modify his password for security reasons, and not make it
accessible to others.
(3) The Settlement of Conflicts
As soon as the assignee indicates that the exercise of his mandate
raises a conflict of interests whose outcome could be prejudicial to the
mandate, he must refuse the mandate if he has not already accepted it, and
later on notify the principal or even terminate the contract."' That could be
the case if the bank had a deficient software authorizing overdraft, and/or
failing to establish a link between the orders made via telebanking, and
those via a more traditional means like the telephone or the fax (it is in
particular the case of the Cr6dit Suisse).

113. PIERRE TERCIER, 4034 LES CONTRACTS SPI-CIAUX

[SPECIAL CONTRACTS]

493

(1995); PIERRE TERCIER, 4037 LES CONTRACTS SPICIAUX [SPECIAL CONTRACTS] 493 (1995).
114. UBS, Basic Conditions for the use of electronic aids, art. 8, available at
http://www.ubs.com/e/ebanking/order/conditions.newdialog.0001 .Uploadl .pdf/conditions.pdf
(2001) [hereinafter UBS Basic Conditions]. The last update of the agreements can be downloaded
from UBS website, http://www.ubs.com, by clicking on "e-banking" and then on "contract
documents."
115. PIERRE TERCIER, 4042 LES CONTRACTS SPtCIAUX 494 (1995).
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If the customer makes several orders without having enough money in
his account, and the bank's computer system fails to stop them, the bank
may believe the customer is misusing the telebanking service. The bank
must resolve this conflict of interest by serving a warning or terminating
the contract.
4. The Duty of Discretion
Discretion's role varies, depending on the purpose of the contract. In
relation to his employer, the assignee has a special duty of discretion which
is not expressly stated by the law. It arises instead from the general
regime of the contract. This duty is based' on the protection of the
employer's personality. By discharging his obligation, the assignee may
and must have knowledge of intimate or secret facts. On the other hand,
the assignee must do everything to avoid disclosure of such facts through
him or through third parties. The scope of this duty is very broad (Article
418(d) al. I of the CO). It relates not only to all that the employer entrusts
to the assignee, but also to what the assignee learns, stumbles on, or
guesses during the exercise of the mandate. It obliges the assignee not
only to disclose nothing, but also to guarantee that third parties cannot,
without authorization, have knowledge of the information in his keeping.
This duty goes beyond the execution of the mandate.116
During a
telebanking operation, the bank and the customer exchange data protected
by bank secrecy resulting from Article Forty-Seven of the Federal Law on
Banks and Savings Banks (LB):
Stock Exchange orders, transfer,
consultation of the account, etc. However, this secrecy is not absolutely
protected in the case of telebanking, for the following two main reasons:
a. Technical Problems Linked to the Internet in General
For technical reasons related to the Internet in general,"' the bank
cannot guarantee that somebody "is not eavesdropping" on the "computer
conversation" which it is carrying on with its customer. However, banks
seem nevertheless to guarantee a restriction in this "eavesdropping." They
assert that "the spy" may know from where the data is coming from and
where it is heading, but that he will not be able to know what is said at the
time of the "electronic conversation." even if the customer connects
116. See generally PIERRE
CONTRACTS LAW] 494-95 (1995).

TERCIER, 4045-4047
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117. Historically, the Internet was designed to stand against the destruction of
communication in the event of a nuclear war. Consequently, to call from point A (Geneva) to
point B (Zurich) one need not necessary remain in Switzerland: all the possible connections
between A and B will be used maybe via the United States, Australia, France, or any other
country which ensures such a connection.
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himself in Switzerland to the computer network of a Swiss bank. The
conditions applicable to Cr6dit Suisse's Direct Net state in particular in
their Article 6.2 that:
[T]he customer also acknowledges that data are transported
over an open network (e.g. the Internet) which is
accessible to third parties. Data are thus transmitted
regularly unchecked across international borders. This
also applies to data transfers where both the sender and
recipient are located in Switzerland.
Although individual data packages are transmitted in
encrypted form, the sender and recipient are not encrypted
and thus can be read by third parties. Itistherefore
possible for a third party to conclude that a banking
relationship exists.",
The bank can therefore never totally guarantee that nobody will access it's
data-processing server, and listen to what is going on. However, the
Internet has not changed many things: foreign States, or unauthorized
third parties can already listen for a long time (without great difficulty) to
the telephone conversations (faxes included) between a bank, and its
customer.
b. Encoding
Because encoding techniques are becoming increasingly advanced,
States are afraid of not being able to listen to all that goes on, particularly
within criminal organizations which can communicate without being
susceptible to interception.
This is why states tend to restrict the
complexity of encoding keys."' For example, in 1999, it was considered a
crime in the United States and Canada to export a key higher than 128 bits.
However, the legislation has been amended since. In France, this limit
was fixed at fifty-six bytes.' ° In Switzerland, there is no maximum limit,
but given the current trend; it is probable that such a law will be on the

118. Credit Suisse Application, supra note 43, at art. 62.
119. The higher the capacity of the key, the more the coding process becomes complex and
the harder will be to interpret the coded communication.
120. See Dcret no 99-200 du 17 mars 1999 d~finissant les cat6gories de moyens et de
prestations de cryptologie dispenses de toute formalit6 pralable (French executive bill of March
17th, 1999, determining the cryptological means and prestations that do not require any
governmental authorization or any filing] available at http://www.admi.net/jo/1999/04051.html
(JORF/LD page 04051).
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agenda.2 1 Swiss banks currently use keys of 128 bits, which are
considered foolproof.,"
However, should the law suddenly fix the
maximum limit, banks will not be able to constantly update their security
and will instead always have to conform to the maximum key allowed by
the law.
The law on encoding would thus curtail the quality of bank secrecy.
Today, a foreigner with a bank account in Switzerland may not necessarily
use telebanking from his country if the law of his country forbids him from
using the encoding keys of Swiss banks. Consequently, the UBS put the
following information on the Internet page, making it possible to download
the telebanking contract: "The products and services proposed on this page
are not accessible to people residing in the United States, Canada, New
Zealand, Australia, Japan and Singapore."
5. Other Obligations
a. The Duty to Submit Reports
Under the terms of Article 400 1 of the CO, "the assignee shall, at the
request of the employer be bound to submit to him at any time a report of
his management." This report is an aspect of the obligation of fidelity.
The employer must be able to learn, at any time, how his business is
progressing.
b. Obligationto Inform
The assignee must in good time provide any information requested in
relation to the mandate; this information must be truthful and complete.
The bank fulfills this obligation by informing it's customer, on it's
protected server, of the situation and the status of the bank's operations.1'2
c. Obligation to PresentAccounts
When the mandate involves the management of financial values, the
assignee must at any time be able to give the employer a detailed
121. As of August 2001, no such law had been adopted in Switzerland. The reason for that
might be that the Swiss banks do no want to be limited in their research for up-to-date and better
encryption products.
122. However, they update permanently the level of encryption to maintain it at the
"foolproof" level.

123. During stock exchange operations, the bank quickly posts on its server the status of
orders transmitted by the customer: seconds after the placing of the order, it is labeled as ' taken
care of' meaning the bank has received it and is processing it. Minutes afterwards, it is labeled

as 'pending', meaning it is in the financial market system and will be carried out as soon as the
period elapses or the market permits. A few hours or at most one day after being executed, it is
labeled 'allotted'. Then two days later, the bank labels it as 'billed'.
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breakdown of the account with supporting documents. The customer can
at any time download a global view of his transactions, the balance of his
accounts, and a breakdown of the last operations carried out.
However, that banks do not claim responsibility for the accuracy of
information that they transmit to their customers via the Internet network.
In our opinion, this exemption is a highly criticizable opinion, and we will
dwell on this point in the chapter devoted to responsibility.
d. The Duty to Refund
By virtue of Article 400 al. I CO, the assignee is, at the request of
the employer, bound to refund to the employer everything that he
received, for the purpose of this management, in whatever capacity
required.' 2 The obligation, which is imperative, exists throughout the
contract; but it takes full significance at the end. The duty to refund is
also a consequence of the general obligation of fidelity. To execute the
mandate, the assignee must receive a number of documents. Moreover,
his role often consists of producing or retrieving documents in order to
collect money on behalf of third parties. Consequently, he has the
obligation to return the documents. The idea is that he should not enrich
himself by executing the mandate, apart from receiving the fees that have
been agreed-upon. The obligation targets not only property, but all that
assignee may have acquired or received. The only case where the
assignee has the right to refuse to satisfy this obligation, is that of the right
of lien of 9 DC 895 lien.'1
The assignee may refuse to satisfy this
obligation in guarantee of his ordinary fee debts.' 2
(i) Restitution during the mandate
Since the current trend is to personalize the presentation of
information on the Internet site for each customer, it will be soon possible
for each customer to choose the presentation that he wishes. The
customer could send to his bank a diagram on CD-ROM or software via
the Internet, explaining how he wishes his various accounts to be
presented on the site. He could also ask for the restitution of this CDROM.
(ii) Restitution at the end of the mandate
At the end of the mandate, the customer can require the destruction
of the bank's data-processing keys. Indeed, if the bank preserves these
124. See Code of Obligations, RS 220 art. 400.
125. PIERRE TERCIER, 4045-4058 LES CONTRACTS SPICIAUX [SPECIFIC CONTRACTS LAW]
494 (1995).

126. Id.
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keys, such preservation could be detrimental to the customer in the future;
for it represents information sensitive to the customer. Because today the
password is increasingly being used to carry out all types of operation,' 2
customers will often tend to use the same password or the same type of
password (names of flowers, dinosaurs, celebrities, etc.).
The bank's possession of this information can give it the means to
enter the private life of the customer, and spy on him without his
knowledge.
This is particularly prohibited by Swiss Federal data
protection law.'u' The bank should give the customer a document attesting
the destruction of personal information. This is of special concern because
the bank requires the assignee, in the event of termination, to turn in the
data-processing keys (Article Nine of the UBS General Conditions). If the
Bank demands the return of such information from their customers, the
information is important.

B. Obligationsof the Employer
1. In General
Within the framework of a mandate contract concluded free of charge,
the employer is bound only to the services necessary to keep the assignee
from sustaining any loss. This is the subject of Article 402 CO.'" Because
the employer's services do not exist in an exchange relationship with the
service rendered, this is a bilateral imperfect contract.' 30
2. The Refunding of the Expenditures
Under the terms of Article 402 al. I CO, "the employer must refund
to the assignee, all sums and accrued interests, on advances, and expenses
that he incurred for the regular execution of the mandate.... "3, As far as
the mandate is concerned, this provision is meant to prevent the assignee
from suffering losses through a reduction of his credit. The telebanking
127. For example, the personal identification Number (PIN) to withdraw money from the
bancomat, used one's VISA card or the alarm or inter-phone codes to enter one's office or
house, the password to consult one's e-mail, buy a book on the internet via www.amazon.com or
to auction property on www.ebay.com.
128. See generally Propri6t6 intellectuelle et protection des donn6es [Swiss Federal Data
Protection Law], Recueil syst6matique du droit f&l6ral [Systematic Collection of the Federal
Right] [RSJ 23, available at http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/rs/23.html [hereinafter Swiss Federal
Data Protection Law].
129. See generally Code of Obligations, RS 220 art. 402, available at
http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/rs/220/a402.html.
130. PIERRE TERCIER, 4095 LES CONTRACTS SPICIAUX [SPECIFIC CONTRACTS LAW] 500

(1995).
131. Code of Obligations, RS 220 art. 402(III)(1).
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contract leads to a lot of money being saved at the bank. The bank no
longer needs to pay managers at exorbitant rates to receive the commands
of the customer, and transmit those commands to the qualified people of
the bank for processing. In telebanking, the customer indeed transmits his
commands to the data-processing server, which automatically transmits the
orders. Accepting orders placed via telebanking is a cost-saving operation
for the bank. The bank not only receives the orders free of charge, but it
deducts less factorage under the telebanking contract. This is why the
bank does not ask its customers to refund the expenditures. However,
although the bank does not exclude its right to expenditures in its
telebanking contract, it can call for their refund if the opportunity arises.
3. Compensation for Damage
Under the terms of Article 402 II CO, the employer "must also
compensate the assignee for the damage caused by the execution of the
mandate, if he proves that this damage occurred through no fault of his."',2
The provision also tends to guarantee that the assignee does not suffer any
loss on account of the execution of the mandate. This rule is applied
subject to the following three conditions:
a. Damage
The assignee needs to have suffered damage, an involuntary reduction
of his property. The concept is distinguishable from deeds that an assignee
must perform in order to discharge his mandate, whatever the origin.
b. In the Execution of the Mandate
This damage must have been suffered not only at the time of the
mandate, but in the very execution of the contract. It would, of course, be
otherwise if the fault came from the assignee himself.
c. Fault
The employer repairs the damage only if he is liable for a personal
fault. This fault may also be presumed. According to case law, a
presumed fault analysis would not apply to a free mandate because the
employer will have to pay damages even if he committed no fault. In this
case, analysis follows the same mode as that of Article 402 II of the CO,
relating to the management of businesses. 3
For example, if the

132. Id. at art. 402(II)(2).
133. PIERRE TERCIER, 4109-4114 LES CONTRACTS SP.CIAUX [SPECIAL CONTRACTS] 502

(1995).
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telebanking software is not powerful, and allows the customer to transmit
several orders which seriously overdraw his account, this could create a
damage at the bank. The customer will have to repair this damage unless
he had good faith during the transmission of his orders, and no time to
check the balance in the account.
4. Payment of Fees
By virtue of the law, the mandate is free. Therefore, in principle, the
employer is not bound to pay to the assignee the fees corresponding to the
services rendered. This was carried over from the time when service was
rendered "free of charge," which in itself did not exclude the payment of a
bonus on an "honorary" basis. Article 394 al. III CO offers two
exceptions to this principle, and the exceptions have become the rule:' 3'
a. Under the Terms of a Convention
By virtue of the principle of contractual freedom (Article 19 1 of the
CO), the parties can agree that the assignee's services will be specially
remunerated. 3, This agreement can be express or tacit.
It may be
contemporaneous with, or after the contract's signing. The assignee must
establish the existence of such an agreement. The telebanking contracts
analyzed are free, and consequently, their general provisions remain, for
the moment, silent on remuneration.
b. By Virtue of Usage
Independent of any special agreement on the matter, the employer
shall owe a remuneration when such is the norm. This is admittedly the
case, except under particular circumstances, when a person renders service
on a purely professional basis: as a lawyer, doctor, chartered accountant,
etc. It goes without saying, even in this case, that the parties can also
agree that the assignee can agree to render certain services without being
paid. However, according to this scheme, the important thing is the extent
to which the services rendered by the assignee can objectively be useful to
the employer. Actually, the rule can be understood only as an application
of the principle outlined in Article 82 CO: the assignee is entitled to
remuneration only if, and only insofar as, he carried out the agreed

134. See

generally

Code
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394,

available

athttp://www.admin.ch/ch/f/rs/220/a394.html.
135. See
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services. " 6 His remuneration is indeed based on the convention. The
convention provides, except where particular rules apply, that it is the
services and not their result which pay for the debt. This criterion can
nevertheless be taken into account to measure conformity of the services.
The telebanking contract is, for the moment, free. Moreover, lower
commissions on the operations carried out via telebanking have provided
incentive to customers to use the service. However, when all the
customers use this medium of communication, the bank will have the right
to require fees of the customer without mentioning those fees under the
general contract conditions.
VII. RESPONSIBILITY OF THE BANK ASSIGNEE
A. In General
1. Principles
An assignee's violation of his obligations can lead to civil sanctions.
Sanctions vary according to the nature of the duty concerned. First, the
employer can refuse to pay all or part of the remuneration. Further, he
can demand restitution of the transmitted accounts or goods. He also has
the right to require the destruction of information relating to him that is
stored in the bank's database (LPD). Lastly, if the contract so provides,
the assignee can be held to pay a conventional penalty. Moreover, this is
the most typical sanction--the employer can sue for damages. According
to Article 398 al.I CO, "the responsibility for the assignee is subject,
generally, to the same rules as those of the worker in labor relations."' 3 7
The rule refers to Article 321 E of the CO, which is itself based on the
general mode of Articles 97/101 CO.1 8
Consequently, the customer of the telebanking service will be able to
do one of the following: 1) Sue the bank for damages; 2) Demand
payment in the amount of the conventional penalty, possibly an amount
fixed in the contract; 3) Refuse to pay the cost of the services if this falls
due one day; 4) Demand restitution of the funds deposited in his account;' 3 9
136. See
Code
of
Obligations,
RS
220
art.
82,
available at
http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/rs/220/a82.html.
137. Code of Obligations, RS 220 art. 398(2)(a)(1).
138. See
Code
of
Obligations,
RS
220
art.
321,
available at
http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/rs/220/a321.html (obligation to perform); see also idat arts. 97-101,
availableat http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/rs/220/indexl.html (effect of non-performance).
139. If the latter are invested for three months by the bank and the customer is forbidden
from withdrawing them during this period, since he will be guaranteed higher returns only if he
were able to retrieve them at any time, the bank may be forced to hand them back to him before
the date.
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or 5) Demand restitution of the documents or information related to him as
well as the destruction of these in the bank's database. The contracts
analyzed, however, mention neither conventional penalty nor service cost.
The bank may also be subjected to other sanctions. The customer
may file criminal charges, particularly if there is a breach of trust, a
violation of bank secrecy, or a data-processing infringement.'4 A customer
may also file an administrative violation charge if the bank violated the
legal obligations enabling it to carry on its activity and does not respect the
4
guidelines of the Federal Banks Commission (FCB).' '
Since this study examines only the legal aspects of the obligations of
the telebanking contract, this analysis concentrates on actions for damages.
This is the most effective measure taken to repair the damage caused to the
employer. One can, however, affirm that in the future, the industry should
expect an increase in the other types of sanctions, given the substantial
increase noted in data-processing criminality these last years.
2. Individual Liability
Under the terms of Article 321 E I of the CO, "the assignee is liable
for the damage that he causes to the employer, either intentionally, or by
negligence."142 The provision, in spite of its formulation, is a repeat of
the general mode of Article 97 or 41 of the CO.'" Liability is subject to
the following four conditions.
a. Prejudice
The employer must prove that he suffered a damage, for example, an
involuntary reduction in his property. Under the terms of Article 99 al. III
CO, the law also targets the moral wrong, if the prejudice is sufficiently

140. See Swiss Penal Code, RS 311.0 art. 318 (breach of trust); id at art. 143 (data
interception); id at art. 143bis (data processing system access); id at art. 144bis (data
modification or erasure); id at art. 147 (fraudulent use of computer); see also Loi f&16rale sur les
banques et les caisses d'dpargne [Federal Law on Banks and Savings Banks], Recueil
syst6matique du droit f~dlral [Systematic Collection of the Federal Right] [RS] 952.0 art. 47,
available at http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/rs/952_0/a47 [hereinafter Federal Law on Banks, RS
9521.
141. See Federal Law
on Banks,
RS
952.0 art 3, available at
http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/rs/9520/a3.html (regulating bank activity).
142. Code of Obligations, RS 220 art. 321(B)(1).

143. See generally Code of Obligations, RS 220 art. 97, available at
http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/rs/220/a97.html (effects of non-performance); see also Code of
Obligations, RS 220 art. 41, available at http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/rs/220/a41.html

principles of damages).

(general
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serious.'- Such damages may include a reduction of the amount available
on the account, if such a reduction is due to improper use or non-increase.
This situation may arise from the bank's failure to transmit the customer's
orders to the person most qualified to handle them.
b. Violation of the Contract
The employer must establish that the assignee violated one of his
obligations. This obligation may be a principal obligation, or an additional
obligation. In the case in point, banks are obligated to prevent an abusive
use of the customer's account, promptly transmit to the bank's executant
all orders transmitted in time by the customer, and guarantee the reliability
of this transmission.
c. CausalRelationship
The employer must establish that there is an adequate causal
relationship between the violation of the contract, and the prejudice he
claims. After ordinary principles are applied, according to the ordinary
course of things and the general experiments of life, the violation of the
contract must have led to the prejudice. Because the customer uses a dataprocessing medium, and generally does not need to deal with
intermediaries to transmit his orders to the executant of the bank, 54 analysis
of the bank's data processing system will be the key to establishing the
causal link.
d. Fault
The responsibility to the assignee is breached only if there is
negligence or an intentional fault. Thus, it can be a question of any fault,
even of a light fault. This fault is presumed under Article 97 of the CO. '4
When these conditions are met, the assignee must repair the damage
in accordance with the general rules governing action for liability (Article
42 CO applicable under the terms of Article 99 al. III CO)." 7 This Article

144. See
Code
of
Obligations,
RS
220
art.
99,
available at
http:l/www.admin.ch/chlf/rs/220/a99.html (responsibility for fault).
145. Except where for technical reasons the system is defective and the order is place via
the telebanking hotline i.e., by phone and thus to a human being.
146. Pierre Tercier, 4074-4079 LES CONTRACTS SPECIAUX [SPECIAL CONTRACTSl 498
(1995); see also Code of Obligations, RS 220 art. 97(A)(1)(1)(1).
147.
See Code of Obligations,
RS 220 art.
42,
available at
http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/rs/220/a42.html (burden of proof for damages); see also Code of
Obligations, RS 220 art. 99(11)(1)(1) (responsibility for fault).
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highlights, in particular, the role which Article 99 II CO can play with
regard to free mandates.,"
3. Third Party Liabilities
The law does not specially treat the assignee's responsibilities towards
the third parties he calls upon in the fulfillment of his contract, except from
the limited angle of substitution. It is consequently necessary to distinguish
between the general principle and the special rule. The substitution rubric
is valid only if the assignee has the right to call upon third parties.
Otherwise he would be committing a breach involving his personal
responsibility. The law expressly provides for the acts of substitutes, for
which the assignee is answerable as if they were his, but the rubric is also
valid if the third parties are mere auxiliaries. The principle is that the
assignee is answerable for the acts of his auxiliaries, in accordance with
Article 101 CO,going back to the general rules. 149
In the specific case of authorized substitution, the assignee is no
longer answerable for the acts of the third parties to whom the execution of
the mandate has been entrusted. According to Article 399 II CO, he is
answerable only if he personally committed an offense in the choice and
instruction of the third party substitute.'Such a situation would be possible if UBS undertook an outsourcing
operation (vertical disintegration) with a third party. UBS would delegate
the management of its information processing system or the execution of
the commands transmitted by its customer.
This, however, remains
unlikely because of bank secrecy, and the security problems that such a
substitution could invite.
a. Regulation
The exercise of action for damages is governed by the usual rules,
especially insofar as that action involves regulation. Such an action must
be filed within ten years.''

148. See generally Code of Obligations, RS 220 art. 99(11)(1)(1)-(3).
149. See
Code
of
Obligations,
http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/rs/220/a101.htmil.

RS

220

art.

101,

available

at

150. Code
of
Obligations,
RS
http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/rs/220/a399.html.

220

art.

399,

available

at

151. Code
of
Obligations,
RS
http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/rs/220/a127.htm.

220

art.

127,

available

at
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b. Exclusive or Restrictive Liability Conventions
The assignee frequently tries, especially by resorting to the general
conditions, to limit or exclude his responsibility. The law does not
specifically address this matter in the provisions related to the mandate
contract. Thus the general rules apply. Given the peculiarity of the
mandate, it is advisable to briefly reiterate them.
1) Unquestionable illegality of the exclusion of responsibility for
serious offense
Under the terms of Article 100 al. I CO, the assignee cannot validly
exclude his responsibility for serious fault.12 This rule is not subject to
exception, and will be interpreted against the party that drafted the general
conditions. Moreover, under the terms of Article 101 III CO, the assignee
cannot validly exclude his responsibility for serious fault in relation to the
activity of his auxiliaries.'
Thus, the bank clerks who committed the
offense as part of the execution of the telebanking contract, engage the
responsibility of the bank.
2) Potential illegality of the exclusion of responsibility for a light
offense
Insofar as the exercise of an assignee's activity is governed by a
concession granted by the authority, Article 100 al. II CO enables even the
judge to consider null the clause which would release the assignee from a
light offense. '1 This provision is particularly important for doctors,
lawyers and bankers. A judge would be capable of nullifying a clause of
the general conditions of a telebanking contract. This would exclude the
bank from responsibility in the event of a light offense.
3) Unquestionable illegality of a limitation of responsibility which is
contrary to manners or affects the rights of the employer
The validity of these clauses remains subject to the general conditions
concerning the purpose of the contract. Since it is contrary to good
manners, 51 1 a limitation of responsibility affecting activities which have a
direct relationship with the employer's physical integrity or individual
rights would be null.

152. See generally Code of Obligations,
http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/rs/220/alOO.html.

RS

220

153. Code of Obligations, RS 220 art. 101(3)(1).
154. Code of Obligations, RS 220 art. 100(2)(2).
155. See generally Code of Obligations, RS 220 arts. 19-20.

art.

100,

available

at
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B. Analysis of Clauses of Exclusion of Responsibility in Swiss
Telebanking Contracts Currently in Force
1. Current Supply
The telebanking currently accessible to Swiss consumers can be
divided into the following two main types:
a. TraditionalTelebanking
Banks offer a range of expanding services via Internet, such as stock
exchange transactions, transfers, and consultation of the account. Union
des Banques Suisses and Credit Suisse via its DirectNet service offer this
type of telebanking.
b. Specialized Telebanking
At present, only two types of services are offered: Stock Exchange
transactions, and bank transfers. Banks or financial institutions offer only
However, the American
stock exchange transactions via Internet.
example, and the current trends spell out a future increase in this figure
particularly with the introduction of credit via the Internet.-'
1) Stock exchange transactions
This mainly involves Tradepac'- (Union des Banques Suisses),
Youtradelm (Cr6dit Suisse) & Swissnetbanking', (MFC Merchant Bank
LTD.). The customers of these sites can only buy and sell titles. They do
not in particular have access to the advice of the bank's financial analysts.
This differs from transactions carried out via traditional telebanking.
2) Bank transfers
Only one major institution offers this service:
by the Swiss Post Office).

Yellownet ' 6° (offered

2. Comparison of Cases of Exclusion of Responsibility
We decided to compare provisions of telebanking contracts' general
conditions of the three leading Swiss companies in order to determine
whether the cases of exclusion of responsibility are identical and legal.

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

www.loan.com in the United States is particularly experiencing a boom.
TradePac is online at http://www.ubs.ch/f/telebanking/trade.html.
Youtrade is online at http://www.youtrade.ch.
Swissnetbanking is online at http://www.swissnetbanking.com.
Postal Suisse's Yellownet is online at http://www.yellownet.ch.
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The companies studied are the Union des Banques Suisses, 161 Credit
Suisse, 162 and the Post Office.
At the Union des Banques Suisses (UBS), three key documents govern
the telebanking contract: the general provisions of the bank,'10 the
framework conditions related to the use of the data-processing keys,'- and
special conditions related to telebanking.' 0 Cr6dit Suisse (CS) uses two
documents to regulate the contract: general conditions,'" and conditions
applicable to DirectNet/Telebanking."6 Postal Suisse (the Post Office) uses
three documents titled respectively: conditions of participation in
Yellownet, conditions of participation in the postal account, and
Postf'mance general conditions.'6

a. The five cases of exclusion of the responsibilityof the bank or the Post
Office providedfor in the general conditions
The general conditions provide for the exclusion of the responsibility
of the bank or the Post Office in the following five principal cases:
1) Damage related to an interruption or a slow-down of the service
a) Cases providedfor by the banks and the Post Office
The customer can suffer a loss if he is unable to transmit his order to
the bank because its network: is overloaded; has problems; is suspended
161. Our analysis is limited to the UBS general conditions of traditional telebanking service,
since those of the specialized "tradepac" telebanking services are identical.
162. Our analysis is limited to the Credit Suisse general conditions of traditional telebanking
service, since those of the specialized "Youtrade" telebanking services are identical.
163. UBS Basic Conditions, supra note 114.
164. See generally UBS, e-banking, at http://www.ubs.com/e/ebanking.html (last visited
November 29, 2001). Data-processing key framework document may be obtained from the
author.
165. See generally UBS, Special Provisionsfor UBS e-banking classic, UBS e-banking
smart,
UBS
e-banking
tv
and
UBS
e-banking
wap,
available
at
http://www.ubs.com/e/ebanking/order/conditions.newdialog.0001 UploadI.pdf/conditions.pdf
(2001) [hereinafter UBS Special Provisions] (contained in same data file as UBS Basic
Conditions, supra note 114.) The last update of the agreements can be downloaded from UBS
website, http://www.ubs.com, by clicking on "e-banking" and then on "contract documents."
166. See generally Credit Suisse, Welcome to Cridit Suisse Private Banking, at
http://www.cspb.com/ (last visited November 29, 2001). [Parts of this World Wide Web site
may be inaccessible from United States Internet connections. General conditions document may
be obtained from the author. -Ed.]
167. CreditSuisse Application, supra note 43.
168. See generally http://www.yellownet.ch [Parts of this World Wide Web site may be
inaccessible due to site security. "Conditions of Participation in YellowNet," "Conditions of
Participation in the Postal Account," and "Postfinance General Conditions" may be obtained
from the author. -Ed.]
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for maintenance; is jammed; has a technical deficiency or transmission
errors; is stopped due to disturbance; and has broken down if the
customer's telebanking service was interrupted for security reasons, if
deficiency comes from the Internet access provider, if the transmitted
command was not carried out, or was carried out late, or if the customer
lodges a late complaint at his bank. In any of these cases, the banks and
the Post Office free themselves from any responsibility. For example, if
the customer sends a "market"'1 purchase order via Internet to his bank at
14.00 and the order enters the stock exchange information processing
system forty minutes later due to one of the reasons stated above,'7 0 and in
the meantime price increases substantially to 14.40, the customer will buy
stock at a higher price than if the order had been registered in time.' 7' The
bank excludes its responsibility if such a damage occurs.
b) Legality of the exclusion of responsibilityin these cases
The damage resulting from an inherent technical problem in any data
processing system, from a perfectly justified interruption (security), or
from an usual and foreseeable reason (maintenance) must be borne by the
customer. The customer accepts the risk that his order may not be carried
out on time. However, this exclusion is not admissible when these
problems recur very often, when the bank or the post office does not try to
solve the problem as quickly as possible, or when the bank or the post
office does not try to inform the customer in a reasonable time that his
order has not been handled. Even in these cases, the bank excludes
responsibility if the customer's Internet service provider fails in its own
obligations to his customer. Indeed, in these cases, the bank or the post
office would meet their general obligations if they did everything to ensure
the prompt transmission of the customer's order to the executant of the
bank.
In addition, if the software presenting the data to the customer
displays false information, (erroneous balance in hand, distorted
confirmation of execution, or assumption of responsibility of command),
the customer will suffer a prejudice. For example, the customer could
decide to buy shares for $100,000, basing his decision on the balance in

169. Meaning without setting a price limit.
170. Electronic markets like NASDAQ, in the United States, have eliminated human
intervention: the customer's order placed via internet is transmitted to the bank's computer
system which then transmits it automatically to the stock exchange system, without passing
through a person.
171. According to Merrill Lynch (Switzerland) the maximum time allowed to punch the
order in the computer system is ten minutes in the case of the American stock exchange and
NASDAQ in particular.
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his account, when his actual account balance is only $70,000. There will
be debit interests to pay, and if the price of the share falls substantially, the
bank will require its customer to refund part of the $30,000 that the
customer obtained by mistake.
These two damages can be due to a software programming error by
the bank. They could also be due to a hacker's modification of the bank's
program during the transmission between the bank's Internet site, and the
customer's computer.
2) Damage related on the exactitude and entirety of information
transmitted by the bank: Cases providedfor by the banks and the Post
Office
The customer that carries out a banking operation via telebanking,
because he bases the transaction on erroneous information provided by his
bank or the post office, will suffer significant damage for which the banks,
and the post office disclaim any responsibility in advance.' n Suppose, a
person consults his account only sporadically.
According to the
telebanking site, he has $100,000 in his account. The bank further states
on it's site that the current value of the Microsoft share is $100. The
customer then places a purchase order limited to $100,000 for 1000
Microsoft shares in order to use all the money of his account. The order is
launched and carried out, bringing the customer's account down to $0 and
depositing the 1000 Microsoft shares in his name. Now suppose that,
because of a deficiency of the bank's data-processing server, the
information presented was false. The customer actually had only $80,000.
The customer will then, as soon as the problem is solved, have a negative
account of balance $20,000, and will consequently have to pay debit
interests. Now suppose that the following day, Microsoft is declared a
monopoly and the shares fall to $60. The total value of the shares of the
customer will go to $60,000, and he will have to refund to the bank the
$20,000 lent by the data processing error.
If the erroneous information displayed on the telebanking site is so
obvious that it can be spotted by an average person placed in the same
circumstances, and that the customer does not notice it, the responsibility
for the damage caused could not be placed on the bank. However, if an
average user placed in the circumstances would be hard pressed to identify
erroneous information, no fault will be ascribed to the customer.
Technical risks must be borne by the customer. However, one can hardly
compare the delay or the non-fulfillment of an order involving a loss of
172. See, e.g., UBS Basic Conditions, supra note 114, at art. 4.; UBS Special Provisions,
supra note 165, at § 1.3.
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profit with the display of false personal (balance of the account), and
sensitive (price of a share) information on which the customer bases a
decision that could involve substantial losses of capital. In such cases, the
bank should repurchase its customers' shares and take the damage as it's
responsibility in order to guarantee the customer a certain security. How
will the customer still dare to carry out transactions via telebanking if he
has no guarantees of the minimum reliability of the information he receives
from his bank by Internet? We are consequently in agreement with the
clause of exclusion of responsibility stipulated by UBS, CS, and the Post
Office. We regard the communication of such erroneous information as a
light or even serious offense, depending on the cases, and we doubt its
legality in the event of litigation.
3) Damage related to the software provided by the bank or the Post
Office
a) Cases consideredby the banks and the Post Office
The customer can suffer an injury if telebanking software provided by
his bank, or the post office does not function. This occurs when the bank
encodes the communication between the bank and the customer, 73 when the
bank presents to the customer the information transmitted across a faulty
network,'4 or when a problem occurs during a data transfer from the
Internet site of the bank or the post office to the customer's computer.'7
Indeed, if the safety of computer communication between the bank's
Internet site, and the customer's computer is endangered by defective
software, bank secrecy will no longer be guaranteed. A third party could
consequently intercept the communication, and note significant information
(account number, name and addresses of customer, password, number of
contract, balances in account, transmitted banking orders, etc.). The third
party could use this information to the customer's detriment.
b) Legality of the exclusion of responsibility in these cases
Before distributing software to their customers, the banks or post
office must check the software diligently and do repeated tests. If these
tests are rigorous, and are conducted a sufficient number of times, banks
cannot be reproached if a problem occurs despite the testing. Some
technical risk is indeed inherent in any information processing system, and

173. See, e.g., UBS Special Provisions, supra note 165, at § 1.1.
174. See, e.g., UBS Basic Conditions, supra note 114, at art. 4; Cridit Suisse Application,
supra note 43, at art. 4.5.
175. See, e.g., UBS Special Provisions,supra note 165, at § 1.3; Cridit Suisse Application,
supra note 43, at art. 4.5.
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the customer must be conscious of it. The customer must accept that risk
when he decides to sign a telebanking contract.
However, if the tests are neither strict nor sufficiently numerous, or if
the bank or the post office notes the deficiency in the software, but fails to
quickly inform the customer of the problem, the bank or Post Office must
bear the resulting damage. They have violated their general obligations to
give the customer the most powerful computer system and software
possible.
Because the risks of data interception, and modification by a computer
hacker are for the moment very low, with a likelihood of occurrence
similar to that of a force majeure, one can accept the exclusion of the
responsibility of the bank.
4) Damage related to the non-fulfillment of commitments to third
parties
a) Cases considered by banks and the Post Office
Many customers commit to making a payment before a specified date.
Institutional customers might commit to buy n number of shares within two
hours from the time the stock exchange lists a company in which the
institution has acquired a large number of shares. If these commitments
are not carried out because of an unspecified problem, be it technical or
related to data interception, the customer will be subject to sanction for
non-fulfillment of his obligation with respect to the third party. This will
lead to a loss to the customer, for which the bank excludes any
76
responsibility in advance.

b) Legality of the exclusion of responsibility in these cases
The bank cannot be held responsible for the violation of customers'
commitments to third parties, because it is difficult to bring evidence.
These transactions often rest on trust and verbal agreements. Indeed, the
bank would be taking great risks if it had to pay considerable damages with
frequency. Such a scenario could endanger the bank's financial health.
The customer must bear these risks related to telebanking. However, in
the event of glaring, and excessive error ascribable to the bank or the Post
Office, the institution has violated its obligation of diligence. It could then
be held to pay all or part of the damage caused to its customer.
5) Damage related to a misuse of the customer's account
a) Cases consideredby the banks and the Post Office

176. See, e.g., Cridit Suisse Application, supra note 43, at art. 4.9.
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Damage can result from an unauthorized third party using the
customer's account in an improper way. For this, the banks and the Post
Office disclaim any responsibility in advance, particularly if illegal
17
interventions take place in the server of the bank,'" or of the customer."
Further, the banks, and the Post Office disclaim responsibility if the
misuse stems from a deficiency of the network operator or of Internet
access provider 7 9 or if a defect of legitimization or an undetected forgery
enables a hacker to access the bank's server.1'1 The banks, and the Post
Office bear no responsibility if the customer or one of his agents has lost
the key;'8 ' if there are unauthorized manipulations of the account,'" or if the
password and/or the list of numbers to be crossed out were wrongly used
during the transmission of the data between the bank and it's customer. 3
Finally, the institutions disclaim responsibility if an abuse occurred during
the blocking of the account, even if it took place within the usual time
frame.''
b) Legality of the exclusion of responsibility in these cases
Any person who knows the content of the data-processing keys given
by the bank to his customer is capable of misusing the account, and
causing significant damage. Moreover, if the customer or one of his
agents does not have the mental capacity, he or she is likely to cause
damage to the account through inexperience and carelessness.
If the customer made a mistake in writing his password and left his
data-processing keys unprotected, no reproach can be made to the bank or
the Post Office. Moreover, if a hacker illegally penetrates the bank's
Internet telebanking site or that of the Post Office, or if the customer in
spite of the best possible computer security arrangement made by the
latter, the banks or the Post Office will not assume the risk. If the
customer or one of his agents does not have mental capacity, he must
inform the bank or the Post Office at the time the contract is signed, or at
least make sure their incapacity is mentioned in an Official Journal. The

177. See, e.g., UBS Basic Conditions, supra note 114, at art. 4; Cridit Suisse Application,
supra note 43, at art. 4.5.

178. See, e.g., Cridit Suisse Application, supra note 43, at art. 4.1.
179. See, e.g., Cr~dit Suisse Application, supra note 43, at art. 4.2.
180. See, e.g., UBS Special Provisions, supra note 165, at § 1.3; CrEdit Suisse Application,
supra note 43, at art. 4.2.
181. See, e.g., UBS Basic Conditions, supra note 114, at art. 2.

182. See, e.g., UBS Special Provisions, supra note 165, at § 1.3.
183. Id.
184. UBS Article 3 D.C.
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customer's failure in this duty will rightly clear the bank or the Post Office
of any responsibility if the account is misused.
However, if the bank did not take all necessary precautions to upgrade
its network with the latest encoding or security, the bank would violate one
of its principal obligations. Such a violation would be a serious or light
offense, depending on the situation. The gravity of the offense should
depend on whether negligence was partial (for example, if the customer
left his data-processing keys lying about without taking precautions), or
total (not of the fault of the customer).
b. Proportionalityand Equity Principles which Water Down the Legality
of Exclusions of Responsibility
The principles of proportionality, and equity must control a bank or a
Post Office's assertion that it is excluded from responsibility. It is true that
technical risks or risks related to hackers cannot be attributed to the bank
or the Post Office if the institutions take all possible steps to protect
themselves. However, if the damage suffered by the customer is great; if
the customer did not commit any offense; and if the bank has sufficient
resources to make good the damage without falling into serious financial
difficulties, the institution must bear partial damages in all cases. It would
indeed be unjust to make a diligent customer sustain huge damages. This
is particularly true in the sensitive field of telebanking, where damage
could have very serious consequences for the customer (for example, a loss
of 85% of a retired employee's fortune - saved all his life - when the
retiree has made no error). The bank could, without falling into major
financial difficulties, assume this sporadically-occurring damage.
c. Principleof Unfavorable Interpretationagainstthe Party Having
Drafted the General Conditions
As we saw above, the general conditions should not be interpreted too
literally. It is necessary to examine the sense and the purpose of each
provision while basing the analysis on honest use. If, in spite of such an
interpretation, the provision in dispute remains ambiguous, this ambiguity
will be interpreted to the detriment of the drafting party (namely, the

bank).
VIII. CONCLUSION
By following the trends of electronic trade, and the Internet's
presence in the world, it is certain that the rapid development of
telebanking will continue for years to come. Trends are already appearing.
Initially, only major banks or financial companies could afford the luxury
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of offering services via Internet. However, small firms are emerging with
specialties in only one telebanking service: sales and purchase of stocks.
Small firms can now emerge as banks. Barely five years ago, this would
have been impossible.
Indeed, without a counter, without direct
interlocutories to the customers (except in the event of big problem via the
Hotline telephone system), and without offering only one type of service,
these financial companies could never have been born. Nor could they
have survived, from a legal and economic standpoint.
The federal banking commission hardly appreciates the so-called
"Swiss banks" whose only links with the country are the name "Swiss
bank" spread across the network, and the presence of a mailbox. For
example, www.swissnetbanking.com, based at P.O. Box 509 in Geneva,
and doing very aggressive advertising in financial newspapers, particularly
the Herald Tribune, is especially striking. The existence of this company
shows that Internet has made it possible to create virtual Swiss banks based
99% in the United States. One should therefore expect a reaction from
Swiss legislators. They will not allow this financial fence to return to
countries of origin which, even yesterday, cast a shadow on the money
market. Moreover, these upstarts are likely to be removed thanks to the
new law on money laundering which came into effect in April, 1998 The
law applies to any bank or financial intermediary, including companies
offering telebanking services. In addition, the prospects for this new
service are frightening vis-a-vis employment. If financial intermediaries
are no longer necessary for the bank to maximize its profit, what will
become of the 120,000 people employed in this vital economic sector of
Switzerland? Will computer specialists replace them all? One should
expect social reactions to the further development of telebanking.
However, the product seems to be worth the price. The amounts
deposited in Swiss banks continue to grow more than 5 % annually, and
today they total 3 trillion Swiss Francs or 1.8 trillion US$.1S5 Telebanking
is likely to increase this figure.
In addition, the growing number of telebank users will inevitably
increase the potential conflicts between the bank, and its customer,
particularly with regard to exclusion of responsibility of the latter. One
can thus expect a re-balancing of the forces at play. At present, the
general conditions favor the banks, which do not want to guarantee any
risks. While hackers doggedly endeavor to pull down bank computer
security systems, and foreign financial companies try to take advantage of
the Swiss banking usage, by owning a Swiss postal address, Swiss banks,
185. McKinsey & Company, Banking and Securities-The Swiss Banking Industry, at
http://www.mckinsey.chaboutus/swisspracticeportfoliolbanking.htm (2001).
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their customers, and the courts will readily attest that the exclusion of
responsibility of banks is abusive and illegal. These will be architects and
creators of the first case law on the telebanking contract which, although
hardly born, already has a bright future ahead of it.
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INTRODUCTION

The scope of this work is to shed some light on the vigorously
debated and delicate subject of same-sex marriages, as well as to review
how some countries have reached the point of recognition and application
of the legal rights that homosexual individuals have within this global
society. Starting with a general overview of the homosexual struggle to
gain social rights and acceptance in particular societies within the Western
Hemisphere, this article will focus on the specific domestic laws of the
United States of America, the Netherlands, and Hungary that deal with the
issue of same-sex marriage. In selecting these particular countries this
article will show a traditionally open-minded society (the Netherlands); a
society that purports to be modem, open-minded, and progressive as the
world leaders (the United States) but, instead, it is one that is still moderate
and conservative; and finally, a society that is just coming out of years of
*
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repression and closure to the rest of the world and its advances (Hungary).
Additionally, this article will show how each country's societies and
institutions have dealt, and deal today, with the subject of same-sex
marriage. After analyzing specific laws and cases from these countries,
this article will compare and contrast how each treat the subject in a
similar or different fashion. This article will explore, based on the latest
case rulings and legislations passed in these countries, how the future is
being shaped and what the trend is in this area of legal concern for sexual
minorities. This is a comparative legal study and analysis among the
selected countries and their treatment of the issue of same-sex marriage
based in their particular cultures, societies, religious influences and
history. To conclude, this article will speculate as to how much
international law can be used to ameliorate the legal situation of gays,
lesbians, and bisexuals who have decided to live together in a same-sex
union.
11. GENERAL HISTORY OF SEXUAL MINORTEs' STRUGGLE
"Sexual minorities include all individuals who have traditionally been
distinguished by societies because of their sexual orientation, inclination,
behavior, or nonconformity with gender roles or identity."'
Homosexuality appears in virtually all social contexts--within different
community settings, socioeconomic levels, and ethnic and religious groups.
In ancient Greece, homosexual relations were acceptable and, in some
cases, expected activity in certain segments of society. 2 It can be assumed
that the ancient gay prototypes of antiquity were not a minority, were not
stigmatized, were not perceived as different or deviant, and above all were
not defined by their sexual orientations or attractions. IThe attitude towards
homosexuality changed in the Western world largely by the prevailing
Judeo-Christian moral codes, which treat homosexuality as immoral and
sinful.4 An alliance of the Roman Empire and the equally imperial Church
of Rome established the two rules on homosexuality that have marginalized
same-sex love for many centuries. Both sexual activity and a legal
marriage required people of opposite sexes. 5
1. James D. Wilets & Elizabeth M. Woods, The Human Rights of Sexual Minorities: A
Global View, 9 (Mar. 2000) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
2.

ENCARTA ENCYCLOPEDIA, Homosexuality (1999).

3

See NEIL MILLER, OUT OF THE PAST-GAY AND LESBIAN HISTORY FROM 1869 TO THE

PRESENT (1995).
4.

ENCARTA ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 2.

5.

F. LEROY-FORGEOT, HISTOIRE JURIDIQUE DE L'HOMOSEXUALITE' EN EUROPE, 24

(1997).
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Although the criminal rule of same-sex activity was essentially
abolished in great parts of Europe by Napoleon's civil codifications, it was
later brought back by other empires (British, German, Austrian). The
marriage rule has taken much longer to disappear, or be abolished, from
Europe or other areas of Western civilization.'
The first half of the twentieth century marked a period of great
hostility and overwhelming negative feelings towards homosexuality." In
the United States, homosexual activity, even among consenting adults, was
made a criminal offense in most of the country by the passing of the socalled "sodomy" statutes.$ Homosexuals were subject to stereotypes and
prejudice. Gay men were viewed as effeminate, and lesbians were
portrayed as mannish, both obsessed with sex, with little self-control or
morality.' In the 1930s and during World War II, homosexuals were
targets of persecution in Nazi Germany.' 0 Only recently have these
prejudices against homosexuals in Western societies begun to change. As
the result of much scientific discussion and study, in 1973 the American
Psychiatric Association eliminated homosexuality from its list of mental
disorders and, in 1980, it dropped it from its Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual."

The institution of marriage has been altered fundamentally in Western
societies because of social changes brought about by the Reformation, the
Industrial Revolution, and a growing ideology of individualism. 2 Because
the family unit provides the framework for most human social activity, it is

the foundation on which social organization is based. In most cultures,
marriage is closely tied to economics, religion, and law."
III.

SAME-SEX MARRIAGE RIGHTS

The question seems a simple one: when does the law recognize that
same-sex partners have the right to marry each other? The answer does
not seem so obvious to a great majority of the Western societies.

However, inEurope and in other areas of the world, particularly, in
specific countries like the United States of America, the Netherlands, and
6. Kees Waaldijk, Civil Developments: Patternsof Reform in the Legal Position of SameSex Partnersin Europe, CAN. J.OF FAM. L. (Feb. 2000).
7.
ENCARTA ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 2.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. MILLER, supra note 3, at 215.
11. ENCARTA ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 2.
12. ENCARTA ENCYCLOPEDIA, Marriage(1999).
13. Id.
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even in Hungary, modem civilization is finally beginning to legally
recognize the right that same-sex partners have to marry each other.
A. The United States of America
On December 20, 1999, the Supreme Court of Vermont reversed the
trial court's judgment in Baker v. State and retained jurisdiction pending
legislative action because Defendant State was constitutionally required to
extend to same-sex couples the common benefits and protections that flow
from marriage under Vermont law.1 Chief Justice Jeffrey L. Amestoy
based his decision on the Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont
Constitution (Chapter I, Article 7), which says that government is for the
common benefit of the community rather than for the advantage of
individuals:' "[G]overnment is, or ought to be, instituted for the common
benefit, protection, and security of the people, nation, or community, and
not for the particular emolument or advantage of any single person, family,
or set of persons, who are a part only of that community... " 16
In the Constitutional claim section of his opinion, C.J. Amestoy
emphasizes the differences between the Common Benefits Clause of the
Vermont Constitution and that of its counterpart, the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
The Chief Justice points out that Vermont's constitutional commitment to
equal rights was the product of the successful effort to create an
independent republic, in 1777, preceding the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment by nearly a century.1 7 In his clarification of the reasons why
this court based its decision on Vermont's Common Benefits Clause,
Justice Amestoy further explains that while the federal amendment may
supplement the protections afforded by the Common Benefits Clause, it
does not supplant it as the first and primary safeguard of the rights and
liberties of all Vermonters and the Court is free to provide more generous
protection to rights under the Vermont Constitution than afforded by the
federal charter.' 8
14. Baker v. State, No. 98-032, 1999 Vt. Lexis 406, at * 4 (Vt. Dec. 20, 1999).
15. Steve France, A MarriageProposal- Vermont Supreme Court Seeks Common Ground
on Gay Unions, ABA JOURNAL, Feb. 2000, at 28.
16. Common Benefits Clause of Vermont Constitution, Baker, 1999 Vt. Lexis 496 at *5.
Cf. Wendy Wright, Vermont Court Denies Same Sex Marriage; But Requires Marital Benefits,
Concerned Women for America, PR NEWSWIRE ASS'N, Inc. (Dec. 21, 1999), available at
http://www.pmewswire.com ("This ruling... runs contrary to the Vermont Constitution which
says, 'Laws for the encouragement of virtue and prevention of vice and immorality ought to be
constantly kept in force, and duly executed.'") (citing VT. CONST. § 68).
17. Baker,1999 Vt. LEXIS 406, at *14.
18. Id.
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The historical origins of the Vermont Constitution thus reveal that the
framers, although enlightened for their day, were not principally concerned
with civil rights for African-Americans and other minorities, but with
equal access to public benefits and protections for the community as a
whole. The concept of equality at the core of the Common Benefits Clause
was not the eradication of racial or class distinctions, but rather the
elimination of artificial governmental preferment and advantages. '9
C. J. Amestoy reasoned that denial of the Plaintiff's request for a
marriage license was found in the legislative intent of the marriage statute
that denied the homosexual couples in question the right to such license.20
"The legislative understanding is also reflected in the enabling statute
governing the issuance of marriage licenses, which provides, in part, that
the license 'shall be issued by the clerk of the town where either the bride
2
'Bride and groom' are gender-specific terms." '
or groom resides.'
Therefore, Chief Justice J. L. Amestoy told Vermont's legislature in this
opinion to either provide for licenses or set up some sort of domestic
partner system where all or most of the same rights and obligations
provided by law to married partners will be extended to same-sex couples.
In what has been called a "historical and ground breaking" event, on
March 16, 2000, the Vermont House approved legislation that would
create the closest thing to gay marriage that America has ever seen. 2 In a
vote of 79-69, a bill giving same-sex couples the benefits of marriage
through "civil unions" was passed.,3 Representative William Lippert, the
only openly gay member of the House, gave a speech where he points out
the many decades of mistreatment, discrimination, and prejudice that has
existed against gay men and lesbians.' Gay couples who form civil unions
would be entitled to about three-hundred state benefits of privileges
available to married couples: filing of joint tax returns, inheritance,
property transfers, medical decisions, and insurance are among the most
important areas.Y On April 26, 2000, Howard Dean, the Governor of
Vermont, signed a "first-in-the-nation" same-sex "civil unions" bill into

19. Id. at 33.
20. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18
21.

§ 5131(a) (2001).

Baker, 1999 Vt. LEXIS 496 at *7.

22. Ross Sneyd, Gay 'Civil Unions' Win Key Support in Vermont, THE MIAMI HERALD
EDITION, Mar. 17, 2000, at 2A.
23.

Id.

24. Vermont House Passes Gay Union Bill on First Vote, The Advocate.corn, (Mar. 17,
2000), at http://www.advocate.com/html/news/031700/031700news01.html.
25. Sneyd, supra note 22 at 2A.
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law.2' The law will allow gay couples to form civil unions beginning July
1.27 While other states will most likely not recognize Vermont's civil
unions, through their "Defense of Marriage Acts," ' this is an enormous
positive step in the fight for same-sex marriage rights in The United States.
On December 9, 1999, the Supreme Court of Hawaii decided Baehr
v. Miike,2' ending an eight-year fight to make this island archipelago the
first United States state to legalize same-sex marriage. The trial court had
entered a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, ruling that the sex-based
classification in Haw. Rev. Stat. § 572-1 (1950) was unconstitutional by
virtue of being in violation of the equal protection clause of Hawaii's
Constitution Article I, section 5.2° The Department of Health was therefore
enjoined from denying an application for a marriage license because
applicants were of the same sex." However, the state legislature amended
the state constitution, investing in the legislature the power to reserve
marriage to opposite sex couples. 2 On appeal, the court held that the
marriage amendment validated § 572-1 by "taking the statute out of the
ambit of the equal protection clause of the Hawaii Constitution, at least
insofar as the statute, both on its face and as applied, purported to limit
access to the marital status to opposite sex couples."" The Court ordered
that the judgment of the circuit court in favor of the plaintiffs be reversed
and that the case be remanded for entry of judgment in favor of Miike and
against the plaintiffs. The marriage amendment rendered the plaintiffs'
complaint moot.
The importance of the Baker decision is that its consequences will not
be limited to the State of Vermont. States in the United States must
determine whether they will extend the Full Faith and Credit provision of
the United States Constitution to any other state that does adopt legislation
granting marriage licenses to same-sex couples.1' This may apply as well
to any state that adopts a domestic partner system where homosexual
couples enjoy the same benefits and rights that heterosexual married
couples enjoy. Article IV, § 1 of the United States Constitution provides:
26. Vermont Governor Signs Bill Creating Marriage-Like 'Civil Unions,' CNN.com, (Apr.
26, 2000), at http://www.grasshopperdesign.com\gaymarriage\news\vt4.htm.
27. Id.
28. The Defense of Marriage Act, Pub.L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996).
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Baehr v. Miike, 994 P.2d 566 (Haw. 1999).
Id. at 1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Wilets & Woods, supra note 1, at 213.
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"Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the Public Acts,
Records, and Judicial Proceedings of every other State... " Public Acts
is the most relevant of the above-mentioned elements of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause of the Constitution to cover marriage, however
some legal commentators have suggested that it is 'comity'
(legal principle whereby courts of one state or jurisdiction
will give effect to laws or judicial decisions of another
state or jurisdiction as a matter of deference and mutual
respect) rather than 'full faith and credit' that is the
relevant legal principle to apply to the question of a state's
recognition of a same-sex marriage performed in another
3
state. 5
Even when this provision means that marriages in one state must be
recognized in another, some states may claim a public policy exception to
the provision.) A major bar to the challenge under the "Full Faith and
Credit" clause has been the passage of the Defense of Marriage Act. This
federal law exempts those states that have enacted statutes that call for a
refusal to recognize the legality of another state's same-sex marriage."
As of February, 2000, "of the 541 pieces of state legislation dealing
with issues concerning gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered people
and their loved ones, 309 were 'favorable' and 232 were 'unfavorable'."18
Bills allowing same-sex marriage failed in Massachusetts and Rhode Island
while in Oregon, an anti-marriage initiative was kept off the ballot. 39 Only
Louisiana passed a bill prohibiting the recognition or validity of any
marriage between persons of the same sex lawfully entered into in another
jurisdiction.40
B. The Netherlands
Under Chapter 1, (Fundamental Rights), article 1 (Equality), of the
Kingdom of the Netherlands's Constitution, there is a clause that reads:

35. Interview with James D. Wilets, Assistant Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern
University in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. (Apr. 28, 2000) (on file with author).
36. Wilets & Woods, supra note 1, at 213.
37. William Eskridge, Current Government Policies DiscriminatingAgainst Gays, (Oct.
24, 1997), at http:lwww.qrd.orglqrd/wwwllegalleskridge-10.25.97.html.
38. State Legislation Impacts PFLAG, PFLAGPOLE
http://www.plag.org.

39. Id. at4.
40.

H.B. 1450, 1999 Leg., 890 Act. (La. 1999).

(Winter

2000),

available at
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"Discrimination on the grounds of religion, political opinion, race, sex, or
on any other grounds whatsoever shall not be permitted."4
Same-sex, as well as opposite sex, unmarried couples and their
children in the Netherlands, have had available to them a "Registered
Partnership" legislation since January 1, 1998.42 The bill was introduced
in the Dutch Parliament through bill number 2376, in June 1994, and it
grants almost all legal consequences of marriage to unmarried couples that
do not wish to marry, but who live together.43 It does not grant the actual
marital status nor any form of parental rights and duties to the couple.
On April 16, 1996, the Lower Chamber of the Dutch Parliament,
through Parliamentary Paper 1995/96, nr. 22700/18, proposed and adopted
the following:
The Chamber, having heard the debate,
noting that often in our society two people of different
sexes and of the same sex want to enter into a lasting and
committed relationship;
noting furthermore that according to the Civil Code the
concluding of a civil marriage is permitted to two people
of different sexes;
being of the opinion that in line with the General Equal
Treatment Act there is no objective justification for the
marriage prohibition for same-sex couples;
resolves, that legal marriage prohibition for two people of
the same sex be lifted."
With the inception of a new coalition government in the Netherlands,
on August 3, 1998, its members agreed to further the interests of
homosexual couples by introducing a bill to open civil marriages and
adoptions to persons of the same sex.4

41.

NETH CONsT. art. I.

42. Kees Waaldijk, Dutch Cabinet Introduces Bills Allowing Same-Sex Marriage and
Same-Sex Adoption, University of Leiden, Neth. (Jun 27, 2000), available at
http://www.coc.nllindex.htmlfile=marriage.html.
43.

Id. at 3.

44. Id.
45.

Id. at4.
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On June 25, 1999, by an amendment to Book 1 of the Civil CodeParliamentary Papers: Kamerstukken 11 1998/99, 26672, nrs. 1-3," the
Dutch Cabinet approved the introduction of bills to open up marriage and
adoption to same-sex partners.4" Normally, it would take both chambers of
Parliament at least until the end of the year 2000 to debate and approve
these bills. Therefore, the first same-sex marriages and adoptions would
not take place before 2001.48 The Marriage Bill will not do away with
registered partnerships and these two will co-exist for at least the next five
years.' 9 In addition, registered partners will get the opportunity to convert
their partnerships into full marriages.
On April 1, 2001, four laws came into effect in the Netherlands by
means of the Royal Decree, Staatsblad, nr. 145. One of these laws is the
law of December 13, 2000 (Staatsblad2001, nr. 11), dealing with various
matters including the further equality between marriage and partnership
registration. Some parts of this law took effect before April 2001. Then,
there is the law of December 21, 2000 (Staatsblad 2001, nr. 9), which
deals with the opening up of marriage for same-sex partners. The third
law that took full effect was the law of December 21, 2000 (Staatsblad
2001, nr. 10), dealing with adoption by same-sex partners. The fourth law
that took effect was the law of March 8, 2001 (Staatsblad2001, nr. 128),
which adjusted various other laws to the opening up of marriage and
adoption." Until a bill, now in Parliament, that provides for automatic
parental custody for children born in same-sex marriages for lesbians or
heterosexual registered partnerships becomes law, the differences between
registered partnership and marriage, and between same-sex marriage and
different-sex marriage, will be insignificant. With the exception of the
differences imposed by biology and foreign laws, which are beyond the
reach and sovereignty of the Netherlands' lawmakers, same-sex and
different-sex foreign partners hold now the same position with respect to
marriage, partnership registration, and immigration.,' At midnight, on
April 01, 2001, four same-sex Dutch couples took their legally recognized
wedding vows after years of struggle for equality.
The Netherlands, thus, becomes the first country in the Western
world to adopt a marriage law that grants same-sex couples all the rights,
including the license, which heterosexual couples have in marriage.
46. Waaldijk, supra note 6, at 17.
47. Id. at 1.
48. Id.
49.

Id.

50. Waaldijk, supra note 42.

51. Id.
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C. Hungary
The Republic of Hungary decriminalized homosexuality in 1961,
when it was still under the Soviet Union's Communist regime." The age
of consent for homosexual practices was 20 years until 1978, when it was
changed by Section 199 of Hungary's Penal Code to 18 years, subject to 3
years of imprisonment for a violation."
"The Hungarian Constitutional Court ruled on March 8, 1995, that it
is unconstitutional for Hungarian law to recognize heterosexual common
law marriages but not lesbian or gay ones." Since Hungary recognizes
marital unions under the common law marriage doctrine, the Hungarian
court found no legal grounds on which to sustain such disparate treatment
and sent the law on common law marriages, called Ptk 578/-1, back to the
legislature, ordering it to take action on the matter by March 1996.6
Nevertheless, the Court also ruled that civil marriages were still off-limits
to homosexual couples by stating that the "Constitution protected the
institution of civil marriage as a union between a man and a woman. "7
On May 21, 1996, by passing Act XLII of 1996, an amendment to
Act IV of the 1959 Civil Code of the Republic of Hungary, Parliament
revised their "cohabitation" law to read: Section 1: "During their
cohabitation, common law spouses shall acquire common property in
proportion to their participation in the acquisition.""
Section 2:
"Common law spouses are two persons living together without marriage in
common household, in emotional and economic community.""
It is also important to note that the Hungarian Constitution contains a
provision, under Article 70A (No Discrimination), whereby "The Republic
of Hungary shall respect the human rights and civil rights of all persons in
the country without discrimination on the basis of race, color, gender...
political or other opinion, or on any other grounds whatsoever."'* Based
on this Constitutional right not to discriminate on "any grounds
whatsoever" and its finding that law Ptk 578/G was arbitrary and contrary

52. The International Lesbian and Gay Association, World Legal Survey (1998), at
http://www.ilga.org/Informationllegal-survey/europe/hungary.html.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id.
Wilets & Woods, supra note 1, at 231.
ILGA, supra note 52.
Wilets & Woods, supra note 1, at 231.
ILGA, supra note 52.
PTK/G (1996) (Hun.)

59. A MAGYAR K6ZTARSASAG ALKOTMANYA [CONSTITUTION] art. 70A.

60. Id.
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to human dignity, the Hungarian Constitutional Court had the legal tools
necessary to demand Parliament to amend the law on cohabitation and,
thus, extend to homosexual couples the same rights that heterosexual
couples enjoyed." Today, in Hungary, same-sex couples living together
can claim all the marital rights of traditional common-law marriages,
except the right to adopt children.
IV. SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES OF LEGAL TREATMENT AMONG
SELECTED COUNTRIES
The United States, the Netherlands, and Hungary treat the issue of
same-sex marriage in similar and different ways. Among the similarities,
what stands out is: i) how recent it is that these countries have taken
seriously the passage of laws to legalize same-sex unions, ii) the process by
which these countries have had to first, recognize that there is
discrimination in the area of sexual orientation; then, progressively,
decriminalize homosexual activity, and then move to allow homosexuals
their civil rights, including the final acceptance of same-sex marriage,
whether based on common law marriage principles (Hungary), civil unions
(USA- State of Vermont), or an actual marriage license (Netherlands).
Another similarity is how internal conservative movements have
continuously tried to obstruct legislation granting gays any type of right,
much less the right to marry.
These countries, however, have dealt with this issue also in different
ways. The Dutch Parliament, has proven time and again how the intense
social conscience that prevails in the Netherlands on the subject of minority
rights, non-discriminatory legislation in the area of sexual orientation,
equal rights for same-sex partners, and general human rights laws, will
find fertile ground in a legal system that works to fully reflect the society it
represents and not only the personal and conservative views of a few of its
members.
The Dutch groundbreaking approach to real legislative
representation has made the Netherlands a pioneer in granting same-sex
couples a myriad of legal rights, whereas in countries like the United
States, the legal system (including the legislative and judiciary branches of
government) and those who represent it, have yet to reach this point in
spite of being the country that created the civil rights movement.
The United States' legislative system, starting from Congress, going
to each state's legislatures, and ending up at the court level, has proven
that, although the awareness is there, the United States still has a long road
to go before it fully reflects in its legislation its social reality in the area of

61. The International Lesbian and Gay Association, supra note 52.
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human and civil rights for gays, lesbians, bisexuals and transgendered
individuals. So far, the only positive legislation passed in the United States
that provides similar rights of heterosexual married couples to same-sex
partners, has been the Vermont civil unions law. In a country with almost
three hundred million inhabitants and as the world economic leader, the
United States has a terrible record as far as the creation and
implementation of domestic anti-discrimination laws that protect the rights
of sexual minorities or homosexuals.
The power that some extremely conservative religious groups assert
over many members of Congress, through their lobbying and political
action groups, is partly responsible for the striking down of legislation that
would have given homosexuals the right to enter into full legal marriages,
at least from the time that the State of Hawaii made its first claims on the
subject. Other reasons are simply based on pure personal ignorance and
fear of the unknown from people in power who, most likely, have never
even met a homosexual couple in their lives. Respected judges in high
courts of the United States have written opinions where they base most of
the "logic" behind the denial of rights to a homosexual person, i.e. the
right of privacy to engage in sexual conduct with a member of one's same
sex,6 upon the judge's own values and standards of morality.60 As long as
the problem is not attacked from its roots, education, and included as part
of the regular general courses that children take in school, (i.e. subjects on
tolerance of those different from us, civil rights and duties, and human
rights) homosexuals, like any other minority in the United States, will
continue to suffer the legal consequences of the blindness and deafness of
the people that are supposed to represent their rights.
The good news is that a country like Hungary, with a much more
controversial past than that of the United States, both socially and
historically, is starting to take some serious steps in the direction of
legislative awareness on the subject of sexual orientation issues and anti62. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
63. Justice White, who wrote the majority opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick, explained:
[tihe law, however, is constantly based on notions of morality, and if all laws
representing essentially moral choices are to be invalidated under the Due Process
Clause, the courts will be very busy indeed . . . [Riespondent insists that the majority
sentiment about the morality of homosexuality should be declared inadequate. We do
not agree . . . [n]o connection between family, marriage, or procreation on the one
hand and homosexual activity on the other, has been demonstrated by either the Court
of Appeals or by respondent [H-ardwick]. Moreover, any claim that precedent cases
presented to support Hardwick's position stand for the proposition that any kind of
private sexual conduct between consenting adults is constitutionally isolated from state
proscription is unsupportable.
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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Even if Hungary's only reason to accept
discriminatory legislation.
homosexual couples living together is to offer an image of social and civil
rights consciousness in order to eventually enter the European Ution, this
creates the legislative awareness needed as basis to move forward into an
eventual full incorporation of same-sex marriage legislation.
V.

REASONS BEHIND LEGAL TREATMENT OF ISSUE

History, religion, culture, economics and society all play an important
role in understanding the reasons why the United States, the Netherlands,
and Hungary treat the issue of same-sex marriage in a variety of ways and
why each behaves legally in a particular way.
The advent of industrial capitalism led the way for the breakdown of
old family structures in the Western world." Individuals started making
their own livings and breaking away from the interdependent family unit.
Urban societies became the center for people who wanted to find others
like themselves.65 In the West, the evolution of liberal and democratic
societies provided legal recourses for homosexuals to acquire, defend, and
expand personal rights that were not available in rural societies or within
the "traditional" heterosexual family structures." In addition, in the
United States and Western Europe, education and economic possibilities
were opening up for women, which translated into less pressure to marry
and have children. 67 With the addition of social mobility, the twentieth
century marked the first time in Western history that the lesbian was able
to emerge as a distinct social identity."
In the United States, the late nineteenth century marked a period of
Romantic friendships
major change in the lives of many women.
flourished in a society were women were still not perceived as sexual
beings." Then came the age of Freud, where women began to be viewed
as "sexual," birth control became more accessible, and heterosexual sex
did not have to end in babies.70 All of these factors threatened male
dominance and women found themselves under pressure to abandon these
romantic friendships and devote themselves to their marriages. The entry
of the United States into World War II, in December 1941, helped

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

See
See
See
Id.
Id.

generally MILLER, supra note 3 (analyzing gay and lesbian history).
generally id.
generally id.
at XXIV.

MILLER,

supra note 3.

Id. at 63.
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strengthen a weak gay and lesbian identity." Thousands of men and
women were taken into sex-segregated environments and away from the
structures that family, church, and their hometowns provided. It was the
first time that the United States military asked recruits whether or not they
were homosexuals.7
A very important event took place on the night of June 27, 1969 in
New York City. The Police Department raided, as it customarily did, a
gay bar known as "Stonewall Inn."" This raid led to a series of days of
riots by gays against the police officer's abuses and discriminations against
that particular section of society. The homosexual revolution had started
with thousands of gays taking the streets, weeks and months after the
Stonewall raid, shouting "Gay Power" and "We Shall Overcome.""4
American society slowly evolved into a liberal one within its
conservative democratic political ideology. This liberal society allowed
homosexuals to have some legal recourse to acquire, defend, and expand
personal rights.7" In the post-1960s period, something known as "identity
politics" came into fashion where the birth of the. "gay and lesbian
76
community" became viewed as just another minority or constituent group.
It is important to point out that "the whole idea of anti-discrimination
legislation (covering first race, religion, and sex) is primarily an American
invention, starting with the Civil Rights Act of 1964."" This means that
the American legal system of the sixties was already setting the grounds
for case and statutory laws that would support the plight of sexual
minorities within American society, although it has been a long and
frustrating struggle.
Religion and morality are often used as reasons why society should
not recognize same-sex marriages. Nevertheless, in the United States,
several Protestant denominations-notably the Unitarian Universalist
Church and many Quaker congregations-recognize same-sex unions. ' In
addition, arguably the United States Constitution's First Amendment's
Freedom of Religion is violated any time a state prohibits same-sex
marriages. The excuse most often alluded to has been that same-sex
71.

MILLER, supra note 3, at 231.

72. Id.
73. WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND
THE LAW 63 (1997).
74. MILLER, supra note 3, at 368.

75. Id.at xxv.
76. Id.
77. Waaldijk, supra note 6, at 11.
78. RUBENSTEIN, supra note 73, at 749-50.
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marriages do not lead to procreation, and this is a fundamental purpose of
marriage." Nevertheless, no state actually requires heterosexual couples to
procreate as a condition precedent to receiving a marriage license." Since
sex cannot occur outside of wedlock and the fundamental purpose of
marriage is to procreate, why are contraceptives not outlawed?
Economics can also play an important role in determining why a state
may want to pursue the recognition of same-sex rights legislation. In a
very perceptive analysis, a California law professor indicated in 1995 that
it would bring economic benefits to any state to be the first to recognize
same-sex laws:
increased tourism and its revenue being the main
economic incentive." She also indicated that the states most likely to be
the ones to legalize same-sex marriage in the Unites States were Hawaii,
New Mexico, or Vermont.8 She was right.
The Netherlands has a reputation for being one of the most openminded and liberal countries within the European Union and the world.
With laws that allow the public use of certain soft drugs, e.g., marijuana,
the legalization of prostitution, the recent passage of a law permitting
euthanasia, and for being the first country in Europe to have full legal
homosexual marriages, their reputation is well deserved. The reasons for
this tolerant atmosphere and uncommon open mentality are mixed. The
Dutch inhabitants are mainly descendants from Franks, Frisians, and
Saxons of Germanic and Nordic origins."
As Figure One indicates, Roman Catholics constitute about thirty-five
percent of the population. Twenty-four percent are Protestants, mostly
belonging to the Dutch Reformed Church, and about forty-one percent of
the people do not belong to a religious body." This translates to sixty-five
percent of the population of the Netherlands who do not hold any of the
strict Judeo-Christian views on homosexuality.

79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Jennifer G. Brown, Competitive Federalism and the Legislative Incentives to Recognize
Same-Sex Marriage, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 745, 749 n. 13 (1995).
82.

Id.

83. ENCARTA ENCYCLOPEDIA, Hungary (1999).

84. Id.
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Figure 1
The Netherlands has no official religion, however the Reformed
Church has had a close association with the Dutch state since the founding
of the Republic." Finally, starting from the sixteenth century, when the
Netherlands was the foremost commercial and maritime power of Europe,
have enjoyed a high level of basic education
until today, the Dutch people
86
rates.
literacy
high
and
Hungary, where about ninety percent of its people are Magyars,
descendants of the Finno-Ugric and Turkish tribes who mingled with
Slavic tribes in the ninth century, possesses a great variety of ethnic
minorities.7 Gypsies, Germans, Slovaks, Croats, Serbs, and Romanians
are among the largest. It is predominantly a Roman Catholic country with
a large Protestant minority, in spite of the fact that, during the Communist
Approximately ninetyperiod, the government dissolved all religions.
nine percent of the adult population is literate and education is mandatory
for children between the ages of six to sixteen. 9 Before the Communists
took power in 1948, Hungary's economy was primarily agricultural.90 The
It emphasized
new Communist government drastically changed it.
unrealistic industrialization goals for many years until new economic

85. Id.
86. Id.
87. ENCARTA ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 83.

88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id
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reforms brought prosperity. 9' The change from Communism to a freemarket economy (1990) has taken its toll on the Eastern European
economies and its people, bringing high inflation and low wages.9 Along
with this economic breakdown comes social problems like a high incidence
of alcoholism." There are also claims of discrimination and persecution
that several Hungarian minorities have suffered. In spite of all this,
Hungary is known for its constitutional guarantees of civil liberties and
human rights. The main reason behind this type of legislation quickly
passing in these former Communist countries of East Europe is that
countries wished to meet the human rights criteria that were set for
membership in the Council of Europe.9' Ultimately, Hungary wants to
become a member of the European Union.
VI. FUTURE TREND-ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
With the legal leadership and precedent already set by the
Netherlands; the legal and social consciousness that are now very present
in the United States, after such states like Hawaii, which paved the way,
and later the state of Vermont, which took the first real step towards
equality for same-sex American couples; and, finally, with the acceptance
of homosexual couple's rights in a country like Hungary, the rest of the
Western world is likely follow these examples. With the increasing trend
toward globalization, all societies will eventually start incorporating into
their legal systems legislation that will recognize same-sex marriages,
partnerships, and the rights and responsibilities that come along with that.
Until World War II, customary international law" stated or implied
that each country could do as it pleased with its people within its borders,
After the Holocaust, the
based on the doctrine of sovereignty. 9'
International Human Rights Movement became part of international law

91.

See JEFFREY A. FRIEDEN & DAVID A. LAKE, INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

475 (1995) (discussing former Soviet states; the observations are equally applicable to Hungary).
92. Id. at 478.
93.

ENCARTA ENCYCLOPEDIA supra note 32.

94. Waaldijk, supra note 6, at 8.
95. International custom is evidence of a general practice accepted as law, with no
requirement of universal acceptance. See art. 38 of the statute. See also The Paquete Habana;
The Lola, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
96. The doctrine of sovereignty-the claim to be the ultimate political authority, subject to
no higher power regarding the making and enforcing of political decisions-developed as part of
the transformation of the modem medieval system in Europe in the modern state system, a
process that culminated in the treaty of Westphalia in 1648. It is the basis of the international
society.

(1996).

Ian McLean, The Concise Oxford Dictionaryof Politics, 464 (Oxford University Press)
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and the United Nations Charter.Y The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), is the main Human
Rights document binding all member states of the United Nations to uphold
its provisions within their territories. Article 1 states that "all human
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights."" Article 2 sets out
the non-discrimination provisions regarding the rights and benefits
provided by the Declaration: "everyone is entitled to all the rights and
freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without discrimination of any kind,
such as race, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national
origin or other status."" Article 7 brings into play the importance of equal
protection guarantees: "All are equal before the law and are entitled
without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled
to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this
Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination. "'
When the European Union was founded, it was not perceived that
there was a fundamental rights aspect to the primarily economic objectives
of the Community. The original member states had established the
separate structure of the Council of Europe and the European Convention
on the Protection of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (1950), and the
European Court of Human Rights guaranteed the protection of human
rights. Initially, fundamental human rights gained recognition through the
judgments of the European Court of Justice, basing its decisions primarily
on general principles of law. However, recent growing concerns within
the European Union that measures taken to improve and implement
internal markets could not be achieved without first addressing disparities
in the protection against any form of discrimination.' 1 In May 1995, the
European Parliament adopted a resolution whereby the Intergovernmental
Conference of 1996 would adopt a treaty that provided more rights for EU
citizens and improved protection of the fundamental rights of all EU
residents. °0 This led to the adoption of the Treaty of Amsterdam at the
European Council Meeting on June 1997.
The importance of this treaty, for purposes of how international law
can assist the rights that same-sex partners may have in marriage, is that it
marks the first time that any international treaty introduces a clause based
97. Anthony Chase, Professor of Law, Lecture on Public International Law, Nova
Southeastern University, Fort Lauderdale, Florida (Feb. 25, 2000) (on file with author).
98. G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc A/810 (1948).

99. Id.
100. Id.
101. JACKIE LEWIS, THE ROAD TO AMSTERDAM 10 (1999).

102.Id. at1l.
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on discrimination. For example, Article 13 makes specific mention of
sexual orientation.'0 3 A significant aspect of this Article is that it
recognizes that discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation exists,
and implies that such types of discriminations calls for action on the part of
the European Union members. Up to now, most legislation that has been
passed that protects against discrimination, whether in Europe or in the
United States, makes reference to sex, religion, race, ethnicity and
nationality, but no specific mention of sexual orientation was ever made.'°'
In the United States, treaties are considered the "supreme law of the
land. " '
Nevertheless, some treaties, e.g., those non-self-executing,
require domestic legislation to make a treaty enforceable.06 The reality is
that sovereignty and the consent of states defines international law. In
other words, countries may sign treaties that protect human rights but they,
ultimately, are the ones who must enforce them within their territories.
Although there are established means of enforcement for violations to
international treaties (such as economic sanctions), only in the last decade
of the 1900s, a movement started towards using military sanctions (NATO
air bombing of Belgrade) against countries in gross violations of human
rights (e.g., genocide).
The importance of these events is that awareness that human rights,
including the rights of same-sex partners, must occupy a more significant
place in world politics and international law is already present.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Western world is seeing homosexual communities becoming
more visible. Large numbers of homosexuals are openly declaring their
identities and demanding their rights to equal and respectful treatment.
What must be realized is that the homosexual community occupies a de
facto place in society and their rights must be recognized de jure just as all
other members of society rightfully do. In the last century, same-sex
marriage went from being some unthinkable proposition to a reality. As
103 Id. at 16.
104. Gay Employee Can't Sue Under Title VII For Sex Harassment, Law. WEEKLY USA,

Apr. 16, 2001, at 5. (Referring to a recent Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision rejecting the
claims of a plaintiff who sued based on sexual harassment under Title VII. This Court
determined that Title VII protects against discrimination based only on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex or national origin. Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., Docket No. 98-16924 (9th Cir.
2001).
105. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
106 International custom is evidence of a general practice accepted as law, with no
requirement of universal acceptance. See art. 38 of the statute. See also The Paquete Habana;
The Lola, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
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long as societies around the world provide all legal consequences of civil
marriage to same-sex couples, whether they choose the Netherlands's full
marriage recognition or registered partnerships, or Vermont's bill allowing
for same-sex civil unions, or Hungary's common law recognition of legal
cohabitation, eventually there will be no political or moral arguments to
support that same-sex unions are not as legal and real as any other
"marriage."
It remains to be seen what legal implications will the
Netherlands' passing of same-sex full marriage law will have within the
European Union. Should the European Court of Justice decide to ignore
same-sex marriages validly contracted in the Netherlands and restrict the
meaning of the word "spouse" to its traditional heterosexual notion, that
would translate to an invasion on the part of the Court to the Netherlands'
domain in the area of family law, over which individual member states still
have preemption.
Despite changing attitudes toward same-sex relationships, homosexual
conduct remains a criminal offense in some jurisdictions of the United
States and many other countries around the world. To effect a global
change in attitude towards homosexual issues, precedent suggests that
countries and their societies need to pass through stages. First, there must
be a conscious acceptance that homosexuals exist and have the same rights
to equal protection of the laws as any other member of society. Second,
countries need the realization that these sexual minorities are targets of
continuous discrimination in practically all areas of life: employment,
marriage, healthcare, housing, adoption, and even education.
Third,
countries need the progressive passage of anti-discrimination laws that
include sexual orientation as part of the statutory language; fourth, the
eradication of the idea that homosexual activity is criminal, immoral, or
deviant. Finally, same-sex partnership legislation that lead to full legal
marriages. As history has shown, it may be a difficult road. However, it
is not an impossible goal.
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On July 8, 1996, the World Court, the International Court of Justice
at the Hague, banned the bomb.I
This was in answer to a question certified by the United Nations
General Assembly, "Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any
circumstance permitted under international law? "2 The answer was no,

*
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1. Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996
I.C.J. Reports 226-593 (July 8) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons]. An earlier petition from the
World Health Organization was dismissed for want of standing in the petitioner. Legality of the
Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, 1996 I.C.J. Reports 66-224 (July 8).
2.
G.A. Res. 75K, U.N. GAOR 49th Sess., U.N. Doe. AI49IPV.90 (1994). See also
1994 U.N.Y.B, 157-58, U.N. Sales No. E.95.I.1. The resolution helped the Court out a bit by
recalling "resolutions 1653 (XVI) of 24 November 1961, 33/71 B of 14 December 1978, 34/83
G of 11 December 1979, 35/152 D of 12 December 1980, 36/92 I of 9 December 1981, 45/59 B
of 4 December 1990 and 46/37 D of 6 December 1991, in which it [the General Assembly]
declared that the use of nuclear weapons would be a violation of the Charter and a crime against
humanity.. . " Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 226-28.
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nuclear warfare is not permitted. The World Court has jurisdiction to give
such answers, and even though the Court has no more battalions than the
Pope or the Archbishop of Canterbury,' still it is the closest thing we have

to a final authority in international law, so the answer must have some
importance. It is astonishing how little reaction and comment this ruling
has generated.'
In 1998, about two years after the ruling, India and Pakistan blasted
their way into the nuclear club. A massive diplomatic response is now
trying to persuade them to leave peacefully.' But the United States and the
Russian Federation each have many times the deliverable warheads of all
the other nuclear powers combined,7 and present plans will allow those two
arsenals to continue at omnicidal and ecocidal levels into the indefinite
future. India and Pakistan can excuse themselves as small contributors to
the nuclear threat, negligible when compared to the United States and
Russia.
Long before the Indian and Pakistani bombs, the two great nuclear
arsenals were being questioned by recovering Cold Warriors with
impeccable military credentials-retired CIA chief Admiral Stansfield
Turner,$ for instance, and retired SAC commander General George Lee

3. See Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 226, 227, 232-38 (discussing Statute of the
International Court of Justice, June 25, 1945, arts. 65-68, 59 Stat. 1031, 1063-64). The Statute
appears annually as an appendix in Yearbook of the United Nations. See, e.g., 1994 U.N.Y.B.
1492, 1496, U.N. Sales No. E.95.I.1, app. II.
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Butler. 9 Their old colleagues from the deep bunkers of the Iron Mountain
era were finding it necessary to circle wagons and defend MAD, overkill,
and the rest of the nuclear status quo.' 0 The World Court's ruling shows
that law has a role to play in this debate. Some of the discipline necessary
to call the world back from its long flirtation with extinction may come
from legal reasoning, and may even come from one of the law's most
disparaged departments, international law.
Therefore, let us examine the World Court's ruling. The lack of
reaction and comment about the ruling may be largely the Court's own
fault. The ruling consists of a formal dispositif," which seems to say there
may be exceptions to the bomb's illegality; a rambling and diffuse
"Advisory Opinion" by the whole Court,' 2 which offers little usable
analysis of the issues; and fourteen separate opinions, one from each
judge, no two concurring with one another. " Most of the discussion is
hopelessly abstract. As a political rallying point the ruling is unpromising.
Clashing viewpoints and differing legal traditions from around the world,
which could make the World Court an intellectual clearinghouse for the
best hopes of humankind, came together, and a decision was reached to
condemn the bomb. But the aspirations of Nuremberg were drowned by
the confusions of Babel.
THE COURT HOLDS NUCLEAR WEAPONS SUBJECT TO LAW
Let us start with the World Court's formal dispositif. It has two
sections. In section 1, the Court, by a vote of thirteen to one, accepted
jurisdiction and agreed to issue an advisory opinion. In section 2, the
Court held:
I.

9.

JONATHAN SCHELL, THE GIFT OF TIME: THE CASE FOR ABOLISHING NUCLEAR

See also George Lee
Butler, Time to End the Age of Nukes, BULL. OF ATOM. SCIENTISTS, Mar./Apr., 1997, at 33-36;
General Andrew Goodpaster, An Evolving U.S. Nuclear Posture, BULL. OF ATOM. SCIENTISTS,
Mar./Apr., 1996, at 52-55; George Lee Butler, The General'sBombshell; What Happened When
I Calledfor PhasingOut the U.S. NuclearArsenal, THE WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 1997 at Cl. See
also the proposals of Bruce Blair and the former chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee,
Senator Sam Nunn, in From Nuclear Deterrence to Mutual Safety; As Russia's Arsenal
Crumbles, It's Time to Act, THE WASH. POST, June 22, 1997, at Cl.
10. Several are quoted in Hendrickson, supra note 8.
11. Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 265-67.
12. Id. at 227-65.
13. All fourteen can be found in Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 268-593. Nine of
them are also published in 35 I.L.M. 809, 832-938. The other five can be found in 35 I.L.M.
1343, 1343-58.
WEAPONS Now (1998) (assembling a variety of anti-nuclear views).
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[(2)]A. Unanimously, There is in neither customary nor
conventional international law any specific authorization of
the threat or use of nuclear weapons;
[(2)]B. By eleven votes to three, There is in neither
customary nor conventional international law any
comprehensive and universal prohibition of the threat or
use of nuclear weapons as such;
[(2)]C. Unanimously, A threat or use of force by means
of nuclear weapons that is contrary to Article 2, paragraph
4, of the United Nations Charter and that fails to meet all
the requirements of Article 51, is unlawful;
[(2)]D. Unanimously, A threat or use of nuclear weapons
should also be compatible.with the requirements of the
international law applicable in armed conflict, particularly
those of the principles and rules of international
humanitarian law, as well as with specific obligations
under treaties and other undertakings which expressly deal
with nuclear weapons;
[(2)]E. By seven votes to seven, by the President's casting
vote, It follows from the above-mentioned requirements
that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally
be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in
armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of
humanitarian law;
However, in view of the current state of international law,
and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court cannot
conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear
weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme
circumstance of self-defense, in which the very survival of
a State would be at stake.
[(2)]F. Unanimously, There exists an obligation to pursue
in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading
to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and
4
effective international control.
14.

Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 266-67 (judges' votes omitted).
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Paragraph (2)A says there is no specific authorization for nuclear weapons.
This states the obvious, but it is far from trivial. If the nuclear powers'
reservations of their rights had been as successful as they claim, surely
there would be some specific authorization somewhere. This paragraph
makes clear that Hiroshima and Nagasaki are not precedents amounting to
such a specific authorization.
Paragraph (2)B says there is no "comprehensive and universal
prohibition of the threat or use of nuclear weapons as such." Language so
loaded with qualification cries out for explanation. It is heavy with what
logicians call negatives pregnant. Two of the three judges who voted
against this paragraph-the three were Christopher G. Weeramantry of Sri
Lanka, Mohamed Shahabuddeen of Guyana, and Abdul G. Koroma of
Sierra Leone-cited the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol as such a prohibition."
The Court did not go along with this, so we must accept that the bold
proposition that the bomb is illegal as a poisonous gas did not survive the
Court's strict constructionism. One of the three judges, however, pointed
to the negatives pregnant and claimed that the Court did not really deny the
possibility of some nuclear prohibition: "The specificity conveyed by the
words 'as such' enables me to recognize that '[t]here is in neither
customary nor conventional international law any comprehensive and
universal prohibition of the threat or use of nuclear weapons as such.' "26
Nevertheless, he voted against the paragraph, he said, because "the words
'as such' do not outweigh a general suggestion that there is no prohibition
at all of the use of nuclear weapons. "1 Both the nuclearists and the antinuclearists on the Court indulged in much of this kind of hair-splitting.
In any event, it was a "comprehensive and universal"-strong
words-"as such" prohibition that paragraph (2)B rejected eleven to three.
This rejection is trivial and meaningless as applied to customary law,
which is not written down and therefore cannot prohibit anything "as such"
(that is, by name, explicitly), and it is only a statement of regrettable but
undeniable fact as applied to treaty law as it now stands, because the allimportant Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (below) prohibits possession,
not use, or it prohibits use only by implication. There is less to paragraph
(2)B than meets the eye.
15. See Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 429, 433 (Opinion of Weeramantry); id. at
429, 508-12 (referencing the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol); id. at 556, 580 (Opinion of Koroma)
(citing Article 23(a) of the Hague Convention of 1899 and 1907 as well as the Geneva Gas
protocol of 1925). The third objecting judge cited the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol in support of a
general principle against weapons that cause unnecessary suffering. Nuclear Weapons, supra
note 1, at 375, 403 (Opinion of Shahabuddeen).
16. Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 375, 377 (Opinion of Shahabuddeen).
17. Id.
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The unanimous holdings of the next two paragraphs, (2)C and (2)D,
take away in practice more than paragraph (2)B allowed in theory. In
these next paragraphs, the Court finds nuclear weapons firmly under the
moderating hand of international law. The Opinion of the Court notes the
general acceptance by the nuclear States that any use of nuclear weapons is
"indeed restricted by the principles and rules of international law, more
particularly humanitarian law. ... "" "A weapon that is already unlawful
per se, whether by treaty or custom, does not become lawful by reason of
its being used for a legitimate purpose under the Charter,"' 9 i.e., selfdefense, and even self-defense is subject to the rules of necessity and
proportionality.20 Any use of nuclear weapons must take account not only
of the effects of the immediate use but also of the retaliatory use it is likely
to engender. 2' It follows that any conceivable use of nuclear weapons
would be illegal. All the negatives pregnant in paragraph (2)B are indeed
gravid with significance. There are customary prohibitions against nuclear
weapons, even if they are not, to the Continental legalist, entirely
"comprehensive" and "universal" and against nuclear weapons "as such."
II.

THE COURT CONDEMNS NUCLEAR WEAPONS "GENERALLY"
If the dispositif stopped there, anti-nuclearism would be far ahead.
But there is the exasperating puzzle of paragraph (2)E.
A majority of the Court felt there must be some limit on its
condemnation of nuclear weapons, or at least on the expression of it.
Paragraph 95 of the Opinion says:
In view of the unique characteristics of nuclear weapons,
to which the Court has referred above, the use of such
weapons in fact seems scarcely reconcilable with respect
for such requirements [the principles and rules of law
applicable in armed conflict]. Nevertheless, the Court
considers that it does not have sufficient elements to enable

18. See Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 239, 260, which quotes the submissions of
several nuclear States: "'Restrictions set by the rules applicable to armed conflicts in respect of
means and methods of warfare definitely also extend to nuclear weapons.' (Russian Federation,
CR 95/29, p. 52); 'So far as the customary law of war is concerned, the United Kingdom has
always accepted that the use of nuclear weapons is subject to the general principles of thejus in
bello.' (United Kingdom, CR 95/34, p. 45); and 'The United States has long shared the view
that the law of armed conflict governs the use of nuclear weapons-just as it governs the use of
conventional weapons.' (United States of America, CR 95/34, p. 85)." Id. at 227, 260.
19. Id.at 227, 245 39.
20. Id.at 227, 245
41-44.
21. Id.at 227, 245 43.
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it to conclude with certainty that the use of nuclear
weapons would necessarily be at variance with the
principles and rules of law applicable in armed conflict in

any circumstance.Y
Most jurists, moralists, and logicians would accept this as a handwringing confession of the inevitable limits of human wisdom and

language. But when the same thought appears in paragraph (2)E of the
dispositif, it has become linked to "an extreme circumstance of selfdefence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake."13 Would

this mean that the Japanese could have legally used the bomb against
America, had they had it in 1945?24 Or that Hitler could have put nuclear
warheads in his V-2s? This would be an alarming concession, but the
Court does not say nuclear weapons would be legal in such cases. The
Court refuses to rule one way or the other.

The Court has been keeping the discussion on the level of abstract
rules and principles, and avoiding concrete situations, real or hypothetical.

Some of the judges seem to have in mind an all-out nuclear exchange,
while others may be speculating about limited battlefield uses of tactical
warheads under special and well-controlled circumstances, while still

others struggle for a formula that would cover all conceivable scenarios
with the phrase "nuclear weapons" in them. This may be inevitable in an
advisory opinion, which does not give a court the pragmatic benefit of a
factual situation. But here at the eleventh hour, one hypothetical-and a
hypothetical hypothetical at that-is sneaked in and given prominent place.
We could use more discussion of hypotheticals, or we could do without

this one.
The individual opinions put all this in a better light. Four- of the
seven27 judges who voted for paragraph (2)E said explicitly that they
22. Id. at 227, 262-63.
23. Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 227, 266.
24. Both id. at 556, 561 (Opinion of Koroma) and id. at 375, 419 n. 33 (Opinion of
Shahabuddeen) point out that this idea of an unlimited right to defend the State was rejected at
Nuremberg.
25. Robert Musil, of Physicians for Social Responsibility, has suggested (orally, in a class)
that the great powers might have taken a more negative attitude toward nuclear weapons and
might have avoided the nuclear arms race entirely if they had first encountered the atomic bomb
as an Axis weapon used against London or San Francisco.
26. Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 556-82 (Opinion of Koroma); id. at 330-74
(Opinion of Oda); id. at 375, 376 (Opinion of Shahabuddeen: "My difficulty is with the second
part [of (2)EJ"); id. at 429, 433 (Opinion of Weeramantry: "My considered opinion is that the
use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is illegal in any circumstances whatsoever" [emphasis in
original]).
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objected only to the limits on the condemnation of nuclear weapons, and
that they thought the condemnation should have been absolute. Only one
of the dissenting seven, Judge Schwebel, candidly argued for the legality
of the bomb."
(This leaves two who were ambiguous or unclear,
Guillaume" and Higgins.n) Of the seven ' who voted for the paragraph,
not one of them expressly said he would have voted against it had it been
stronger and had the condemnation been without limits.32 No matter how
the limitations got in there, we have both a clear statement that most uses
of the bomb would be illegal and a possible majority of judges believing
that any use would always be illegal.
III. THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY BANS POSSESSION
Whatever the cautionary negatives in the first several paragraphs of
the dispositif, the tone changes in the final paragraph, (2)F. The Court
lays down the law and spells out a clear and unequivocal obligation for
future action: The nuclear signatories of the Non-Proliferation Treaty
must give up their nuclear weapons. The negotiations leading to that treaty
resulted in a bargain between the nuclear States and the non-nuclear States,
with the nuclear States agreeing to Article VI: "Each of the Parties to the
Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective
measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and
to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete
disarmament under strict and effective international control.",33

27. Guillaume, Higgins, Koroma, Oda, Schwebel, Shahabuddeen, and Weeramantry. Id at
266.
28. Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 311-29 (Opinion of Schwebel).
29. Id. at 287-93 (Opinion of Guillaunme).
30. Id. at 583-93 (Opinion of Higgins).
31. Id. at 266. The judges are Bedjaoui, Ferrari Bravo, Fleischhauer, Herczegh, Ranjeva,
Shi, and Vereshchetin.
32. Indeed, Ranjeva said, "[If the two clauses of paragraph 2 E had appeared as separate
paragraphs, I would have voted without hesitation in favour of the first clause and, if the
provisions of the Statute and Rules of the Court so allowed, I would have abstained on the second
clause ... " Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 294, 304 (Opinion of Ranjeva). Herczegh said
he believed "the wording of this sentence [the reservation of judgment about nuclear weapons in
extreme circumstances of self-defense] cannot easily be reconciled with the earlier reference to
'all the requirements' of Article 51 of the Charter." Id. at 275, 276 (Opinion of Herczegh).
But, on the other hand, Fleischhauer said there was no ground to hold the law of humanity and
the immunity of neutrals superior to the right of self-defense. Id. at 305-310 (Opinion of
Fleischhauer). Vereshchetin said an absolute prohibition would require a treaty. Id. at 279-81
(Declaration of Vereshchetin).
33. Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 227, 263 (quoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty, 21 UST 483; TIAS 6839; 729 UNTS 161, Article VI).
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The last paragraph of the dispositif, (2)F, holds the signatory nuclear
States to this agreement. It unanimously decrees that these nuclear powers
are obliged to negotiate complete nuclear disarmament. Paragraph 99 of
the Opinion of the Court amplifies this:
The legal import of that obligation goes beyond that of a
mere obligation of conduct; the obligation involved here is
an obligation to achieve a precise result-nuclear
disarmament in all its aspects-by adopting a particular
course of conduct, namely, the pursuit of negotiations on
the matter in good faith.Y
The Court went on to support this voluntarily incurred treaty
obligation, this promise made by each nuclear power to all the other States
signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty, by citing General Assembly
resolutions from the very first ' onward,3' and the statements of the 1995
NPT review conference." Thus, the Court squarely rejected the notion
that the post-Cold War world order might include the United States and the
Russian Federation bristling with thousands of nuclear weapons each.
IV. NATIONS OUTSIDE THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY
When the Court discusses possession, it takes the course of least
resistance and most certainty by leaving unwritten law behind and focusing
on the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Little did anyone know how dramatically
attention would shift two years later to nations outside the Treaty, when
two of them, India and Pakistan, would write in subterranean fire the
questions the Court neglected to answer: Is it lawful under international
law, outside of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, for a nation to arm itself with
a nuclear weapon? Is it lawful even if the nation in question has a
traditional enemy that is sure to respond by similarly arming itself? Is it
lawful to start or join a nuclear arms race?

34. Id. at 227, 263-64.
35. Literally the first: Resolution 1(I), of 24 January 1946. Ferrari Bravo stressed the
importance of this resolution, citing, "The United Nations in World Affairs, 1945-1947, 1947,
pp. 391 et seq." Nuclear Weapons, at 282, 283 (Declaration of Ferrari Bravo). See also G.A.
Res. 1946-47 U.N.Y.B. 64-66, U.N. Sales No. 1947.1.18.
36. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 808 A (IX), U.N. Doc. A/2779 (1954); 1954 U.N.Y.B. 20-21,
U.N. Sales No. 1955.1.25. See note 2, supra, for others.
37. Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 227, 265 (citing "the final document of the Review
and Extension Conference of the parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, held from 17 April to 12 May 1995," as well as the Security Council resolution before
the review conference, S/RES/984 (1995), Apr. 11, 1995).
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The arguments against the lawfulness of any nation, even one outside
the Treaty, acquiring a nuclear weapon are many. Acquiring a nuclear
weapon, especially when one's adversaries are likely to acquire it too, is a
threat to international peace and security. So the UN Security Council said
through its president in 1992: "The proliferation of all weapons of mass
destruction constitutes a threat to international peace and security . ... ,
If use of nuclear weapons is a crime against humanity, then preparation for
use must be at least an inchoate illegality. And when a treaty commands as
much acceptance as has the Non-Proliferation Treaty, 39 it may be
declaratory of the jus cogens, the general principles binding on all.40
Perhaps a nation gains nothing by holding back its signature. We can
assume that all these arguments are being made to India and Pakistan-and
to Israel as well, one hopes. But the World Court did not explicitly
address the question of nations outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty.
V.

THE JUDGES' SEPARATE OPINIONS

The fourteen separate opinions, one from each member of the Court,
suggest by their very bulk that the dispositif and its limitations may not
have been the optimum set of compromises. It is too much to expect that
fourteen judges using different languages and grounded in differing legal
traditions might sharpen issues as effectively as, for instance, the nine
members of the United States Supreme Court sometimes do. But we
cannot help but wish that their output might have been both shorter and
clearer.

38. Statement of the President of the Security Council, 1992 U.N.Y.B. at 33, 35, U.N.
Sales No. E.93.I.1.
39. Only India, Pakistan, and Israel have not signed the treaty and have bombs or the
makings of bombs. Cuba and a handful of other small States have not signed: e.g., Cook Islands

and Niue. Brazil, Chile, and Argentina have recently come on board. The dreaded "rogue
States"-Libya, Iraq, Iran, North Korea-have all signed, as have all of the large nuclear
powers:

America, Britain, and Russia from the beginning, and China and France since 1992.

The nations resulting from the breakup of the Soviet Union have all signed. They have all
become non-nuclear except the Russian Federation. Treaties in Force, 2000, 434. Not since the
founding of the United Nations Organization has any proposal for international good behavior
won such wide acceptance.
40.

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; Jonathan I. Charney,

Universal InternationalLaw, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 529 (1993). But see Anthony D'Amato, It's a
Bird, It's a Plane, It's Jus Cogens! 6 CONN. J. INT'L L. 1 (Fall 1990); Adam Steinfeld, Nuclear
Objections: The PersistentObjector and the Legality of the Use of Nuclear Weapons, 62 BROOK.

L. REV. 1635 (Winter 1996).
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A. The Anti-Nuclearists
Three of the separate opinions, long as they are, make good reading
for the anti-nuclearist: Christopher G. Weeramantry of Sri Lanka covered
126 pages (about 50,000 words) with arguments against the bomb;"
Mohamed Shahabuddeen of Guyana fifty-three pages (about 20,000
words);' 2 and Abdul G. Koroma of Sierra Leone, twenty-six pages (about
10,000 words). 3
Koroma was one of the judges mentioned above who voted against
paragraph (2)C because they believed that the gas protocols and other
He voted against
conventions do ban nuclear weapons "as such."
paragraph (2)E because he read the Nuremberg tribunal as saying a State's
right to ensure its own survival is not unlimited," and the ICJ's own
Nicaragua case likewise." He found the fifty-year tradition of non-use
amply backed by an opiniojuris against the bomb, making it binding law."6
In one of the few references" to Hiroshima and Nagasaki by any member
of the Court, Koroma said: "It should not be forgotten that the Second
World War had witnessed the use of the atomic weapon in Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, resulting in the deaths of thousands of human beings. The
Second World War therefore came to be regarded as the period
epitomizing gross violations of human rights."'"
Koroma dismissed the distinction between treaty law, admittedly
binding, and humanitarian customary law, which the United States and

41. Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 429-555 (Opinion of Weeramantry).
42. Id. at 375-428 (Opinion of Shahabuddeen).
43. Id. at 556-82 (Opinion of Koroma).
44. Id. at 556, 561 (Opinion of Koroma) (citing THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY
TRIBUNAL SITrING AT NUREMBERG GERMANY, THE TRIAL OF GERMAN MAJOR WAR
CRIMINALS, vol. 1 at 208.
45. Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 556, 561 (Opinion of Koroma) (citing Military and
ParamilitaryActivities in and againstNicaragua(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. REP. 14, 94).
46. Id. at 556, 578-79 (Opinion of Koroma).
47. Shahabuddeen quoted a Red Cross reaction to Hiroshima and Nagasaki and cited to the
Tokyo District Court ruling condemning those urbicides: Shimodo v. The State, 8 JAPANESE
ANN. OF INT'L L. 212, 235 (1964). Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 375, 383, 397 (Opinion
of Shahabuddeen). Weeramantry argued those bombings did not show that modem nuclear war
would be survivable because, for one thing, they did not involve the modem risk of escalation.
Id. at 429, 473-75 (Opinion of Weeramantry). Other references to the Japanese cities were
perfunctory or dealt only with the destruction and injury done there. For a summary of the
statements of the mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, see id. at 556, 567-69 (Opinion of
Koroma).
48. Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 556, 577 (Opinion of Koroma).
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others had urged the Court to leave to political consideration.49 He cited
several authorities rejecting such a double standard and holding that the
humanitarian side of customary law is part of the jus cogens binding on
all.Weeramantry and Shahabuddeen were as anti-nuclear as Koroma, and
wrote at greater length. The idea that nuclear weapons are essentially a
gas and are prohibited by the anti-gas protocols5' was rejected by the
majority of the Court, but many of their other points remain arguable law.
B. The Candid Nuclearist
The only unabashed apologist for the bomb was the American, Judge
Harold Schwebel, Vice President of the Court. Schwebel served for many
years in the office of the Legal Advisor in the United States State
Department. His opinion begins, "More than any case in the history of the
Court, this proceeding presents a titanic tension between State practice and
legal principle." 2
He claims that for a half-century, the threat to use nuclear weapons
has been clear and constant from the major States, States "that together
represent the bulk of the world's military and economic and financial and
technological power and a very large proportion of its population."" But
we know the vast majority of States do not possess nuclear weapons, and
those that possess them seldom or never make threats, even implicitly, and
have not used a nuclear weapon since 1945. This more accurate view of
State practice would take some of the titanic out of Judge Schwebel's
tension between practice and principle.
Schwebel takes similar liberties by enlisting the treaty regimes of the
last half-century on the pro-nuclear side of his tension. All the limited
nuclear bans, such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty, legitimize that which
they do not ban, he argues M He carries this to the extreme of reading the
assurances of non-use the nuclear powers gave to the non-aligned, nonnuclear signatories of the Non-Proliferation Treaty as implying the threat
to use nuclear weapons elsewhere.55 As for the anti-nuclear General
49. Id. Written Statement of the Government of the United States of America, June 20,
1995. Unpublished. Source on file with author.
50. Id. at 556, 572-74 (Opinion of Koroma).
51. Id. at 429, 433 (Opinion of Weeramantry). See supra note 15.
52. Id. at 311 (Opinion of Schwebel).
53. Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 311, 312 (Opinion of Schwebel).
54. Id at 311, 315-17. (Opinion of Schwebel). Many nations have said explicitly when
supporting these limited bans that they do not mean to validate bombs outside of the ban.
55. Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 311, 315-17 (Opinion of Schwebel).
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Assembly resolutions, Schwebel requires that such resolutions be "adopted
unanimously (or virtually so, qualitatively as well as quantitatively) or by
consensus. . ." before they become evidence of the world's opiniojuris.'
Thus he claims that the resolutions passed by mere majorities serve only to
show that the law is the opposite of what they say.
Schwebel accepts the concessions of the nuclear powers that any
nuclear use is subject to the humanitarian principles of law." Those
principles are what make up the anti-nuclear side of his tension. He agrees
there is a problem in the deterrence theory of the nuclear States: It rests
on a professed willingness to incinerate millions of civilians with no
conceivable proportionality to any legitimate military objective, and such
behavior is against generally accepted principles of humanitarian law.
Faced with this contradiction, Schwebel comes close to concurring with the
Court's anti-nuclear ruling: "The use of nuclear weapons is, for the
reasons examined above, exceptionally difficult to reconcile with the rules
of international law applicable in armed conflict, particularly the principles
and rules of international humanitarian law.""
Further to his credit, Schwebel puts forth a hypothetical. What if a
rogue submarine were destroying cities and killing and threatening to kill
millions? Ordinary depth charges are powerless against it. Would it be
illegal to hit it with a nuclear depth charge, a clean nuclear explosion that
would save the threatened cities with no collateral damage, fallout, or risk
of escalation?
We asked for hypotheticals, so it is only fair that we give our
enthusiastic endorsement to this virtuous nuclear explosion. It sounds as
wholesome as a nuclear bomb vaporizing a giant meteor headed toward the
earth," and about as likely. In the post-nuclear world, there will be no
submarines capable of killing millions, and the greater safety lies in seeing
that such incapacity comes about as soon as possible.60 A legal rule should

56. Id. at 311,319.
57. Id. at 311.
58. Id. at 311,321.
59. Timothy Ferris, Annals of Space: Is This the End?, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 27, 1997
at 44, 53-55 (discussing Edward Teller's proposals to prepare for just such a contingency).
60. Likewise for nuclear terrorism, where nuclear weapons in the hands of national
authorities would be of little value anyhow. Whatever the virtue or necessity of some residual
nuclear capability remaining with some authority, we are so far from that level of disarmament
that it is dishonest to talk about it. The present issue when we talk about law and rules is this:
Can the general rule against nuclear weapons per se be destroyed by improbable thoughtexperiments or does the general ban, with its authorization to keep nuclear weapons away from
terrorists and rogue nations, stand as a general ban, whatever the limitations and defeasibility of
all verbal rules?
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condemn a source of danger, not condone it in the hope that it might
possibly in some extraordinary case serve as a homeopathic antidote to
itself. Schwebel's interest in this hypothetical reflects the same view as the
United States' filing with the Court:" the view that the Court should not
attempt to synthesize a verbal rule unless a treaty has led the way and
supplied the rule, and that any rule as verbalized must be indefeasible by
any conceivable set of circumstances. There is some authority for this
kind of judicial restraint in the healthy maxim nulla poena sine lege (no
punishment without a law), but as far as major crimes against humanity are
concerned, it was conclusively rejected at Nuremberg.
The underlying problem with Schwebel's approach is his allocation of
burdens of legal persuasion. If he encounters a divided view on any
nuclear issue, it is nuclearism that prevails, and restraint must bear the risk
of non-persuasion. He rests this on the adage that that which is not
prohibited is allowed-a sound principle, but one that does not apply to
mass destruction. With mass destruction, that which is not specifically and
affirmatively justified, and brought within some extraordinary license, is
illicit-because mass destruction is generally illicit. Schwebel's approach
is well-illustrated by some speculations about the 1991 Gulf War that take
up the final pages of his opinion. Tariq Aziz, the Iraqi Foreign Minister,
has claimed that Iraq had been ready to use chemical and biological
warfare but was deterred by the veiled nuclear threats of United States
Secretary of State James Baker.Y Schwebel offers this as an instance of the
bomb having a healthy effect. His logic here is the eternal logic of
bellicism: The bomb gets credit for deterring everything the Iraqis did not
do, however speculative their ability to do it, but need accept no
embarrassment for what they actually did do, in defiance of the same
deterrent.
But putting aside this fundamentally misplaced presumption of
regularity, Schwebel's opinion presents issues at the crux-of this case:
1) How are the opinions of nations to be weighed? Do the great
powers outweigh the rest of the world in determining legal consensus?
Or are all foreign offices created equal? Or does the truth lie between
these extremes?
2) To what extent should any official or any commentator, including
the International Court of Justice, limit its discussion of international

61. Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1. Written Statement of the Government of the United
States of America, June 20, 1995. Unpublished. Source on file with author.
62. Much skepticism has greeted Aziz's story. See William M. Arkin, 52 BULL. OF THE
ATOM. SCIENTISTS 64, (May/June 1996).
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law to written treaties, and dismiss the opinion of humanity because it
is diffuse and ill-defined?
3) Do the unwritten principles of humanitarian law ever ban a
particular weapon, or must those principles always address only the
results accomplished?
The first question will disappear if and when the United States and the
other nuclear powers cease opposing the rest of the world on the legality of
nuclear arms. The Court's ruling answers the second question for the
International Court of Justice at the Hague: The unwritten law of
humanitarian restraint is as real there as it was at Nuremberg a halfcentury ago.6 The third question remains as the last-ditch defense of
nuclearism: Maybe we can't use our nuclear weapons and maybe we are
obliged to get rid of them, but just don't say that they are illegal per se.
The nuclearists' world may end not with a bang but a quibble.
We can be grateful to Schwebel for his clarity and candor. He voted
against paragraph (2)E because he saw no general illegality in the use of
nuclear weapons, and a clear majority of the Court voted down that theory.
VI. THE LAW As IT Now STANDS
Our review of the World Court's work has perhaps smacked of
ingratitude. The International Court of Justice is the closest we have to a
final authority in international law (even if it is not one, because nations
reserve the right to ignore its opinions). When such an authority condemns
the bomb, it seems ungrateful to complain of obscurity or lack of clarity.
The World Court accomplished much. Because of its efforts we can now
declare large areas of law settled. Let us try to outline the law as it now
stands. First, some obvious distinctions:
1) Categories of nuclear acts: research, development, acquisition,
stockpiling, deployment, threatening to use, and the actual use of
nuclear weapons.
2) Categories of use: peaceful explosions, testing, and the possible
combat uses, all of which have been hypothetical since 1945: tactical
use in controllable situations, limited escalations, counterforce
escalations, countervalue escalations, urbicide, genocide, omnicide,
ecocide, etc.
3) Sources of law: customs joined with an opiniojuris, including the
basic humanitarian laws of war; treaty regimes, also confusingly
called conventional law; and fully implemented rules acknowledged
63. Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 265.
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by States and conveyed to their officials by laws, orders, and
regulations.
4) Criteria of legality: rules that forbid a given weapon per se, and
rules that forbid certain weapons because of the unlikelihood that they
can be used legally; rules that forbid a weapon by name, and rules
that denounce it by description.
With all of this factual and conceptual variety, and with the general
lack of institutional settlement in international law, there is much we
cannot say with authority. But if we focus on the use of nuclear weapons,
we find three points that are now generally accepted by nuclear and nonnuclear States alike:
1) Any military use of nuclear weapons is subject to the unwritten
principles of humanitarian law, the law referred to in the Martens
clause."
2) These principles ban the targeting of civilians.6
3) They require economy and proportionality even when the targets
are military."
4) While the nuclear powers accept these points, they seem to have
trouble with what obviously follows: that any nuclear exchange
would be against international law as well as violating every other
standard of human conduct. So would any nuclear bombing of any
city." Only the most unlikely hypothetical use-against Schwebel's
rogue submarine, for instance-could avoid collateral consequences of
escalation and fallout enough to escape a ringing condemnation by
"the requirements of the public conscience." Even the smallest of
"tactical" nuclear artillery would bring down on the nation or group
using it the odium of humankind for crossing the nuclear threshold.6
64. Id. at 227, 266.
The Martens clause says that, unless otherwise provided,
"populations and belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the principles of
international law, as they result from the usages established between civilized nations, from the
laws of humanity, and the requirements of the public conscience." See, e.g., Hague Convention
II of 1899, Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 32 Stat. 1803,
1805. See also 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT'L L.: MARTENS' CLAUSE 326-27 (1997). A

more recent form of the Martens clause is quoted at Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 227,
257.
65.

Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 227, 257, 266.

66.

Id. at 227, 245 (Opinion of the Court).

67. Id. at 227, 266.
68. Id.

69. Id. at 227, 245 (Opinion of the Court).
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Thus the half-century of non-use is not a legal irrelevancy. It has
given rise to law as clear as any written on paper and signed at conference
tables, and breaking it would cost any nation or group dearly. Counselors
who try to define this law out of existence will regret their words, should
anyone ever be foolish enough to act upon their advice.
VII. WHITHER Now?
Apart from all the considerations discussed above, humanitarian law
as well as treaty law should have something to say about the sheer mass of
the two largest nuclear arsenals, even after their post-Cold War reductions,
because no conceivable military or political threat can justify the risks of
omnicide and ecocide involved. There are several distinct principles at
work here: Any acquisition of a nuclear bomb is destabilizing and a threat
and should be denounced as illegally aggressive under the Charter,' in
addition to its illegality under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. But quite
separate from this, and antecedent to even the simplest attempts at forming
international law, when a nuclear arsenal reaches the size that it becomes a
threat to the life of the planet itself as well as a threat to the peace, it must
acquire yet another dimension of illegality. None of this is covered in the
Court's opinion.
The Russian Federation and NATO have switched places since the
days of John Foster Dulles, but still the weaker side sees its nuclear
weapons as a cheap substitute for the prohibitively expensive buildup it
would need to reach a balance of conventional forces. This was American
doctrine under Truman and Eisenhower, when faced with the massive Red
Army sprawled over half of Europe," and it is the doctrine of the Russians
now, faced with NATO expanding into former Soviet satellites. It would
dramatically enhance the American margin of power if the nuclear
weapons were out of the order of battle.
On most of the above legal questions, the United States professes
doctrines different from the rest of the world. That is the chief source of
legal obscurity. Judge Schwebel and others find benefit in this obscurity.
This is the crux of this matter: Which is safer, a world professing the
illegality of nuclear weapons and seeking to suppress them by that
illegality, or a world professing their legitimacy and hoping to hold them
in check by their own dangerous effects, such as nuclear diplomacy and
70. Statement of the President of the Security Council, 1992 U.N.Y.B. 33, 35.
71. Bernard Baruch to John Foster Dulles, Oct. 5, 1948: "The only thing that stands in
the way of the over-running of Europe today is the atom bomb. When once we outlaw that,
there is nothing to stop the Russian advance." UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1948 448, 450 (Vol. 1, Part I, 1975).
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nuclear terror?
Because the issue is not capable of experimental
resolution, the answer must turn on presumptions and judgment. When it
comes to the omnicidal arsenals now in place, and to the proposed
retention of enough of those arsenals for multiple genocides, the world
must vote down Judge Schwebel, his former colleagues in the Department
of State, and those of like mind in the Russian Federation.
Somewhere, sometime, there may have been a State that refrained
from an evil act because its legal advisors could not say nuclear retribution
against it would be illegal. It seems unlikely. But we kfiow for sure that
States such as India and Pakistan rely on the legal arguments of the nuclear
States when they claim the right to become nuclear. So we must seize the
chance the World Court has given us to rectify the legal confusion left over
from the 1940s and 1950s, and declare to, and for, all the planet that the
United States accepts the rule that no one may lawfully use a nuclear
weapon. Then we must give the Russian Federation the assurances it
needs so that all the nuclear powers may carry out the promise of Article
VI and rid the world of their nuclear weapons. If we let the present
window of relative opportunity pass, and if the Russian Federation is left
with its thousands of warheads-unstable, but cocked and ready to go-we
will deserve the curses of our descendants, if we have any.
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INTRODUCTION

Foreign pressure on the United States on the capital punishment issue
continues to build. Fewer States around the world are employing capital
punishment. This progression leaves the United States more and more
isolated as one of only a handful of States that execute as criminal
punishment. The isolation is particularly strong on the issue of the
execution of juvenile offenders. While some States have stricken capital
punishment from their statute books, others have simply ceased using
capital punishment in practice. They have taken the approach of a defacto
moratorium.
In many States of the world, capital punishment, whether imposed on
adults or on juveniles, is regarded as a throwback to a former era and is
condemned out of the same considerations that have resulted in universal
condemnation of the use of torture. In Europe, capital punishment is
outlawed by treaty as a human rights violation. In Latin America, capital
punishment is used by only a few small States. These are the two regions
of the world with the closest ties to the United States.

*
Editor's note: these remarks were originally presented at the ILA International Law
Weekend, New York, New York, United States, October 2000.
Additional conference
proceedings are available in Volume 7, Issue 2 of the I.SA Journal of International &
ComparativeLaw (2001).
** President's Club Professor in Law, Ohio State University. A.B., LL.B., M.A.,
Harvard University.
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II. POLITICAL PRESSURE
In addition to isolating the United States by their own practice, other
States have taken affirmative steps to curb the use of capital punishment by
the United States. Within the past year, capital punishment in the United
States has become a major political issue in the United States-Europe
relationship. When the European Union and United States met for a
summit meeting in 2000, capital punishment in the United States was
viewed by commentators as a major issue impeding the development of a
closer transatlantic relationship. European leaders frequently raise the
capital punishment issue with United States officials.
On April 13, 2000, the European Parliament formally requested of
President Clinton that he institute a moratorium on federal executions in
the United States. On July 12, 2000, the European Union made a similar
request of President Clinton. The European Union added a call to
President Clinton to exercise his power of clemency with respect to Juan
Garza, who was scheduled to be executed for a federal crime, and who
would have been the first person executed under recently adopted federal
legislation providing the death penalty for a wide variety of offenses.
These d6marches are, as international relations go, extraordinary
developments. States do not readily make a public request to another State
on a matter of the domestic policy of the other State. States value too
highly their own sovereignty to criticize other States over domestic policy.
To do so sets a precedent and may lead to a request by the United States in
the future on some issue of domestic policy in Europe. The fact that the
European Parliament and the European Union took this 'step indicates
strong sentiment in Europe that the United States, by using capital
punishment, acts beyond the limits of what is acceptable.
International human rights mechanisms have also been invoked with
respect to use of capital punishment in the United States. The United
Nations Human Rights Commission undertook a study of the application of
the death penalty in the United States, sending a special rapporteur to visit
the United States and to analyze the manner in which capital punishment is
used.' The report found racial bias in the use of capital punishment in the
United States. 2 It also concluded that the use of capital punishment is
arbitrary in that standards do not seem to be followed with respect to the
question of who is subjected to capital punishment.3

1. Elizabeth Olson, U.N. Report Criticizes U.S. for 'Racist' Use of Death Penalty, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 7, 1998, at A17.
2. Id.
3. Id.
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HI. EXTRADITION IN CAPITAL CASES
Many States, both European and others, refuse to extradite persons
requested by the United States, if capital punishment awaits them in the
United States. Many foreign States have insisted on the insertion, in
bilateral extradition treaties with the United States, of a clause that allows
the requested State to decline to surrender a person being charged
capitally. In the context of requests by the United States for the surrender
of suspects, many foreign States have insisted on this clause and have
refused to extradite unless the United States first agreed that capital
punishment would not be sought for the suspect.
In one case in Europe, the United States sought the surrender by the
United Kingdom of a man wanted on a capital charge in Virginia.' A
United States-United Kingdom treaty contained a clause on capital
punishment, but the United Kingdom, after some hesitation, did not insist
that United States authorities commit to foregoing a capital charge against
the man.- The man took the matter to the European Court of Human
Rights, which ruled that if the United Kingdom were to extradite, it would
itself be in violation of a provision in the European human rights treaty that
precludes inhuman and degrading treatment.'
The United Kingdom complied with the ruling of the European Court
of Human Rights. It informed the United States that it would surrender the
man only if the United States undertook that he would not be executed.
The United States was forced to make such a commitment, and only then
was the man surrendered. After being surrendered, he was convicted of
non-capital murder in Virginia.
Pressure has also been exerted on the United States by the committee
that monitors compliance with the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights.' In one case, the issue was manner of execution. Canada
was about to extradite to the United States a man sought on a capital
charge in California. In a complaint against Canada to the monitoring
committee, the man argued that the gas chamber as then used in California
inflicted unnecessary suffering, and therefore if Canada surrendered the
man, Canada would violate a provision in the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights that forbids inhuman and degrading treatment or
punishment.
4.
Report).
5.
6.
7.
S. 171.

Soering v. United Kingdom, App. No. 14038/88, 11 Eur.H.R.Rep. 439 (1989) (Court
ld. at 444.
Id. at 439.
See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T
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The monitoring committee agreed with this argument and ruled that
Canada would be in violation of the International Covenant were it to
surrender the man for a trial on a capital charge in California., Canada
surrendered the man without conditions.
However, after he was
surrendered, United States courts came to the same conclusion as the
monitoring committee about the California gas chamber, ruling that its use
caused unnecessary suffering and therefore violated United States
constitutional protections. 9

IV. FOREIGN CONSULS INUNITED STATES COURTS
Consuls of foreign States who are accredited in the United States have
become increasingly active in recent years in seeking to ensure that capital
punishment not be imposed on their own nationals. It is estimated that
approximately seventy foreign nationals are currently under a sentence of
death in the United States and are awaiting execution. In a recent case in
Illinois, a Polish national was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to
die.' 0 The Polish Consul in Chicago intervened in the case at the appellate
stage, thereby becoming a third party to the litigation." The consul's
challenge to the death sentence was based on the failure of Chicago police
to inform the individual at the time of arrest that he had a right to approach
the Polish Consul for assistance.12 The governments of both Germany and
Mexico filed briefs as amicus curiae in support of Poland's Consul.' 3
The United States, along with some one hundred sixty other States, is
party to a multilateral treaty, the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations, which stipulates that detaining authorities must inform a
foreigner, upon detention, of the right to contact the home State consulate
for assistance in preparation of a defense. Police in the United States
rarely comply with this obligation, and as a result most of the seventy or so
foreigners presently under death sentences in the United States were not
informed of their right of consular access.
The Chicago case went to the Supreme Court of Illinois, which upheld
the death sentence by a four to three vote, on the ground that the defendant
had not raised in a timely manner the issue of the failure of police to
8. Ng v. Canada, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., CN. 469/1991 (1993), reprintedin 15 HUM.
RTS. L.J. 149 (1994).
9. Fierrov. Gomez, 77 F.3d 301 (9th Cir. 1996).
10. People v. Madej, 739 N.E.2d 423 (II. 2000).
11. Id. at 423.
12. Id. at 425.
13. Id. at 426.
14. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Germany v. U.S.), 1999 I.C.J. 9 (Mar. 3).
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inform him of his right to approach the Polish Consul.' 5 The three
dissenting judges would have voided the death sentence for the police's
failure. 16 One of the four judges in the majority stated that he considered it
more appropriate that the individual serve a jail term in Poland, rather than
be executed in Illinois."
Foreign governments now routinely file briefs as amicus curiae in
cases in which foreign nationals are subjected to a capital charge. While
such briefs more often than not do not convince the court to reverse a
death sentence, the cumulative effect may be considerable. On occasion,
courts respond. One recent murder case in Ohio, albeit a non-capital case,
involved a young Mexican man who had recently arrived in Ohio to do
agricultural work." In the middle of the night, someone broke into the
apartment where he and several other young Mexicans were living, with
the apparent intent to steal.' 9 One of the young Mexicans apparently
chased the intruder out of the house and shot and killed him.2 One of the
young Mexicans was arrested and was interrogated through an interpreter
at a local police station.' He was tried and convicted and sentenced to life
in prison."
On appeal of the conviction, the Mexican government filed a brief as
amicus curiae on behalf of the young man. In preparing that brief, the
Mexican government discovered a fact that had to that point not been
apparent to lawyers on either side, namely, that the interpreter who helped
the police interrogate the young man barely spoke Spanish, and that, in
particular, the manner in which she rendered the Miranda warnings bore
little relation to the warnings the United States Supreme Court requires be
conveyed to a suspect. As a result, the Ohio Court of Appeals reversed
the murder conviction.2
Incidents like this case can have an impact at the local level that can
raise protections for foreign nationals against false convictions, including
capital convictions. Following the reversal by the Ohio Court of Appeals,
procedures in the particular county were changed to increase the chances
that a non-English-speaking suspect would be properly informed of the
15. Madej, 739 N.E. 2d at427.

16. Id. at 429-32.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. at 428.
State v. Ramirez, 732 N.E.2d 1065 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999).
Id. at 1066.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Ramirez, 732 N.E.2d at 1071.
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Miranda rights and would be interrogated through a competent translator.
Procedures were also changed to ensure that foreigners arrested as criminal
suspects be informed of their right to contact the consul of their home
country.
In their efforts to stop executions, foreign consuls have found an ally
in non-governmental organizations with an international focus. Both
Amnesty International and the American Branch of the International Law
Association have filed amicus curiae briefs in such cases, urging strict
compliance with the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.
V. INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION
In two instances, a foreign State has taken the United States to the
International Court of Justice over the imposition of capital punishment on
one of its nationals. Paraguay filed such a case in 1998, and Germany did
so in 1999. Germany's case is pending before the Court, having
proceeded through the state of oral argument. Germany's ground for
alleging illegality is that the two German nationals, who were charged with
capital murder in Arizona, were not informed at the time of arrest of their
right to contact a German Consul. A multilateral treaty to which Germany
and the United States are parties requires that such information be given.
A protocol to the treaty provides that in the event of non-compliance, the
State whose national was the suspect may sue in the International Court of
Justice. Under procedures of the International Court of Justice, which are
agreed by treaty, decisions of the Court are binding on the parties.
Thus, Germany seeks a Court ruling that would be binding on the
United States in this case. Germany is asking the Court to rule that if the
obligation to provide the necessary information to a suspect is not fulfilled,
a court may not convict the person, and if it does the conviction must be
reversed. In the instant case, the two German nationals have already been
executed by the state of Arizona. Germany seeks a ruling by the Court
that would preclude the United States from executing in the future a
foreign national who has not been informed of the right to contact a
consul.24

Pressure has also been brought to bear on the United States by a 1999
advisory opinion issued by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
The opinion dealt with the obligation to inform foreign nationals detained
as criminal suspects of their right to contact their consulate, in particular in
the context of capital cases. The Court ruled that a conviction secured
after a failure to comply with this obligation may not stand. The Court
24. Case Concerning the Vienna Convnention on Consular Relations (LaGrand) (Germany

v. U.S.A.), 1999 I.C.J. 9.
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also ruled that where such a flawed conviction leads to a death sentence,
the right to life, an internationally secured human right, is violated. The
Court said consular assistance is an element of due process because it
allows a foreign national to present a proper defense., The Court said the
imposition of a death sentence without compliance with the obligation to
inform of the right of consular access constitutes arbitrary deprivation of
life, in violation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, and of the American Convention on Human Rights.26
VI. FEDERALISM AS AN OBSTACLE
A factor that limits the effectiveness of international pressure on the
United States on the capital punishment issue is the nature of the United
States' system of government as a federal system. The pressure is felt
largely by the federal government, because it carries out foreign relations.
Capital punishment, however, is carried out primarily by the constituent
states.
The pressure complicates life for the federal government, as it is
forced to respond to criticism, and as it is responsible for extradition. The
pressure is felt much less by the states, where the executive branch (state
governors) and the legislative branch largely view international pressure as
irrelevant.
Some pressure, to be sure, has been exerted on state
institutions by foreign actors, in particular in making representations to
state governors about particular pending executions. In many instances,
foreign non-governmental organizations and individual foreign officials
have approached a governor to ask for a reprieve, even in cases in which
the condemned person was a United States national. Nonetheless, because
state governors do not have to deal with foreign governments on a regular
basis, they can ignore the representations without any significant political
cost.
The federal government has exerted some pressure on states in
response to pressure being exerted from abroad on the federal government.
To date, however, the federal government has tread quite cautiously in this
realm. It has not taken action to compel states to comply with international
obligations. The instance in which the federal government has gone the
farthest is extradition. Here it has, on more than a few occasions, made a
commitment to a foreign government that a person sought by a state within
25. Inter-Am. C.H.R., El derecho a la informaci6n sobre la asistencia consular en el
marco de las garantlas del debido proceso legal, Opini6n consultiva OC-16/99/ de 1 de Octubre
de
1999,
solicitada
por
los
Estados
Unidos
Mexicanos,
available at
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/serieaing/a-16_ing.htmi.
26. Id. at 137.
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the United States on a capital charge would not be subjected to capital
punishment. It has then informed the authorities of the state that it is able
to secure the surrender of the individual only on condition that capital
punishment not be imposed. To date, state prosecuting officials have
complied with this condition and have foregone pursuing a death penalty.
Federalism, to be sure, may not be an insuperable obstacle to the
federal government in securing a change in policy by the states on an
important social issue. One need only recall school desegregation in the
1950s, where the federal government pursued a policy of reform despite
strong opposition from many states.
VII. THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE
International pressure operates in a fashion that oftentimes seems
exceedingly weak. When the United Nations Human Rights Commission,
as noted above, criticized the United States on its use of capital
punishment, federal authorities immediately rejected the report. They had,
in fact, declined to cooperate with the United Nations rapporteur while he
was in the United States conducting his study.27 Despite such reactions,
one cannot dismiss such pressure. It is difficult to predict the long-term
effect of pressure. Measures of pressure that seem inconsequential can
work with others to produce results. On the one hand, the United States is
more resistant to international pressure than most States, as a result of its
economic independence and strength. Weaker States are more subject to
pressure, because they depend for economic aid on other States that may
invoke human rights criteria as a condition to extending aid.
One example among many is the concern shown by Ethiopia in trials
that have been in process there for a number of years against members of
the prior government for atrocities those persons are alleged to have
committed while in office. On the one hand, Ethiopia was under pressure
from the donor community to try these persons. At the same time, it was
under pressure from the donor community to try them applying standards
of due process. Donor States established aid projects to assist in the
conduct of both the prosecution and defense in these cases, to ensure
observance of due process. Because Ethiopia is dependent on aid for
economic progress, it was keen to accept this assistance in order to
maintain good standing with the donor community.
A State like the United States is obviously in quite a different
position. Far from being subject to pressure like that which can be placed
on Ethiopia, the United States often seems to enjoy a kind of informal

27. U.S. Rejects U.N. Report on Death Penalty, WASH. POST, Apr. 16, 1998, at A29.
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immunity on human rights matters. As a State that gives aid instead of
receiving it, it is unlikely to be pressured by States that receive aid from it,
and most States of the world do. The only States with sufficient economic
independence to put pressure on the United States are the European States.
It is those States, for example, and those alone, that have filed formal
objections to the extensive reservations that the United States entered when
it ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In
particular, several of them filed objections to the United States reservation
to the provision of the Covenant that prohibits the execution of persons
who were juveniles at the time of committing the offense for which they
were convicted. Only a very few States of the world allow the execution
of such persons, so presumably most States of the world viewed the United
States' reservation in a negative light. However, it was only several States
in Europe that went to the length of filing a formal reservation.
At the extreme, international pressure takes the form of developing an
international-legal norm, which could be a treaty outlawing capital
punishment, or the emergence of a norm of customary international law
against its use. In either event, however, the United States could opt out.
It is not required to ratify any draft treaty on capital punishment. And
even if all States except the United States come to the view that capital
punishment is precluded by international custom, the United States could
insist that it does not accept this customary norm. States that object to the
formation of a customary norm are not bound by it, even if it is a
customary norm as to all other States.
Finally, even if the United States did become bound by a treaty or
customary norm against capital punishment, judicial redress would
probably not be available, either for an individual facing execution, or for
a foreign State.
The rulings by the European Court of Human Rights in the Soering
case, and by the monitoring committee of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights in the Ng case, represent a unique form of
pressure, in that the States found to be under an obligation were not the
United States but the States where suspects sought by the United States
were found. Thus, the United States' insistence on seeking the death
penalty created international complications for the United Kingdom and for
Canada. Each of them was haled in as a defendant State before an
international human rights body and was required to explain its conduct.
In these instances, use of capital punishment by the United States caused
substantial inconvenience and significant allocation of resources by the
United Kingdom and Canada in connection with the proceedings that were
taken against them.
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What one might call the "nuisance effect" of international pressure is
one way it often operates. All States prefer smooth relations with others.
For the United States, when it schedules a summit with the European
Union to discuss economic and political issues, it is a significant distraction
if the United States is bombarded with questions about death sentences in
Texas or Florida.
The "nuisance effect" is heightened when the
inconvenience is caused as well to one's allies, as occurs, as noted above,
when the United States seeks extradition on a capital charge.
Other States would prefer not to have to be concerned about United
States' use of capital punishment when they get an extradition request from
the United States.
The inconvenience is particularly significant for
Canada, because it shares a border with the United States and not
infrequently finds itself hosting persons who have fled United States
justice. Canada, on the one hand, has taken a firm stand against capital
punishment, and many Canadian officials would probably prefer not to be
in the position of facilitating death sentences in the United States by
surrendering fugitives. On the other hand, because of its very proximity to
the United States, Canada is concerned lest it become a haven for large
numbers of fugitives. The use of capital punishment in the United States
creates a dilemma for Canada, one in which it would prefer not to find
itself.
It is difficult to calculate the cumulative effect on the United States of
the pressure being exerted upon it on the capital punishment issue. On
this, or other issues, pressure can be exerted over a long period without
substantial effect. On the other hand, incidents may occur or situations
may develop that will highlight the issue, and suddenly the cumulative
effect of the pressure can produce dramatic results.
Foreign States have shown considerable consistency in pressuring the
United States. This is in one sense surprising, because the United States
holds a position of economic predominance that frequently immunizes it
from pressure on human rights matters. The strength of sentiment against
capital punishment has been sufficiently strong that foreign States have
continued the pressure. Popular sentiment has at times played a role. In
particular, in situations in which a national of a foreign State is scheduled
for execution in the United States, marches have been held to the United
States embassy in the relevant State. Such expressions of popular feeling
put pressure on the government of such a State to pressure the United
States, even where doing so may jeopardize economic or other kinds of
relations the State has with the United States.
The example mentioned above of school desegregation may hold some
precedential value. A factor in the decision by the federal authorities to
desegregate the schools was pressure from abroad. Enmeshed in the Cold
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War, the United States was hard-pressed to "sell" its way of life to third
world countries in competition with the Soviet Union, so long as
segregation remained the law of the land. The United States Department
of Justice filed an amicus curiae brief in Brown v. Board of Education,23

urging the United States Supreme Court to desegregate the schools. The
Department wrote, "the United States is trying to prove to the people of
the world, of any nationality, race and color, that a free democracy is the
most civilized and most secure form of government yet devised by man."
The pressure of Soviet criticism of the United States over racial
segregation was reflected in the quoted language from the United States
brief.

29

To be sure, the Cold War has ended, and as a result the United States
may be less responsive to criticism over capital punishment than it was to
criticism over segregation. Nonetheless, the pressure being exerted on the
United States over capital punishment does not appear likely to dissipate.
This pressure imposes a definite diplomatic cost on the United States.
Foreign pressure is, of course, not the sole factor operating on the question
of the continued use of capital punishment in the United States. Domestic
factors remain key. Nonetheless, the foreign pressure has become a
significant element in the capital punishment picture in the United States.

28. Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
29. Mary L. Dudziak, Comment, Desegregationas a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L.
REV. 61 (1988).
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I.
INTRODUCTION
Judicial activism has a wide variety of definitions, while its true
content remains unclear. This paper will engage in the exercise of
fashioning criteria with which to measure the decisions of the International
Court of Justice (hereinafter ICJ) for the extent of their judicial activism.
Once these criteria have been determined, I will methodologically analyze
the decisions and come to an objective conclusion about the work of the
ICJ.
This article will show that the ICJ rules in a judicially active fashion.
To this end, it will first introduce the concept of national judicial activism
and adjust it according to the needs of an international tribunal like the
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ICJ.
It will discuss the character of the United Nations Charter,
subsuming it to both the treaty and the constitutional model, to show the
different implications of these theoretical distinctions. These distinctions
can alter the objective criteria used to evaluate the ICJ for judicial
activism. Thus, the character of the United Nations Charter plays an
important role iii deciding how to fashion the standard of judicial activism
for our purpose. The analysis will show that neither model alone is
sufficient to describe the United Nations Charter. This article will then
proceed to synthesize both models into a new thesis, resulting in new
criteria for assessing the ICJ. It will then use these adapted norms for
judicial activism to judge the work of the "World Court."
The article will also compare the status of the ICJ to the status of
national courts and the ways of these systems to remedy wrongful
decisions. This comparison will help to better assess the consequences of
judicial activism within the United Nations system and the possible impact
of legitimacy concerns that derive from judicial activism. To assess
whether the ICJ is in fact judicially active, compared to the objective
criteria introduced, this article will divide the practice of the ICJ into
procedural activism and substantive activism.
The assessment of procedural activism in the ICJ requires the critical
refection of domestic procedural concepts, such as the political question
doctrine and the advisory opinion doctrine. This article will introduce the
domestic doctrines of "advisory opinion" and "political question". These
doctrines are creations governed by judicial restraint and the reaction of the
judges to a doctrine of restraint will show whether they are procedurally
judicially active. Considerable adjustment of these concepts for application
in the ICJ is needed, and only after amending the doctrines, this paper will
transfer and apply them to the international plane. Turning to the
substantive United Nations Charter interpretation, this article will primarily
suggest different possible outcomes and reasons for activism discovered in
the ICJ. Lastly, it will consider the legitimacy of the ICJ in light of the
judicial activism displayed, as well as in light of the lack of review of other
United Nations organs' actions. The analysis will conclude with some
remarks referring to the necessary deference that should be afforded to the
ICJ when fulfilling its task and plead for more consistency in the judges'
attitudes toward their task.
The ICJ is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations system,'
and as such, its judges decide many disputes concerning the proper
interpretation of the United Nations Charter text. The ICJ has an
important role to play in international law and politics, because its
1.

U.N. CHARTER art. 92.
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decisions are the last word on matters of international law worldwide. Not
all decisions I have read met my approval, and I am certain everyone who
has ever read a few cases, disagrees on which ones meet their approval and
for what reasons. This paper is intended to give a bird's-eye view and
some insight on consistency and activism in fifty years of United Nations
Charter interpretation.
II. WHAT DoEs JUDICIAL ACTIVISM MEAN?
Anglo-American legal systems commonly use the term "judicial
activism," and the early United States Supreme Court became particularly
well known for its judicial activism2 Civil Law jurisdictions do not often
use the term, because Civil Law judges view their roles very differently
from Common Law judges., Even Anglo-American jurisdictions use the
term in a variety of definitions. Due to these differences (and other
problems discussed below) the term shall be laid out anew in the context in
this paper, to develop a better understanding of its meaning in international
tribunals such as the International Court of Justice.
A.

What is JudicialActivism?

Judicial activism exists in numerous definitions, originating from
various scholars such as Posner,, Harwood, and Lewis 6. These and other
scholars have applied the concept domestically. In order to apply it
internationally, the reader must be informed about the domestic application
first. This will assist the reader in appreciating both the differences
between national and international application and the impact of the
practice of ICJ judges.

2. See generally R.E. FISCHER, THE CONCEPT OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: ITS NATURE AND
FUNCTION IN UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1977). Some decisions and judges that

have been considered activist are: Judges: Brennan, Blackmun, Burger, Butler, Cardozo, Field,
Marshall. Decisions include Griswold v. Connecticut; New York Times v. Sullivan; Roe v. Wade
and The Slaughter House Cases.
3. - A Civil Law judge will not consider [a] decision he makes to create law, merely to
interpret existing law. Civil Law countries aspire to a complete law, which needs no additional
rules made by judges. Although this may be true only in theory, inner convictions of judges as
civil servants influence their thinking in practice. Thus, the idea of a judge effectively engaged
in lawmaking is unthinkable and with it the idea of judicial activism. See KONRAD ZWEIGERT &
HEIN KOTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW (Tony Weir, trans., 2d. ed. 1987).
4. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE (1990).
5. See generally STERLING HARWOOD, JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: A RESTRAINED DEFENSE 2
(1993).
6. See FREDERICK P. LEWIS, THE CONTEXT OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: THE ENDURANCE
OF THE WARREN COURT LEGACY INA CONSERVATIVE AGE (1999).
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Judicial activism in the United States or any national jurisdiction is
separate and distinct from any meaning the term could have internationally.
Judicial activism can be identified by measuring either the behavior of
judges against objective criteria, or the results achieved against other
7
Most definitions use behaviors as a focal point.
possible results.
However, no single definition has achieved universal acceptance and
therefore, interpretations of what constitutes judicial activism vary. The
most useful interpretations for our purposes employ objective criteria to
identify the concept of judicial activism. Judges decide in a judicially
active fashion if they (a) refuse to take an attitude of deference for
legislative or executive power or judgment, (b) relax requirements of
justiciability, (c) break precedent or (d) loosely construe constitutions,
statutes or binding precedent. 8 Some of the criticisms 9 of judicial activism
include non-democratic lawmaking, decision-making based on personal
morals or preferences, and rewriting law under the guise of
interpretation'0 . Black also adds progressiveness to the definition." The
above-mentioned criteria establish a working definition to be used
2
throughout this paper that will suffice for our purposes.'
Judicial activism can be identified not only by behavioral patterns but
also by the results it can produce. The most common feature of a
judicially active outcome is avoidance of an unjust result. For example,
through creative reasoning, a judge can avoid letting strict application of
the law lead to an unjust result." Results so achieved are mostly tailored to
the case at hand rather than to the overarching system which is usually
taken into account by legislators.

7.

Compare supra notes 4, 5 and 6.

8.

HARWOOD, supra note 5, at 2.

9.
I consider criticism nothing but a negative definition of the concept in this context.
10. HARWOOD, supra note 5, at 3.
11.

HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK Er AL., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 847 (7th ed. 1990).

12. This working definition will suffice for the moment, because the domestic definition of
judicial activism is but a starting point for this analysis.
13.

HARWOOD, supra note 5, at 3.
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B. Domestic Implications of JudicialActivism14
The parties involved in the proceeding are primarily impacted by
implications of judicial activism,"5 and even beyond the parties concerned
in a particular dispute, the overall structure of the legal system is affected
by judicially active decisions. ," Therefore, judicial activism can lead to
questions relating to legitimacy."1 When judges act in an activist fashion,
two common paths can be taken to avoid the result achieved. The first
possibility to affect an unwanted result is judicial.. The second is
legislative. The likelihood of access to these ways differs depending on the
court involved.
The judicial possibility is through the appeals process. In lower
courts, appeals to the next higher courts are possible, and will likely lead
to a different result, should the judge have been too active in construing the
law. In higher-level courts, such as Appellate Courts or even State
Supreme Courts the possibility for appeal is much reduced, because higher
courts have discretion to grant or deny certiorari."$For example, the grant
of certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court is not guaranteed and thus the
possibility of appeal may end at this point. 9 Appeals from the United
States Supreme Courts are naturally excluded once a judgment is
rendered.2' In general, judicial activism in the highest court of any given

14.

It is impossible to address judicial activism in every country, so I choose the U.S. as

an example the reader will be most familiar with. In the U.S. domestic context, judicial activism
is a very disputed subject and therefore I must stress that concerning domestic judicial activism, I
am entirely neutral and do not intend to pass judgments or conclusions. Like Cannon, "I accept
judicial activism [in the domestic arena] as a fact of life." Bradley C. Cannon, Defending the
dimensions ofjudicialactivism, 66 JUDICATURE, 236, 246 (1983).
15. The individual party is affected, because they believed the state of the law to be one
thing, when the judge decides it is another.
16. Different judges can make different decisions, therefore, the system is affected through
lack of clarity and inconsistency of the law.
17. In the domestic context, the question of legitimacy does not seem as pressing to me
because judges are elected publicly, or appointed by an elected member of the executive.
Further, statutes and the Constitution offer a far better anchorage in domestic law then they offer
in international law. The issue of legitimacy in the ICJ is discussed in another paragraph
separately.
18. By way of example, the House of Lords can decide either to take a case, or refuse to
take it. ROBIN C.A. WHITE, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM INACTION: THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE 219, 221 (3d ed. 1999).
19. See generally WILLIAM BURNHAM, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM
OF THE UNITED STATES (1995).
20. This is true provided there is no separate constitutional Court in the country as exists
in Italy, Germany, and South Africa.
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22
jurisdiction cannot be "corrected" through appeal.
The legislative way to correct decisions of overly active judges is to
lobby lawmakers to overturn precedent or interpretation by way of a new
statute. Even the highest courts of any given jurisdiction are susceptible to
legislative action.Y If a legislature does not like a decision of a Supreme
Court, then it will pass a statute or regulation changing the effects of the
decision.Y
Legislative override is possible in both state and federal
legislatures.2' The legislative path is not open at all stages; because it is
quite unlikely that Congress would act on an interpretation of a lower
court, whether the judgment is subject to appeal or not." An example of
Legislature in the United States overriding the Supreme Court is Missouri
v. Holland.6 In some cases, even ordinary congressional action cannot
override the Supreme Court, whether activist or not.27 An American
example is Marbury v. Madison,29 in which the Supreme Court declared to
have exclusive right to interpret the Constitution and derived this right
from the Constitution. No legislative act short of an amendment of the
Constitution could overturn this decision.
Chances of action, either through appeal or legislative act, decrease
2 9
with the proficiency of the judges' using "interpretive techniques."
Neither of the two mechanisms is thus fully failsafe. The implication of
judicial activism is therefore far from minimal for both the interplay of
laws in any country and the dispute of the parties involved.

21.

In the United States Supreme Court, many such decisions have been rendered from

Marbury v. Madision, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), to Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 40 S.Ct. 382

(1920).
22. Ironically, the highest courts seem to be the most likely target for this kind of
ramification.
23. An example of legislative override is the Miranda warnings. The U.S. Supreme Court
stated they were not constitutionally mandated, so Congress enacted the protection of Miranda
warnings through statute. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (1966).
24. Although legislative override is specifically tailored to the U.S., the general idea is
true in every democratic society.

25. It would be ineffective for the legislature to act on every magistrate court's unpopular
judgment. They will most likely say there is a possibility for appeal.
26. The History of Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 40 S.Ct. 382 (1920), was as

follows: Congress passed a statute concerning migratory birds. The Supreme Court ruled the
statute unconstitutional. The legislature then turned around, made a treaty with Canada, and
reenacted the statute as treaty. The Supreme Court then approved the piece of legislation.
27. I am referring to regular legislative action, short of amending of the Constitution.
28. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).

29. This is so because the better the judge conceals the actual reason for the result, or the
better he or she can employ unrelated precedent, the less likely the judge will be discovered and
overturned.
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Having the potential to change the law through interpreting it in any
given case reflects much power, the abuse of which leads to the issue of
legitimacy of judicial activism, particularly where a decision is nonreviewable. In a way the judge can make law, but should judges make
law? In the tripod structure of democratic society, the role of the judiciary
involves interpretation and not creation of law. In the United States, state
court judges are elected, so that their beliefs and morals will likely reflect
the belief and morals of the community whose disputes are affected by
potential activism." When non-elected federal justices can make law,
judicial activism seems to be contrary to the foundation of democratic
society.' We will get back to the point of legitimacy later in the discussion
and will not focus on it in the context of domestic law. Just one word
spoken true and wise to this subject: sometimes we do not want the
n
majority to be able to control it all!
C. JudicialActivism Internationally
After having laid a foundation for the following discussion, the
transition of the concept of judicial activism to the international plane must
be made. This shift exceeds mere copying of concepts, because it involves
establishing a new working definition of judicial activism adapted to the
international context. Both working conditions and impact of decisions
vary internationally from their domestic equivalents. The transfer made in
this article is only applicable to the International Court of Justice, which is
the focus of this work. This discussion is also limited in substantive
considerations to the United Nations Charter interpretation.
To make a successful conversion from the domestic to the
international sphere, the United Nations Charter must be considered more
closely with respect to its function and purpose, because theoretical
classification impacts the criteria forming our new working definition.
Some have considered the United Nations Charter to be an instrument
similar to a constitution3 while others see the United Nations Charter as
30. Judges are elected not only because of competence, but also because of personality. If
the judge does not reflect the community's beliefs by ruling in a certain fashion, then he/she will
not be reelected.
31. See LEWIS, supra note 6, at ch. 3, for a good discussion. In most countries, judges
are not elected, so that their law making can be compared to the U.S. federal judges. The same
is true for judges of international tribunals.
32. I refrain from further comments on the subject in the realm of domestic courts,
because it exceeds the scope of this paper and is only included to clarify the later points
concerning the ICJ.
33. See Oscar Schachter, The Law of the United Nations, 60 YALE L. J. 189, 193 (1951)
(book review).
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simply a treaty.-' Even the ICJ displays some lack of uniformity on this
question in its decisions.'1. The Constitutional and Treaty Model
In this subsection, I will discuss the arguments for and against the
schools of thought that consider the United Nations Charter either
constitution or treaty respectively.
The constitutional model seems appealing, but has its shortcomings.
Similar to many domestic constitutions, the United Nations Charter forms
the basic underpinning for the organization of the United Nations. It
purports to give a purpose 6 , allocate powers" and create different organs., 8
National constitutions usually establish branches of government,
comparable to the principal organs of the United Nations, allocate powers
to the organs/branches, establish a judiciary, and grant certain rights and
freedoms. Many international organizations follow a comparable model
with more or less similarity.3 ' The analogy of corporate charters would be
more appropriate because they too have an executive body and
shareholders as constituents of their power.4' The shareholders could also
be equated with the members of the General Assembly. It is useful to
consider these structural similarities more closely.

34. Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 157 (July 1962) [hereinafter
Certain Expenses].
35. The Charter has been called a treaty in the Certain Expenses, Id., and a constitution in
the Conditions of Admission of a state to membership in the United Nations, 1948 I.C.J. 57, 70
(May 28) [hereinafter Conditions of Admission]; to mention only two different cases. Many
authors refer to constitutionalism with respect to the UN and the ICJ. See generally EDWARD
MCWHINNEY & PAUL MARTIN, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE WESTERN
TRADITION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1987).
36. U.N. CHARTER art. 1.
37. Each organ has a set of powers allocated in the Charter. The Security Council, e.g.,
has powers allocated in UN Charter arts. 24-26; the Economic and Social Council in U.N.
Charter arts. 62-66, and so on.
38. The principal organs are enumerated in U.N. CHARTER art. 7 para. 1.
39. See e.g., Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on the European Union, the
Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related acts, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 1
[hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam].
40. See generally WILLIAM KLEIN & JOHN COFFEE JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND
FINANCE, 118 (6th ed. 1996).
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a. Structure of the Organization
The United Nations Charter creates four main bodies," which have
their own allocated powers: the Security Council4, the General Assembly, 3
the Secretariat," and the ICJ4, which, if compared to national democratic
models, reveals some striking similarities to domestic constitutions. The
General Assembly is a body comprising all members talking about the
world and the state of affairs, very similar to legislatures. The point where
the analogy to legislatures fails is that the General Assembly does not
create hard law in the form of statutes; it has no legislative power in the
domestic sense." It does, however, have the power to make statutes and
rules for the bodies within its control." The Security Council could be said
to be the executive branch of the United Nations, since substantive power
The
comes from the Council in the form of binding resolutions.'4
Secretary General could be viewed as the head of state, representing the
organization and capable of ceremonial acts. 9 Unlike the American head
of state, the President, the Secretary General is without true power.1 The
ICJ could be viewed as the judiciary branch, the final arbiter of
legitimacy.'
b. Characterof the United Nations Charter
The character of the United Nations Charter may point toward a
constitutional model as well. It directs powers and functions, declares a
purpose, and has every possibility to provide authority for a wide variety
41.

U.N. CHARTER art. 7, para. 1, establishes the main organs. Although it also creates

the Trusteeship Council and the Economic and Social Council, they have little impact on this
analysis.
42.

Id. at ch. V is devoted to the Security Council, describing powers and duties.

43. Id. at ch. IV, describing General Assembly powers and duties.

44. Id. at ch. XV, describing Secretariat powers and duties.
45.

Id. at ch. XIV, describing ICJ powers and duties.

46. This statement should be read as excluding housekeeping functions, such as the budget
power.
47. The Effects of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative

Tribunal, 1954 I.C.J.47 (July 13) [hereinafter Effects of Awards].
48. The Security Council has the power to compel members. U.N. CHARTER art. 25.
49. U.N. CHARTER art. 97 makes the Secretary General the head of the Secretariat.
50. The concept of a virtually powerless Head of State is not unknown. In the Federal
Republic of Germany, the president has limited power. GRUNDGESETZ [GG [Constitution] arts.
54-61 (F.R.G.).

Similarly, the Queen of England, is still head of state.

Like the Secretary

General, the power of these persons in office are symbolic in nature.
51. Matthias J. Herdegen, The Constinajonalizationof the UN Security System, 27 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 135, 137 (1994).
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of "laws," due to certain ambiguities. These resemblances to domestic
constitutions are bound to be present in many treaties that purport to form
organizations, and they are essential to some international contracts. 3 The
ICJ has declared that the United Nations is a special kind of organization
and that its character is different form any other organization due to its
purpose and fundamentality,5 ' so that this uniqueness should elevate the
United Nations Charter to the constitutional level.
The ambiguity of the United Nations Charter in certain areas could
also be comparable to domestic constitutions, because constitutions are
meant to survive changes in society.5
Against this point stands the
argument that the world leaders would have never agreed to make a
constitution, and that ambiguities result from a lack of consensus rather
than foresight.5 6 It could be argued that they made a treaty to establish an
organization of fundamental reach, but not a world constitution.
The limitless duration of the United Nations Charter gives it the
character distinct from treaties.57 However, this seems rather a tribute to
the effort behind succeeding to form an organization so many countries
could agree on. 8 The United Nations Charter is important, like a
constitution is, but that is why it cannot be interpreted as a constitution. Its
failing would be catastrophic. When would we be able to write a new
constitution and get over 150 countries to agree to it?59 Although I find the
idea intriguing in order to stress the value and gravity of the United
Nations Charter by calling it a constitution, it cannot be a true constitution.
c. Pro-Treaty Arguments
Scholars have recognized the difficulty of the constitutional model and

52. An example of the ambiguity that creates problems is exhibited in the UNAT case in
1954; See Effects of Awards, supra note 47.
53. See Blaine Sloan, The UnitedNations Charteras a Constitution, 1 PACE Y.B. INT'L L.
61, 116 (1989).
54. See Certain Expenses, supra note 34.
55. The U.S. Constitution, now over 200 years old, is a good example of a constitution
surviving over a long period of time.
56. Cf. Blaine Sloan, supra note 53, at 117, 118 (citing Lord Halifax, Verbatim Minutes
of the First Meeting of the Commission I, Doc. 10006, 1/6, 6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 26 (1945)).
57. Compare Conference on the Conservation of the Antarctic Marine Living Resources,
19 I.L.M. 837 (1980).
58. It is hard to imagine fifty countries agreeing on such a fundamental document now. It
could be worse if this process had to be repeated time after time, whenever the "contract" came
to an end.
59. The number of current members as of Apr. 17, 2001,
http://www.un.org/Overview/unmember.htmi (last visited Oct. 9, 2001).
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have thus focused on the treaty model. The main points in favor of this
view derive from the shortcomings of the constitutional model and from
the mere fact that the United Nations Charter fits the definition of a treaty.
A treaty is an instrument between subjects of international law, mostly
states, purporting to deal with the objects of international law.60 The
United Nations Charter is concluded between the oldest subjects of
international law and deals with objects of international law, namely
international peace and security. There is no judicial review as in domestic
constitutions;61 there are no democratic justifications, no world elections
for representation in the United Nations; there is no lawmaking in the
domestic sense. Countries came together, bargained and formed a contract
for the formation of an organization to achieve one purpose: international
peace and security.62 There was no delegation of power from the people
63
or, for that matter, from countries to give to a new government.
However, contracts are not usually open-ended and do not have the power
to bind third parties." The United Nations, through its United Nations
Charter, has in effect the power to bind and put pressure on third parties.61
d. Implications of the Models
The impacts both theories will have on the standards to be imposed
are broad indeed. If the United Nations Charter is a mere contract, a
treaty, it ought to be interpreted according to the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties." The Vienna Convention requires a more textualist
approach and refers to the use of intent and purpose for interpretation only
if the text leads to an absurd result. Under the treaty-based approach, no
consideration would need to be given to gaps, functioning, and vitality of
the United Nations system. No double-checking of purpose and intent as
against other organs would be appropriate. If the United Nations Charter

60

1965 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 2 para. la, reprinted in PAUL

REUTER, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF TREATIES (Jose Mico & Peter Haggenmacher trans.
1989).

61. For a scholar arguing that there is no judicial review, see Herdegen, supra note 51.
62.

U.N. CHARTER arts. 1, 2.

63. Constitutions are usually associated with the creation of a government.
64. This excludes third party beneficiaries.
65. Reparations for Injures Received suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949
I.C.J. 174 (Apr. 11) [hereinafter Reparations]. (Israel had not been a member of the UN at the
time, yet was bound through this opinion. In addition, sanctions can also put pressure on nonmember states).
66. Although the Vienna Convention does not technically apply because it is younger than
the UN Charter, the principles of interpretation are still valid.
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is to be interpreted like a constitution, then a more functionalist approach
is necessary.
A constitution has to function, because it builds the foundation of the
rule of law, unlike a mere treaty. Intent or purpose might be the only
bases of interpretation. If a mere contract is silent on a point, legal norms
already in existence will be applied to the contract. In the constitutional
context, that is not possible. If the United Nations Charter were a
constitution, it would mean that similar standards apply as in the
interpretation of domestic constitutions and similar standards as in
constitutional law would be appropriate. It would also mean that the
interpretations given by the ICJ must adhere to a higher standard, results
reached would always have to be weighed against the spirit of the United
Nations Charter, short of hyper-textualism and political decisions. The ICJ
would have to be able to review the actions of the other organs of the
United Nations to their conformity with the United Nations Charter and
imply that the ICJ could annul the acts of other organs as ultra vires. In
short, the constitutional model would require both more freedom for the
judges to aid the organization in functioning and more deference to other
organs with respect to the same goal. The treaty model would require
more restraint of interpretive freedom and less deference to the other
organs, because the ICJ would be limited by the pure text.
e. New Model: Consensual Constitution
The United Nations Charter is no constitution; however, the treaty
model has its shortcomings as well. It is certainly a mixture between the
two models. 7 The United Nations Charter is a "consensus constitution."
A consensus constitution is a contract forming the basis of an organization,
one that exceeds the original consensus but remains limited by its original
form. This model gives greater leeway for interpretation, without allowing
the filling of blatant gaps in the law. The United Nations Charter does not
stand alone and customary international law as well as jus cogens norms
can be utilized when gaps are apparent to help bridge them. This implies,
that the objective criteria one has to use for evaluating the decision of the
ICJ for activism have to be sensitive to both textual and teleological
possibilities. The "consensual constitution" model affords deference to the
other organs of the United Nations and interpretive freedom to the ICJ to
make the organization work, while it restrains deference and interpretive
freedom at the same time, through the knowledge that the text and overall

67. See Sloan, supra note 53.
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scheme are paramount and may not be compromised for the sake of
convenience or function."
2. Legal Systems
The "consensus constitution" model alone is not adequate to provide a
standard for ICJ judge. Knowing what kind of instrument is to be
interpreted, the status of the court within the system needs to be discussed
to find the appropriate level of scrutiny. Besides the institutional
differences between national and international system, there are variances
in the specific legal structure between courts that influence the transition of
the judicial activism doctrine.69
In the United Nations' court system, a structure comparable to that of
the domestic plane is lacking. In domestic courts, various steps of appeal
are possible, whereas the in United Nations system the ICJ is sole
tribunal.70 Although there are other international tribunals, such as the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) or the World Trade Organization boards,
these tribunals are unconnected with each other and do not form a coherent
system comparable to domestic judiciaries. 71 Tribunals that are more
closely connected to the United Nations structure, such as the UNAT, n the
ICTY,73 or the ITR,74 however, do not fall under one coherent structure. 7
68. See MCWHINNEY, supra note 35, at 143, 144. He accepts the law-making role of the
ICJ more readily, and considers the ICJ even less drastic than the U.S. Supreme Court. He
states that the ICJ only does as is necessary for the maintenance of the organization.
69. This will be explained in this section more closely.
70. Unlike the U.S. Constitution, the Charter does not provide for the creation of
additional courts. U.S. CONST. art. 3; U.N. CHARTER art. 92.
71. Unlike a domestic judiciary, there are different statutes making these courts, and all
follow different rules of procedure.
72. See Statute of the Administrative Tribunal of the United Nations, as adopted by the
General Assembly by resolution 351 A (IV) on 24 November 1949, reprinted in BYUONG CHUL
KOH, UNITED NATIONS ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL (1966).
73. U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3217 mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993).
74. U.N. SCOR 48th Sess., 3453 mtg.,U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994).
75. The ICJ served for a brief period as appellate body to the UNAT in special
circumstances, but got tired of the task. Under consensus circumstances, the ICJ serves as
appellate board for ICA decisions if countries agree. These circumstances are, however,
extraordinary and not relevant for this discussion. Although they are connected to the UN, they
have independent jurisdiction and their decisions are not subject to appeal in the ICJ. The
exception is the UNAT, where appeal is possible. One could argue that state courts are separate
from the federal system as well, and that the lower federal courts had not been established
expressly by the Constitution either. These arguments must fail. The UNAT is established by
the General Assembly and has it's own statute and not the same subject matter or personal
jurisdiction that the ICJ has. The ICTY and ITR were established by the Security Council and
have their own statutes and jurisdiction different from the ICJ.
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Thus, the ICJ is the sole judicial organ deciding matters arising between
states or the organs of the United Nations in the United Nations system.
No appeal, i.e., no judicial correction, is possible. This fact gives the ICJ
the status of a Supreme Court or a Constitutional Court for the purpose of
measuring the impact of activism.
The impact of the unique role as interpreter of the United Nations
Charter in case of conflict is intensified because the possibility of
legislative action to remedy a wrongful decision is virtually lacking the
context of United Nations Charter interpretation. The only possibility of
overriding an interpretation is United Nations Charter amendment.6 The
United Nations cannot overrule an interpretation of the ICJ by mere
statute. First, there is no power to make a statue." Second, as the basic
instrument of the organization, the United Nations Charter has somewhat
the status of a constitution as discussed supra. A United Nations Charter
amendment has occurred only thrice since its entry into force, and it is
very unlikely to occur again. This gives the ICJ much more influence than
even the Supreme Courts or Constitutional courts of nations possess. 8 In
turn, this power consequently requires both more regard to the overall
scheme of the United Nations when making decisions in order to let it
serve its function, and more judicial restraint than a domestic court would
have to exercise to avoid being too judicially active. A wrong decision
cannot be remedied as easily, if at all. The following section will identify
the criteria applied to the ICJ for judicial activism with regard to the
differences in the systems.

3. Objective Criteria for ICJ
Oriented on the prior domestic working definition of judicial activism,
this section identifies a new working definition for the concept to evaluate
the ICJ.
Some of the domestic criteria for judicial activism do not neatly fit in
Non-democratic lawmaking is one of the
the international setting.

76. There have been only 3 sets of amendments, not adding any paragraphs, merely
changing the Charter; the latest came into force in June 1968. They are quite similar to the U.S.
constitutional amendments but even more difficult in practice. In practice, the ICJ cannot compel
action in accordance with its decisions. It would have to rely on the Security Council and thus an
interpretation might be ignored, specifically as requested in advisory opinions. See Herdegen,
supra note 51.
77. There is no provision in the UN Charter that gives power to legislate. Compare U.N.
CHARTER.

78. This is true at least in theory, but in practice, the ICJ is not always obeyed.
Certain Expenses, supra note 34. France and Russia still refused to pay their dues.

See
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examples:

there is no democratic process involved in international law.79

One could substitute "non-democratic" for "progressive." If there is no
law on the subject or sufficiently close to it, such as custom or treaty, the
ICJ cannot give an opinion without progressing international law. This
progress would create law without direct participation of the subjects of
international law and could be compared with non-democratic lawmaking
domestically, matching one of Black's points of reference.
Breaking of precedent is an aspect I will fully strike as an objective
criterion, because precedent is an Anglo-American concept.
In
international law, there is no formal precedent, although in practice, prior
decisions can be of importance and are often quoted by the ICJ judges.'
This criterion should be abandoned for another reason: there are simply
not enough cases in comparison to domestic law to create a gapless net of
precedent. In addition, because the ICJ is the only court, it can only break
its own precedent,8 2 an act which domestically is not considered overly
activist.
The criterion of relaxation of justiciability requirements ought to be
modified, but it remains in substance, because the ICJ does not have
extensive justiciability criteria. Issues like political questions, 3 mootness,
and ripeness have different implications." The ICJ has not frequently
applied the mootness doctrine, 85 and ripeness issues can easily be avoided
by phrasing a question for advisory opinion or request for (preliminary)
measures. The concept of justiciability is better-served in the international
arena under the heading of deference to political decisions.
Lack of deference to decisions of other United Nations organs is a
definite criterion for activism. How much deference is required and how
little mandated by the structure of the United Nations Charter as
"consensual constitution" is another question. The rough concept is that

79. See generally ANTHONY D'AMATO, INTERNATIONAL
ACCOMPANY INTERNATIONAL LAW ANTHOLOGY, ch. 8 (1994).

80.

LAW

COURSEBOOK,

TO

See BLACK ET AL, supra note 11.

81. See, e.g., Certain Expenses of the UN, supra note 34, at 156, (citing with approval
Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations Article 4 of the
Charter, 1947 I.C.J. 61). For more information on precedent in the ICJ, see generally
MOHAMED SHAHABUDDEEN, PRECEDENT INTHE WORLD COURT (1996).

82. One more precedent-possibility exists: the prior Permanent Court of International
Justice. But for the purpose of this statement, the courts ought to be considered one for successor
reasons. Id.
83. This will be discussed inf!ra.
84. I will not go into detail concerning the differences and ask the reader to bear with me
in accepting that there are differences.
85. The only case I can think of was Nuclear Test (N.Z. v. Fr.) 1974 I.C.J. 457 (1974).
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the court needs to afford deference to other organs of the United Nations,
unless there is an apparent United Nations Charter violation or a violation
of object and purpose of the United Nations Charter. Deference need only
be afforded in areas where the particular organ has absolute jurisdiction to
decide; in particular I am referring to examples like the Article 39
determinations of the Security Council" or the budget approval power of
the General Assembly.' Review of actions taken should be limited to the
criteria laid out in the United Nations Charter for the specific action and
the general purpose of the United Nations Charter. Deference should be
broad enough to exclude only what specifically violates either the text or
the intent and purpose of the United Nations Charter as they are stated in
Articles One and Two. Where concurrent jurisdiction is given to two or
more United Nations organs, the ICJ should be mindful of who is posing a
request and whether that party would be injured in case of infringement of
powers."
Loose construction of the United Nations Charter remains as a
criterion. We now add another aspect, tailored to the ICJ: loose
construction of questions put before the court in advisory opinions as well
as rephrasing the questions beyond the necessary to retain jurisdiction.
This criterion is very important indeed, because it can give the court a
power to address issues almost sua sponte. This power has not been
conferred on the court by any treaty, and no other court has such power
either domestically" or internationally.90 In addition, its use might create a
discrepancy between practice and decision."

86. See U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
87.

U.N. CHARTER art. 17, para. 1.

88. In addition, I think it would not be a bad idea to steal some of the concepts of domestic
variable scrutiny for a variety of different scenarios, depending on how important the action
taken by another organ are.
89. This is to be read to exclude issues of justiciability, which can and in some instances
have to be raised by the court. I am here referring to substantive issues. I am not referring to
dictum either, because it does not have the same effect nationally form internationally.

90. With the exception of the International Criminal Court [hereinafter ICC], which has an
almost sua sponte aspect. The prosecutor of the ICC can initiate proceedings. Since he is a part
of the ICC, one could say there is some sua sponte possibility.
91. As an example, I am speaking about the voting procedure in the Security Council:
Although the court approved of the practice despite the words of the Charter, Legal
Consequences of the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia notwithstanding Security
Council Resolution 1971 I.C.J. 16 (June 21) [hereinafter Namibia]; had the court raised this
question and answered it negatively when the other organs did not believe it to be a problem,
there could have been a world of trouble. Compare Marcella David, Passport to Justice,
Internationalizationof the Political Question Doctrine for Application in the World Court, 40
HARV. INT'L L.J. 81, 121 (1999).
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Decision-making based on personal morals or preferences and
rewriting law under the guise of interpretation is the ultimate criterion for
judicial activism. This includes focusing on results in avoidance of an
unjust result-for example, through creative reasoning rather than strict
application of the law. Also included is narrowing the question to exclude
aspects that the requesting organ anticipated to be answered. This factor
must hence be altered for the international setting. Advisory opinions, for
example, require the court to make a statement for the overall structure of
the United Nations, so that creative reasoning becomes necessary in the
face of a lack of narrow grounds. In the case of contentious proceedings,
the matter changes, because narrow grounds are available for limiting the
decision and should be utilized. This leads to a two-fold approach.
Stricter scrutiny for review is required for contentious proceedings than for
advisory opinions. For the ICJ, this ties into the remarks about deference.
Personal preference not to review certain actions of the Security Council
not only qualifies as judicial activism, but also raises a question of
legitimacy, because personal preferences change with the set of judges on
the court.
In summary, the new working definition includes: a) progressing of
international law as defined above; b) lack of deference; c) loose or overly
narrow construction of queries; and d) decision-making based on personal
preferences with focus on a result rather than in light of the United Nations
Charter as consensual constitution.
III. INTERPRETATIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER IN THE
ICJ
The above-mentioned forms of judicial activism are used in this
section to evaluate the ICJ decisions.
It will be proposed that ICJ
jurisprudence in reference to activism cannot be subdivided into phases;9
however, I will subdivide the analysis in two categories: procedural issues
and substantive United Nations Charter interpretation.
A. ProcedureEvidencing Activism
In every legal system, courts exercise some form of restraint when
asserting their power to adjudicate,9 and the ICJ is not an exception.
Doctrines like ripeness or mootness have been applied in the ICJ as in
92.
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many courts across the globe.9 This section will discuss the Political
Question doctrine more closely."
The ICJ does not recognize the Political Question doctrine in the
domestic sense, because use of the Political Question rhetoric is
incompatible with the mission of the ICJ. 9'6 Although the court can only
consider legal questions before it,17 in the international arena hardly any
question does not involve political decision-making.98 In the domestic area,
the Political Question doctrine describes behavior of self-restraint exercised
by the courts when decisions of political branches are involved and when
these branches are expressly granted absolute discretion over the area the
decision affects." This doctrine of self-restraint could be adapted to the
United Nations system.'°° The ICJ could review other organs' actions for
the apparent compliance with the United Nations Charter when requested,
yet refrain from criticizing once there is no apparent violation; or, in the
alternative, when the organ that is subject to the inquiry had absolute
discretion in the matter.10' The ICJ would lose importance and most likely
many cases if the Political Question doctrine were fully applied, because
international law is made by political decisions and the court made clear
that those could be used to evaluate new political decisions made prior in
time. Although the ICJ never rejected the doctrine as such,n much impact
has been taken from it, and the court has reduced the substance of the
Political Question doctrine to insignificance.103 Hence it is fair to say the
ICJ has rejected the doctrine.'"

94. The mootness question was asserted in Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 457
(Dec. 20). There a unilateral declaration of France not to conduct more tests was considered
sufficient to render the dispute moot
95. The division is the same as the above-mentioned behavior and result separation. The
procedural analysis equals the behavior part of the definition; the substantive analysis, the result
part.

96. See David, supra note 91, at 145.
97. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 65 [hereinafter ICJ statute].
98. This issue is explained further in the text.
99. This approach to the Political Question doctrine is taken from U.S. Constitutional law,
Baker v. Carr, 389 U.S. 186, 210 (1962).
100. See David, supra note 91, at 132.
101. The Security Council isthe only organ deciding whether a threat to the peace exists.
This decision would not be reviewable; actions taken under the powers of Chapter VII however
would be reveiwable, to see if they violate the charter or the object and purpose of it (e.g., SC
ordering genocide). Cf.id.at 133 (believing considerable adaptation is needed).
102. See Conditions of Admission, supra note 35, at para 24 saying it is a political
question.
103. Already in Conditions of Admission, the court stated:
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Rejecting the Political Question doctrine is not judicially active in
the ICJ, although it would be in any other domestic court. Measured
against our definition of judicial activism, the rejection of the doctrine
makes sense. As stated above, every decision that ICJ can make °, would
only hold new political decisions against other commitments entered into
through prior political decisions.'06 These commitments take the form of
legal rules despite their political character. Pacta servanda sunt has
always been a recognized principle. In order to answer questions of
political nature, the ICJ has often interpreted the questions given to it, to
transform them into issues that can be legally analyzed.1'w In doing so, the
ICJ exercises discretion and judgment. Unlike domestic legal instruments,
such as the United States Constitution, the United Nations Charter is more
concerned with function of its organs than with substance,1w so that an
allocation of powers that grants discretion exclusively to one organ hardly
exists. ,o9

The Certain Expenses case makes clear that the responsibility for
international peace and security is not only in the Security Council's hands
alone but also in the General Assembly's hands. 110This example makes
When a question is referred to the Court, the latter therefore must decide whether its
dominant element is legal, and whether it should accordingly deal with it, or whether
the political element is dominant and, in that case, it must declare that it has no
jurisdiction. In the questions, which it is called upon, to consider, the Court must,
however, take into account all aspects of the matter, including the political aspect when
it is closely bound up with the legal aspect. It would be a manifest mistake to seek to
limit the Court to consideration of questions solely from their legal aspect, to the
exclusion of other aspects; it would be inconsistent with the realities of international
life. It follows from the foregoing that the constitutional Charter cannot be interpreted
according to a strictly legal criterion; another and broader criterion must be employed
and room left, if need be, for political considerations.
Conditions of Admission, supra note 35, at 70.
104. Id.
105. Assuming they do not overstep their boundaries.
106. Since international law is made by states that decide as political entities every decision
and every act has political implications, regardless of discretion. Every country has full
authority -over their affairs, so that with a full political question doctrine no legal review would
be possible.
107. See e.g. Case concerning the military and paramilitary activities in and against
Nicaragua. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 169 (Nov. 1984).
[hereinafter Nicaragua].
108. The articles entitled functions and powers only number 17 of 111 articles.
U.N. CHARTER.

Compare

109. There are instances, but in general, the main functions are allocated between two
organs, e.g. Maintenance of international peace and security. See MCWHINNEY & MARTIN,
supra note 35, at 143 (agreeing that the organs have little exclusive power).
110. See Certain Expenses, supra note 34.
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clear that little true separation of powers exists. Without a clear separation
of power, a basic underpinning of the Political Question doctrine is missing
in many cases before the court. No one organ can claim absolute
discretion necessary in one sector to claim a right to be free from
scrutiny.'" The Court cannot refuse to decide a case because one organ is
vested with absolute discretion, so that review would be outside justiciable
limits. Also, in terms of advisory opinions discussed below, the Court
cannot, without compelling reasons, refuse to answer a question.112 A
certain level of flexibility is required for the ICJ because, unlike the United
States government, the Security Council may not intervene in any
contentious proceedings."3
The following paragraph will determine
whether the ICJ was judicially active when accepting political questions.
1. Transforming Inquiries Into Legal Issues
According to the ICJ statute, the Court can only answer questions of a
legal nature." 4 One example of the court transforming an inquiry is the
first on the Court's docket: the Conditions of Admission case in 1948."11
In that case, the General Assembly requested an advisory opinion
concerning additional criteria to the admission of new members process of
the United Nations Charter. The question was political in nature: Can
sovereign states be bound to consent to admission without the bargaining
process usually involved in state action?", Holding the question justiciable,
the judges stated that there was more than political will involved in affairs
of the United Nations Charter and that states would be bound to the rules
they had agreed to without much leeway.
The ICJ initially made clear that it did not intend to pass judgment on
' 17
the internal decisions that prompted a vote for or against membership.

111. There are some rare exceptions, like the presence of the article 39 situations by the
Security Council, but a review of the actions taken under article 39 situations are still possible
against purpose and intent of the Charter.
112. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 IC.J. 226, para. 14 (July
8) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons].
113. Compare David, supra note 91.
114. ICJ Statute art. 65.

115. See Conditions of Admission, supra note 35.
116. What I am trying to get at is that states usually do not do favors for another state
without gaining an advantage, or worsening their collective position. The states could not accept
that the Charter would be able to take precedence over the political will of the states that created
it.

117. See Conditions of Admission, supra note 35, at 60.
political to decide.

That issue would have been
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While the substance of the interpretation stated the obvious,", the second
interpretation cut precisely into the heart of the inquiry. Considering the
circumstances, the General Assembly wanted to know what, if any, kind of
condition can the members require for an affirmative vote while still
fulfilling their obligations under the United Nations Charter." 9 The Court
cleverly limited the question by expressing the opinion: "The Court is not
called upon either to define the meaning and scope of the conditions on
which admission is made dependent, or to specify the elements which may
serve in a concrete case to verify the existence of the requisite
conditions."'11
While the General Assembly wanted to know what kind of conditions
can be imposed other than those purely internal to the state decision
making process, the ICJ only wanted to answer that internal processes
were of no importance. In doing so, the Court refused to declare openly
that it was unwilling to pass judgment on internal decision-making
processes, but declared rather that the question was not asked.' 2 ' This
limitation served only one function, namely to disguise that the Court was
not willing to answer the second part of the question. The Court reduced
the question of the General Assembly from one of entitlement to add
conditions into a question of the mere interpretation text of Article Four of
the United Nations Charter."I This interpretation transformed the question
into a purely legal analysis of a textual provision rather than into a problem
of interplay of politics.
Measuring this decision on the working definition of judicial activism,
the judges neither acted progressively nor lacked deference. Nevertheless,
they construed the question posed loosely. In doing so, the judges did not
act in a judicially active fashion, because the construction was not overly
loose. The judges remained neutral. Holding parties to what they have
118. It is impossible for the organization to control the reasons why a member passes its
vote. If it did, it would infringe on the principle of sovereignty. Each country can do with its
vote whatever it chooses. And is precisely not subject to legal standards.
119. The question was phrased as follows:

In particular, can such a Member, while it recognizes the conditions set forth in that
provision to be fulfilled by the State concerned, subject its affirmative vote to the
additional condition that other States be admitted to membership in the United Nations
together with that State?
Conditions of Admission, supra note 35, at 58.

120. Id.
121. In fact it was not asked, but the way the court limited the scope of its decision at the
outset makes it seem like they thought it was. If it had been asked, the limitation would not have
been necessary, but rather a declaration that these matters are not legal.
122. U.N. CHARTER art. 4.
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promised to do is a universal principle, the application of which did not
overstep any boundaries or advance the general understanding; therefore
progressiveness cannot be implied here. A lack of deference is not
evidenced, because there was no body to afford deference to. The General
Assembly was requesting advice because it was split over the question, and
individual members' actions do not require the Court to extend the
privilege of deference.'1 No act requiring deference occurred, regardless
of the loose construction. The Court did not overstep its bounds.
The Nicaragua case in 19841u was politically very charged and
provided for another opportunity to test for the Political Question doctrine:
Is a country answerable before a court if it engages in military activity that
it considers vital to its interest? Each political leader is bound to act as is
best for his/her country in order to maintain approval in that country.n Is
survival of the state as entity in international law not the ultimate issue of
sovereignty, a sovereignty that the United Nations had accepted?'2 The
ICJ held: No.'1 The Court rephrased this highly emotional question into a
question of fact that was to be held against the word of the United Nations
Charter.1'2 States could not engage in aggressive behavior unless in selfdefense, a question of fact before a clear rule.'2 9 The obligation not to act
in violation of another State's sovereignty and its exceptions was an
obligation
that the United States entered into and could be held to abide
3

by. 1 0

This opinion was not judicially active in the issues we are presently
discussing. The Court did not progress the law on the subject of the
Political Question doctrine with this case, going beyond narrow boundaries
already drawn. It would not make sense to have international law condemn
aggression without the ICJ's ability to find that a country commits this
123. The political spiel of the members does not need to concern the deference
considerations as to the organization as a whole.
124. See Nicaragua, supra note 107.
125. This is true for democratic regimes. In totalitarian regimes, the goal is to stay in
power of something, and thus the state interest becomes the personal interest.
126. I am hopelessly exaggerating the U.S. position and I am aware of it, but it is necessary
to illustrate the point.
127. This answer changed slightly in the face on the Threat of nuclear weapons opinion in
1996, see Nuclear Weapons, supra note 112 (when the justices refused to answer a similar point
for lack of law on the subject).
128. The Charter forbids aggression. U.N. CHARTER art. 2 para. 4.
129. Again I am hopelessly simplifying, because the court had a huge amount of difficulty
defining the actual law, but to that later. The court determined there was law and that each act
could be held against it.
130. See Nicaragua, supra note 107.
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aggression. In order to hold a State to the promise not to commit
aggression, the question had to be within the Court's justiciability
standards.
Very closely intertwined with the concept of Political Question and
the transformation of questions is the issue of advisory opinions.

2. Transforming Non-Political Advisory Opinions
This subsection presents a related and yet different aspect of the issue
of transforming inquiries of political nature into legal ones. We have
determined that the Court has to engage in some rephrasing and limiting,
in order to be able to answer the questions at all. This subsection is
concerned not with the political implications of the questions, but with the
tendency of the ICJ to rephrase questions to suit the judges' answers, a
phenomenon limited to advisory opinions.
An advisory opinion is an opinion that judges are requested to render
on an abstract legal question. Usually, no factual background and no
actual controversy are involved. The concept is in place to help the other
branches of government to interpret existing law in an area, either in order
to tailor new laws and regulations to the existing ones, or to end an
interpretive dispute before it rises to the level of an actual controversy
before the courts. Some countries are familiar with the concept of
advisory opinions.'3 The ICJ often follows the practice of interpreting the
questions posed to it so drastically that the actual question is altered to an
extent the asking body did not intend. The next section will lay out the
practice in domestic courts and then draw parallels to the ICJ practice.

3. Domestic Advisory Opinions
Most courts do not recognize a doctrine of advisory opinion, yet some
countries and some states in the United States permit their Supreme Courts
to render advisory opinions.'3 2 To take an example of one of the United
States' states, the Rhode Island" Supreme Court shall render advisory

131. Some of these countries are India, and South Africa.
recognizes a similar doctrine.

Internationally, the ECJ

132. It could be the Supreme Court or the Constitutional Court depending on the system.
Some of the national courts include the Canadian Supreme Court, and the English and the Indian
Supreme Courts; See DRAHMA PRATAP, ADVISORY JURISDICTION IN THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT, 263 (1972) as well as the South African Constitutional Court, CONSTITUTION OF THE
REPUBLIC OF S. AFR., Act 108 of 1996 S 167 (6). Islamic law incorporates the concept of
advisory opinions as well.
133. I am using the example of Rhode Island, because it is similar to many others in respect
of the statutory or constitutional underpinnings of the doctrine. For analysis of states allowing
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opinions upon written request by either of the coordinate branches but not
jointly.1'3 Where allowed, advisory opinions are limited in scope. States
vary in their limitations; the range extends from, "any question of law" to
"important questions of law" or "solemn occasions."'"' Courts differ in
their opinion as to the bindingness of advisory opinions.'" In general,
domestic judges tend to reject and disagree with the doctrine.'"7
State court judges have put additional limits on the issuance of
advisory opinions not found in the original grant of power to render the
opinion, such as prohibiting requests dealing with private interests.'" Even
in states where issuance of an advisory opinion is mandatory, the Supreme
Courts have imposed limits, such as the relatedness to the constitution.'39

Some more common general restrictions are the refusal to entertain an
advisory opinion if litigation is pending in a matter directly or indirectly
related to the advisory opinion.11
Judges often rephrase questions posed to them in order to either fit the
restrictions or fit their standards. An example of the common trait of
rephrasing the question is tellingly in a multilateral court: the ECJ
commonly rephrases questions submitted to it by the national courts to fit
the interpretive standard imposed on the Court.' 4' National courts follow
the same practice if they feel that a question does not fit the requirement,
but nevertheless believe the query ought to be answered. 42

advisory opinions, and an analysis thereof, see Mel A. Topf, The Jurisprudenceof the Advisory
Processin Rhode Island, 2 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 207, 214 (1997).
134. Id. at 215.
135. Id. at 216.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 231, 232.
138. The Jurisprudence of the Advisory Process, at 234-35.
139. See e.g., Opinion to the Governor, 96 R.I. 358, 191 A.2d 611 (1963).
140. See Topf, supra note 133, at 236.
141. I am referring here specifically to the Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse,
1963, 1 C.M.L.R. 105 (1997) [hereinafter Van Gend], where the court rephrased the question in
this manner. The ECJ can take questions referred to it by national courts, if these questions only
deal with an abstract matter of law. The Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on the
European Union, Nov. 10, 1997 OJ C 340 art. 234 (1997), makes these referrals of interpretive
questions possible and sometimes mandatory. They can be considered an advisory opinion as
well, because they do not decide a case as such, but help the courts in interpreting a provision
that is necessary to decide the case. In the area of treaties, the ECJ can give a purely advisory
opinion as well, but Van Gent, Id. does not arise out of such a pure advisory opinion.
142. See generallyTopf, supra note 133.
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4. Practice of the ICJ
The ICJ also has certain requirements attached to its advisory
jurisdiction set out in Article 65 of the Statute of the Court. 4 3 The proper
organ has to request an opinion and the question must be a legal one.'"
There is no restriction such as "important," but "any" legal question
The judges believe they are vested with
should be answered."'
discretion,14 but they have hardly declined any requests. This section
discusses the practice of the ICJ with regard to phrasing of the question by
the requesting organ. Advisory opinions pose a query to the Court that the
Court is supposed to answer.'"4 One aspect of this is the fitting of a
question into legal terms;'" the second aspect is interpreting the legal
question to mean one thing rather than the other.
49
A case thirty-two years after the Conditions of Admission case,
when the Political Question doctrine was well settled, illustrates'the
difference. Although the ICJ used to attempt to separate context and
query, it now required context. In the WHO v. Egypt case,' an advisory
opinion was requested, but instead of ignoring the actual circumstance to
answer an abstract question in a legal fashion, the Court stated: "if a
question put in the hypothetical way in which it is posed in the request is to
receive a pertinent and effectual reply, the Court must first ascertain the
meaning and full implications of the question in the light of the actual
framework of fact and law."'

143. ICJ Statute art. 65.
144. Id. at para. 1. See also Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996
I.C.J. 66 (July 1996).
145. U.N. CHARTER art. 96 para. 1.
146. See Nuclear Weapons, supra note 111, at para. 14.
147. Although the court considers itself to have discretion whether to answer an inquiry,
U.N. CHARTER, supra note 145, it has only refused to do so in two cases. There has been no
refusal, based on the discretionary power of the Court, to act upon a request for advisory opinion
in the history of the present Court; in the case concerning the Legality of the Use by a State of
Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, the refusal to give the World Health Organization the
advisory opinion requested by it was justified by the Court's lack of jurisdiction in that case. See
supra note 111, at para. 14.
148. The fitting of the question into legal terms is not limited to advisory cases, but I will
rely in this second on advisory opinions as a matter of example. This issue has been amply
addressed above.
149. See Conditions of Admission, supra note 35.
150. See Interpretation of an Agreement of 25 March 1951 between WHO and Egypt, 180
I.C.J. 73 (Dec. 20) [hereinafter WHO and Egypt].
151. Id. at 76.
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The Court still contended that the inquiry was a legal one, although
admitting that it had political implications. 5 2 The ICJ declined to take
motives leading to the request into consideration. 1 3 It re-articulated a
question regardless of its already abstract character. The original inquiry
was this:
Are the negotiation and notice provisions of Section 37 of
the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the World
Health Organization and Egypt applicable in the event that
either party to the Agreement wishes to have the Regional
Office transferred from the territory of Egypt?
2. If so, what would be the legal responsibilities of both
the World Health Organization and Egypt, with regard to
the Regional Office in Alexandria, during the two-year
period between notice and termination of the Agreement?5
This inquiry would have required nothing but an interpretation of a
treaty between the World Health Organization (WHO) and Egypt.
Nevertheless, the World Court transformed the inquiry into: "What are
the legal principles and rules applicable to the question under what
conditions and in accordance with what modalities a transfer of the
Regional Office from Egypt may be effect? ' 5In changing the question, the Court effectively addressed the issue of
whether international organizations have to comply with their agreements;
therefore the ICJ ruled judicially actively. Measured against the working
definition, the ICJ clearly construed the request given in a fashion designed
to raise issues unnecessary to fully answer to the original request. Both the
almost sua sponte raising of an issue and the lack of limitation to the
necessary for a satisfying answer make the case a landmark decision.
In the Competence of the General Assembly case of 1950,' the Court
was faced with the question of whether the General Assembly could sua
sponte accept members without a positive or negative recommendation of
the Security Council.-7 The inquiry was directed at the issue of how to
interpret a vetoed resolution for acceptance or denial of acceptance-in

152. Id.
153. Id. at para. 33.
154. Id. at para. 1.
155. See WHO and Egypt, supra note 149, at para. 35.
156. Competence of the General Assembly for the admission of a state to the United
Nations, 150 I.C.J. 4 (Mar. 30) [hereinafter General Assembly].
157. Id. at 5
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short, whether a vetoed decision was a decision at all for the purposes of
acceptance.
The ICJ instead interpreted the question as follows: "The Court is,
therefore, called upon to determine solely whether the General Assembly
can make a decision to admit a State when the Security Council has
transmitted no recommendation to it." "'
The court here used "no recommendation" rather than what had been
described by General Assembly"5 9 as "negative recommendation."'" This
"vetoed
because when
the outcome,
rephrase predetermined
recommendation" became "no recommendation" at all, only textualism
was needed.
This interpretation of the question here was not true' 6' to the query;
nevertheless, it was not judicially active. Although the ICJ changed the
issue and avoided interpreting the true question of the General Assembly,
the judges gave the United Nations a sufficient answer, by refusing to
analyze whether a vetoed recommendation was sufficient, and rather
assuming that this was the case. Since this assumption fits within the
natural interpretation, the Court was not judicially active in this case.
In the CertainExpenses case, the Court decided whether cost incurred
during peacekeeping operations were expenses of the organization that had
to be paid by all its members. 162 The World Court again stressed that it
could only answer legal questions.' It concluded that all it was asked to
decide was the interpretation of the specific United Nations Charter
provision, namely Article 17.'" In the interpretation of this article
however, the Court extended the inquiry further. l '6 Claiming that nothing
but the query itself was relevant for a discussion under the advisory
opinion, the ICJ formally dismissed the French amendment to the inquiry
that had been rejected by the General Assembly.'" The ICJ still reserved

158. Id. at 7.
159. Id. at 9.
160. Id. at 7.
161. See General Assembly, supra note 156 at 21 (Judge Azevedo, dissenting, contends,
that the court left out an important part of the inquiry, namely the question whether a vetoed
recommendation would count as a negative recommendation).
162. See Certain Expenses, supra note 34.
163. Id.at 155.
164. Id.
165. Id.at 199 (Judge Fitzmaurice concurring, agrees that the court went into more detail

than required, see also Id. at 235, Judge Basedevant, dissenting).
166. Id. at 155.
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the right to comment on the particular amendment, namely the question of
67
the appropriateness of incurring the cost.
The judges of the 1962 Court in fact remained with the original
problem; however, in the decision, it inserted language justifying the
actions of the General Assembly by giving it the Court's seal of
appropriateness.' The ICJ could have stopped at page 162 of its opinion.
Everything after page 162 refers to the problem of appropriateness, which
the General Assembly specifically ruled out of the inquiry."6 The Court
specifically addressed that the General Assembly has an independent power
over international peace and security, and thereby declared the
peacekeeping operations legitimate.'70 The judges even went as far as to
make the inference explicit.'7' Judge Spiropoulos made clear that he
viewed the Court as exceeding the boundaries in his declaration following
the opinion.',
The Court in this case clearly overstepped the limits to judicial
activism, because of the result achieved and the fashion in which it was
achieved. As measured against our working definition, the Court clearly
lacked deference to the inquiry posed to it and took it upon itself to solve a
question that the General Assembly had explicitly taken out of the equation
for the ICJ to discuss. There was no ambiguity as to the General
73
Assembly's wishes.
While the inquiry was evidently a legal one, the ICJ changed the
inquiry to add dictum. With this dictum the Court entered into sua sponte
considerations that are not within the scope of advisory opinions. The
World Court was faced with a question of interpretation technically not in
dispute; the task of an advisory opinion is to engage into an analysis that
answers the question narrowly so as to avoid possible conflict with a
standing practice. 7 4 Here, the Court engaged in an analysis the requesting
167. See Certain Expenses, supra note 34 at 156-57.
168. What I am referring to here is the language: "It is a consistent practice of the General
Assembly to include in the annual budget resolution, a provision for expenses relating to the
maintenance of peace and security." Id.at 160.
169. Id. after page 162 (the court turns to limitation on the budgetary power, which is

discussed in far more detail and in a direction not necessary for the immediate question at hand).
170. See General Assembly, supra note 156, at 163.
171. Id.at 176-77.

172. Judge Spiropoulos, supra note 160, at 180-81 (Judge Spender also agrees on this point,
concurring, at 182-83).
173. Since, as mentioned before, the General Assembly voted against the expansion of the

very question.
174. The same comments apply as mentioned before, regarding the possible difference
between practice and theory.
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organ wanted to avoid, causing a lack of deference, which alone renders
the opinion judicially active.7
The inquiry posed to the court in the Namibia Case' was rather
simple: "What are the legal consequences for States of the continued
presence of South Africa in Namibia, notwithstanding Security Council
resolution 276 (1970)?"'"
The broadness of the question allowed and forced the Court to go into
many details and into considerations beyond the immediately necessary.'
Surprisingly, the Court refused to take advantage of the full scope of the
inquiry. The actual outcome of the question is hardly as interesting as
some of the statements going along with the opinion. The Court could
have reviewed the legality of the resolutions made by the General
Assembly and the Security Council, as it had done previously in the
Certain Expenses," case with less authority to do so.", Instead the Court
states,
Undoubtedly, the Court does not possess powers of judicial
review or appeal in respect of the decisions taken by the
United Nations organs concerned. The question of the
validity or conformity with the Charter of General
Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) or of related Security
Council resolutions does not form the subject of the
request for advisory opinion.'"'
In the Namibia"' decision we find one of the rare instances in which
the Court under-uses the power conferred upon it. The question to be
answered here is whether this action amounts to judicial activism as
175. I feel the need to express that I do agree with the outcome of the case, and I am
relieved that the court decided as it did. Nevertheless, the task of this paper is to analyze the
jurisprudence of the court, and assess the attitude the court takes to its task. The evaluation of
their performance will be discussed later.
176. See Namibia, supra note 91
177. Id. at 27, para. 42.
178. The question whether this particular resolution of the Security Council was justified,
and what consequences would arise, are only examples.
179. See Certain Expenses, supra note 34.
180. Again, this touches on the issue of deference and the obligation to review to maintain
legitimacy in the UN.
181. See Certain Expenses, supra note 34, at para. 89. It would have been possible to
review the power to make this decision and the foundations of the decision of the other organs of
the UN, to assess whether South Africa's presence was indeed valid and the resolution without
effect. Although the court goes into some of these issues, not all are addressed. The selectivity
with which the court here operates is striking.
182. See Namibia, supra note 91.
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defined in this paper. From the decision that was handed down, the Court
stayed well within the boundaries of the inquiry, the Court also afforded
deference to the other organs of the United Nations and did not seem to
interpret in a lax fashion.
Nevertheless, not engaging in some kind of review concerning the
substance of the other organs' actions appears to be another form of
activism, namely decision based on personal preference.,
The refusal to
go into some of South Africa's concerns regarding voting patterns in the
Security Council might not have altered the query so to render the opinion
activist in the procedural sense, but changed the result. By refusing review
of other organs' actions, the Court was only concerned with the case, not
the overall scheme of the United Nations Charter. In the future, this action
might have consequences harmful to the United Nations system.
B. Interpretationof Substantive United Nations CharterProvisions
This paper will now turn to address decisions of the ICJ relating to the
substantive analysis of the United Nations Charter interpretation. In the
Conditions of Admission case,I" the Court was faced with the interpretation
of a narrow article of the United Nations Charter. The ICJ engaged in a
by-the-book textual analysis: what the meaning of the words were,
whether they were exclusive or by way of example. The court was here
guided by plain meaning of the text.", The court stated: "To warrant an
interpretation other than that which ensues from the natural meaning of the
words, a decisive reason would be required which has not been
established.""'6
The ICJ engaged in an analysis of the results of an opposite
decision in order to justify a result already reached and concluded that a
different decision would violate the spirit of Article Four of the United
Nations Charter. 18
Here, the Court was certainly not willing to
compromise the text of the United Nations Charter for political necessities
of the member States. It interpreted the United Nations Charter true to the
text and did not engage in loose interpretation. Thus, from a substantive
point of view, the Court did not rule in a judicially active fashion.

183. The court effectively decided that there could not be a review of UN organ action, a
striking view, which could well be further discussed in a different paper.

184. See Conditions to Admission, supra note 35, at 57.
185. Id. at 62.
186. Id. at 63.
187. Id.
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In the early phase of interpretation of the United Nations Charter and
a time when legal positivism was a preferred form of interpretation,' 8 the
Court would have been unlikely to decide otherwise. The Court had not
yet established enough strength to rule on the basis of purpose and intent
alone, not only because of its own weakness and inexperience, but also
because of the credibility of the organization and its purpose.
The
organization had been formed to create a body that supervised the rule of
international law in the form of peace and security; how could its principal
organ rule on any other basis than the written rule of law? The text of
Article Four is quite clear, so that it would have asked too much of the
Court to decide otherwise. The conclusion here must therefore be that the
court did not rule judicially actively.
In the Competence of the General Assembly case 89, the Court
proceeded in the same pattern, not only because the query was made only
two years later, but also because the same Article Four was involved and
the surrounding reasons had not dramatically changed.
In the Effects of Awards of the UNAT case in 1954'1, the Court was
faced with a request for advisory opinion that was in part too far remote
from an actual provision of the United Nations Charter for the World
Court to operate on a purely textual basis. The opinion can be separated
into two parts. The Court held that the findings of the UNAT were
binding upon the organization and that the General Assembly had the right
to establish the UNAT."' In the first part of the decision, the ICJ analyzed
the language of the statue of the tribunal and found it to be a judicial
body."2 Then the Court proceeded to infer all characteristics of a judicial
body, so the tribunal could fulfill its purpose.191
When the court proceeded to consider whether the General Assembly
,had the power to create a tribunal rendering decisions binding on the
Organization, the analysis was further removed from any text. Article 101
provided the basis from which to infer the power of the General Assembly

188. See R. MOLES, DEFINITION AND RULE IN LEGAL THEORY: A REASSESSMENT OF
H.L.A. HART AND THE POSITIVIST TRADITION (1987); See also EDWARD MCWHINNEY, JUDGE
MANFRED LACHS AND JUDICIAL LAW MAKING, 17 (1995); See also MCWHINNEY, supra note

35, at 35 (commenting on the positivist tradition).

189. See General Assembly, supra note 156.
190. See Effects of Awards, supra note 47.

191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 53. The court found that a judiciaLorgan was established and that the nature of a
judicial organ includes binding decisions and independence. It therefore refused to let the
General Assembly have the right to review without alternation of the statute.
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to create the tribunal,1'9 however, the article is hardly detailed. The Court
had to infer intent and purpose to even be able to rule on the question
whether the General Assembly had the power to create the UNAT.1 95
Without a strong background of a rather clear United Nations Charter
provision, the ICJ was left with intent and purpose of the provisions and,
frankly speaking, common sense. Although this decision was only four
years after the Competence of the General Assembly case,19' it seems the
Court was more comfortable with departing from the actual text. There
appear to be several reasons for this departure: first, there was hardly any
applicable text; second, it made logical sense; third, principles common to
many legal systems in the world suggested this result; fourth, the departure
only briefly touched upon the subject of the inquiry; and fifth, the ICJ
cannot refuse a proper request for an advisory opinion.
The court did not overstep the bounds to activism in the result. The
argument that articles 101(1) and 101(3) were a basis to infer that the
General Assembly had authority to even create the tribunal is hardly
convincing. The Court attempted to conceal the lack of text (and thus of
law) by pointing to remotely applicable portions of the United Nations
Charter.
The judges did not directly admit to the United States
constitutional language, that the creation of the UNAT was a "necessary
and proper" use of powers, to fulfill the task given to the General
Assembly, but did not fall very short of the statement. Measured against
the working definition, I cannot find activism regardless of the apparent
lack of text. The Court showed deference to the General Assembly, by
conceding that there was a need and the possibility to create the tribunal.
The standard of deference applied seems most appropriate in this
instance, first because the General Assembly agreed and second it seemed
logical to proceed in this fashion. There was no danger threatening basic
principles of the United Nations, because the creation of the UNAT did not
violate any express term of the United Nations Charter and rather fostered
the principles therein. Holding the General Assembly to the statute of the
tribunal, as they had created it, was based on textualism. In interpreting
the statute of the tribunal narrowly based on text and function, the ICJ did

194. U.N. CHARTER art. 100.
195. The language of the text of the Charter in the relevant provisions is as follows: "the
Security Council under regulations established by the General Assembly shall appoint the staff."
U.N. CHARTER art. 101, para. 1.

See also U.N. CHARTER art. 101, para. 3 ("the paramount

consideration in the employment of the staff and in the determination of the conditions of service
shall be the necessity of securing the highest standards of efficiency.")
196. See General Assembly, supra note 156.
197. U.N. CHARTER art. 100, paras. 1, 3.
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neither interpret the statute in a loose fashion, so as to bring them into the
definition of activism nor progressed international law. The decision was
very narrow in scope and did not affect international law in general, so as
to progress it.
Another example of this approach is the Certain Expenses case.-w
Although this case has been discussed in an earlier section under the
heading of procedural activism, the value of this case for the section on
substance will become evident. The Court employed analysis of the text of
the United Nations Charter, discussing the issue whether an expense had to
be administrative or other, to introduce the issue of maintenance of peace
and security into the discussion. '' In deciding the case, the ICJ introduced
the distinction between enforcement and non-enforcement action." Since
the United Nations Charter seems to give the General Assembly and the
Security Council concurrent jurisdiction over the matter of international
peace and security, 02 the World Court had to find a way to make sense of
the United Nations Charter and transform it into a workable form. By
making the distinction, the ICJ introduced a new concept into the United
Nations Charter.22 The dividing line between the Security Council's
competence and the General Assembly's competence is ICJ made. The use
of purpose and intent as interpretive guidelines becomes more evident in
this case, compared to the cases of the earlier decisions.
Through its procedural activism, the Court increased the difficulty for
itself and ruled in a judicially active fashion. The Court did not allow
deference to the creators of the United Nations Charter, trusting that
concurrent jurisdiction was feasible without a line drawn, so as to give
room for practice. The ICJ progressed the law of the United Nations
Charter by introducing a new concept creating the modern peacekeeping
missions, which were not originally in the United Nations Charter. For
these reasons, the Court was judicially active in the substance of this case.
Recalling the deadlock in the Security Council, the ICJ was, more likely
then not, concerned with the possibility of the United Nations being able to
fulfill its purpose and thus generated this result. However, it should not
have gotten politically involved. The Court was not forced to decide on an

198. See Certain Expenses, supra note 34.
199. Id. at 160.
200. Id. at 163.
201. U.N. CHARTER art. 24, para.1; art. 11, para. 1.
202. See Certain Expenses supra note 34, at 197 (Judge Spender, in a separate opinion,
expresses his discontent with the approach of the majority, and warns the court not to engage into
political considerations rather than legal ones).
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infringement of powers, and no substantive violation of principles of the
United Nations Charter was evident as to invite review.
In the Reparation for Injuries case,2°1 the ICJ conferred upon the
organization international legal personality. Loosely tying this privilege to
the text of Article 100 of the United Nations Charter,204 the ICJ implied that
an opposite decision would violate the text of this Article, nevertheless
plainly stating:
The Charter does not expressly confer upon the
Organization the capacity to include, in its claim for
reparation, damage caused to the victim or to persons
entitled through him. The Court must therefore begin by
enquiring whether the provisions of the Charter concerning
the functions of the Organization, and the part played by
its agents in the performance of those functions. 0
The Court here had no choice but to use a positivist approach,
because of the simple lack of text. Does this make the decision activist by
definition? Not by itself. The Court here exhibited great deference to the
makers of the United Nations Charter as well as to the personnel involved.
What was implied did in fact progress the law, but not to an extent that
was surprising or unforeseeable.20 The judges pointed to the uniqueness of
the United Nations Charter and of its function, thereby limiting the
possible extent of the decision. Nothing in the United Nations Charter
made its legal personality express; giving the organization international
personality was a novelty in international law.20 Our prior discussion
concerning the character of the United Nations Charter is of help here to
evaluate the ICJ decision.
As adequate for a "consensual constitution," the judges were under
the obligation to bridge gaps in international law. This case marks a
paramount measure for the difference between creating law and bridging
the gaps. The former is improper, while the latter is proper. Whether this
decision is activist or not, this case illustrates the closest possible scenario
between proper bridging and improper creation. 8 Giving the United
203. See Reparations, supra note 65.
204. U.N. CHARTER, art. 100.
205. See Reparations, supra note 65, at 182.
206. Id. at 190 (Judge Alvarez, concurring in the result, is even of the opinion that the court
has the legitimate power to progress the law in the face of new situations).
207. Up to this point only states had had international legal personality.
208. I must be clear that I refuse to express my opinion, whether this case is activist or not,
in an absolute fashion. It is a close call and reasonable people can differ.
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Nations legal personality was necessary for the functioning of the
organization. But does the end justify the means? Although the judges
attempted to limit their ruling by stating that the United Nations has special
status, politicians are unlikely to have considered the theoretical
implications of what they intended to create. If they had known that it
would take actual legal personality, and what leap this would entail for
international law, to create the United Nations, they might have denied this
status to their creation.
No international institution had had legal
personality before, so that the leap the ICJ took crosses the line to
activism.
In the Namibia case, 10° the Court again interpreted the United Nations
Charter in a purpositivist fashion. Over South Africa's objection, the ICJ
condoned the voting procedures of in the Security Council, although they
violated the actual text of the United Nations Charter. 2 t The Court did not
want to allow South Africa to invoke an issue it felt that only the
permanent members of the Security Council had standing to raise. By
refusing to let South Africa raise the issue, the Court again overstepped its
limits. The considerations that probably went into the decision were more
focused on a just result, namely that South Africa leave Namibia, than law.
This result orientation fits neatly in the definition of judicial activism. A
consideration outside the law was to regain the trust of Third World
22
Countries, after the devastating South West Africa decision series. 1
The court ruled in an activist fashion by construing the text of the
United Nations Charter so loosely and letting practice alter the United
Nations Charter's express terms. The ICJ could have declined to decide
the issue raised by South Africa based on standing or through interpretation
of the question, rather than to decide the issue.
In the Threat of Nuclear Weapons case, 213 The ICJ decided the
question posed, but refused to decide an issue imbedded in it, namely the
question whether self-defense would trump the prohibition against use of
209. See Reparations, supra note 65, at 197-98 (Judge Hackworth dissenting, agrees, that
there was nothing suggesting this kind of power for an international organization). Cf. id. at 205
(Judge Pasha, dissenting).
210. See Namibia, supra note 91.
211. Id. In this case, the ICJ decided that an abstention was equally valid as a vote form a

permanent member of the Security Council. The text of the Charter however requires an
affirmative vote: "Decisions of the security Council on all other matters shall be made by an
affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members."
U.N. CHARTER art. 27, para 3.
212. The court had been immediately criticized for its decisions and, in the aftermath, the
court changed its views. See MCWHINNEY, supra note 188, at 14.
213. See Certain Expenses, supra note 34.
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force.' The ICJ alleged the reason of insufficiency of the law in order to
2
avoid deciding the issue. '
The World Court did not overreach beyond normal judicial limits in
this case. By admitting to a lacuna the Court did not stretch the limits of
the question in abuse of discretion, nor did it display a lack of deference.
This was the first time in the history of the Court that the judges decided to
take a query, but returned a decision that did not give a full answer,
because of a lacuna. In the overall structure, it could not harm the United
Nations to admit to certain gaps in the law. No one organ needed
deference in this regard because they were likely not to be involved in such
issues. The question had been: "Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in
any circumstance permitted under international law? 21 6 The Court did its
best not to alter the question and refrained from trying to legislate.
After the aforementioned examples of ICJ jurisprudence that
established some cases of judicial activism, this paper will consider
whether the Court legitimately exercises this activism, thereby excusing the
activism exhibited.
C. Legitimacy of the ICI
The ICJ is the principal judicial body of the United Nations.2 " As the
principal judicial organ, its task is to interpret the United Nations Charter
and to resolve disputes between the organs of the United Nations and its
member States. The ICJ has on several occasions exceeded the task given
to it by the United Nations Charter, by ignoring a question, by adding to
it, or by interpreting the United Nations Charter loosely. Where does the
ICJ obtain its legitimacy, if it is judicially active?
Like many federal judges, ICJ judges are not elected by common
ballot among the people in their community. They are nominated by the
Permanent Court of Arbitration and then elected by the General Assembly
and the Security Council. 218 The judges represent the major legal systems
and cultures of the world.2 "9 This representation is not formal and the

214. See Antonio F. Perez, The Passive Virtues and the World Court: Pro-dialogic
Abstention by the InternationalCourt of Justice, 18 MICH. J.INT'L L. 399, 430 (1997).
215. Id.
216. See Nuclear Weapons, supra note 112.
217. U.N. CHARTER, art. 92.
218. ICJ Statute art. 4, para. 1.

219. E.g., no two judges of the same nationality are allowed on the court.

ICJ Statue art. 3,

para. 1. See also Liz Heffernan, The Nuclear Weapons Opinions Reflections on the Advisory
Procedureof the InternationalCourtof Justice, 28 STETSON L. REV. 133, 135-36 (1998).
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judges do not serve as agents of their countries, but are neutral.'
Since
they are not representatives, do they have the legitimacy to make law? In
international law, countries make law by either treaty or custom."' If the
judges do not represent the will of the countries, they cannot make law
with democratic legitimacy.m There has been some writing on democratic
legitimacy on the international law community, without a conclusive result.
International law is not based on democratic legitimacy and does not need
to be. International law is a separate legal system, as explained many
times in this paper, and therefore, the rules of what constitutes legitimacy
are different from the domestic context and legitimacy must be derived
from a different source. The basic legitimacy of the ICJ derives from the
instrument creating it, but if the scope of the power conferred is exceeded
by judicial activism, there is little that can offer legitimacy. Of course it is
difficult for any judge to proclaim the law without coloring the words and
adding to the flavor, but this coloring may not exceed the scope of bridging
gaps in the law. m
If judges in the World Court continue to actively make law, m their
legitimacy will be lost. Judicial activism in the ICJ can take not only the
form of active creation of law, but also of (passive) refusal to act in
fulfillment of their judicial function in accordance with the United Nations
Charter. When the World Court refuses, for example, to pass judgment on
or review certain actions of other United Nations organs, it cannot fulfill
its functions fully, namely to protect the object and purpose of the United
Nations Charter.m If judges do not fulfill their functions, they loose
legitimacy and put the credibility of the United Nations and the ICJ at
risk.6
220. ICJ Statue art. 2.
221. See Certain Expenses, supra note 34.
222. I will not go into detail as to the democratic legitimacy of international law in general,
first because it will exceed this paper's scope, and second because it has been hotly debated
among scholars.
223. Talim Elias argues that the General Assembly took cognizance of the rule making
powers of the ICJ, and that this action, taken in resolution 3232 (XXIX) of 12 November 1974,
is sufficient. He also argues that the court cannot declare a non liquet. See TALIM ELIAS,
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND SOME CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS, 216-17 (1983). I
cannot agree fully with this argument for several reasons. First, the General Assembly cannot by
resolution itself make hard law, so it cannot authorize the ICJ to do so. Second, the resolution
itself is not as unambiguous as portrayed.

224. They may not since the Nuclear Weapons case showed the newly coming reluctance
and preference to admit to a lacuna.
225. Q. David, supra note 91.
226. It is, in my view, hypocritical to let the 880-pound Gorilla do whatever it pleases.
There is a limit. Articles I and 2 of the Charter and the ICJ should be there to watch over this
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I do not mean to imply that Article 3922 determinations are
reviewable, but rather only measures blatantly against the text of the
United Nations Charter.
Since the World Court has, on numerous
occasions, refused to review the other organs' actions for their
compatibility with principles of the United Nations, m this paper has not
even reached the question on how much review should be in place. First,
there must be review in the first place.29 The ICJ has virtually rejected the
Political Question doctrine and has no excuse to reject a review of other
organ's actions. In the Namibia case the judges refused review, in the
Certain Expenses case they undertook review. There are more examples
on both sides; some review engaged in for right or wrong reason and in the
proper or improper way, some review refused for the right or wrong
reasons, in a proper or improper way. Lack of consistency in deciding
will not help to establish legitimacy and credibility.
IV. CONCLUSION
Procedurally, the Court used to be more active than it is now.
Concerning substantive activism, the actions of the Court can be tied to the
existence of text to guide the interpretation. 23° When there is clear text, the
Court usually does not ignore the plain meaning. When no clear text is
involved, the Court has proven to be quite active in creating law.
In the early stages of the ICJ, the justices were trained mostly in
Europe or were themselves European."' This resulted in a strong tendency
toward legal positivism. The judges wanted to separate particular issues
totally from their social context. 2 2 Unfortunately over time, the judges
were not able to separate the issues form their social context and fell victim
to the apparent need to create law. When clear text is involved, the judges
limit. Although Marcella David, supra note 91, has pointed out difficulties, I am referring not to
things that cannot be checked against object and purpose like the determination of a threat to the
peace but rather only to the actions taken and if they violate international peace and security
blatantly.
227. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.

228. Compare Namibia, supra note 91.
229. 1 think I have made clear how much review I would apply in through the standard of
deference I have suggested as measure for judicial activism.
230. Cf BODIE, supra note 92. Bodie subdivides the courts activism in two phases, before

and after 1966. I disagree, due to the reasons shown in this paper. Concerning the substance
before 1966, the ICJ stripped the inquiry to its textual essentials. id. at 64. In the period after
1966, the ICJ turned to more evaluative reasons and became more conscious of the charter's

background, purpose, and intention. Id. at 62.
231. Id. at 61.
232. EDWARD MCWHINNEY, JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES xvii,
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used to rule for the plain meaning, and when no clear text was available,
purpose and intent of the United Nations Charter ruled the decision. In
later cases, with a new set of judges, the World Court took great liberty
with which issues were decided and which chosen to be left at rest, once
any inquiry or conflict had been presented to them. This liberty falls
within the working definition of judicial activism. Although not every case
warrants this label, the analysis above shows that the Court in procedural
liberty throughout the years of jurisprudence displays a great deal of
activism that is not part of a grand scheme.
Another factor in this assessment, however, has to be the need for
activism. It has been said that every judicial body makes law and that
indeed, lawmaking is an essential function of the adjudicative role., 3 The
role of the judges is to state the law, and in doing so, judges necessarily
23
add color or flavor to the rule, thereby adding and making new law. 4
Judges necessarily advance the law minimally by their interpretation and
their application. It is also clear that the position of the ICJ as only arbiter
increases pressure on the judges to reach the right result, while they are
still trapped with a strong need for restraint because their decisions cannot
be remedied like domestic decisions. Nevertheless, the ICJ often went
beyond the "flavoring" of the law by deciding issues not in question or
avoiding them. The unique role of the Court, as it has been described
supra, makes its decisions uniquely important and restraint on its side is
desirable. Although the judges found the right measure at times, the lack
of consistency, traceable to different panels at different times with different
morals and cultural backgrounds, shows that judicial activism in the ICJ is
less a creed and more a creature of personal preference.
Although the intent of the judges to progress the law and heal the
international machinery is commendable, where it occurred, medicine
applied the wrong way can still harm the patient. Consistency is necessary
for the ICJ. Doctrines of ripeness and mootness have their place in
international and domestic law, so that the decision of questions not within
the inquiry should, more often than not, not be an issue. Similar to the
ripeness doctrine, an issue not on the agenda should not be decided in a
sterile setting, removed from a problem situation. It could result, and at
times has resulted, in a fundamental decision with the ability to cause more

233. Speech by Laurance Boisson de Chazournes, at 95th Annual Meeting of the American
Society of International Law, panel on the Role of the International adjudicator, available at
http://www.asil.org/opps.htm (last visited Apr. 2001).
234. See Reparations, supra note 65, at 190 (Judge Alvarez, concurring in the result, states
that he cannot even see the line that separates law making from development of law).
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harm than use. The World Court has said in the Asylum case"5 it ought to
consider the question asked and ignore those not asked. This is also
known as the non-ultra petita rule. "6 The judges should stick to this rule.
If the ICJ were less active procedurally, it would be less hard-pressed in
some substantive decisions.
The ICJ has a unique task in the international plane, which calls for
consideration of the judges' positions as to the basics of the structure of the
United Nations, the position of the Court in the organization, and their
own roles. Once these factors are clearer in the minds of the judges, the
activism exhibited by ICJ may be directed into a more controlled and
consistent manner that does justice to the important role played in
international law. If consistency is reached beyond one set of judges or
one set of circumstances, the ICJ will receive more leeway for being
judicially active. Unfortunately, over the fifty-year period the Court has
been in place, the personal attitudes of the judges varied so strongly that no
coherent trend can be identified, and the Court at times resembles an ad
hoc panel rather than a standing Court with fifty years of decisions to guide
it.
Judicial activism is certainly not "evil" for international law,
nevertheless, everything can be overdone. The judges in the World Court
can be compared with Supreme Court justices in the United States. To a
degree judicial activism is inherent in their function as the court of last
resort. The judges have to be active. In international law, the ideal would
be comparable to domestic law: legislators come together and create law
where there is a need for it. Unfortunately, international law is always
behind its time. 1 If we do not want more non-decisions of the ICJ as in
the Threat of Nuclear Weapons case,231 then we have to live with an active
Court from time to time.
The United Nations Charter must be interpreted first on its face, and
the result so achieved must be weighed against the object and purpose of
the United Nations Charter. The object and purpose must then be
construed broadly to exclude only those results, which would offend its
purpose blatantly in order to afford sufficient deference to the other organs
Nevertheless, consistency in this review is
of the United Nations.
necessary to afford legitimacy to both the court and to the United Nations.
235. See Asylum (Colom.v. Peru), 150 I.C.J. 266, 402 (Nov. 20).

Although this was a

contentious case, the rephrasing of questions remains, and the doctrine administered by the court
should also stay consistent.

236. See BODIE, supra note 92, at 65.
237. Compare MCWHINNEY & MARTIN, supra note 35, at 147-48.
238. See Nuclear Weapons, supra note 112.
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If that takes some activism from time to time, the author is willing to
accept that. But not everyone shares this view, as some say: "[A]
proactive court is as dangerous as a proactive council."219 One cannot help
but feel a swell of pity for the ICJ judges, stuck with the need for
deference and review-stuck with a whipsaw.

239. See David, supra note 91, at 149.
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INTRODUCTION

Economy Class Syndrome is a condition coined from the cramped
seating conditions passengers often experience while riding in coach or
Although the condition
economy class on commercial air carriers.'
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received its name from the economy seating on air carriers, it is by no
2
means limited to economy class air travel .
It is the intention of this article to establish a legal basis by which air
carriers will be determined liable to their passengers who develop deep
vein thrombosis and, as a result, suffer damages from Economy Class
Syndrome. This article will evaluate the individual elements of the
Warsaw Convention as they relate to international air carrier liability and
the established judicial standards for the elements. After establishing the
elements of the tort, it will analyze the factors of Economy Class
Syndrome, in conjunction with the elements of the tort, to establish that the
air carriers are liable to their passengers for the damages they suffer from
the conditions that lead to Economy Class Syndrome. Although the
development of Economy Class Syndrome does not qualify as an
"accident" under the Warsaw Convention, Article 17, the air carrier is
nevertheless liable for damages under Article 25, due to its "willful
misconduct" in recklessly and knowingly creating the conditions that result
in Economy Class Syndrome.

A. Overview
The purpose of this article is to determine an air carrier's liability for
Economy Class Syndrome and to evaluate the damages that occur from it.
This article begins with an overview of Deep Vein Thrombosis, the
underlying medical condition of Economy Class Syndrome, and the
particular conditions that cause it. This is followed by a brief section
discussing some of the current events that have raised the public's
awareness of Economy Class Syndrome, combined with a background of
Deep Vein Thrombosis. The third section covers the Warsaw Convention
and how this Treaty affects air carrier liability. This article does not go
into explicit detail on the history of the Warsaw Convention or the
subsequent amendments made to it in later treaties. These issues have
been thoroughly discussed in prior works of other individuals and therefore
are not analyzed here., The fourth section discusses the elements of torts
in commercial air carrier liability as established by the Warsaw
Convention. The fifth section discusses the issue of "willful misconduct,"
2. Id. (stating the condition is known to result from long periods of inactivity that slows
the blood flow, an example of which is the prolonged immobility due to surgery or a limb set in
a cast).
3. 1. H. PH. DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, AN INTRODUCTION To AIR LAW 57-118 (6th ed.
1997); Robert P. Boyle, The Warsaw Convention-Past,Present and Future, in ESSAYS IN AIR
LAW 1 (Arnold Kean ed., 1982); BERNARD WOOD, PRINCIPAL INSTRUMENTS OF THE WARSAW
SYSTEM, at Foreword (2d ed. 1981).
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and the consequences of knowingly acting with disregard for the
passenger's safety, followed by air carrier defenses to such claims. The
article concludes by incorporating the tort elements established by the
Warsaw Convention, the conditions of Economy Class Syndrome, and the
exception created in Article 25, which moves the air carriers limited
liability to an unlimited liability.
B. Deep Vein Thrombosis
The medical term for Economy Class Syndrome is Deep Vein
Thrombosis (hereinafter DVT).' DVT is a pulmonary condition, in which
there is a formation of blood clots in the lower extremities of the body
after an individual has been immobilized for long periods of time with the
legs in a lowered position., This condition may result in a pulmonary
embolism, a potentially fatal condition which occurs when a developed
blood clot moves through the blood stream and suddenly becomes lodged
in the lung arteries, blocking the blood flow to the lung tissue.' The
symptoms of Economy Class Syndrome may vary from person to person.
Some of the more commonly reported symptoms include panic attacks,
shortness of breath, sharp chest pains (often thought to be a heart attack),
dizziness, and coughing blood.7 If the pulmonary condition is not
immediately treated, it can be fatal. There are approximately 600,000
cases of pulmonary embolisms annually, ten percent of which result in
death.8
C. Public Awareness
Due to the increased media coverage in the late 1990s, the traveling
public has become increasingly aware of effects of these blood clots and
the development of Economy Class Syndrome. Much of this awareness
has come after the sudden death of a twenty-eight year-old woman, who
suddenly collapsed after departing her twenty-hour flight from Sydney,
Australia to London's Heathrow Airport. 9 The traveling public's concern
of the condition was further sparked after the realization that Economy
4. Mayo Clinic, Pulmonary Embolism-What You Know May Save Your Life, (Jan. 2001)
at http://www.mayoclinic.com/home?id =NE00253.
5. See id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Rachel Salazar, Economy Class Syndrome: Some Plane Facts, WORLDROOM.COM,
(Jan. 2001) at http://www.worldroom.com/pages/health/plane facts.phtnil.
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Class Syndrome can affect individuals who are otherwise healthy."0 This
became a reality when three Olympic athletes who were traveling to the
2000 Summer Games in Australia developed DVT, and subsequently
suffered from Economy Class Syndrome after their flight to Australia."
Due to the extensive flight distances, often in excess of fifteen hours, the
majority of Economy Class Syndrome claims are from flights emanating to
2
or from the far-east countries such as Australia, Japan, and New Zealand.'
As a result of the public's concern and the recent global recognition of
Economy Class Syndrome, the commercial air carrier industry has begun
to address the issue of passenger related Economy Class Syndrome
claims. 4 Several of the major commercial air carriers are now informing
passengers of the possibilities of Economy Class Syndrome and educating
them on how to reduce their risk of developing DVT blood clots during
long flights. 5 These preemptive measures include advising passengers to
get up and walk to the restroom during a flight and having flight crews
demonstrate stretching exercises that will increase the passengers' blood
flow to their legs. In addition, several commercial air carriers have started
including warnings on their tickets and advising passengers of the
possibility of developing DVT during prolonged flights."
H. BACKGROUND
The medical condition DVT was a first described in the 1940s during
World War II, when physicians began noticing an increase in pulmonary
embolisms among people who spent extended periods of time crouched in
air-raid shelters during the London "Blitz."" In the post-World War II
10. Squash Star Saved By Her Fitness, EVENING NEWS (Scotland), Feb.

13, 2001,

available at WL 6108780 (suffering from economy class syndrome, doctors tell a squash player
that if she wasn't a professional athlete she wouldn't be alive at all).
11. Marie Mclnnerney, Doctor Says Three British Olympians Had Thrombosis, (Jan.
2001) at http://uk.news.yahoo.com/01O111/80/avi7o.html.
12. Tom Bogdanowics, Doctors, Airlines Warn of Blood Clot Risk, (Jan. 2001) at
http://www.cnn.com/2001ITRAVEL/NEWS/01/1 1/travelers.thrombosis/index.html.

13. Both the increased awareness of the medical condition and the public's perception of
DVT.
14. See Airlines to Attend Summit on Economy Class Syndrome, AP NEWSWIRE, Feb. 4,

2001 (stating that a summit addressing recent deaths attributed to economy class syndrome will
be attended by airline executives from Qantas, Virgin, Air New Zealand and British Airways,
and also by aviation regulators, doctors and pilot unions).
15.

Salazar, supra note 9.

16. Id.
17. Interview by Tom Brokaw with Stanley Mohler, Ph.D., Wright State's Aerospace
Medicine Chair, Wright State University School of Medicine, in Dayton, Ohio, (Oct. 23, 2000)
at http://www.med.wright.edu/whatsnew/spotlight.html.
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years, DVT has been almost unheard-of by the general and traveling
public. One of the reasons DVT has remained a relatively obscure
condition among travelers is that doctors who treat the passengers often
misdiagnose the condition due to the symptom's resemblance to other,
more common, medical conditions."
Although Economy Class Syndrome can affect otherwise healthy
individuals, there are several well-known risk factors that may increase an
individual's chance of developing DVT. Individuals have an increased
chance of developing blood clots and suffering from Economy Class
Syndrome if they "have a history of blood clots, cancer, prolonged bed
rest following orthopedic surgery, recent treatment involving general
anesthesia, estrogen therapy, obesity, and cigarette smoking."' 9 These
factors, combined with the prolonged travel in a stationary position,
contribute to a traveler's possibilities of suffering from Economy Class
Syndrome.
fI.

AIR CARRIER LIABILITY-THE WARSAW CONVENTION

The Warsaw Convention" is the governing rule of law that protects air
carrier passengers traveling on international routes.2' Since the inception
of the Warsaw Convention, international aviation has undergone great
expansion.
International flights have become a common event and
travelers who are seeking to embark on this form of transportation often
have numerous carriers to choose from, many of which are not based
within the United States. Due to this industry expansion, the Warsaw
Convention has undergone numerous changes to keep it current.Y It is well
established that when the courts interpret a treaty, they are to give the
language of the treaty the same meaning as the contracting parties do to the
treaty.2
To briefly mention jurisdiction under the Warsaw Convention, the
Warsaw Treaty as adopted by Congress clearly states that under the
Treaty, "resort to local law is precluded only where the incident is covered

18.
19.
20.
Air, Oct.

Id.
Id.
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by
2, 1929 [hereinafter Warsaw Convention].
21. See El Al Israeli Airlines v. Tsui Yaun Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 167 (1999) (explaining
that a ratified treaty is not only the law of the land, but also an agreement among sovereign
powers).
22. DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, supra note 3, at 57.
23. El Al IsraeliAirlines, 525 U.S. at 167.
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by Article 17."24 This means local law is precluded where there has been a
passenger accident, either on the plane or in the course of embarking or
disembarking, which led to death, wounding, or other bodily injury." In
addition, the Warsaw Treaty precludes passengers from bringing actions
under local laws when they cannot establish air carrier liability under the
treaty.26 The courts have held that the Warsaw Convention is the exclusive
basis of recovery for injuries that fall under the Convention, meaning the
Warsaw Convention preempts all claims based on state law." However,
"[t]he Warsaw Convention does not preempt local law in.cases arising out
of [an air carrier's] willful misconduct. "n
The court in the following passage, as it relates to air carrier
liability, described the scope of the Warsaw Convention:
The Warsaw Convention establishes that the treaty applies
to all international transportation of persons, baggage, or
good performed by aircraft for hire, Ch. I, Art. 1(1);
describes three areas of air carrier liability, Ch. III, Arts.
17 (bodily injuries suffered as a result of an 'accident...
on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the
operations of embarking or disembarking'), 18 (baggage or
goods destruction, loss, or damage), and 19 (damage
caused by delay); and instruct that cases covered by article
17 can only be brought subject to the conditions and limits
set out in the Convention.2
The specific language of the Warsaw Convention that allows for
commercial air carrier liability is this:
The carrier shall be liable for damages sustained in the
event of death or wounding of a passenger or any other
bodily injury suffered by a passenger, if the accident which
caused the damage so sustained took place on board the

24. Id. at 155 (precluding passengers from bringing actions under local law when they
cannot establish air carrier liability under the treaty).
25. Warsaw Convention, Oct. 12, 1929, art. 17, 49 Stat. 3018.
26. The Warsaw Treaty, Sept. 28, 1998, Rev. art. 24, 144 CONG. REC. S11059.
27. In re Air DisasteratLockerbie Scotland, 928 F.2d 1267 (2d Cir. 1991).
28. See El Al IsraeliAirlines, 525 U.S. at 178 (stating in Article 25 that a carrier shall not
be entitled to avail itself of the provisions of the Convention if its misconduct is willful).
29. Id. at 155.
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aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of
embarking or disembarking the aircraft.'3
Article 25 of the Warsaw Convention removes the air carrier from the
protections of limited liability provided by the Convention when the
conduct of the air carrier is "willful misconduct" by stating:
In the carriage of passengers and baggage, the limits of
liability specified in Article 22 shall not apply if it is
proved that the damage resulted from an act or omission of
the carrier, his servant or agents, done with intent to cause
damage or recklessly and with knowledge that damage
would probably result; provided that, in the case of a such
act or omission of a servant or agent, it is also proved that
he was acting within the scope of his employment.,
Although the drafters of the Warsaw Convention were interested in
protecting the passengers by creating consistent and uniform guidelines for
air carrier liability, they were also interested in providing the air carrier
with limited liability." The drafters therefore created a "fault based"
liability with a "reverse burden of proof" which is placed on the air
carrier." The drafters included several clauses that relieve the air carrier
of liability. The first clause states the air carrier is not liable for a
passenger injury if it has "taken all necessary measures to avoid the
damage."'4' Secondly, an air carrier is not liable if it was impossible for it
to take such measures.3 - The third scenario that removes the air carrier's
liability is when the passenger's negligence was a contributing factor in
causing the injuries.3 However, in what can be rationalized as a "good
faith" provision, the drafters included a powerful provision that punishes
air carriers who deliberately or recklessly place passengers at risk.3
The Warsaw Convention also places restrictions on the monetary
The courts have followed these
damages passengers can claim.3 '

30. Warsaw Convention, Oct. 12, 1929, art. 17, 49 Stat. 3018.
31. Warsaw Convention, Oct. 12, 1929, art. 25, 49 Stat. 3020.
32. DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, supra note 3, at 57.
33.
exchange
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

See id. at 68 (explaining that the burden of proof lies on the carrier shoulders in
for the passengers losing the benefit of unlimited liability of the carrier).
Warsaw Convention, Oct. 12, 1929, art. 20, 49 Stat. 3019.
DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, supra note 3, at 69.
Warsaw Convention, Oct. 12, 1929, art. 20, 49 Stat. 3019.
Warsaw Convention, Oct. 12, 1929, art. 25, 49 Stat. 3020.
Warsaw Convention, Oct. 12, 1929, art. 22, 49 Stat. 3019.
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restrictions by holding that punitive damages are not permitted under the
terms of the Warsaw Convention; rather, only compensatory damages are
recoverable."
Although the air carriers have limited liability, the liability standard is
that of strict liability that cannot be contracted away.40 The Warsaw
Convention voids "any [contract] provision tending to relieve the carrier of
liability or to fix a lower limit than that which is laid down in the
Convention. "41 To further protect the passenger from "willful misconduct"
by the air carrier, the Warsaw Convention voids the limited liability
enjoyed by the air carrier if it is determined by the court that the damages
are caused by the air carrier's "willful misconduct.-" 2
A. Elements of Liability
The Warsaw Convention has established specific elements that must
be met for a tortious claim to be successful.4 3 These elements are: 1) an
unexpected or unusual event, termed by the courts as an accident; 2) which
results in death or bodily injury; 3) while either on board, embarking, or
disembarking the aircraft."
1. Accident
An "accident," as defined by Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, is
an "unexpected or unusual event or happening that is external to the
passenger."4

Courts have held that this definition should "be flexibly

applied after assessment of all the circumstances surrounding a passenger's
injuries."" Courts have further held that air carriers may be held strictly
liable for injuries to passengers that are proximately caused by risks
inherent in air travel.47 The courts have held that it is not a prerequisite for
39. See In re Disasterat Lockerbie Scotland, 928 F.2d 1267 (holding that the language in

the context it was written, the law of contracting parties, subsequent interpretations, and the
historical translation argue that the language establishes liability for compensatory damages only,
and it would be inconsistent with the purpose of the Warsaw Convention to permit the recovery
of punitive damages).

40. Warsaw Convention, Oct. 12, 1929, at art. 23, 49 Stat. 3020.
41.

Id.

42. Warsaw Convention, Oct. 12, 1929, art. 25, 49 Stat. 3020.
43.

Seguritan v. NorthwestAirlines, Inc., 86 A.2d 658 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).

44. Id.
45. Air Francev. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 405 (1985).
46.

Id.

47. See id. (finding airline was liable for damages sustained to a passenger's broken
eardrum because the pressurization of an aircraft cabin falls within the normal operations of an
aircraft).
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liability that a claimant demonstrates a malfunction or abnormality in the
operation of the aircraft.'
An "accident, " as defined by the courts, is not limited to the initial
injury suffered by the passenger. An accident may be an event that occurs
after the initial injury, such as the failure of the air carrier's agents to
render medical assistance after the initial injury or medical condition has
occurred. 41 Therefore, an air carrier may be held strictly liable for
medical conditions that are caused by the air carrier's actions or lack
thereof.
The courts have consistently held that an "accident" requires that a
passenger's injury must be caused by an "unexpected or "sudden" event
other than the normal operations of the aircraft.10 In the case of Economy
Class Syndrome, the development of the embolism while seated onboard
the aircraft does not constitute an "unexpected" or "sudden" event. Rather
all passengers are aware of the approximate time, length, and seating
conditions of their flight prior to boarding the aircraft.
The court
differentiates between the two causes by categorizing them as either
"accidents" or "occurrences," the latter of which does not qualify as an
unexpected or sudden event as intended by the Warsaw Convention.-'
However, even if the courts do not recognize the development of a medical
condition during the normal operations of the aircraft, they have
recognized that the failure to provide assistance may establish a claim
where the air carrier's agents fail to provide reasonable care to its
passengers suffering from a medical condition.n
2. Bodily Injury
When determining what constitutes bodily injury, a determination
must be made between "physical injury" and "mental injury." The courts
have provided us guidance in separating physical from mental injury by
stating:
The claim must [be] predicate upon some objectively
identifiable injury to the body. In addition, there must be
some causal connection between the bodily injury and the
'accident.' In our view, this connection can be established
48. Saks v. Air France, 724 F.2d 1383, 1384 (9th. Cir. 1984).
49. See Seguritan, 86 A.2d at 658 (holding that the accident was not the passenger's heart
attack, rather it was the alleged aggravation of decedent's condition by the negligent failure of
defendant's employees to render her medical assistance).
50. Air France, 470 U.S. at 404.
51.

Id. at 406.

52. Fischerv. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 623 F. Supp. 1064, 1066 (N.D. I1l. 1985).
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whether the bodily injury was caused by physical impact,
by the physical circumstances of the confinement or by
psychic trauma. If the accident .. caused severe fright,
which in turn manifested itself in some objective 'bodily
injury,' then we would conclude that the [Warsaw]
Convention's requirement of the causal connection is
satisfied.53
Therefore, there may be a causal link between mental and physical
injuries of the accident. If a causal link establishes that the physical injury
resulted from the mental injuries, the plaintiff may be allowed to recover
for the physical suffering caused by the accident.-' However, mental
injuries are not recoverable, only damages that resulted from the physical
injury may be recovered."5 The court relies on the ordinary meanings of
the words in Article 17 to support the plaintiff's claims for a physical
(bodily) injury.6
Economy Class Syndrome, by definition, is a physical condition
where there is the development of blood clots within a passenger's
extremities.-" The development of these blood clots may result in physical
conditions such as chest pains, pain in the calf or leg, swelling of the leg or
limb, shortness of breath, protracted surface veins and even death.5 By
following the court's distinction between the physical and mental injuries,
death is not necessary to constitute damage as long as there is some form
of physical injury to the passenger. If there is no physical injury to the
passenger, rather only a physical discomfort that does not escalate to an
injury, such as chest pains, there is no recoverable damage as defined by
the court. Although a mental condition may occur from a passenger's
temporary physical discomfort, unless that mental condition is the
contributing cause of a physical injury, there is no recoverable damages. 9
A passenger would only be able to recover from the physical injury caused
53. Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 34 N.Y.2d 385, 399 (N.Y. 1974).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 400.
56. See id. (explaining that the terms, in their ordinary meaning, will not support
plaintiffs' claim that psychic trauma alone, or even the psychic trauma which caused the bodily
injury, is compensable under the Warsaw Convention).
57. Pulmonary Embolism-What You Know May Save Your Life, supra note 4.
58. Andrew Demaria, Deep Vein Thrombosis Explained, (Feb. 2001), at
http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/O1/24/dvt.medical/index.html (sudden death can
occur a week to ten days after the thrombosis is formed as a result of the pulmonary embolism).
59. A man who honestly believes he is suffering from a heart attack, and possibly death,
may very well suffer some form of mental injury as a result of that belief.
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by Economy Class Syndrome, whether that physical injury is a primary
result of the Economy Class Syndrome physical injury, or a secondary
injury where the mental injury resulted in a subsequent physical injury to
the passenger. This would also include cases in which the temporary
discomfort condition escalated into a physical injury.
3. Onboard, Embarking, Disembarking the Aircraft
Air carriers are only liable to passengers who are within specific areas
that are under the carriers' control. These areas are onboard the aircraft,
embarking the aircraft, or disembarking the aircraft.60 One of the problems
a plaintiff faces in establishing a valid Economy Class Syndrome claim is
establishing the actual location in which the condition developed. The
effects of the blood clots often are not discovered until after the passenger
has left the airport, sometimes days after."
In order for the blood clots to develop, the passenger must be in a
stationary position for an extended period of time.62 It would be highly
unusual for a passenger to develop DVT while embarking an aircraft
unless there was an extended timeframe (fifteen plus hours) of stationary
condition prior to this action. It can be held that, under the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur, the Economy Class Syndrome facts speak for itself in that
the only reasonable incubator for the development of these blood clots is in
the extended seated position onboard the aircraft.
B. Reckless Disregard-Article25
Air carriers have followed their drive for increased profit margins at
the expense of passenger safety. Many air carriers have reduced seat pitch
to "shoehorn" more passengers onto their aircrafts.63 An example of this is
that in the 1980s, all USAir 727-200 aircraft were equipped with 145
seats." The same model aircraft in 1994 was equipped with 163 seats. 6
During the same period, United Airlines increased its DC-10-30's capacity
by adding five rows of seats. This increased the number of seats on the

60. AirFrance, 470 U.S. at 394.
61. Demaria, supra note 58.
62. Pulmonary Embolism-What You Know May Save Your Life, supra note 4.
63. Paul Stephen Dempsey, Airlines in Turbulence: Strategies for Survival, 23 TRANS.
L.J. 15, 53 (1995).
64. Michael J. McCarthy, Airline Squeeze Play: More Seats, Less Legroom, WALL ST.
J.,Apr. 18, 1994, at B1.
65. Id.
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aircraft from 232 to almost 300." When TWA removed four of the seats

from a 141-seat MD-80 to accommodate their passengers' legroom, it
resulted in an $87,603 annual loss in revenue for that aircraft. 7 Multiply
this by hundreds of aircrafts in a carrier's fleet, and it is easy to see how
cost plays a major factor in passenger safety.
Air carriers have drastically shortened the legroom of passengers.
What is referred to as the "pitch," the spacing between the front of one
seat and the back of the seat preceding it, has decreased during the late
1980s from thirty-four (34) inches to just thirty-one (31) inches." Coach
seats, which had a typical pitch of twenty-two (22) inches in 1993,
decreased to approximately nineteen (19) inches in 1994.69 This constitutes
the airline's willful disregard for the passenger's safety in the name of
greater load factors for the aircraft.
C. Trier of Facts
In a claim made by a passenger, the complaint must be construed in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff and construed as true.70 A
complaint should not be dismissed "unless it appears beyond a reasonable
doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that
would entitle him to the requested relief. "71 In the event of personal injury
to a passenger where there is contradictory evidence, it is for the trier of
fact to determine if an accident has occurred."2 In determining if an
accident occurred or if there was a willful and disregard for passenger
safety, there are defenses available to the air carrier that will hold them not
liable for damages.

D. Air CarrierDefenses
1. Preexisting Conditions
The courts have held that the definition of an "accident" under the
Warsaw Convention is to be construed flexibly and a passenger only needs
to prove "that some link in the [causal] chain was an unusual or

66. Dempsey, supra note 63, at 53 (citing Michael J.McCarthy, Airline Squeeze Play:
More Seats, Less Legroom, 4/18/94 WALL ST. J., Apr. 18, 1994, at B1).
67. Id.
68. McCarthy, supra note 64.
69. Id.
70. Fischer, 623 F. Supp. at 1065.
71. Id.
72. Air France, 470 U.S. at 405.
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unexpected event external to the passenger.""7 The courts have further
held that injuries that are a result of a preexisting condition do not
constitute an accident as defined by the Warsaw Convention, even if there
74
was a causal link provided by the negligent actions of the air carrier staff.
2. Preventive Measures to Avoid Accident
The Warsaw Convention provides a clause to protect air carriers who
take the preventive steps to protect their passengers' well-being."1 An air
carrier is not liable for injury to its passengers if "he and his employees
have taken all necessary measures to avoid the damage, or if it was
impossible for him, or them, to take such measures. "76 It is up to the
discretion of the trial judge to determine what actions actually constitute
"necessary measures.""
E. Statute of Limitations
There is a two-year statute of limitations for claims arising under the
Warsaw Convention." This limitation is established in Article 29 of the
convention which states:
(1) The right to damages shall be extinguished if an action
is not brought within 2 years, reckoned from the date of
arrival at the destination, or from the date on which the
aircraft ought to have arrived, or from the date on which
the transportation stopped. (2) The method of calculating
the period of limitation shall be determined by the law of
,the court to which the case is submitted.' 9
The courts have held that the two-year time limitation is a "condition
precedent" which bars the party's right to bring a claim if the "action
precedent" which bars the party's right to bring a claim if the action is not

73. Id. at 392.
74. Fischer,623 F. Supp. at 1065 (finding failure to treat passenger suffering from a heart
attack was not an "accident" for which liability could be imposed under the Warsaw
Convention).
75. DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, supra note 3, at 69.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Seguritan, 86 A.D.2d at 658 (finding a complaint served more than two years after
plane arrived at destination was barred by the statute of limitations).
79. Id. at 659 (citing Warsaw Convention, art. 29).
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commenced within two years.$* The statute of limitations begins to run
upon the arrival at the destination or on the date that the aircraft was
scheduled to arrive, or on the date that the transportation actually stopped.-"
The laws of the court in which the action is filed determine which method
is used to calculate the timefrarne.8
IV. CONCLUSION
The Warsaw Convention requires that a passenger's claim of injury
meet three conditions: 1) accident, and 2)bodily injury, while 3) onboard,
embarking, or disembarking the aircraft. Economy Class Syndrome, while
occurring onboard the aircraft and resulting in physical injury, does not
qualify as an "accident" under the Warsaw Convention. Rather than the
passenger's physical injury occurring as a result of an unexpected event,
the blood clots develop during what is considered the "normal" practice of
remaining seated during the flight. The physical injury is not a result of a
sudden or unusual event as required by the courts, and therefore Economy
Class Syndrome does not meet the elements of a tort as defined by the
Warsaw Convention.
It is not the contention of this article to redefine the courts' definition
of an "accident." Rather it is this article's contention that the air carriers,
through their long-time practices of decreasing seat pitch and failing to
warn passengers of the foreseeable development of DVT blood clots,
results in what can be termed only as a reckless disregard for the
passengers' safety. The result is the removal of the air carrier from the
protection of the Warsaw Convention as stated in Article 25 of the
Convention. Removing the limited liability status of the air carrier who
fails to take reasonable measures to prevent Economy Class Syndrome will
hold the air carriers liable for damages suffered by their passengers.

80.

Kahn v. Trans World Airlines, 82 A.D.2d 696 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981).
81. Id. at 698-99.

82. Id.at 699.
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In 1960, President Dwight D. Eisenhower began what has become
one of the longest standing economic embargoes this country has ever had

against another country.' In 1964, President John F. Kennedy continued
what president Eisenhower started, and strengthened economic sanctions

against the Cuban government. 2

The sanctions passed by President

Kennedy prohibited almost all direct commerce between the United States

and Cuba.3 In February 1996, a Cuban MiG-29 fighter jet shot down two
unarmed United States civilian planes in international airspace, killing all

four individuals on board.' In response to this unprovoked attack by the
Cuban government, President William Jefferson Clinton signed into law
the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996
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1. Digna B. French, Comment, Economic Sanctions Imposed by the United States Against
Cuba: The Thirty-Nine year Old Embargo Culminating with the Cuban Liberty and Democratic
Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, 7 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 1 (1998).
2. Id.
3. See id.
4. Implementation of the LIBERTAD Act, 7 U.S. Dept. of State Dispatch 15 (Apr. 8,
1996). See also U.S. and the UN Respond to Cuban Shootdown of Civilian Aircraft, 7 U.S.
Dept. of State Dispatch 11 (Mar. 11, 1996) (reacting to the incident and discussing unilateral
actions taken).
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(Helms-Burton) on March 12, 1996.1 This piece of legislation is the focus
of this article, and is the focus of great debate in the international
community. Since its inception the Helms-Burton Act has created a
surplus of commentaries, law reviews, and symposia concerning certain
titles of the Act, in particular Titles III and IV. 6 The stage is now set for

President George W. Bush to inflict the final blow on the Cuban regime,
and sign into law Title III of the Helms-Burton Act, which many legal
scholars believe would end Castro's tyranny.7 This article suggests that
suspending Title III from the Helms-Burton Act renders the Act as nothing
more than political gesturing, and simply a mere extension of the 1959
Trade Embargo currently in place. Indeed, if the current administration
wants to see an end to the Castro regime, it must be proactive in its
approach towards Castro, and not succumb to the political pressures being
applied by their trading partners.
Part I of this article analyzes the four provisions of the Helms-Burton
Act, closely scrutinizing Title III, which allows United States nationals to
file lawsuits against any foreign investors who traffic8 in illegally
confiscated property within Cuba. Part II of this article examines whether
the Helms-Burton Act is in line with international law in light of harsh
criticism and non-support from the international community. Finally, part
III of this article examines whether United States courts have jurisdiction
based upon the "effects" doctrine which grants countries the right to
exercise jurisdiction with respect to activity outside of the state, but have
or intend to have a substantial effect within the state's territory. 9 This
article concludes that the Helms-Burton Act is a legal, effective, but
unutilized tool to strengthen the Cuban embargo, bring an end to Castro's
hegemonic regime, and be the final piece of a forty-year-old puzzle giving
every Cuban-American a country free from tyranny.
5. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-14, 110 Stat.
785 (1996) (codified 22 U.S.C. § 6021-6091) [hereinafter Helms-Burton Act].
6. See Jorge F. Perez-Lopez and Matias F. Travieso-Diaz, The Helms-Burton Law and
Its Antidotes: A ClassicalStandoff7, 7 Sw. J.L. & TRADE AM. 95 (2000).
7. See David M. Shamberger, Comment, The Helms-Burton Act: A Legal and Effective
Vehicle for Redressing U.S. Property Claims in Cuba and Accelerating The Demise of the Castro
Regime, 21 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 497 (1998).
8.
"Traffics as used in Tite III, and except as provided in subparagraph (B), is someone
who sells, transfers, distributes, dispenses, brokers, manages, or otherwise disposes of
confiscated property, or purchases, leases, receives, possesses, obtains control of, manages,
uses, or otherwise acquires or holds an interest in confiscated property." 22 U.S.C.A. §
6023(13) (2001).

9.

See Antonella Troia, Comment, The Helms-Burton Controversy: An Examination of

Arguments that the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 Violates U.S.
Obligations Under NAFTA, 23 BROOK. J.INT'L L. 603, 608 (1997).
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I.
HELMS-BURTON ACT OF 1996 ANALYZED
The Helms-Burton Act's explicit purpose is to assist the Cuban people
in regaining their freedom and prosperity, as well as in joining the
community of democratic countries that are flourishing in the Western
Hemisphere,' 0 to strengthen international sanctions against the Castro
government," and to provide for the continued national security of the
United States in the face of continuing threats from the Castro government
of terrorism, theft, and political manipulation of the desire of Cubans to
escape that results in mass migration to the United States.' 2 The Act
further seeks to encourage the holding of free and fair democratic elections
in Cuba conducted under the supervision of internationally recognized
observers,' 3 to establish a policy framework for United States support to
the Cuban people in response to the formation of a transition government
or a democratically elected government in Cuba. 4 Finally, the Act aims to
protect United States nationals against confiscatory takings and the
wrongful trafficking in property confiscated by the Castro regime.Title I, "Strengthening International Sanctions Against the Castro
Government""1 calls upon the President of the United States to advocate
and instruct the permanent representatives to the United Nations to seek,
within the Security Council, a mandatory international embargo against the
Further, Title I combines incentives and
Cuban Government."
consequences to achieve a democratic government in Cuba.'" Section 101,
entitled "Statement of Policy," makes it clear to the international
community, and in particular to the Castro government, any threat of
national security posed by the operation of any nuclear facility will
culminate in a backlash of consequences against the Castro government.'9
10. Helms Burton Act, supra note 5, § 6022 (1996).
11. Id. § 6022(2) (1996).
12. Id. § 6022(3) (1996).
13. Id. § 6022(4) (1996).

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. § 6022(5) (1996).
Helms Burton Act, supra note 5, § 6022 (6) (1996).
Id. § 6031 (1996).
Id. § 6031(2) (1996).
French, supra note 1, at 8.
Helms-Burton Act, supra note 5, at § 6031 (1996). The President should do all in his

power to make it clear to the Cuban Government that (a) the completion and operation of any
nuclear power facility, or (b) any further political manipulation of the desire of Cubans to escape
that results in mass migration to the United States, will be considered an act of aggression which
will be met with an appropriate response in order to maintain the security of the national borders
of the United States and the health and safety of the American people. It is beyond the scope of
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In essence, the goal of Title I is to apply economic pressure to the Castro
government by restricting imports from Cuba into the United States.
Further, Title I does not allow any American people or companies to
invest, supply loans, credits, or any other form of economic help for the
Castro government.20
Title II of Helms-Burton Act, "Assistance to a Free and Independent
Cuba," calls upon the United States to provide assistance to a transitional
government in Cuba.2' This Section formally states that the United States
will form solidarity with the Cuban people, to provide appropriate forms of
assistance to a transition government in Cuba, and to facilitate the rapid
movement from such a transition government to a democratically elected
government in Cuba, that results from an expression of the self
determination of the Cuban people.Y The provisions of this Section will
take effect upon a determination by the President of the United States that a
transition to democracy is taking place in Cuba." Among aid the United
States will provide to Cuba, once a democratically elected government is in
place, shall be items such as food, medicine, medical supplies, and
equipment to meet emergency needs to protect the basic human rights of
the Cuban people.2
Keeping the provisions of Title I and Title II in mind, we turn now to
the 1959 Trade Embargo, and compare the provisions of that Embargo
with the Helms-Burton Act. The 1959 Trade Embargo calls upon the
United States to prohibit all direct commerce between the United States
and Cuba; block all assets in the United States belonging either to Cuba or
to Cuban nationals, including freezing bank accounts; rescind Cuba's
"most favored nation" status; and ban aid to any country which provides
assistance to Cuba.2 In comparing Title I and II with the 1959 Trade
Embargo, there does not seem to be a great deal of distinction between the
two. Quite frankly, the first two titles of the Helms-Burton Act are simply
an extension of the 1959 Trade Embargo, because the objectives of both
are to isolate Castro's government and prevent countries from supporting
this article to explore the consequences which will occur if Cuba maintains and operates a
nuclear power plant within its country.
20. French, supra note 1, at 8.
21. Helms-Burton Act, supra note 5, § 6061(11) (1996).
22. Id. § 6061(5) (1996).
23. Helms Burton Act, supra note 5, § 6062 (a)(1) (1996). "The President shall develop a
plan for providing economic assistance to Cuba at such time as the President determines that a
transition government or a democratically elected government in Cuba as determined under
section 203(c) is in power." Id.
24. Id. § 6062(b)(2)(A)(1) (1996).
25. See French, supra note 1, at 2-3.
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the communist regime. It is not until reading the provisions of Title Ill
and Title IV that a clear distinction is marked between the two statutes.
Title III has received the harshest criticism from the international
community.6 Title III of the Act, entitled "Protection of Property Rights
of United States Nationals" states that
any person that traffics in confiscated property for which
liability is incurred under paragraph (1) shall, if a United
States national owns a claim with respect to that property
which was certified by the Foreign Claims Settlement
Commission under Title V of the International Claims
Settlement Act of 1949, be liable for damages computed in
accordance with subparagraph (C).27
In essence, this title protects United States property that has been
wrongfully confiscated by the Cuban government and resold in an effort to
stir economic re-growth for the Castro regime. However, the re-growth
comes at the expense of the rightful owners who are United States
nationals, or have become United States nationals as a consequence of
fleeing the communist country. It is this title that gives the Helms-Burton
Act not only distinction from the 1959 Trade Embargo, but clearly places a
strain on the Castro government by making any and all individuals or
corporations trafficking confiscated property in Cuba, subject to a lawsuit
by the rightful owners of that property.
This article is not opposition to Section 306, granting the President
power to suspend the effective date of Title III for a period of six months,
provided that the President states in writing that the suspension is
necessary to the national interests of the United States and will expedite a
transition to democracy in Cuba.2 This article, however, is in opposition
to the manner in which Section 306 has been used to appease countries
engaging in the very acts that Helms-Burton opposes. This presidential
power has been used consecutively since the signing of the Helms-Burton
Act, 29 first by President William Jefferson Clinton and more recently by
President George W. Bush. ° President Bush stated that he hopes by
26. See Jonathon Ratchik, The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996, 11
AM. U. J.INT'L L. & POL'Y 343 (1996).
27. Helms-Burton Act, supra note 5, § 6082(a)(3) (1996).
28. Id. § 6085(b)(2) (1996).
29. See Associated Press, Bush Suspends Law on Cuba Lawsuits (July 16, 2001), available
at AOL: APO/Bush-Cuba/. See also Peter Morton & John Geddes, Ottawa Spurns Clinton
Move: Suspension of Helms-Burton Lawsuits Dismissed by Eggleton, FIN. POST, Jan. 4, 1997;
Robert S. Greenberger, U.S. Hold Up Cuba Suits, Pleasing Few, WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 1997.

30. d.
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suspending Title III it will encourage a movement toward democracy on
the island.,' However, President Bush fails to state what events or steps
the Castro government has taken that would support such a statement.
Since Fidel Castro seized power in Cuba in 1959 he has
trampled on the fundamental rights of the Cuban people,
and through his personal despotism, has confiscated the
property of millions of his own citizens, thousands of
United States nationals; and thousands more Cubans who
claimed asylum in the United States as refugees because of
persecution and later became naturalized citizens of the
United States. 32
The Castro government has not given any indication it is willing to change
its form of government, 3 and has openly referred to democratic pluralism
as "pluralistic garbage."' 4

President Clinton and President Bush have

consequently suspended more than 6511 lawsuits that have been filed under
Title III of the Helms-Burton Act.33 There is no question the President has
the authority, pursuant to Section 306, to suspend the right to bring a
lawsuit under the title. However, there has been strong criticism against
both President Clinton and now against President Bush by the Cuban
American leaders and supporters.36 By suspending Title III the HelmsBurton Act, we are left with a mere extension of the 1959 Trade Embargo,
the rest of the Act becomes superfluous.
Finally, Title IV of the Act, "Exclusion of Certain Aliens," gives the
Secretary of State the power to deny a visa, and the Attorney General the
power to exclude from the United States, any alien who has confiscated
property of United States nationals or who traffic in such property.37
Opposition to Title IV is also based on the notion that denial of visas to
executives of corporations, as well as denying visas to their families, is an
over extension of United States law, because the denial is solely based on
the executives trafficking in property outside of the United States.38
Further, countries such as Canada and Mexico argue that Title IV is a
31. Id.
32. Helms-Burton Act, supra note 5, § 6081(3) (1996).
33. Id. § 6021(3) (1996).

34. Id. § 6021(16) (1996).
35. See Troia, supra note 9, at 605.
36. Associated Press, supra note 29.
37. Helms-Burton Act, supra note 5, § 6091 (a) (1996).
38. See Shari-Ellen Bourque, Note, The Illegality of The Cuban Embargo in the Current
International System, 13 B.U. INT'L L.J. 191 (1995).
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violation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) to which
the United States is a party. 39 Both Canada and Mexico have been very
vocal about their opposition to the Helms-Burton Act, and argue that the
Act violates Chapter Eleven of NAFTA which requires that each NAFTA
signatory treat investors of other NAFTA signatories with the "most
favored nation" principle.40
In light of these harsh criticisms by the international community, it is
essential to understand that Congress did not zealously draft this
controversial piece of legislation without first finding sufficient reason to
do so. Consequently, it is essential now to look at some of the findings
that led to the drafting of the Helms-Burton Act of 1996. Congress makes
the following finding:
(3) The Castro regime has made it abundantly clear that it
will not engage in any substantive political reforms that
would lead to democracy, a market economy, or an
economic recovery. (4) The repression of the Cuban
people, including a ban on free and fair democratic
elections, and continuing violations of fundamental human
rights, have isolated the Cuban regime as the only
completely non-democratic government in the Western
Hemisphere. (5) As long as free elections are not held in
Cuba, the economic condition of the country and the
welfare of the Cuban people will not improve in any
significant way. (6) The totalitarian nature of the Castro
regime has deprived the Cuban people of any peaceful
means to improve their condition and has led thousands of
Cuban citizens to risk or lose their lives in dangerous
attempts to escape from Cuba to freedom.41

39. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, art. 2022, 107 Stat. 2057, 32
I.L.M. 296, 32 I.L.M. 605 [hereinafter NAFTA].

40. See Troia supra note 9, at 607 n. 26. The "most favored nation" is a term that
requires "each party shall accord to another party treatment no less favorable than that it accords,
in like circumstances to any other Part of a non-party with respect to the establishment,
acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of
investments." NAFTA, supra note 39, at 639.
41. Helms-Burton Act, supra note 5, § 6021 (1996). There are several other findings
Congress made prior to the drafting of this Act which further solidify the foundation upon which
the Helms-Burton Act is not only justified, but necessary. Among those omitted from the body
of the text are (1) The economy of Cuba has experienced a decline of at least 60 percent in the
last 5 years as a result of (A) the end of its subsidization by the former Soviet Union of between
5 billion and 6 billion dollars annually, (B) 36 years of communist tyranny and economic
mismanagement by the Castro government; (C) the extreme decline in trade between Cuba and
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These and several other findings are the basis upon which the HelmsBurton Act is not only justified, but required.
In spite of such findings, opponents of the Helms-Burton Act are still
overly critical of both Title III and Title IV.' 2 In Section 301 of Title III of

the Helms-Burton Act, Congress has found "it is in the interest of the
Cuban people that the Cuban Government respect equally the property
right of Cuban nationals and nationals of other countries."' 3

Congress

further finds that
individuals enjoy a fundamental right to own property
which is enshrined in the United States Constitution." (2)
The wrongful confiscation or taking of property belonging
to the United States nationals by the Cuban Government,
and subsequent exploitation of this property at the expense
of the rightful owner, undermines the comity of nations,
the free flow of commerce, and economic development.'4
The Cuban Government has unlawfully confiscated property that rightfully
belongs to United States nationals, and has turned around and offered that
property to foreign investors in an effort to stimulate economic growth
within the country."6 The Helms-Burton Act merely affords those
individuals who have been deprived of their property the right to redress
their loss in the just courts of law. Yet, because of politics and economics,
countries continue to oppose the Helms-Burton Act, and have sufficiently
manipulated our leaders to suspend Title III.
II. HELMS-BURTON AcT ISINLINE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW
Chief trading partners with the United States have vehemently
opposed the Helms-Burton Act, and argue that Helms-Burton does not fall
in line with international law.' 7 Consequently, many countries have
adopted several "antidotes" to counter the effects of the Helms-Burton Act
in an effort to make it clear to the international community that acts by the
the countries of the former Soviet bloc; and (D) the stated policy of the Russian Government and
the countries of the former Soviet bloc to conduct economic relations with Cuba on strictly
commercial terms.
42. See, e.g., Bruce W. Nelan, Taking on the World, TIME, Aug 26, 1996, at 26. See
also Troia, supra note 9.
43. See Perez-Lopez & Travieso-Diaz, supra note 6, at 102.
44. Helms Burton Act, supra note 5, § 6081(1) (1996).

45. Id. § 6081(2) (1996).
46. Id. § 6081(5) (1996).
47. See generally Shamberger, supra note 7.
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United States government will not go unopposed.u However, the HelmsBurton Act is in full compliance with international law, and the United
States has the proper right to enact such laws that protecting the national
security of the United States as this Act does. 9
Critics of the Helms-Burton Act argue that it violates provisions of the
General Assembly on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).- In particular, the very
purpose of the GATT agreement is to encourage its contracting parties to
"enter into reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to
the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade, and to the
elimination of discriminatory treatment in international commerce. "' On
its face it would seem that Helms-Burton is in violation of the GATT
agreement, however, within the GATT agreement itself, there is a
provision providing an exception when the security interests of the country
are at stake. 2 The security exception to GATT which reads as follows:
Nothing in this agreement shall be construed (a) to require
any contracting party to furnish any information the
disclosure of which it considers contrary to its essential
security interest; or (b) to prevent any contracting party
from taking any action which it considers necessary for the
protection of its essentials security interests.-"
The United States, and frankly the international world, has a strong
national security interest in being free of the cronyism of the Castro
government. It is part (b) of the GATT exception which the United States
can use to justify whatever violation of international law may be claimed
by the European Union under the GATT agreement. The national security
interest that the United States would claim is a product of the atrocious act
by the Cuban government of shooting down the two civilian United States
planes in international airspace, which killed four people.4
However, it is clear that opponents to the Helms-Burton Act do not
share this view of national security interest. In fact, the European Union
has been the chief advocate against the Helms-Burton Act, and has
encouraged investors to blatantly ignore the Helms-Burton Act and invest
48. See Perez-Lopez, supra note 6.
49. See The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30,
[hereinafter GAIT].
50. See Ratchik, supra note 26.
51. See Shamberger, supra note 7, at 528.
52. Id. at 508.
53. Id. at 537 n. 84.
54. See Implementation of the LIBERTAD Act, supra note 4.

1947, art. XXI
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in any properties in Cuba." In essence the European Union is telling its
investors to outright ignore the interests of the United States, ignore the
fact that Castro has taken properties that rightfully belong to United States
nationals, and invest in those properties. Further, the European Union
investors shall ignore the continual Human Rights violations that occur in
Cuba; and justify their actions by passing resolutions posturing a political
stance, which in actuality are nothing more than political jargon.'
The European Union has been quite vocal in its opposition to the
Helms-Burton Act -because it would affect the pocket of many of its
investing companies. However, it is not quite as vocal in its opposition to
the continual human rights violations that occur within Cuba, "while the
[European Union] called for a peaceful transition to a pluralistic
democracy, respect for human rights, and fundamental freedoms in Cuba,"
it never indicated that trade and investment with Cuba would be
conditioned upon advancements in these areas." The European Union,
along with countries such as Canada and Mexico, are concerned with the
Helms-Burton Act not because of the "unhealthy precedent" that it will
set, but rather because it will affect them economically.
Opponents to the Helms-Burton Act argue that to permit HelmsBurton is a direct violation of the obligation the United States has under the
NAFTA to treat all members with "most-favored-nation" status 3 In
pertinent part, NAFTA states, "each Party shall accord to investors of
another Party treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in like
circumstances, to investors of any other Party or of a non-Party with
respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct,
operation, and sale or other disposition of investments."10 Further, Canada
and Mexico argue that Helms-Burton violates Chapter Sixteen of NAFTA,
explicitly requiring all parties to NAFTA accord temporary entry of
business persons to the respective countries.61

Canadian and Mexican

investors argue that Title III, which allows lawsuits to be brought against
those investors who deal in confiscated property in Cuba, and Title IV,
which denies entry to the United States for those investors and their
family, frustrates the very purpose of Chapter Eleven and Chapter sixteen

55. Shamberger, supra note 7, at 509.
56.

Id.

57. Id. at 509.
58.

Id. at 508.

59. NAFTA, supra note 39, at 639.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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of NAFTA.6
However, the United States has several arguments that
would not only allow but justify the United States enacting Title III, and
maintaining Title IV of Helms-Burton, without violating any provision of
the NAFTA agreement.
The United States can rightfully claim, under Article 1110 of Chapter
Eleven of the NAFTA agreement, one of the member countries can
prohibit other country members from taking measures that directly or
indirectly expropriate an investment of a NAFTA country.61 Clearly, the
Canadian or Mexican investor who traffics in confiscated United States
property is in direct violation of Article 1110, and it is therefore justified
for the United States to take measures that would prohibit these investors
from profiting from confiscated property. The very purpose of Article
1110 is to allow other member countries from being handcuffed in
situations such as this. The Canadian or Mexican investor is willfully and
knowingly trafficking in properties that were wrongfully confiscated by the
Cuban government. The United States has no other recourse but to
exercise its right under Article 1110."
Next, the United States can rightfully deny Chapter Eleven benefits to
any of the member countries, if it finds that Canadian or Mexican investors
maintain investments that are owned or controlled by investors of a nonNAFTA country with which the United States maintains no diplomatic
relations, or against which it maintains economic sanctions.63
The
government of Cuba is not a member of the NAFTA agreement, and the
United States, which is denying benefits to the Canadian and Mexican
investors, maintains economic sanctions against the Cuban government. It
does not matter that the investment comes from Canada or Mexico,
because the investment is administrated or run in Cuba, and therefore the
rules and laws of the Cuban government control what occurs with the
investment.6
Finally, the United States can use Article 2102, which allows any one
of the NAFTA member countries to take a contrary position to the
agreement if it feels that national security interests are being threatened.6 7

62. See Troia, supra note 9, at 606-07.
63. See NAFTA, supra note 39, at 641 (governing payment of compensation when an
investment is appropriated).
64. See Troia, supra note 9, at 616.
65. See NAFTA supra note 39. at 642 (authorizing denial of chapter eleven benefits).
66. See Troia, supra note 9, at 616.
67. See Troia, supra note 9, at 616-17.
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As described earlier in relation to the GATT agreement," the United States
has a national security interest in protecting its citizens from ruthless
attacks on the part of the Cuban government. The Cuban government can
only thrive and continue if countries such as Canada and Mexico continue
to openly invest in the country, providing the Cuban government with the
hard currency necessary to maintain the government running."

It is

contrary to the national security of the United States to have a country,
which is only ninety miles away and is hostile to the United States,
continue to receive economic support by the very countries with which the
United States is suppose to have strong trading ties." Therefore, it is in
the interest of United States national security to implement legislation such
as the Helms-Burton Act that will dismantle the Cuban regime which has
shown time and again its dislike for the United States., Clearly the United
States has ample justification for the implementation of Title III of the
Helms-Burton Act and the maintenance of Title IV, without dealing with
the issue of whether or not the GATT agreement or the NAFTA agreement
are violated. The United States has an obligation first and foremost to the
citizens of the United States, irrespective of whether the Mexican and
Canadian investors are in agreement with the manner in which that
obligation is carried out.
III.

THE EFFECTS DOCTRINE PERMITS THE UNITED STATES TO
IMPLEMENT EXTRATERRITORIAL LEGISLATION

It is argued that the Helms-Burton Act violates international law
because it is an unjustified extraterritorial application of United States law
against foreign countries.72 Opponents to Helms-Burton argue that it is an
extraterritorial legislation because it seeks to require foreign countries and
their nationals to comply with the United States embargo against Cuba, or
68. See GATT, supra note 49.
69. See Troia, supra note 9, at 616.
70. See NAFTA, supra note 39 at 639.
71. Helms-Burton Act, supra note 5, § 6031 (1996). It is the sense of the Congress that
(4) in view of the threat to the national security posed by the operation of any nuclear facility,
and the Castro government's continuing blackmail to unleash another wave of Cuban refugees
fleeing from Castro's oppression, most of whom find their way to the United States shores,
further depleting limited humanitarian and other resources of the United States, the President
should do all in his power to make it clear to the Cuban Government that (a) the completion and
operation of any nuclear power facility or (b) any further political manipulation of the desire of
Cubans to escape that results in mass migration to the United States, will be considered an act of
aggression which will be met with an appropriate response in order to maintain the security of
the national borders of the United States and the health and safety of the American people.
72. See Troia, supra note 9, at 637.
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face the possibility of a lawsuit in a United States court." The United
States recognizes in international law five basis for jurisdiction prescribed
by international law. The five bases that the United States recognizes for
jurisdiction are as follows:
1.
Territoriality: Entails the notion that countries are
free to regulate and exercise jurisdiction over conduct that,
wholly or in substantial part, takes place within its
territory.
2.
. Nationality:
Permits a country to exercise
jurisdiction over the status of persons, or interests in
things, present within its territory.
3.
Protective:
Recognizes the right of a state to
punish a limited class of offenses committed outside its
territory by persons who are not its nationals-offenses
directed against the security of the state or other offenses
threatening the integrity of governmental functions that are
generally recognized as crimes by developed legal systems.
4.
Passive Personality: Asserts that a state may apply
law-particularly criminal law-to an act committed
outside its territory by a person not its national where the
victim of the act was its national. 4
The fifth basis, the effects doctrine, is discussed within this article.
The United States can rightfully claim that under the "effects doctrine" of
the Restatement, legislation such as the Helms-Burton Act is in compliance
with international law because the foreign investments in Cuba have a
substantial effect within the United States.75 The effects doctrine reads in
pertinent part:
[A] state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to
(1)(a) conduct that wholly, or in substantial part, takes
place within its territory; (b) the status of persons, or
interests in things, present within its territory; (c) conduct

73.

Id. at 637.

74. Id. at 640.
75. See Troia, supra note 9, at 640-42 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW § 402(3)(d) (1986)).
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outside its territory that has or is6 intended to have a
substantial effect within its territory.

The effects doctrine has on prior occasions been used to address cases
dealing in anti-trust, securities, and environmental protection. In such
cases, United States courts have held that conduct between foreign
companies on foreign soil could nevertheless subject them to United States
jurisdiction if there are effects in the United States." Knowing that the
effects doctrine is a vehicle by which the United States can get around
violating international law, it is important to note that under Section 403 of
the Restatement, a state may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with
respect to a person or activity having connections with another state when
the exercise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable.7" Clearly the question
then turns to what exactly the legislature means by reasonable. In Section
403(2) the legislature provides a non-exhaustive list which describes the
several factors that must be considered when trying to determine if a
particular piece of legislature is reasonable.'9 The United States should
76.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 (1987).

77. See Shamberger, supra note 7; TimberlaneLwnber Co. v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust
& Say. Ass'n, 549 F. 2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Alwninwn Co., 148 F. 2d at 444
(2d Cir. 1945).
78.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403 (1987).

79. The Restatement (Third) states:
(2) Whether exercise of jurisdiction over a person or activity is unreasonable is
determined by evaluating all relevant factors, including, where appropriate:
(a) The link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the extent to
which the activity takes place within the territory, or has substantial, direct, and
foreseeable effect upon or in the territory;
(b) The connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between
the regulating state and the person principally responsible for the activity, to be
regulated, or between that state and those whom the regulation is designed to protect:
(c) The character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation to the
regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities, and the degree
to which the desirability of such regulation is generally accepted.
(d) The existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the
regulation;
(e) The importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or economic
system;
(f) The extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the
international system;
(g) The extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the activity;
and

20011

Soto

argue that subsection (a) of Section 403(2) is a good example of why it is
reasonable to implement Helms-Burton.
Under subsection (a) the
regulating state, i.e., the United States, has to demonstrate that there is a
link between the activity and the territory wanting to regulate the activity.'0
The United States is trying to regulate the activity of countries that are
trafficking in illegally confiscated property. The justification for doing so
is that there will be a substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon the
United States if it continues to allow countries to traffic in United States
properties illegally confiscated by the Cuban government."I To continue to
allow the Castro government to taint the titles of properties that rightfully
belong to the United States nationals, would create an insurmountable
problem for the United States down the line in the claims resolutions.82
"The clouds on titles created by these purported valid transfers to
traffickers of other nationalities would, at the very least, delay and
complicate the task of settling the valid property claims of United States
nationals through the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission."' 3 This
purported action by the Castro government would create a substantial
effect on the United States, and would thus justify the provisions of HelmsBurton, in particular Title III. This is not to say that based on subsection
(a), and it alone, would the United States reach the reasonable standard
that was discussed earlier in Section 403 of the Restatement. It is clear
that there is some form of a totality of the circumstances approach by the
legislature to reach the reasonable standard.
We turn now to the question of whether or not the interests of other
countries such as Canada, Mexico, or the European Union, outweigh the
interests of the United States when addressing the issue of whether
legislation which has extraterritorial effects are reasonable. We first can
compare, and quickly dismiss, the notion that the interests of the Cuba
outweigh those of the United States. The only interest Cuba has is in
profiting from property that has been illegally confiscated from the United
States." Such interests, compared with those of the United States, are not
legitimate. The United States and its nationals have a compelling interest

(h) The likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403 (1987).

80. Id.
81. See Brice M. Clagett, Tie III of the Helms Burton Act is Consistent with International
Law, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 434 (1996).

82. See Shamberger, supra note 7, at 522.
83.

Id. at 523.

84.

Id. at 522.
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in getting back property that rightfully belongs to them."5 This interest
substantially outweighs any kind of interest that the Cuban government
might have in trying to continue its illegal trafficking of confiscated
property.
The more interesting situation arises when comparing the interests of
the United States with those of the European Union, Mexico, and Canada.
There is a closer argument that the interests of the European Union,
Mexico, and Canada outweigh those of the United States. However, there
is no mistaking the fact that the United States has an interest in not
allowing foreign nations to continue to profit at the expense of the United
States. 6 These foreign nations that are profiting from United States
confiscated property are fully aware that the Castro government seized
those properties without compensating the United States nationals for the
property." These foreign nations argue that their interests lie in their
ability to continue to conduct trade and business with Cuba free from the
laws of the United States.u Yet, what these nations do not seem to
understand is first, that the Helms-Burton Act is not a complete ban upon
countries that want to do business with the Cuban government. Rather it is
a measure taken to protect the interests of United States nationals who have
lost their ownership rights to property in Cuba, simply because of the
desperado tactics of the Castro government.
These nations that argue that their rights to freely deal with the Cuban
government are hindered by Helms-Burton are only partially correct,
because Helms-Burton is called into effect when these foreign nations
begin to traffic in property which was illegally confiscated from United
States nationals." There is not one provision within the Helms-Burton Act
which bans any and all trades with Cuba. It only bans those trades and
dealings which implicate directly properties that were confiscated from
United States nationals."0 To further illustrate the substantial interest the
United States has in passing such legislation, the Foreign Claims
Settlement Commission recently announced that the United States nationals
possess claims to confiscated property that exceeds six billion dollars."
Clearly that number will continue to rise as long as the Castro government
is allowed to profit from those illegal activities.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

See Clageu, supra note 81, at 436.
See Shamberger, supra note 7, at 524.
Id. at 524.
Id. at 523.
See generally Helms-Burton Act, supra note 5.
See generally id.
See Shamberger, supra note 7, at 522.
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Lastly, it is a well recognized principle in international law that
confiscations in violation of international law are ineffective in passing
valid title to the property. Therefore, the countries do not have an
obligation to recognize the passing of the title to the subsequent purchaser
Therefore, the United States can claim that its interests
of title.
substantially outweigh those of these other competing countries, inasmuch
as these competing companies do not have free and clear title to
confiscated property. In the event these countries continue to traffic in
those properties, they are assuming the risk of purchasing property that
they know is confiscated illegally."
IV. CONCLUSION

The Helms-Burton Act, as it is in place right now, is a great piece of
legislation which quite frankly is being misused, or rather unused. While
Title III continues to be suspended by the President, the Helms-Burton Act
is nothing more than political posturing by the current administration, and
an extension of the 1959 Trade Embargo. It would be shameful to think
that Congress drafted a piece of legislation which does nothing more than
address an issue which has already been addressed. Indeed, it seems an
improbability to think that Congress intended to make Helms-Burton a
mere extension. Rather, it is clear from the language within the HelmsBurton Act itself that it was intended to be the final blow to the Cuban
regime. Our leaders have an obligation to the citizens of this country.
The obligations the country owes its people are promulgated by the United
States Constitution, which states:
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a
more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic
Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the
general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to
ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this
Constitution of the United States of America."
The obligation to provide for the common defense, and establishment of
Justice, is for the citizens of this country and not for the benefit of trading
partners.
The Helms-Burton Act is the vehicle by which a final period can be
placed on the Castro regime. However, it is up to our great leaders to step

92. See id. at 525.
93. See Claget, supra note 81, at 437.
94. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
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to the forefront and ensure that such a result will occur. This great nation
was founded upon an ideology of non-compliance with tyranny and
oppression. The Castro government has time and again proven that
tyranny and oppression shall be the standards by which they shall be
measured, and defiantly dare the United States government to act. The
legislature has acted and now it is up to the President of the United States
to put the final nail in the Castro government, and bring an end to the
tyrant's regime. Great leaders are measured by what great things they did
in their time of ruling. President Truman during World War II saw an end
to the Adolf Hitler rule. President George Bush saw the mighty fall of the
Communist Soviet Union and an influx of democracy to that region. The
fall of the Castro regime would have the same if not greater historical
accolades, and it is now the time for the current administration to do
everything within their power to bring the tyrant's regime to an end.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Ten years elapsed from the time the first case of Bovine Spongiform
Encephalopathy (BSE), commonly referred to as "mad cow disease,"' was
discovered in Great Britain, until researchers confirmed that BSE was

*
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1. See USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Bovine Spongiform
Encephalpathy, [hereinafter USDAIAPHIS, BSE], at www.aphis.usda.gov/oa/bse (last visited
Oct. 5, 2001).
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responsible for many human deaths., In many regions of the world,
especially the United Kingdom, rampant epidemics of the dreaded footand-mouth disease (FMD) threaten to devastate the worldwide multi-billion
dollar agricultural industry. 3 During the last five years, the public has been
exposed to the media onslaught of written, verbal, and photographic
images depicting flaming piles of animal corpses conveying the fear and
mayhem caused by these contagious diseases that appear to pose serious
health hazards.
Independent governmental bodies have had mixed
reactions to the current outbreaks that exist in or threaten to invade their
respective countries.
Currently, there is no uniform method of procedure to contain and
ultimately eradicate these animal diseases. The World Trade Organization
(WTO), the International Office of Epizootics (OIE, or World
Organization for Animal Health), and the Codex Alimentarius Commission
(Codex) are several global entities working in conjunction to curb the
threat of these diseases that are potential causes of international catastrophe
to physical and economic health. Recent accusations by European Union
countries of independent policymaking motivated by economic
protectionism, rather than by scientific principle, have spurred debates
about conformity of disease prevention and eradication standards and trade
regulations.4
This article will explore the nature of these viral epidemics and
contemplate whether disease-free countries like the United States are
sufficiently protected from, and prepared for, an outbreak of either or both
of these viruses. Additionally, this article will provide an overview of how
different countries around the world are coping with containment,
eradication, and prevention of viral outbreaks. Finally, this article will
address the issue of fairness and efficacy of international policies related to
BSE and FMD.
2. After the first confirmed case of BSE in 1986, the British government assured the
public that beef was safe to eat. This was based on the scientific perception that TSEs
(Transimissable Spongiform Encephalopathies - the general term for the type of virus that
includes BSE) were not transmissible between species. The BSE Inquiry, Vol. 1: Findings and
Conclusions, Executive Summary of the Report of the Inquiry, 5. Communication of the Risk
Posed by BSE to Humans, at http://www.bse.org.uk/report/volumel/execsum6.htm (last visited
Oct. 27, 2001).
3. See, e.g., Foreign Animal Diseases Emergency Plan Urged by House Agriculture
Committee Leaders, Vol. 39 FOOD CHEMICAL NEWS, Nov. 24, 1997, at 1, available at 1997
WL 10014496; Alex Binkley, et. al., EU Extends Measures to Combat Foot-and-Mouth Disease,
43 FOOD CHEMICAL NEWS, Mar. 5, 2001, at 1, availableat 2001 WL 12772751.
4. See, e.g., World Trade Organization, Committee Discusses Foot-and-Mouth Disease,
BSE and Equivalence, WTO NEWS: 2001 NEWS ITEMS [hereinafter WTO News], at
www.wto.org/english/newse/news0l-e/01071 lspsctte._e.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2001).
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Part One of this article will illustrate the characteristics of BSE and
FMD. Part Two of this article will examine the United States' strategies to
protect its citizens and its agricultural industry against these two diseases.
Part Three of this article will focus on the current status of the two
diseases in selected regions of the world, and what policies specific
countries have enacted. Part Four will address the sanitary standards for
exporting countries contained in the SPS Agreement, the international
treaty governed by the WTO. Part Five will contemplate the perspectives
of disease-free countries and countries affected economically by the trade
regulations and the importation policies and restrictions that have been
imposed by importing countries.
IX. DISEASE CHARACTERISTICS
A. BSE
BSE is a type of degenerative neurological diseases known as
Transmissible Spongiform Encepalopathy (TSE).s TSEs occurring in other
animal species are known by names specific to the type of animal. 6 It is
not known exactly how TSEs are spread., However, it is now recognized
that the once common practice of using ground bodily remains of TSEcarrying animals in feed given to ruminant animals, which are inherently
herbivorous, has caused the recent BSE outbreak in Great Britain.' In the
commercial livestock industry, cattle and sheep are routinely fed high
protein diets to facilitate rapid and enhanced growth.' BSE incubation
periods can run from several months to several years after ingestion of
contaminated animal feed.' 0 What is known for certain is that TSEs always
result in fatality of the affected organism."
BSE afflicted cattle exhibit symptoms of neurological and central
nervous system damage, including changes in disposition, difficulty
standing straight, and other signs of physical debilitation.' 2 A BSE infected
animal's brain will have sponge-like holes on its surface, a common
5. USDA/APHIS, BSE, supra note 1.
6. Id. The TSE found in sheep is known as "scrapie." As of this writing, scrapie is not
transmissible to humans. Id.
7. Id. The causative agent of TSEs has not been fully characterized, though they are
suspected to be caused by a type of a virus or a protein. Id.
8. See ERIC SCHLOSSER, FAST FOOD NATION: THE DARK SIDE OF THE ALL-AMERICAN
MEAL 202 (2001). See also USDA/APHIS, BSE, supra note 1.
9. See SCHLOSSER, supra note 8, at 202.
10. See USDA/APHIS, BSE, supra note 1.
11. Id.
12. Id.
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characteristic of all TSEs." Currently, diagnosis of BSE can only be
confirmed through a post-mortem examination of the animal's brain."
There is no known treatment or cure for BSE. 5 A BSE infected
animal's condition will systematically worsen until it dies naturally within
two weeks to six months, or until it is slaughtered. '6 Upon confirmation of
BSE in an animal, the affected animal, along with the remainder of its
herd, will be quickly destroyed and the carcasses incinerated in an effort to
halt the spread and eradicate the disease. 7 The milk and offspring of these
animals are not known to carry BSE.8 BSE is only known to be contracted
as a result of ingesting BSE contaminated meat.9
The form of TSE that affects humans is called Creutzfeldt-Jakob
Disease (CJD).20 Currently, there are no known cases of CJD in the
United States. 2' The first confirmed case of CJD in Great Britain was
reported in 1986.2 Incidence of CJD is estimated to be one in one million
people around the world." In the mid-1990s ten cases of CJD in humans
were confirmed in Great Britain.2 Scientists discovered that this was a
variant form of CJD (vCJD) that closely resembles BSE." Like all TSEs,
vCJD is a fatal disease that attacks brain tissue. 2' Scientists believe that
vCJD was contracted by humans after ingesting or otherwise coming into
contact with BSE contaminated animal products." Products containing
13. Id.
14. Currently, BSE is undetectable in live animals. Animals showing signs of neurological
disorders are slaughtered and during necropsy, their brain tissue is examined for BSE.
Additionally, immunohistochemistry and immunoblotting techniques are used to detect the
partially-proteinase resistant form of the prion (PRPres) protein that would confirm a BSE
diagnosis. The laboratory confirmation of BSE takes up to two weeks. USDA/APHIS, BSE,
supra note 1.
15. National Center for Infectious Diseases, Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and New
Variant Creutfeldt-JakobDisease, [hereinafter CDC, BSE, and vCJDJ, at www.cdc.gov/ncidod
/diseases/cjdlbsecjd.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2001).
16. Clinical Signs of BSE in Cattle, USDA/APHIS, BSE, supra note 1, at 2.
17. CDC, BSE, and vCJD, supra note 15.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. USDA/APHIS, BSE, supra note 1.
23. See CDC, BSE, and vCJD, supra note 15.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See CDC, BSE, and vCJD, supra note 15.

2001]

Schwarz

259

possible BSE contaminated beef go far beyond a simple hamburger. ' $ They
include cosmetics, pharmaceuticals, vaccines, and gelatin. 29 It is unknown

which, if any, of these products were responsible for the BSE outbreak in
the United Kingdom." This finding spurred the enactment of measures
worldwide to control the spread and eradicate BSE. 3'
No cases of either BSE or vCJD currently exist in the United States.32
In 1997, the United States banned the use of most animal remains in cattle
feed, especially meat and bone meal (MBM), which is the suspected culprit
of the origination of BSE. There is no vaccination or treatment currently
available for any of the TSEs.- The scientific inconclusiveness about the
epidemiology (how the disease is contracted and transmitted) of the disease
is cause for health and economic concern in any part of the world where
cattle products are a substantial part of daily living."
B. FMD
FMD is a highly contagious viral infection that affects cloven-foot
domestic livestock and wild animals.? It is rarely contagious to humans.31
The primary concern humans have regarding a FMD outbreak is of an
economic nature.u Although FMD has a mortality rate of less than one
28. The BSE Inquiry, Vol. 1: Findings and Conclusions, 1. Introduction, at
http://www.bse.org.uk/report/volumel/chaptera.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2001).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See, e.g., United States Department of Agriculture, Bovine Spongiform
Encephalopathy
(BSE)
Response
Plan
Summary
(Oct.
1998)
at
www.aphis.usda.gov/oaBSE/BSEsum.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2001).
32. Id.
33. The FDA banned the practice of adding the wastes and remains from slaughtered
ruminant animals to animal feed meant for ruminants. This ban was based on evidence
suggesting that consumption of BSE contaminated animal feed caused the BSE outbreak in the
United Kingdom, SCHLOSSER, supra note 8, at 202. See also Office of Public Affairs, FDA
Announces Test Results from Texas Feed Lot, FDA NEWS, Jan. 30, 2001.
34. CDC, BSE and vCJD, supra note 15.
35. Id.
36. Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Keeping America Free From Foreign
Animal Diseases [hereinafter APHIS], at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/ep/fad-traininglbibpage
.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2001).
37. Memorandum from James R. Little, Chair, National Food and Agriculture Council, to
all employees of the USDA, On Guard Against Foot-and-Mouth Disease (June 12, 2001),
available at www.aphis.usda.gov/oalfmd/fmdmemo.html.
38. Id. See also Japan to Ban Pork, Mutton From EU Over Foot-and-Mouth, ASIAN
ECONOMIC NEWS, Mar. 26, 2001, available at www.lexis.com/research/retrieve (last visited
Oct. 27, 2001).
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percent, it weakens and reduces the productivity of the afflicted livestock. 9
FMD is transmitted easily by animal-to-animal or human-to-animal
contact.4 There is thought to be a risk of airborne contamination risk
because it can spread to nearby flocks without any physical contact.41 For
example, a human who has been in contact with a FMD infected animal
may harbor the virus in his or her respiratory tract for twenty-four hours,
and possibly transmit the disease to a FMD susceptible animal in another
3
area.' 2 Humans can also carry the disease on their clothing and shoes.'
Animals easily contract the virus by breathing it in through their noses or
ingesting it in their mouths." The incubation period is one to five days.5

Symptoms include fever and characteristic oozing sores, known as
vesicles, on the feet, legs, teats, udder, and in and around the mouth." An
infected animal's tongue grows a grayish-white coating with several
blisters protruding from underneath." As the disease runs its course, the
protrusions erupt and the thick grayish-white coating layer eventually
sloughs off by itself."3 FMD damages the cardiac muscle and results in
decreased fertility and milk production."
Although the mortality rate for FMD is under one percent, this
percentage rises in young and otherwise immune-compromised animals. '
The cost of a FMD outbreak can ultimately amount to billions of dollars. 5'
39. Aphis, supra note 36, at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/ep/fadtraining/VESVOL7/
page2O7.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2001), http://www.aphis.usda.govlvslep/fad-trainingl
VESVOL7/page7O7.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2001). (pregnant cows may abort, milk output
falls, and young calves are more likely to die from FMD).
40. Aphis, supra note 36, at http:llwww.aphis.usda.govlvsleplfad-traininglVESVOL7/
pagel2_7.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2001).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Aphis, supra note 36, at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/ep/fad-training/VESVOL7/
pagel5_7.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2001).
46. Id. at 20-21.
47. Id.
48. Id.at 21. At later stages, FMD infected animals may exhibit signs of aggression,
lameness, excessive drooling, and nasal discharge. Id.
49. APHIS, supra note 36, at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/ep/fad training/VESVOL7/
page20_7.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2001).
50. Id. at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/ep/fad-training/VESVOL7/page7O_7.htm (last
visited Oct. 27, 2001).
51. An FMD outbreak could have a devastating effect on the $93 billion United States
animal agriculture industry. Foreign Animal Diseases Emergency Plan Urged by House
Agriculture Committee Leaders, FOOD CHEMICAL NEWS, Nov. 24, 1997; See also Foot-and-
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Vaccinations are available for FMD, but one vaccine cannot protect against
all variant strains of the disease? Furthermore, a country is prohibited
from claiming an official recognition of "disease-free" status if it has a
current FMD vaccination program in effect.53 Countries implementing
vaccination programs are designated as "FMD-free (with vaccination). "'4
As such, the downgrade in status to "FMD-free (with vaccination)" creates
a downward spiral in export prices for meat products, while meat prices
rise for consumers within these countries. In endemic countries, meaning
those where FMD is deemed generally under control, livestock export

prices are generally fifty percent lower5 6 Declaring a country57 free of
FMD increases its livestock export prices by one hundred percent.
Many countries choose not to implement a vaccination program, but
rather opt to eradicate FMD through the immediate slaughter of all
susceptible animals within a proscribed zone of possible contamination and
decontamination of the infected premises.18 This instant slaughter and bum
method is quicker and, arguably, more efficient than employing a
vaccination program; but it is the most costly method both economically
and environmentally." In some countries, like the United Kingdom, the
government compensates farmers for their slaughtered livestock.w
Ultimately, the whole country suffers financially from an outbreak.6 ' In
Great Britain, for example, the cost of eradicating FMD is estimated to be
Mouth War is Costing Taxpayers, THE SUN SENTINEL, July 14, 2001, at 17A [hereinafter FMD
War] (Eradication of the FMD outbreak in the United Kingdom will cost U.S.$3 billion. This
includes the cost of destroying and disposing of animals, disinfecting contaminated areas, and
compensating farmers for their losses sustained).
52. Farmers once coped with FMD outbreaks by wiping the tongues of FMD infected
animals with rags and then used those rags to purposely spread the disease to the rest of the herd.
This way, they would all be infected at the same time and build up immunity to FMD.
However, this tactic did not always work because the cattle, while immune to one strain of
FMD, would become stricken by other variant strains of the disease. APHIS, supra note 36, at
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/ep/fadtraining/VESVOL7/page77.7.htm (last visited Oct. 27,
2001).
53. Steven Lewis, South America Facing Shortage of Foot-and-Mouth Vaccines, 43 FOOD
CHEMICAL NEWS, May 7, 2001, at 7.
54.
55.
56.
DAVIS J.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

See, e.g., Binkley, et. al., supra note 3, at 17.
Id.
James F. Smith, From Frankenfood to Fruit Flies: Navigating the WTO/SPS, 6 U.C.
INTL L. & POL'Y 1, 29 (2000).
Id.
Id.
Id.
See FMD War, supra note 51, at 17A.
Id.
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several billion dollars.2 In other countries, farmers can be financially
devastated by an FMD outbreak if they are forced to have their animals
slaughtered or carry the financial burden of vaccinating their herds, or the
diminished productivity of their disease ridden livestock.'6

Im. FMD AND BSE STATUS INTHE UNITED STATES
The United States currently employs measures to vigilantly guard
against BSE and FMD." BSE poses less of a threat than FMD because
there has never been a case in the United States, and because it is spread
by ingestion of BSE contaminated meat.65 Feedlots where live cattle are
held awaiting slaughter and slaughterhouses are constantly monitored for
signs of cattle with neurological disorders, and brains of slaughtered cattle
are routinely tested as a precaution." Since 1997, feed mills have been
prohibited from using ruminant animal wastes as an ingredient in feed for
ruminant animals.67

Disease outbreaks can have far-reaching effects in the modem global
economy besides affecting meat and milk prices. For example, the
BSE/vCJD outbreak in Europe may lead to a reduction in the amount of
surgical procedures performed in New York City, where at least twentyfive percent of the blood supply is imported from Europe." This is due to
new Food and Drug Administration (FDA) guidelines restricting blood
donations from people who may have been exposed to BSE."
The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), in conjunction
with the Centers for Disease Control, the National Institute of Health, and
the Food and Drug Administration, bears the responsibility of safeguarding
the United States from food-borne diseases.-0 Recently, the USDA
obtained a court order to confiscate and destroy several hundred sheep
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See Foreign Animal Diseases Emergency Plan Urged by House Agriculture Committee
Leaders, supra note 3.
65. See SCHLOSSER, supra note 8.
66. See CDC, BSE and vCJD, supra note 15.
67. See SCHLOSSER, supra note 8.
68. See Raymond Hernandez, Mad Cow Test Could Cut New York Blood Supply, N.Y.
TIMES, June 27 2001, at 8A.
69. Id.
70. See Allison Beers, Animal Diseases Targeted, But Few New Policy Initiatives in Bush
Budget; Proposalof Slight Increasefor Food Safety and Inspection Service, 43 FOOD CHEMICAL
NEWS 8 (Apr. 16, 2001); Andy Solomon, USDA to Destroy Three Vermont Sheep Flocks
Quarantined for TSE, USDA, Office of Communications (July 14, 2000), available at
www.usda.gov/news/releases (last visited Oct. 27, 2001).
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from neighboring Vermont farms." The sheep, imported from Belgium
and the Netherlands in 1996, were suspected of being exposed to BSE
contaminated feed before being imported into the United States. 7 In 2000,
some sheep in the Vermont flocks tested positive for a TSE, prompting the
USDA to issue a "declaration of extraordinary emergency" to have the
sheep removed." It may take years to determine, through laboratory tests,
which form of TSE was found in the Vermont sheep.7 ' Although there are
no documented cases of BSE infected sheep, serious concern arises from
the fact that sheep can contract BSE from ingestion of a very small amount
of BSE contaminated feed.75 Additional fears arose from the uncertainty of
7
whether flocks of sheep were consistently monitored in Europe for TSEs. 6
Consequently, humans are possibly in danger of exposure to vCJD from
the Vermont sheep." Prior to 1998, when the USDA learned of the
possible exposure to BSE contaminated feed, offspring and milk products
from the Vermont sheep were sold for human consumption.8
FMD threatens United States livestock because it is easily
transmissable.7'9 Over fifty years have passed since the last FMD outbreak
in the United States.' ° Animals in the United States are particularly
susceptible to an outbreak of FMD because they have no immunity.81
Currently, there is no vaccination program in effect due to the high cost
involved and the questionable effectiveness of such a program.8 2 Because
FMD is a highly contagious viral disease spread by physical contact,
widespread fears abound of the threat of contamination from people
carrying the disease and arriving in the United States from FMD affected

71. Jim Rogers, et. al., USDA Removes QuarantinedSheep From Second Vermont Farm,
USDA,
Office
of
Communications
(Mar.
23,
2001)
available
at
www.aphis.usda.gov/oafrSE/addinfo.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2001).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See Solomon, supra note 70.
75. United States Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service,
Additional Information on the Imported Belgium/Netherlands Sheep, available at
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/oa/tse/addinfo.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2001).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See Solomon, supra note 70.
79. See Smith, supra note 56.
80. Id. at 28-29.
81. Id. at 29.
82. USDA, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Foot-and-Mouth Disease Vaccine
(July 2001), available at www.aphis.usda.gov/oa/pubs/fsfindvac.html.
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countries. 3 An FMD outbreak may cost the United States taxpayers
billions of dollars before it is under control and eradicated."4
IV. FMD STATUS INTERNATIONALLY
Although FMD is widespread around the world, currently North
America, Central America, Chile, Australia, New Zealand, and some
European countries are considered FMD disease-free.0 South America,
Africa, and parts of Asia have reported recent outbreaks of FMD." While
reported outbreaks of FMD are on the decline in the United Kingdom,
public disapproval of the slaughter and burn program has swayed the
British government toward enactment of a regional vaccination program. 7
The head of the European- Union's meat trade association officially
recognized the financial devastation that would ensue in the event of an
FMD outbreak in the mainland European countries.u In 1998, the United
States placed a ban on importation of all meat products from the European
Union countries. 9
A. Japan
Similarly, in response to a recent outbreak of FMD, for the first time
in ninety-two years Japan has recently banned all pork, mutton, and related
meat imports from the European Union Countries.9 This follows a ban on

83. See, e.g., In re qnthia Twum Boafo, P.Q. Docket No. 00-0014, 2001 WL 195269
(USDA) (A woman imported beef from Ghana, a FMD affected region. Regardless of lack of
intent to spread disease, sanctions were issued as a deterrent to others who try to import meat);
In re Conrad Payne, A.Q. Docket No. 98-000457, 1998 WL 872494 (USDA) (A man imported
uncooked sausage from the Netherlands. In a USDA administrative appeal hearing regarding
importation of raw meat. The Netherlands, at the time, was considered at the time to be free of
FMD).
Even though the USDA has declared a region free of FMD, the meat and other animal
products produced in such free regions may be commingled with the meat of animals from an
infected region, resulting in an undue risk of introducing FMD into the United States. See 9
C.F.R. § 94.1.
84. See Foreign Animal Diseases Emergency Plan Urged by House Agriculture Committee
Leaders, supra note 3.
85. See Steve Clapp and Mark Thornton, FAO Warns that Foot-and-Mouth Disease
Represents Global Threat, 43 FOOD CHEMICAL NEWS, Mar. 19, 2001, at 1.
86. Id.
87. Sebastian Romero Melchor and Terry Downs, EU Veterinary Panel Extends All Footand-Mouth Disease Bans, 43 FOOD CHEMICAL NEWS, Apr. 2, 2001, at 7.
88. Binkley, et al., supra note 3, at 17.
89. Id.
90. Japan to Ban Pork, Mutton From EU Over Foot-and-Mouth, supra note 38.
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all beef products two months earlier after the European outbreak of BSE. 9t
The European Commission called Japan's ban on meat from all the
European Union countries "unnecessary and not proportionate. "92 The ban
on meat products from all the European Union countries will drive up meat
prices in Japan."
B. Canada
Like the United States and Japan, Canada does not import meat
products from Europe because even a small outbreak would cost the
country an estimated $2 billion dollars." The last FMD outbreak occurred
there in 1952, and it has been FMD-free since that time." Since Canada
does not allow any meat products imported from Europe, its main concern
is that someone will unknowingly bring the virus into the country on their
shoes or in food or plants through their luggage." Canadian inspectors are
increasing inspections of passengers and luggage on flights from Britain in
order to keep FMD out of North America."
C. European Union

1. United Kingdom
Combined efforts between the European Union's Standing Veterinary
Committee and the United Kingdom government authorities intended to
contain and eliminate FMD have been fairly successful in reducing the
frequency of outbreaks." The British government has extended the ban on
the movement of all livestock within the country, while other European
Union member-states also are taking unilateral steps."
Following
outbreaks earlier this year, France, the Netherlands, and Germany have
slaughtered all animals with any connection to Great Britain.'tm The French
government prohibits vaccination programs in favor of eradication of

91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Binkley, et al., supra note 3, at 17.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Binkley, et al., supra note 3, at 17. (In the United Kingdom, the number of new cases
have fallen from forty per day at the peak of the outbreak to less than ten per day.) See WTO
News, supra note 4, at 1.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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affected animals and has implemented a ban on importation.' 0' France has
recently declared itself FMD disease-free.1°1
2. Ireland
Ireland also has a FMD disease-free status after enacting aggressive
measures throughout its territory.' °0 Police, military, and Department of
Agriculture officials are banning together to effectuate extensive controls at
ports, airports, and on vehicles at the border of United Kingdom/Northern
Ireland.', As in other countries, they require disinfection of vehicles at the
border, ports, and airports.'1 Movement of all FMD susceptible species is
banned, except diredtly to slaughter or for welfare reasons.'0' Vehicles
must be cleaned and disinfected following transport of susceptible
species.' °0 Personnel have been increased in slaughter plants for the
purpose of detailed ante-mortem examination of sheep.'10 Intensive public
campaigns disseminate information to farmers, veterinarians, and the
general public.' 09

D. South America
1. Argentina
Various types of FMD viruses have been identified recently in South
America." 0 In South America, countries battling FMD outbreaks vaccinate
animals as part of their eradication programs." Supplies of vaccinations
are rapidly depleting in an effort to control the spread of the recent FMD
outbreak. 12 Delays in reporting FMD outbreaks in Argentina have been
instrumental in spreading the disease across its borders."' Secrecy in
101. See Office International Des Epizooties, International Animal Health Code at 892
(June 29, 2001), available at
http://www.oie.int/eng/info/hebdo/acurrent.htm#Sec2
[hereinafter OE, IAC].
102. Id.
103. Binkley, et al., supra note 3, at 17.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Binkley, et al., supra note 3, at 17.
109. Id.

110. Clapp and Thornton, supra note 85.
111. OlE, JAC, supra note 101.
112. Lewis, supra note 53, at 19.
113. Steven Lewis, Argentina's Secrecy on Foot-And-Mouth Proves Costly; Restrictions
Imposed on Meat Exports, 43 FOOD CHEMICAL NEWS, Mar. 26, 2001, at 4.
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reporting the true status of FMD outbreaks in Argentina will prove costly,
not only because of the expenses involved and loss of exports, but in terms
of the government's image."'
Argentina requires FMD vaccine to inoculate fifty million head of
cattle against the disease.1"' In June, a total of eighty-six outbreaks
affecting thousands of animals were confirmed, clinically and by
laboratory tests, in cattle in various districts and departments in provinces
of Argentina.' Control measures involve application of animal movement
restrictions, in the areas around the outbreaks and in the surveillance
zones." 7 These measures include a temporary ban on gatherings of animals
for trade, whatever the destination and purpose." Primary vaccination
against FMD is being performed in accordance with the provisions of the
Eradication Program, and is due to be completed in late June or early July,
depending on the climatic conditions prevailing in the different parts of the
country.9
2. Uruguay
Coping with a new FMD epidemic, Uruguay will have trouble
Recognized as FMD free, the
meeting its demand for FMD vaccine.'1
country had previously implemented a vaccination program along with
movement restrictions, to eliminate the disease in 1994.21
Furthermore, in 1994, Uruguay passed a law banning the production
of FMD vaccine, in an effort to improve its standing as a FMD diseasefree nation. '2 Now, the country has one laboratory equipped to
manufacture the vaccine, and it will not be able to produce the estimated
28 million doses needed for its vaccination program. 12 Beef exports have
been put on hold until the disease is once again eradicated.u

114. Id.
115. See OlE, JAC, supra note 101, at 892. (The number of affected animals is 4021, out
of 94,122 animals exposed to the risk of infection. Up to June 23, 2000, 1429 total outbreaks
were confirmed.); Steven Lewis, Argentina's Secrecy on Foot-And-Mouth Proves Costly;
Restrictions Imposed on Meat Exports, 43 FOOD CHEMICAL NEWS, Mar. 26, 2001, at 4.
116. Id.
117. Lewis, supra note 53, at 7.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See Smith, supra note 58, at 29.
122. See Lewis, supra note 53, at 7.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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3. Brazil
Bordering Uruguay, Brazil has been coping with its own FMD
outbreaks."' Although thousands of animals have been slaughtered to date,
the Brazilian government, under pressure from cattle industry associations,
has implemented a regional vaccination program along with other control
measures, including a halt to vehicle or pedestrian movement across the
Brazil/Uruguay border, where the most recent FMD outbreaks have
occurred. 12
V. WTO SANITARY/PHYTOSANITARY AGREEMENT
The Sanitary/Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement was drafted in 1994 to
promote uniform sanitary and phytosanitary measures for WTO member
countries. 27 To achieve this goal, the SPS Agreement encourages WTO
members, when creating or maintaining SPS measures, to rely upon the
SPS standards established by three international organizations: the Codex
Alimentarius Commission (Codex); the International Plant Protection
Convention (IPPC); and the International Office of Epizootics (OIE).'2
These organizations act as advisory boards to address issues concerning
human, plant, and animal life and health, respectively. '12
Disputes may arise concerning standards proposed based on the
specific trade agendas of member countries, as opposed to scientific
Lengthy approval processes and the desire to retain
evidence.'3
professional integrity of the scientists who are delegates to these
organizations, may prevent the creation of scientifically questionable
standards.' 3 ' The SPS Agreement was designed to provide sanitary
guidelines based on scientific principles, not to impose strict uniform
standards on its member countries.' n Consequently, wide latitude is given

125. Id.
126. id.
127. Terence P. Stewart and David S. Johanson, The SPS Agreement of The World Trade
Organizationand InternationalOrganizations:The Roles of the Codex Alimentarius Commission,
the International Plant Protection Convention, and the International Office of Epizootics, 26
SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 27, 28

(1998).

128. Id. at 28.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 51.
131. Id. at 52.
132. David G. Victor, The Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement of the World Trade
Organization: An Assessment after Five Years, 32 N.Y.J.U. INT'L. L. & POL. 865, 879-80
(2000).
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to the individual sanitary policies of member countries.'The SPS
Agreement's purpose is to encourage international trade by limiting the use
of sanitary measures as disguised barriers to trade.'
WTO member
countries have the right to impose SPS measures as necessary "for the
protection of human, animal or plant life or health."I' Another goal is to
minimize trade barriers by preventing countries from committing arbitrary
or unjustifiable discrimination when imposing SPS policies on imported
36
products.
VI. PROTECTIONISM OR PROTECTION?

The European Union has taken offense to the United States and
Japanese bans on imports from all European Union countries as
unreasonable measures, and accused the United States policy of being
rooted in economic protectionism because the ban is not considered
scientifically grounded. 7
However, a European Union official has
recognized that the current FMD outbreak in Great Britain is a result of a
particularly potent strain of the virus believed to be brought over from
India. 3 ' As such, it is understandable that FMD-free countries would want
to employ the most drastic measures necessary to prevent introduction of
the virus. At issue are the adequacy of monitoring standards set by the
OIE and import restrictions on meat that are not as stringent as in the
United States. 3 9
The principle argument of the European Union is that it is unfair to
ban imports from regions that are disease-free because they are European
Union countries." 4 The European Union feels that it is protectionism
masked by unsound scientific principle."' The United States may soon find
itself on the opposite end of this type of dispute. 2 The European
Communities may ban imports of United States manufactured
pharmaceuticals because of the use of gelatin capsule casings partially
composed of materials such as bovine brains and spinal cords originating

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

d. at 877.
Id. at 875.
Id.
Id.
Stewart and Johanson, supra note 127, at 53; Binkley, supra note 3, at 17.
Id.
Stewart and Johanson, supra note 127, at 51-52.
Id. at 51.
Id.
Id.
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from BSE infected countries.' 3 This ban could cost the United States
billions of dollars in pharmaceutical sales overseas.'" The United States
views this European Communities measure as violating the SPS Agreement
based on "scientifically unsound" principles because the United States
monitors for BSE in compliance with OIE standards.'"
VII. CONCLUSION
FMD and BSE seriously threaten human and animal health, food
supplies, and agricultural economy around the world. Public awareness of
the implications of an outbreak is important so that governments and
regulatory agencies will be more accountable for their control of
agricultural industries. Though global entities are striving for uniformity
in sanitary practices and disease eradication measures, cultural differences
may thwart efforts to maintain harmony in international trade.
Difficulty lies in distinguishing between international trade policies
rooted in protectionism and those based on sound scientific principle. It is
more important for a government body to make decisions for its
constituents erring on the side of caution than it is for a particular forbign
country to expect entitlement to sell its exports. Fears of losing export
business because of FMD or BSE should provide economic incentive for
countries to adhere to sanitary standard guidelines.
Until BSE is
eradicated and there is certainty that an FMD outbreak can be easily
quashed without debilitating great numbers of livestock, there should be no
reason to subject a country to international disputes involving a decision to
ban imports from any other country or region.

143. Id.
144. Stewart and Johanson, supra note 127, at 51.
145. Id.
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I.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Pursuant to Article 40(1) of the Statute of the Court, the Republic of
Erebus and the Kingdom of Merapi, by a special agreement dated 1
November 2000, have agreed to submit their present dispute concerning
maritime boundary delimitation and the seabed mining facility to the
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice under Article 36(1) of the
Statute of the Court.
II. QUESTIONS PRESENTED TO THE COURT
1. Whether the Treaty of Amity and Peace established the ErebianMerapin boundary as being the middle of the Krakatoa River's
principal arm, irrespective of any subsequent movement in the location
of said arm;
2. Whether the shift that has occurred in the location of the Krakatoa
River's principle arm is governed by the doctrine of accretion;
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3. Whether the shift in the Krakatoa's main arm has resulted in placing
the Alma Shoals and the adjacent petroleum reserves within the
Erebian exclusive economic zone;
4. Whether Merapi acted in violation of international law when it seized
and subjected to forfeiture proceedings six Erebian-flagged vessels
fishing in the Alma Shoals;
5.

Whether Erebus acted consistent with international law when, in
response to the Merapin seizures, it provided naval escorts to Erebian
fishing vessels in the Alma Shoals;
6. Whether Merapi is required to return or compensate for the Erebian
fishing vessels it seized in the Alma Shoals;
7. Whether the establishment of the Erebian deep seabed mining facility
under the high seas was inconsistent with international law;
8.

Whether Merapi is prevented by the doctrine of equitable estoppel
from asserting that the Erebian seabed mining facility is not in
compliance with international law;

9. Whether the Aqua Protectors' attack on the Erebian seabed mining
facility is imputable to the government of Merapi;
10. Whether Merapi's involvement in the Aqua Protectors' attack was
justifiable as self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations
Charter;
11. Whether Merapi had authorization from the United Nations Security
Council to attack the Erebian seabed mining facility;
12. Whether Merapi is required to compensate Erebus for the cost of
repairing the seabed mining facility and lost profits while such repair is
underway;
13. Whether Merapi is required to compensate Erebus for the loss of life
inflicted by the Aqua Protectors' attack; and
14. Whether Merapi must extradite the responsible members of the Aqua
Protectors for prosecution in Erebus.
III. STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case arises out of the Kingdom of Merapi's seizure of Erebianflagged fishing vessels and its support for a deadly attack on the Erebian
government's seabed mining facility. (Compromis
7, 18; Clarifications
4).
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The Kingdom of Merapi borders the Republic of Erebus to its south.
(Comp. 12). In 1947, Erebus and Merapi entered into the Treaty of Amity
and Peace, which established their common land border as the midpoint of
the principal arm of the Krakatoa River. (Comp. 13, 4). The Krakatoa
River follows an easterly path and forms a large uninhabited delta before
reaching the Etna Sea. (Comp. 2; Clar. 12). The Treaty also marked the
nations' maritime boundary as extending out to sea from the midpoint of the
principle arm of the Krakatoa River. (Comp. 14).
At the time the Treaty was prepared, the principle arm lay between
Pigeon Rock to the south and the Cape of Realto to the north. (Comp. 4).
As a result, the Alma Shoals and its fish-stocks were placed within the
contiguous waters of Merapi. (Comp. 2). Notwithstanding, vessels from
Erebus and other nations fished the area without provoking a response from
Merapi. (Clar. 3).
Over time, hurricane-induced erosion has shifted the principal arm of
the Krakatoa southward, so as today Pigeon Rock lies to the north of the
principal arm. (Comp. 5). The river's previous main arm has ceased to
exist as a distinct topographical feature. (Comp. 5; Clar. 1). Drawing the
maritime boundary from the midpoint of the river's new principal arm
establishes the Alma Shoals as now being within the exclusive economic
zone of Erebus. (Comp. 5).
In early 1999, an Erebian oil company discovered petroleum reserves
approximately 50 nautical miles from shore and adjacent to the Alma Shoals.
(Comp. 5; Clar. 3). In August 1999, Erebus clarified its position that the
Treaty of Amity and Peace places the Alma Shoals and the petroleum
reserves within Erebian waters. (Comp. 6). Shortly thereafter, the Prime
Minister of Merapi issued a communiqud, which stated that any
interpretation of the Treaty as giving Erebus claim to this territory would
constitute an act of hostility. (Comp. 6). Additionally, the Prime Minister
threatened the seizure of Erebian fishing vessels operating in the Shoals.
(Comp. 6). Erebus did not alter its position in response, and vessels
bearing its flag continued to fish the Shoals. (Comp. 7).
Several months after the communiqu6, the Merapin navy seized six
Erebian fishing vessels found in the Shoals. (Comp. 7). The crews of these
ships were released unharmed; however, the ships themselves were
confiscated for their alleged trespass. (Comp. 7). In response, Erebus
offered to provide naval escorts to any Erebian vessel wishing to exercise its
right to fish in the Alma Shoals. (Comp. 7). No further confrontations
between Erebian and Merapin vessels have occurred in the Shoals region.
(Comp. 7). However, Erebus continues to demand the release of the six
captured vessels bearing its flag. (Comp. 21).
Erebus's northern neighbor is the powerful state of Fogo, whose
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territorial ambitions have created hostile relations, resulting in sporadic
military confrontation. (Comp. 1). In response to Fogo's aggression,
Erebus has been forced to embark upon a buildup of its defensive forces.
(Comp. 19). Some of the weapon systems that Erebus is developing require
the procurement of minerals such as manganese, cobalt, nickel, and copper.
(Comp. 19). While Erebus has a modem, developed economy, it is almost
totally dependent on imports for its mineral needs. (Comp. 1.) In response
to this critical strategic weakness, Erebus spent a number of years studying
deep seabed nodules as a potentially dependable and economically viable
source of minerals. (Comp. 19.)
In April 2000, Erebus announced to the world its intention to begin
mining manganese nodules in international waters approximately 300
nautical miles beyond Merapi's exclusive economic zone. (Comp. 19).
Government owned and operated facility was being constructed 5,000 feet
below the surface of the water with mining scheduled to begin by the end of
September 2000. (Comp.
9; Clar. 4).
This announcement was
accompanied by the release of an exhaustive report conducted by the Chair
of the Department of Environmental Science of the University of Erebus.
(Comp. 10). This report, which was the result of computer modeling and
site comparison research, vouched for the environmental safety of the
project. (Comp. 10; Clar. 4).
On August 15, 2000, the President of the United Nations' Security
Council released a statement regarding concerns over the Erebian seabed
mining facility. (Comp. 12). The statement asked Erebus to postpone
mining until it could prove to the Council that the operation would not harm
the fish-stocks of the nearby Grand Basin. (Comp. 12; Corrections 2). In
a prompt reply to the Security Council, Erebus noted that while it had
announced its seabed mining plans some six months prior, Merapi had never
protested these plans. (Comp. 13). While Erebus could appreciate the
Council's concerns, Erebus declined to postpone the mining operation at
such a late date. (Comp. 13). Erebus believed the operation to be fully
tested and proven safe. (Comp. 13). Additionally, due to continued tense
relations with Fogo, Erebus had an immediate need for minerals for selfdefense purposes. (Comp. 13).
Merapi's first diplomatic correspondence regarding the seabed
mining operation was an August 25, 2000 note to the Security Council, in
which Merapi requested that the Council take actions to prevent Erebus from
beginning its mining operation. (Comp. 14). While the Council stated its
intention "to remain seized of the matter," it took no official action in
response to Merapi's request. (Comp. 15).
On the morning of September 1, 2000, saboteurs bombed the
Erebian seabed mining facility. (Comp. 16). The bombing of the facility
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resulted in the death of six Erebian civilians who at the time of the blast
were working on a temporary platform. (Comp. 16). Additionally, the
explosion resulted in over U.S. $1 billion in damages to the physical plant
that will take over a year to repair. (Comp. 16).
Later that same day, a Merapi-based organization calling itself the
"Aqua Protectors" claimed responsibility for the attack, which it referred to
as "Operation Sea Storm." (Comp. 11, 16). Within hours, Merapi
delivered a diplomatic note to the Security Council in which it denied either
planning or participating in the attack. (Comp. 117). However, the same
day the Merapi Times reported that the government of Merapi had prior
knowledge of the operation and had financially backed the attack with US
$100,000. (Comp. 18; Corrections 3). This report was later confirmed
during routine oversight hearings in the Merapin Legislature. (Comp. 18).
Erebus immediately demanded that Merapi pay for the damage and loss
of life caused by this attack. (Comp. 119). Additionally, Erebus demanded
that Merapi extradite the responsible members of the Aqua Protectors for
prosecution in Erebus on charges of homicide and destruction of government
property. (Comp. 119; Clar. 6). Some of the individuals responsible are
Merapin citizens, while others are nationals of a third state to Merapi's
south. (Clar. 5.) To date, Merapi has neither extradited nor prosecuted any
of these individuals. (Comp. 19; Clar. 6). They remain free from police
custody, amidst the general population of Merapi. (Clar. 16).
On October 1, 2000, after a series of diplomatic talks, the parties
agreed to submit their dispute to the International Court of Justice. (Comp.
22).
IV. SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS
A. The Erebian-Merapin border is the present location of the Krakatoa
River's principal arm. Erebus and Merapi are bound by the terms of
the Treaty of Amity and Peace, the plain meaning of which establishes
their boundary as the middle of the principal arm of the Krakatoa,
irrespective of changes in the river's location. Over time, hurricaneinduced erosion has shifted the river's principle arm southward. Since
this movement was of a gradual nature, the doctrine of accretion
dictates that the Erebian-Merapin boundary moved with the shift in the
river. Consequently, the Alma Shoals, as well as the adjacent
petroleum reserves, now lie within the Erebian exclusive economic
zone, entitling Erebus to exploit and regulate the sea and seabed
resources of that area.
B. Independent of the issue of the location of the Erebian-Merapin
maritime boundary, Merapi's seizure and submission to forfeiture

2001]

DistinguishedBrief

279

procedures of Erebian vessels fishing in the Alma Shoals was a
violation of international law. Erebus was, thus, justified in sending
its naval vessels into the Alma Shoals to protect other Erebian fishing
vessels. International law requires that Merapi must either return the
six unlawfully seized vessels bearing the Erebian flag, or pay Erebus
reparations equal to their value.
C. The Erebian deep seabed mining operation was not in violation of
international law. Erebus is a party to neither the 1982 Law of the Sea
Convention nor the 1994 Agreement on Implementing Part XI of the
1982 Convention.
The seabed mining provisions of the 1982
Convention and the 1994 Agreement do not constitute customary
international law binding on non-parties.
Thus, Erebus is not
restricted by the seabed mining provisions in these agreements, and
may mine the seabed consistent with the customary international law
freedom of the high seas doctrine.
Finally, the United Nations
Security Council Presidential Statement did not create a binding
obligation upon Erebus to forbear from commencing its seabed mining
operation. In any event, the doctrine of estoppel bars any claim that
Merapi may have had concerning the legality of the Erebian seabed
mining facility, since it made no protest during the construction of the
billion-dollar facility.
D. Merapi is liable for the destruction of the Erebian seabed mining
facility and the killing of Erebian nationals. Under the principles of
state responsibility, Merapi's financial support to the Aqua Protectors,
with prior knowledge of their planned attack against the Erebian
facility, amounts to a use of force against the property and citizens of
Erebus. Since Merapi had knowledge of the Aqua Protectors' plan,
Merapi was obligated to warn Erebus and to take other reasonable
measures to prevent the Aqua Protectors' attack. Merapi's support of
the Aqua Protectors was not justified as self-defense consistent with
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, because Article 51 does not
authorize anticipatory self-defense, and even if it did, the potential for
economic or environmental harm would not constitute an "armed
attack" triggering such a right. In any event, Merapi's actions were
inconsistent
with
the
requirements
of
"necessity"
and
"proportionality." Merapi's actions were unnecessary, both because
the United Nations Security Council was actively engaged in the
dispute and because Merapi failed to exhaust all available peaceful
measures. Merapi's actions were also disproportional, since the attack
needlessly resulted in the death of civilians.
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E. International law requires Merapi to compensate Erebus for the
destruction of the mining facility and the killing of Erebian nationals,
as well as to extradite the responsible parties to Erebus for
prosecution. Merapi's refusal to extradite cannot be justified by resort
to the political offense exception as the Aqua Protectors do not qualify
as "political offenders" under any of the internationally excepted tests
for determining the exception's applicability.
V. PLEADINGS
A. The Legitimate Boundary Between Erebus and Merapi is the
PresentLocation of the Krakatoa River's PrincipalArm
1. Merapi and Erebus are bound by the terms of the Treaty of
Amity and Peace, which explicitly establishes their land and
maritime boundaries.
A treaty is a written agreement between states, governed by
international law.' All treaties are binding upon their contracting parties. 2
In 1947, Erebus and Merapi entered into the Treaty of Amity and Peace
[hereinafter "Treaty"], which established their common land and
maritime boundaries. As parties to this treaty, Erebus and Merapi are
bound by its terms.
a. The plain meaning of the Treaty establishes the borderas the midpoint
of the principalarm of the Krakatoa River, irrespective of the river's
location.
A treaty is to be understood according to the plain meaning of its
terms, subject to the context in which they appear, with an eye towards
the purpose of the instrument.4 Unless it leads to a reading that is
ambiguous or patently unreasonable, the plain meaning is definitive.The Treaty establishes the Erebian-Merapin land border as being

1. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 2(1)(a), May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc.
A./CONF. 39/27 (1971), reprinted in 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 875, 876 (1969) [hereinafter Vienna
Convention). See also LORD MCNAIR, THE LAW OFTREATIES 4 (1961).
2.
See Vienna Convention, supra note 1, at art. 26. See also Richard D. Kearney &
Robert E. Dalton, The Treaty on Treaties, 64 AM. J. INT'L. L. 495, 516 (1970).
3.
Compromis 3, 4.
4.
See Vienna Convention, supra note 1, at art. 31. See also Kasikili/Sedudu Island
(Bots. v. Namib.), 1999 I.C.J. (Dec. 13), reprinted in 39 I.L.M. 310, 320 (2000). See also Oil
Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 1996 I.C.J. 803, 812 (Prelim. Obj., Dec. 12).
5.
See Vienna Convention, supra note 1, at art. 32.
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"the midpoint of the Krakatoa River."' The Treaty is thus clear that the
border is the river itself, and not an indelible line fixed by a surveyor's
level and compass. The Treaty states that the maritime boundary
extends from "the mouth of the Krakatoa River, taking as the mouth
of the river its principal arm . . . "I The Treaty, thus, again utilizes an
impermanent, rather than a geographically fixed, marker. The Treaty
goes on to identify the river's principal arm as "lying between Pigeon
Rock to the South, and the Cape of Realto to the North.", The context
in which this phrase is employed compels the interpretation that it was
meant as a contemporary identification of the principle arm, and not a
condition precedent to using the principal arm to mark the boundary.
The Treaty's plain meaning clearly establishes that the ErebianMerapin land and maritime boundaries are indeterminate in nature,
subject to change with the course of the Krakatoa. There is nothing
unreasonable about this interpretation, as despite their fundamental
impermanence, states routinely use the course of rivers to mark their
boundaries.' Moreover, Merapi was aware that the Krakatoa had
shifted course in the past,' 0 yet it did not insist on a clause, such as
exists in the Israeli-Jordanian Peace Agreement," stating that the
boundary would not move with the river, perhaps because the previous
shift had been favorable to Merapi.
b. Evidence of the circumstancessurrounding the Treaty's conclusion
confirm that the reference to Pigeon Rock and the Cape of Realto was
meant for contemporary identificationpurposes only.
Recourse to extrinsic evidence, such as preparatory work and
evidence of the circumstances surrounding a treaty's conclusion, is allowed
for the purpose of confirming a treaty's interpretation.' 2 The circumstances
surrounding agreement on the Erebian-Merapin maritime boundary
indicate that the parties were primarily interested in setting forth "an

6.
7.
8.

Comp. 4.
Id.
Id.

9.
See STEPHEN B. JONES, BOUNDARY-MAKING:
TREATY AND BOUNDARY COMMISSIONERS 108 (1971).

A HANDBOOK FOR STATESMEN,

10. Clarifications 2.
11. See Israel-Jordan: Treaty of Peace, Oct. 26, 1994, Isr.-Jordan, Annex I(a), reprinted
in 34 I.L.M. 43 (1995).
12. See Vienna Convention, supra note 1, at art. 32. See also Kearney, supra note 2, at

282 ILSA Journalof Internaional& ComparativeLaw [Vol. 8:271
objectively identifiable boundary."" This extrinsic evidence, thus, confirms
that the purpose of the phrase "said arm lying between Pigeon Rock to the
South, and the Cape of Realto to the North," was to identify the principal
arm's location at the time. This phrase is now obsolete, since the new
principal arm is in itself an objectively identifiable boundary, as its
location is uncontested, while the previous riverbed has ceased to exist as a
4
distinct topographical feature.

2. Under the doctrine of accretion, the Erebian-Merapin border
followed the gradual southerly shift of the Krakatoa's principal arm.
The shifting of riparian boundaries is governed by either the doctrine
of accretion or avulsion, depending on the speed at which the change
occurs." When the course of the river changes over time, accretion
dictates that the boundary follows the altered course." When the river's
path is suddenly altered, avulsion leaves the boundary in the middle of the
now abandoned riverbed. 7
A typical avulsion was displayed in the case of Arkarias v. Tennessee,
wherein the Mississippi River changed its course over a period of 30 hours so
as to abandon 20 miles of the riverbed. ' Alternatively, accretion was
illustrated by the case of Nebraska v. Iowa, wherein the Missouri River
markedly changed course over a period of several years." In that case, Nebraska
argued that, due to local soil conditions, large sections of riverbank often collapsed
into the river, thus, the change was "not gradual and irnperctepible, but sudden and
visible," and consequently, inconsistent with accretion.- The United States
Supreme Court, however, found the doctrine of accretion to apply, because the
change, though relatively rapid, was the product of an ongoing erosive process
2
and not a swift and singular event. '

Gradually, over a period of several years, hurricane-induced erosion
shifted the Krakatoa's principal arm southward." Thus, according to the
principle of accretion, the boundary moved with the shift in the river.2
13. Comp. 4.
14. Comp. 4, 5; Clar. 1.
15. See 72 AM. JUf. 2d, States §27 (1974). See, e.g., Nebraska v. Iowa, 143 U.S. 359,.
369 (1892).
16. See 45 AM. JUR. 2d, InternationalLaw §29 (1999).
17. See id.
18. See Arkansas v. Tennessee, 246 U.S. 158, 162 (1917).
19. 143 U.S. at 369-70 (1892).
20. d. at 367-68.
21. See id. at 368-70.
22. Comp. 5.
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3. The shifting of the Krakatoa River has placed the Alma Shoals
and the adjacent petroleum reserves within the exclusive economic
zone of Erebus.
All states are entitled to an exclusive economic zone [hereinafter "EEZ"]
extending 200 nautical miles beyond their coastal baseline.2 First codified in
the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention [hereinafter "UNCLOS"], the concept
of the EEZ has ripened into customary international law." Within their
EEZ, states have an exclusive right to non-living resources and a preferential
right to living resources 26 It should be noted, the relative socio-economic
conditions of the parties are irrelevant in the resolution of a maritime boundary
dispute.27 Thus, any contention that Merapi's economic conditions should
influence the Court's judgment must be rejected as "[s]uch considerations are
totally unrelated to the underlying intention of the applicable rules of
international law. "

Drawing the maritime boundary from the midpoint of the Krakatoa
River's new principal arm establishes that the newly discovered petroleum
reserves and the Alma Shoals lie within the EEZ of Erebus. 2' Erebus, thus,
has the exclusive right to any petroleum found in the zone and a priority
right to the zone's living resources.20

23.

Cf. A. S. WISDOM, THE LAW OF RIVERS AND WATERCOURSES 25 (4th ed., 1979).

24. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, art. 57, U.N.
Doc. A./CONF. 62/122 (1982), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1245, 1280 (1982) [hereinafter
UNCLOS].
25. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES §514 cmt. a (1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. See also Delimitation of the Maritime
Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 246, 294 (Oct. 12).
26. See UNCLOS, supra note 24, at art. 56. See also James E. Bailey III, The ExcLusive
Econmic Zone: Its Development and Fture in ntemational and Domestic Law, 45 LA. L. REV.
1269, 1270 (1985).
27. See Maritime Delimitation in the Area Between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Den. v.
Nor.), 1993 I.C.J. 38, 74 (June 14).
28. Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13, 41 (June 3).
29. Comp. 4, 5.
30. See RESTATEMENr, surq
24, at arts. 56, 61-62.

note 25, at § 514, Repone's Note 4. See also UNCLOS, spra ote
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B. Merapi is Liable for Its Unjustified Seizure of Erebian Fishing

Vessels in the Alma Shoals
1. Irrespective of the legal status of the Alma Shoals, Merapi's
seizure and subjection to forfeiture proceedings of the Erebian
fishing vessels is unlawful.
While under customary international law a coastal state has certain
economic rights in its EEZ, in all other respects, the zone retains the
attributes of the high seas. 3 ' Under customary international law, a ship
operating beyond territorial waters is functionally a floating island of the
country whose flag it flies, and as such, no other state may exercise
jurisdiction upon it without the flag state's consent." Under the UNCLOS,
a party-state may enforce fishing regulations in its EEZ by boarding,
inspecting, and arresting the vessel of another party-state believed to be out
of compliance with such regulations. 3 However, as a non-party to the
UNCLOS,"' Erebus never consented to such a regime.
Moreover, there is no indication that the Erebian-flagged vessels
were in violation of any regulatory regime. Prior to recent events,
Merapi had not objected to Erebian vessels fishing in the Shoals, 3 and
the actual count with which the seized vessels were charged was simply
"trespass."16
Additionally, the UNCLOS provides that when a ship is lawfully
seized, not only must the crew be promptly released, but also the vessel
itself must be released upon the posting of a reasonable bond. 3' Thus,
even if the UNCLOS's search and seizure provisions are found to be
applicable to the Erebian vessels, Merapi violated international law by
subjecting the vessels to forfeiture proceedings without affording
Erebus the option of posting a bond to secure their return.

31. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 25, § 514 cmt. b.
32. See The S.S. Lotus (Turk. v. Fr.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 25 (Sept. 7). See
also Koru North American v. United States, 701 F. Supp. 229, 231 (1988).
33. See UNCLOS, supra note 24, at art. 73.
34. Comp. 8.
35. Clar. 3.
36. Comp. 7.
37. See UNCLOS, supra note 24, at arts. 73, 292. See generally The "Camouco" Case
(Pan. v. Fr.), 2000 ITLOS (Judgm. of Feb. 8), reprintedin 39 I.L.M. 666 (2000).
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2. Merapi's unlawful seizure and forfeiture of Erebian-flagged ships
provided Erebus the right to send naval vessels to protect Erebian
ships fishing in the Shoals.
When a state's rights have been denied or infringed under
international law that state has the right to respond with appropriate
defensive measures.'
Merapi's seizure of the Erebian ships was an
unlawful act; thus, Erebus clearly acted within its rights when it responded
by providing naval escorts to Erebian vessels wishing to operate in the
Alma Shoals. Moreover, the mere presence of naval vessels in the EEZ of
another state is a violation of neither customary international law, nor the
UNCLOS. 39

3. International law requires Merapi to return the six unlawfully
seized fishing vessels or make reparations to Erebus on behalf of
their owners.
Reparations must, to the extent possible, eliminate the consequences
of the breach of duty and restore the injured state to the position it would
have occupied if the breach had never occurred.'4 The unlawful seizure of
a ship at sea is a violation of the rights of the flag-state, not simply a
violation of the rights of the ship's owner and crew.4 ' Since the

requirement to exhaust effective local remedies before bringing an action
in an international tribunal applies only to cases in which the plaintiffstate is making a claim on behalf of a private citizen, it does not apply to
the case at hand.'2 Therefore, Merapi is obligated to redress the Erebian
injury by either returning the unjustly seized vessels to their owners, or
paying reparations equal to their value. 3

38. Cf. Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 30 (Apr. 9).
39. See D.G. Stephens, The Impact of the Law of the Sea Convention on the Conduct of
PeacetimeNaval/Military Operations,29 CAL. W. INT'L L. J. 283, 290 (1999).
40. See Factory at Chorzow (Merits) (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 4748 (Sept. 13).
41. See The M/V "Saiga" (No. 2) Case (St. Vincent v. Guinea), 1999 ITLOS, paras. 9798 (Judgm. of July 1), available at < http://www.un.org/Depts/los/ITLOS/JudgE.htm >.
42. See id. See also Draft Articles of State Responsibility, [19801 11-2 Y.B. INT'L L. L.
COMM'N 32, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1980/Add. 1 (Part 2); Phosphates in Morocco (Judgm.)
(Italy v. Fr.), 1936 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 74, at 25 (June).
43. See YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENSE 115 (1994).
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C. The Erebian Deep Seabed Mining Operation is not In Violation
of InternationalLaw.
1. International law imposes no obligation upon Erebus to refrain
from mining the deep seabed under international waters.
a. As a non-party, neither Part XI of the UNCLOS nor the 1994
Agreement on Implementing PartXI bind Erebus.
According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, to which
both Erebus and Merapi are parties," a treaty may obligate a non-party
only if it "expressly accepts that obligation in writing."4" As a non-party,
Erebus cannot be bound by the terms of either Part XI of the UNCLOS or
the 1994 Agreement on Implementing Part XI [hereinafter "Agreement"],
without its consent.
b. The seabed mining provisionsfound in PartXI of the UNCLOS and the
1994 Agreement have not ripened into customary internationallaw.
The opinio juris and consistent practice of a substantial number of
states evidence customary international law." International agreements
may lead to the creation of customary law only when they are intended for
general adherence and become widely accepted. 7 The party claiming a
customary international norm bears the burden of proving its existence."
Though the UNCLOS was signed by a majority of states, several
important industrialized nations, including the United States, refused to
sign it due to the "hopelessly flawed"1 seabed mining provisions
contained in Part XI. The Agreement made substantial changes to those
provisions in an effort to appease the industrialized world.-' However, it
apparently failed to appease the United States Senate, which has continued
44. Comp. 8.
45.

See Vienna Convention, supra note 1, art. 35.

See also MCNAIR, supra note 1, at

309.
46. See The Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116, 191 (Dec. 18). See also SIR
GERALD FITZMAURICE, THE LAW AND PROCEDURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
17-18 (1986).
47.

See RESTATEMENT, supra note 25, at §102.

48. See Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J. at 28.
49. White House Office of Policy Information, The Law of the Sea Convention, Issue
Update No. 10, at 8 (Apr. 15, 1983).
50. See E.D. Brown, Freedom of the High Seas Versus the Common Heritage of Mankind:
FundamentalPrinciples in Conflict, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 521 (1983).
51. See Bernard H. Oxman, The 1994 Agreement on Implementation of the Seabed
Provisions of the Convention on the Law of the Sea: The 1994 Agreement and the Convention,
88 AM. J. INT'L L. 687 (1994).
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to block ratification.2 What the Agreement accomplished, though, was to
fracture any international conformity that may have existed regarding
acceptance of a seabed mining regime. Today, the UNCLOS has 158
signatories, while the Agreement, with its substantially altered provisions,
has only 79.53
Finally, the Secretary-General of the International Seabed Authority,
in his most recent annual report, admitted that it was too soon to tell if the
seabed mining regime would be successful as currently constructed?
Accordingly, it cannot be said that either the UNCLOS deep seabed mining
provisions or the Agreement have crystallized into customary international
law binding on Erebus.55
c. GeneralAssembly Resolutions proclaiming the seabed to be the
"common heritage of mankind" do not constitute customary international
law.
A General Assembly Resolution, in and of itself, is not legally binding
upon member states.' While General Assembly Resolutions may function as
a part of the larger customary law creating process, by themselves, they are
merely recommendations!,
In 1970, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the
"Declaration of Principles Governing the Seabed," which proclaimed the
deep seabed and its resources to be the "common heritage of mankind," and
provided that the exploitation of these resources had to be carried out to the
benefit of all mankind.- While the vote was unanimous, a number of states
made comments at the time of its adoption that the Declaration was intended
to be aspirational rather than binding59 Since a General Assembly
Resolution is not binding in the absence of other evidence of conforming
52. See John Alton Duff, UNCLOS and the New Deep Seabed Mining Regime: The Risks
of Refuting the Treaty, 19 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 1, 15, 32-33 (1995).
53. See II MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL:
STATUS AS AT 31 DECEMBER 1999, ST/LEG/SER.E/18, 209, 242 (2000).
54. See Report of the Secretary-Generalof the InternationalSeabed Authority under article
166, paragraph4, of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, ISBA/6/A/9 (June 6,

2000).
55.

See RESTATEMENT, supra note 25, Part V: Introductory Note, at 7.

56. See Voting Procedure on Questions Relating to Reports and Petitions Concerning the Territory
of South-West Africa, 1955 I.C.J. 67, 115 (Sep. Op. of J. Lauterpact, June 7).
57. Cf. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 254-55
(Advisory Op., July 8) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons].

58. See Declaration of Principles Governing the Seabed and the Ocean Floor, and Subsoil
Thereof, Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, G.A. Res. 2749, 25 GAOR Supp. (No. 28),

at 28, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
59. See Brown, supra note 50, at 542-46.
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state practice, the Declaration of Principles Governing the Seabed does not
constitute customary international law.60
d. The United Nations Security Council PresidentialStatement does not
legally obligate Erebus to delay commencement of its seabed mining
operation.
Security Council Presidential Statements are informal documents,
which should not be interpreted as creating legal obligations.61 Whereas
Chapter VII Resolutions are formal statements of the will of the Council,
and as such have the force of law, Presidential Statements are the product
of informal consultations between the Council President and members, and
not a decision by the body as a whole.Y These informal consultations are
not Security Council "meetings;" in fact, they have no legal status as the
Council's procedural rules make no reference to them. 3 Additionally,
informal consultations, unlike formal Security Council meetings, do not
afford "a party to a dispute under consideration,"" such as Erebus, its right
under Article 32 of the United Nations Charter to participate in Council debates.0
In light of these facts, the Presidential Statement dated August 15, 2000,
should not be interpreted as having legally obligated Erebus to delay its
seabed mining operation.
It should be noted that this Court has previously determined that it
lacks the power of "judicial review," and is thus, incapable of passing
judgment upon the validity of a Security Council action." However, it is
within this Court's ability to interpret the purpose and meaning of a Security
Council instrument.67

60. See id. at 540-41.
61. Cf SYDNEY D. BAILEY & SAM DAVIS, THE PROCEDURE OF THE U.N. SECURITY
COUNCIL 65 (3d ed., 1998).

62. C id. at 65, 547.
63. See id. See also Michael C. Wood, Security Council Working Methods and
Procedures: Recent Developments, 45 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 150, 155 (1996).
64. U.N. CHARTER art. 32.

65.
Making,
66.
20).
67.

See Loie Feuerle, Informal Consultation: A Mechanism In Security Council Decision18 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 267, 298 (1985).
See Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.CJ. 151, 168 (Advisory Op., July
See, e.g., East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90, 103-04 (June 30).
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2. The Erebian facility conforms to the customary international law
doctrine of freedom of the high seas and the duty of states to protect
the natural environment.
The freedom to use the high seas, the air space above them, and the
seabed may only be limited or modified by a general consensus amongst
states.68 Thus, in the absence of a universally recognized seabed mining
regime, the doctrine of freedom of the high seas remains controlling.'
According to this doctrine, deep seabed mining is permitted as long as the
state conducting such activity gives reasonable regard for the rights of
others engaged in similar activities,70 and adequately complies with its
customary law duty to protect the environment'

In April 2000, Erebus announced its intention to begin mining
manganese nodules in international waters. 7 No state or individual has
suggested to Erebus that this project will interfere with their similar
operation. Erebus complied with its duty to safeguard the environment by
conducting an exhaustive environmental impact assessment, which has
vouched for the project's safety.73 While others less familiar with the project
have disputed its environmental soundness,' it should be noted that when
faced with similarly conflicting environmental studies in the past, this
Court as declined to weigh their relative merit." Since Erebus has satisfied
all requirements of freedom of the high seas doctrine, the seabed mining
project is permitted by customary international law.
3. Merapi is estopped from asserting that the Erebian seabed mining
facility is in violation of international law.
The principle of estoppel bars a state's claim when a state has
maintained an inconsistent position in regard to a matter of fact or law. 6 An
68. See North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. v. Den; Ger. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 103
(Sep. Op. of J. Ammoun, Feb. 20).
69. See Brown, supra note 50, 559-60.
70. See id.
71. Cf. The Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hun. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7,41 (Sept.
25). See Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. at 241-42.
72. Comp. 9.
73. Comp. 10; Clar. 4.
74. Comp. 10.
75. See Gabcikovo, 1997 I.C.J. at 41.
76. See Tenple of Preah Vihear (Camb. v. Thail.), 1962 I.C.J. 6, 42 (Sep. Op. of J. aro, June
15); Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 4,17, 25 (Feb. 5); Land,
Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal. v. Hond.), 1990 l.C.J. 92,118 (Sept. 13); Fisheries Case,
1951 I.C.J. at 138-39.
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estoppel by acquiescence results when a plaintiff-state is provided ample
opportunity to protest what it believes is an infringement of its rights, but
remains silent, thus, leading the defendant-state to believe that its conduct is
acceptable."
Erebus announced to the world its intention to begin deep seabed
mining 500 nautical miles off Merapi's coast. 8 Merapi did not protest
Erebus's plan for several critical months during which Erebus, relying
upon Merapi's silent acceptance, poured vast economic resources into the
project. 9 Merapi is, thus, estopped from objecting to the Erebian seabed
mining facility.
D. Merapi is Liable for the Destruction of the Erebian Seabed
Mining Facility and the Killing of ErebianNationals
1. Under the Principles of State Responsibility, Merapi is
responsible for the Aqua Protectors' attack, either by its acts or by
its omissions.
a. Merapi's act of providingfinancial support to the Aqua Protectors with
priorknowledge of theirplanned attack againstthe Erebianfacility
amounts to a use offorce against the property and citizens of Erebus.
Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter prohibits the use of force in
international relations 0 The term "use of force" is not limited to
conventional military force, but also prohibits states from "organizing or
encouraging the organization of irregular forces or armed bands... for
incursion into the territory of another state.""
Merapi's financial support of the Aqua Protectors with knowledge of their
objective was an act of "encouraging" their plan to attack the Erebian facility.
Erebus's seabed mining facility isjurisdictionally a part of Erebian territory, just as
Erebian ship on the high seas would be.12 Thus, Merapi's support for the
operation conducted by the Aqua Protectors is a violation of the prohibition
against the use of force.
77. See Christopher Brown, Comment:

A Comparative and Critical Assessment of

Estoppel in InternationalLaw, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 369, 397 (1995).

78. Comp. 9.
79. Comp. 17.
80.

See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.

81. The Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and CoOperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, 25
* U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.28), at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970). See also Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and against Nicaragua (Merits) (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 101 (June 27).

82. Cf. Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J. at 18.
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b. Since Merapi had knowledge that an attack on Erebus was
being planned on Merapin territory, Merapi was obligated to warn Erebus
and to take other reasonable measures to prevent the Aqua Protectors'
attack.
Customary international law requires that states use "due diligence"
to prevent their territory from being used for the purposes of attacks on
other states with whom they are not at war." Since states exercise
exclusive control over their territory, victim states are at a disadvantage
when attempting to establish facts necessary to prove such a breach of
duty. 8' Under these circumstances, victim states are entitled to a relaxed
burden of proof, and a more generous allowance for circumstantial
evidence and inference.95
In the Corfu Channel Case, two British ships struck mines in
Albanian waters, sustaining serious damage and loss of life." This Court
found, by way of circumstantial evidence, that Albania knew of the mines,
and thus, breached international law by not warning others of the danger.81
This Court also found the duty to warn to be part of the obligation of all
states not to allow knowingly their territory to be used for attacks on other
states."
Merapi knew the Aqua Protectors where planning an attack on
Erebus's seabed mining facility from their headquarters in Merapin
territory, 9 yet it neither acted to prevent the attack nor to warn Erebus of
it. Thus, Merapi has incurred responsibility for the attack.
2. Merapi's suppbrt of the Aqua Protectors was not justified as an
act of self-defense consistent with Article 51 of the United Nations
Charter.
a. Article 51 of the United Nations Charterdoes not authorize
anticipatoryself-defensive attacks.
The plain meaning of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter
prohibits a state from resorting to the use of force before it has been the
subject of a military attack. Article 51 states: "Nothing in the present

83. See United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479, 484 (1887). See also FITZMAURICE, supra
note 46, at 21.

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

See FITZMAURICE, supra note 46, at 128.
See id.
See Corfu, 1949 I.C.J. at 10.
See id.at 18-23.
See id.at 22.

89.

Comp.

18.

292 ILSA Journalof International& ComparativeLaw [Vol. 8:271
Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective selfdefense ifan armed attack occurs ...
Merapi was never subjected to
an armed attack.
While some publicists have argued that Article 51's use of the phrase
"inherent right of self-defense" preserved the right as it existed prior to the
Charter, and thus, includes a right of anticipatory self-defense, 9' others have
pointed out that such a reading renders the words "if an armed attack occurs"
inoperable.- Publicist Philip Jessup believed that Article 51 did not codify a right
to anticipatory self-defense: "Under the Charter, alarming military preparations
by a neighboring state would justify a resort to the Security Council, but
would not justify resort to anticipatory force. ...""
Additionally, the case for anticipatory self-defense is weakened by the
fact that consistently large numbers of states have condemned, censured, or
disapproved of uses of force justified on the basis of anticipatory selfdefense.9' The best historic analogy is the 1981 Israeli bombing of a
partially constructed Iraqi nuclear reactor. Israel justified its attack as
anticipatory self-defense, since it feared that Iraq would use the reactor to
produce fissionable material for weapons to be used against it." However,
the Security Council unanimously rejected this defense in a resolution,
which stated that the attack was a "clear violation of the charter of the
United Nations and the norms of international conduct.""
b. Even ifanticipatoryself-defense were legitimate under Article 51, the
potentialfor economic harm does not constitute an "armedattack"
triggeringthe right of self-defense.
Even if the United Nations Charter allowed anticipatory selfdefense, Merapi's contention that economic harm can be the equivalent
of an armed attack" is without merit. During the 1945 negotiations of the
United Nations Charter in San Francisco, the drafters confirmed that
90. U.N. CHARTER art. 51 (emphasis added).
91.

See IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 257

(1963). See also TIMOTHY L.H. MCCORMACK, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE
ISRAELI RAID ON THE IRAQI NUCLEAR REACTOR 150, 151 (1996).
92. See Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV.
1620, 1634 (1984). See also DINSTEIN, supra note 43, at 182-84 (1994).

93. PHILIP C. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 166 (1968).
94. See STANIMIR A. ALEXANDROV,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 165 (1996).

SELF-DEFENSE AGAINST THE USE OF FORCE IN

95. See id.
at 191.
96. S.C. Res. 487, U.N. SCOR, 36th Sess., 2288th mtg. at 10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/487

(1981).
97. Comp. 14.
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economic embargoes did not constitute an unlawful use of force, let alone
armed attack." State practice has never recognized economic harm as
justifying the use of force.
Merapi claims its economic dependence on the fish-stock within the
Grand Basin means that a threat to that resource is the same as an armed
attack on Merapi itself." Merapi's argument is similar to the economic
justifications for the use of force used by France, Great Britain, and Israel
during the 1956 Suez Canal crisis.'0 All three nations justified their actions
at least partly on the economic necessity of maintaining the flow of traffic
through the canal.'01 However, an overwhelming majority of nations
rejected their rationalizations, as the General Assembly voted 64 to five to

denounce their actions. 102
c. Internationallaw does not allow a state to intervene in anticipationof
environmentaldamage outside of its EEZ.
The practice and opinio juris of states indicate that a right to
environmental intervention on the high seas has not been internationally
recognized. This was recently confirmed in the Canadian-Spanish dispute,
which began when Canada amended its laws to authorize its officials to use
force to board foreign vessels in international waters to prevent overfishing of stocks important to Canada's economy.101 In 1995, Canadian
naval forces chased, fired upon and captured a Spanish fishing vessel
suspected of violating Canadian law and regulations.' ° Spain strenuously
objected to Canada's unilateral extension of jurisdiction into international
waters. 0 1 As part of the settlement that ensued, Canada was required to
repeal the statutes allowing for the seizure of foreign ships in international
waters.'06 Thus, Merapi's concern for the marine environment of the Grand
Basin cannot justify a use of force against the Erebian facility.

98. See ANN VAN WYNEN THOMAS & A. J. THOMAS, JR., NON-INTERVENTION:
LAW AND IMPORT IN THE AMERICAS 410-11 (1956).

THE

99. Comp. 14.
100. See Quincy Wright, Intervention, 1956, 51 AM. J. INT'L L. 257, 271-73 (1957).
101. See id. at 272.
102. See ALEXANDROV, supra note 94, at 152.

103. See Coastal Fisheries Protection Act, R.S.C., ch. C-33, §7 (1994) (Can.), reprintedin
33 I.L.M. 1383, 1386 (1994).
104. See Fieries Jurialditin Cam (Spain v. Can.), 1998 I.CJ. at para. 19 (Dec. 4), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/ibonaibonajudgmentslibomijudgment_19991213.hun.
105. See id. 20.
106. See id.
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d. In any event, Merapi's actions are inconsistent with the customary
internationallaw requirements of "necessity" and "proportionality."
Customary international law holds that the use of self-defense must be
necessary and proportional.'10 These requirements stem from the Caroline
incident, as to which U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster wrote that
self-defense must be limited to situations in which the "necessity of the
self-defense is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and
no moment for deliberation. "'0

Additionally, Webster wrote that a

necessary action must also be proportionate in that it "must be limited by
that necessity, and kept clearly within it." °0
. Merapi's actions cannot meet the requirement of necessity
because Merapi did not first exhaust all possible peaceful
measures available to it.
Before self-defense can be "necessary," a state must exhaust all of
potential peaceful means of settling the dispute. 110 Article 2(3) of. the
United Nations Charter requires states to "settle their international disputes
by peaceful means .... "111 Article 33(1) requires that attempts be made to
resolve disputes by means, such as "negotiation, enquiry, mediation,
conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement..." prior to the use of force. 112
Merapi failed to exhaust this list of potential peaceful settlement means
prior to launching its attack. Therefore, Merapi's actions were in violation
of the requirement of "necessity."
ii. Merapi's actions cannot meet the requirement of necessity
since the Security Council was actively engaged in the matter.
Self-defense under Article 51 is limited to the time prior to the
Security Council's engagement in a dispute.-3 Once the Security Council is
involved in a dispute, it has sole authority to "determine the existence of
any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression....
Mere days before the Aqua Protectors attacked the seabed mining facility,
the Security Council stated its intent "to remain seized of the matter. ' 115
107. See Military and ParamilitaryActivities, 1986 I.C.J. at 103.
108. BROWNLIE, supra note 91, at 42-43.

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 261.
See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 3; art. 33, para. 1.
Id. art. 2, para. 3.
Id. art. 33, para. 1
Seeid. art. 51.
Id. art. 39.
Comp. 15.
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Thus, Merapi's actions were not "necessary" as the Security Council was

actively engaged in the dispute.'6
iii.
Merapi's actions cannot meet the requirement of
proportionality since the attack needlessly resulted in the death
of civilians.
A proportionate self-defensive use of force is one that is equal to its
necessity, not one that is equal to the initial threat." 7 Thus, no matter how
great a threat Merapi may have believed the Erebian seabed mining facility
posed to its security, proportionality required Merapi to use self-defensive
measures that were only equal to what was required to eliminate that
threat."" Merapi and its agents, the Aqua Protectors, could have given
warning (even just a few minutes) to ensure that the Erebian civilians could
be evacuated from the temporary platforms before the detonation of the
explosives."19 The loss of life that accompanied the Aqua Protectors'
attack',2 was unjustified; thus, the attack was disproportionate.
e. Merapi had no implied authorizationfrom the Security Council to
attack the Erebian seabed mining facility.
In every past case in which the Security Council authorized the use of
force (Iraq,"' Bosnia,'" Somalia,'" Rwanda,1'2 Haiti"'), it employed the
phrase "all necessary means," which does not appear in this Presidential
Statement.'- In the absence of this talismanic phrase, authorization to use
force should not be read into the actions of the Security Council.
Resolutions and statements from the Security Council are often the subject
of intense negotiations. Allowing tenuous assertions of authorization for
116. Comp.

12.

117. See ALEXANDROV, supra note 94, at 165.

118. See id.
119. Comp.

16.

120. See id.

121. S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963d mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678
(1990).

122.
(1992).
123.
(1992).
124.
(1994).
125.
(1994).
126.

S.C. Res. 770, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3106th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/770
S.C. Res. 794, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3145th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. SIRESI794
S.C. Res. 929, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3392nd mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/929
S.C. Res. 940, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3413th mtg. at 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/940
Comp. 12.
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the use of force to be read into these instruments effectively undoes their
negotiations.'" For this reason, the Court should reject any assertion by
Merapi that the Presidential Statement implicitly authorized their use of
force.

E. InternationalLaw Requires Merapi to Compensate Erebusfor the
Destruction of the Mining Facility and Killing of Erebian
Nationals, as well as Surrender the Perpetratorsof the Attack to
Erebusfor Prosecution
1. International law requires Merapi to compensate for the unlawful
destruction of Erebian property.
Reparations must be set at a level equal to the cost of repairing or
replacing the destroyed property plus any lost profits, which the property
may reasonably have been expected to produce. 128 Merapi is thus required
to compensate Erebus for the cost of repairing the seabed mining facility
and the cost of purchasing manganese, cobalt, nickel, and copper on the
open market for the period of time that will be required to repair the
facility.
2. International law requires Merapi to compensate for the unlawful
killing of Erebian citizens.
International law gives states the right to bring claims for the
injuries suffered by their nationals. '29 Though the state is asserting its
own rights and not acting in a representative capacity, the damages are,
nonetheless, measured by the injury suffered by the citizens or their
estates.," Six Erebian citizens were killed by Merapi's attack on the seabed
mining facility.", Thus, Merapi is liable to Erebus for these citizens'
injuries, measured by the loss to their estates.

127. See Christine M. Chinkin, Kosovo: A "Good' or "Bad" War?, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 841, 842

1999).
128. See Chorzow, 1928 P.C.I.J. at 47-48.

129. See FITZMAURICE, supra note 46, at 26.
130. See id.
131. Comp.

16.
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3. International law requires Merapi to surrender the members of
the Aqua Protectors responsible for the attack on the seabed mining
facility.
a. The customary internationallaw principle of aut dedere aut judicare
requiresMerapi to extradite or prosecute the Aqua Protectors.
States have a duty under the customary international law principle of
aut dedere autjudicare to either extradite persons accused of terrorism and
other international crimes, or prosecute them under their own laws. 32 This
duty is rooted in the principles of state responsibility and starts from the
assumption that when an international crime is committed, the injured state
has a right to punish the perpetrators.' As a fundamental duty to respect
the sovereign rights of fellow states, the duty applies equally with regards
to aliens and nationals.'34

While the international crime of terrorism has no precise definition,
terrorist activities have certain characteristics, which include the
victimization of innocent third parties, and the targeting of non-military
facilities.'" Given these characteristics, the Aqua Protectors are clearly
terrorists, as their targeting of a non-military installation killed innocent
civilians.
Since the duty of aut dedere aut judicare is a part of so many multinational treaties dealing with international crimes such as terrorism,' 3 6 it may
be deemed to have ripened into customary international law.'" Thus, Merapi
has a duty to prosecute or extradite the Aqua Protectors even in the absence
of a specific treaty obligation. In light of Merapi's involvement in the
132. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI & EDWARD M. WISE, AUT DEDERE AUT JUDICARE: THE
DUTY TO EXTRADITE OR PROSECUTE IN INTERNATIONAL Law 22-24 (1995). See also IAN
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 315 (4th ed. 1990).
133. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 132, at 38-39.
134. See II HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI Ac PACiS LIBRI TRES, 529 (Francis W. Kelsey
trans., 1995) See also I1 E. DE VATrEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL
LAW 136-37 (Charles G. Fenwick trans., 1995).

135. See Draft Single Convention on the Legal Control of InternationalTerrorism, Int'l Law
Ass'n (1980), reprinted in RICHARD B. LILLICH, TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM CONVENTIONS
AND COMMENTARY 199 (1982).
136. See, e.g., Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16,

1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105, art. VII; International Convention Against the Taking
of Hostages, Dec. 18, 1979, U.N. G.A. Res. 34/145 (XXXIV), 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.46),

at 245, U.N. Doc. A/34/146, arts. 7-8; Convention and Protocol on the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, adopted by the International Maritime
Organization, at Rome, Mar. 10, 1988, I.M.O. Doc. SUA/CON/15, arts. 10-11; International

Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing, Jan. 9, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/52/653, art.
8.
137. See BASSIOUNI, supranote 132, at 47.
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actions of the Aqua Protectors and its failure to arrest or bring criminal
charges against them,'' extradition is required because Merapi cannot
realistically be expected to prosecute this case diligently. 39
b. Merapi has displayed a lack of good faith in its invocation of the
political offense exception to the duty to extradite.
Under the political offense exception, states may refuse the
extradition of fugitives accused of crimes of a political nature. '4
While the exception is applied according to the standards of the state
from which extradition is requested,"' like all decisions affecting relations
between States, its application is subject to a duty of good faith." 2 Since

a principal justification for the exception is to maintain neutrality in other
states' political conflicts, good faith requires a nonpolitical branch, i.e. the
judiciary, to determine the exception's applicability."4 Merapi's invocation

of the exception exhibits a lack of good faith. Firstly, Merapi has refused
to submit the issue to its court system for a nonpolitical determination.
Secondly, the Aqua Protectors do not qualify as political offenders under
any of the tests applied by the international community.
Under the political-incidence test employed by most common law
countries, a crime is considered a political offense when the perpetrator is
a member of an organization engaged in a political uprising and the crime
is committed in furtherance of that uprising.'" Erebus has not witnessed a
political uprising; thus, the actions of the Aqua Protectors cannot be
deemed to further a political uprising.
Under the proportionality test employed by most civil law countries,
the political element must predominate over the act's common crime
aspects in order for it to be considered a political offense.' However,
138. Comp. 119; Clar. 6.
139. See Oral Pleadings of the United States, Question and Interpretation and
Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention'Arising from the Aerial Incident at
Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.), Prelim. Obj., at 3.59, 3.61 (Oct. 15, 1997), available at
http://www. icj-cij .org/icjwww/idocketlilus/iluscr/ilusicr9719.htm.
140. See Michael R. Littenberg, The Political Offense Exception: An Historical Analysis
and Model for the Future, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1196 (1990).
141. See Manuel R. Garcia-Mora, The Nature of Political Offenses: A Knotty Problem of
ExtraditionLaw, 48 VA. L. REV. 1226, 1227 (1962).
142. C. GERHARD VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 137 (7th ed., 1996).
143. Cf. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 793 (9th Cir. 1986).
144. See id. at 806-07. See generally In re Castioni, [1891] 1 Q.B. 149 (1890).
145. See CHRISTINE VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, THE POLITICAL OFFENSE EXCEPTION TO
EXTRADITION 127 (1980). See, e.g., In re Peruzzo, [1952] INT'L L. REP. 369 (1951) (Swit.).
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like the political-incidence test, the crime must be committed in the
confines of the political uprising.'" Again, since Erebus has not been the
subject of political unrest, the Aqua Protectors' attack cannot constitute a
political offense.
The French political objective test focuses on the nature of the injury,
rather than on the intent of the perpetrator. 47 Under this test it would be irrelevant
whether the Aqua Protectors intended a political result, as the question would be
whether the injury resulting was solely to the state.'" Under the political objective
test, treason, espionage, and even the destruction of government property
would qualify as political offenses, however, the killing of civilians, as
occurred in the present case,' would not.
VI. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
For the reasons stated above, the Republic of Erebus respectfully
requests that this Honorable Court:
1. DECLARE that by virtue of the change in course of the principal arm
of the Krakatoa River, the Alma Shoals lie within the EEZ of Erebus,
and its citizens and vessels, therefore, have a right to fish there;
2.

DECLARE that its proposed deep seabed mining operations are
consistent with international law;

3.

DECLARE that Merapi violated international law through its
involvement in the terrorist attack against the Erebian seabed mining
facility, and by its seizure and detention of the six Erebian vessels;

4.

ORDER Merapi to pay Erebus U.S. $1.2 billion in compensation for
the damage to the facility, the loss of human life, and the loss of future
seabed mining revenue; and

5.

ORDER Merapi to surrender the members of the Aqua Protectors
responsible for the attack on the seabed mining facility to Erebus for
prosecution, as well as to release the Erebian fishing vessels.

146.
147.
148.
149.

See Garcia-Mora, supra note 141, at 1249-53.
See id. at 1249-50.
See id.
Comp. 16.
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Merapi and Erebus have agreed to submit the Case Concerning The
Seabed Mining Facility to the ICJ pursuant to Art.36(1) of the Statute of
the ICJ. The jurisdiction of the Court has not been qualified or contested.
There is no dispute as to the jurisdiction of the Court.
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II. QUESTIONS PRESENTED TO THE COURT
Merapi asks the Court:
1.

Whether the Alma Shoals still lie in Merapin waters, despite the
change in the course of the Krakatoa river;

2.

Whether Merapins still have the right to fish the Alma Shoals even
if the boundary has moved;

3.

Whether Merapi is required to release the six Erebian fishing
vessels;

4.

Whether Erebus has to pay compensation for the losses Merapi has
sustained as a result of Erebus' occupation of the Alma Shoals;

5.

Whether the proposed Erebian seabed mining operation is in
violation of international law;

6.

Whether Erebus should be enjoined from starting up the seabed
mining operation;

7.

Whether Erebus is required to upgrade or relocate the seabed
mining facility;

8.

Whether Merapi acted in violation of international law regarding
the destruction of the seabed mining facility

9.

Whether Merapi is required to surrender the members of the Aqua
Protectors to Erebus.
III.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

Merapi is a small developing State whose fishing industry provides its
main source of subsistence. By contrast Erebus is a large economically
developed State with a minor fishing sector. Both are parties to the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties and the four 1958 Geneva Conventions
on the Law of the Sea. Only Merapi is party to the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea. The land and maritime boundaries
between Merapi and Erebus are delimited by the 1947 Treaty of Amity and
Peace which specifies that the maritime boundary should follow the mouth
of the principal arm of the Krakatoa River, "said arm lying between
Pigeon Rock to the South, and the Cape of Realto to the North."
According to the preparatory works the river was chosen to provide a
boundary that would satisfy both parties. This solution was agreed to after
difficult negotiations, over opposed territorial claims and Merapi's burial
sites. From 1996 to 1999 the river's principal arm has made a substantial
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southward shift, resulting from three violent hurricanes, so that the Alma
Shoals presently lie to its north. Erebus now holds that this has placed the
rich fishing grounds of the Alma Shoals, lying immediately off the
Merapin coast, in its waters. Merapi has fished the Alma Shoals for
decades and without interruption, contributing 10% to its GDP. After
Merapi had warned Erebus against fishing in the Alma Shoals, six Erebian
vessels subsequently found fishing there were seized. Proceedings are still
pending before Merapin courts. Erebus responded with an armed
occupation driving Merapin vessels from the area, causing losses in fishing
of U.S.$ 1 billion.
In the midst of the escalating fishing dispute, Erebus announced that
seabed mining would start near the Grand Basin in September 2000 for its
own purposes, although the hard metals sought are also available on the
world market. Merapin fishermen have had exclusive use of the resourcerich Grand Basin, lying 220nm off the coast of Merapi, for at least half a
century, amounting to 40% of Merapi's GDP. Erebus' announcement,
although accompanied by a report which however was limited to computer
simulations of seabed mining data, was met with harsh criticism by
prominent scientists around the world who indicated that the operation
would severely endanger the marine environment in a 300nm radius,
including most fish stocks in the Grand Basin. The President of the
International Sea-Bed Authority also opposed the operation. Several States
brought the issue to the attention of the U.N. Security Council which
determined, by Presidential Statement, that the boundary dispute and the
potential environmental catastrophe constitute a threat to international
peace and security within the meaning of Chapter VII of the Charter and
demanded the delay of the operation until proof was given that it would not
threaten marine life. Erebus refused to comply with this demand. Merapi
stated that the pollution would be equivalent to an armed attack, resulting
in human death and starvation on a massive scale. The Security Council
has been unable to reach any further decision. The Aqua Protectors,
environmentalists partially funded by Merapi, carried out an operation to
disable the seabed mining facility a few days before the proposed
commencement of mining, unfortunately resulting in six casualties and
property damage. The operation was brought to Merapi's attention.
Merapi refused to extradite the members of the Aqua Protectors due
to the absence of an extradition treaty between the two countries and the
policy of Merapi not to extradite its own nationals or political offenders.
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IV. SUMMARY OF THE PLEADINGS
A. The Alma Shoals still lie in Merapi's EEZ despite the -shift in the
Krakatoa river, since the boundary has remained in place pursuant to
interpretation of the Treaty of Amity and Peace. Further, according to
customary international law a boundary delimited by a river does not
change when the river makes a sudden and violent shift. Even if the
boundary has moved Merapi still has the right to exclude Erebus from
fishing because of Merapi's historic rights and due to its dependence
on fishing.
B. The proposed Erebian seabed mining operation is in breach of the 1958
Convention on the High Seas since it excludes other legitimate uses.
Erebus furthermore contravenes customary international environmental
law by polluting areas beyond national jurisdiction, and not consulting
other States. It violates the principle of the common heritage of
mankind by not sharing the seabed resources with other States. The
continuance of the operation contravenes the Security Council's
Presidential Statement, a binding decision under Chapter VII.
C. Merapi did not violate international law regarding the destruction of
the seabed mining facility because the private action of the Aqua
Protectors cannot be attributed to Merapi. Even if it is attributable, the
action is justified as carrying out the Presidential Statement. Even if no
authorization by the Security Council existed, it was justified by a state
of necessity.
D. Merapi is not required to surrender the environmentalists since no
extradition treaty exists between the two States. No duty to extradite
exists under customary international law for offences not constituting
international crimes. Furthermore, Merapi does not have to extradite
persons for predominantly political offences, or its nationals. In place
of extraditing, Merapi may still prosecute the Aqua Protectors.
E. Merapi is not required to release the six fishing vessels since the
Erebian ship owners have not exhausted local remedies. Furthermore,
under customary international law Merapi was allowed to seize and
detain vessels fishing in its EEZ, and Erebus may not claim their
release, not being party to the UNCLOS and not having posted any
bond.
F. Merapi requests the Court to indicate provisional measures to avoid
irreparable harm from the pollution of the Grand Basin, which would
render any decision of the Court ineffective.
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G. Under customary international law Erebus is obliged to upgrade or
relocate the mining facility in order to prevent, or at least reduce,
pollution of the Grand Basin and to respect Merapi's historic fishing
rights. Further, it has to respect Merapi's human right to development.
H. Erebus must compensate Merapi for U.S.$l billion in fishing losses
resulting from the unlawful occupation of the Alma Shoals. Exhaustion
of local remedies is not required because the losses to Merapi's
nationals are incidental to the direct injury caused to Merapi in its
quality as a State. Furthermore, the grave infringement in itself on
Merapi's sovereign rights renders Erebus responsible.
I. Even if Erebus is not responsible, it has to reimburse the revenue from
fishing, as it is unjustly enriched.
V. PLEADINGS
A. Merapi Requests The Court To Declare That, Notwithstanding
The Change In Course Of The Principal Arm Of The Krakatoa
River, It Has The Right Under International Law To Exclude
Vessels And Persons Of Erebian Nationality From Fishing The
Alma Shoals
1. The boundary between Merapi and Erebus has not moved and
the Alma Shoals remain in Merapi's exclusive economic zone.
Under customary international law a coastal state enjoys sovereign
rights to exploit all natural resources of the sea and exclude other States in
a 200nm zone from its coast.' This regime of an Exclusive Economic Zone
[hereinafter EEZ] is codified in Part V of the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea [hereinafter UNCLOS]. 2 In order to
ascertain Merapi's EEZ towards Erebus, the 1947 Treaty of Amity and

1. Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13, 33 (Jun. 3); Continental Shelf
(Tunis v. Libya), 1982 I.C.J. 18, 73, 74 (Feb. 24); Gulf of Me. (Can. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J.
247, 265 (Oct. 12); Fitzmaurice/Lachs, The Legal Regime of the Baltic Sea Fisheries, 29 NILR
232 (1982); JfMENEZ DE ARtCHAGA, Customary International Law and the Conference on the
Law of the Sea, in IN HONOUR OF JUDGE MANFRED LACHS 585 (1984); VIGNES, La coutume
surgie de 1973 d 1982 n'aurait-ellepas icartie la codification comme source principale du droit
de la mer?, in LIBER AMICORUM HONOURING IGNAZ SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN 639 (1988);
BARBARA KWIATKOWSKA, THE 200 MILE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE IN THE NEW LAW OF

THE SEA 28 (1989); D.N. Hutchinson, The Seaward Limit to Continental Shelf Jurisdictionin
Customary InternationalLaw, 1985 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 170.

2.

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, art. 56, 1(a), 21

I.L.M. 1261 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
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Peace [hereinafter TAP] determining the land and maritime boundaries,
has to be interpreted.
2. The boundary between Merapi and Erebus has not moved
according to the TAP.
Although both States are parties to the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties [hereinafter VCLT] its non-retroactivity3 renders the VCLT
inapplicable to the 1947 TAP. However, since Arts. 31 and 32 VCLT are
customary international law, the terms of a treaty have to be interpreted in
good faith according to their ordinary or especially intended meaning, in
the light of the treaty's object and purpose, 4 at the time of conclusion.- In
case of ambiguity, recourse may be had to supplementary means including
6
the preparatory work and circumstances of the treaty's conclusion.
The ordinary meaning of a term may be displaced by a special,
unusual meaning.' The parties gave a special meaning to the term
"principal arm" by defining it as "lying between Pigeon Rock to the South
and the Cape of Realto to the North." With regard to this geographical
meaning intended by the parties, the terms of the TAP do not allow the
line of delimitation to lie south of Pigeon Rock.
In order to determine the object and purpose of a treaty the intentions
of the parties have to be taken into account.' Object and purpose of a
3.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 22, 1969, art. 4, 1155 UNTS 331
[hereinafter VCLT].
4.
Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Bots. v. Namib.), 1999 I.C.J. available at http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/idocket/ibona/ibonaframe.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2001); Territorial Dispute
(Libya v. Chad), 1994 I.C.J. 21, 22; I.SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF
TREATIES 153 (2d ed.1984); A.AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 10s (2000).
5.
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, 1971 I.C.J. 16 (June 21,
1971); Right of Passage (Port. v. India), 1960 I.C.J. 6, 37, 38 (Apr. 12); Grisbadarna (Nor. v.
Swed.), 1909 Rep. Int'l Arb. Awards 147-60 (Mar. 14); Hugh Thirlway, The Law and
Procedure of the InternationalCourt of Justice 1960-1989 (PartThree), 1991 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L
L. 27, 57; Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedureof the InternationalCourt of Justice,
1951-54: General Principles, and Sources of Law, 1953 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 5.
6.
VCLT, supra note 3, at art. 32; Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 1996 I.C.J. 803, 812
(Dec. 12); Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions (Qatar v. Bahrain), 1995 I.C.J. 6, 17
(Feb. 15).
7. VCLT, supra note 3, at arts. 31, 34; Thirlway, supra note 5, at 27; Western Sahara,.
1975 I.C.J. 12, 52 (Oct. 16).
8.
Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco (Fr. v. U.S.), 1952
I.C.J. 176, 197 (Aug. 27); Gerald Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International
Court of Justice 1951-54: Treaty Interpretationsand Other Treaty Points, 1957 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L
L. 203, 204; Employment of Women During the Night, 1932 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 50, at 383
(Anilotti, J., dissenting), availablein World Court Reports.
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boundary treaty is stability and finality of borders, 9 otherwise instability
could continue indefinitely, and "finality would never be reached."' 0 A
boundary established by a treaty may not even be unilaterally altered by
invoking a fundamental change of circumstances." The parties to the TAP
wanted a stable and final border, protecting the achieved balance of
interests between the two opposing territorial claims. Therefore, the
boundary remains at the old river course.
Even if the Court decides that the meaning of the terms is ambiguous,
the travaux pr~paratoires and the circumstances of the TAP as
supplementary means of interpretation still confirm that the boundary did
not change. Heritage sites as a special local circumstance are of relevance
for determining State boundaries.' 2 Ancient Merapin burial sites are lying
between the Cape of Realto and Pigeon Rock. In 1947 Merapi already
agreed to losing the northern half of its burial sites. The travaux
pr~paratoiresshow that the drafters of the TAP agreed on a satisfactory
solution forming the basis of the Treaty. Having the boundary at the
present river course would deprive Merapi of all the remaining burial sites
and would not have satisfied it in 1947, nor today. Therefore the
preparatory work and the circumstances at the time of the conclusion of the
TAP confirm that the boundary has not changed.
Moreover, according to the principle of restrictive interpretation,
restrictions on the sovereignty of States are not to be presumed.' 3
Interpreting the TAP so as to move the boundary would lead to a loss of
territory for Merapi. The ensuing loss of territorial sovereignty cannot
therefore be presumed.
For all these reasons, correct interpretation of the TAP leads to the
result that the boundary has not changed.

9. Temple of Preach Vihear (Cambodia v. Thail.), 1962 I.C.J. 6, 33 (Jun. 15); A.
WAITS & R. JENNINGS, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 667 (1992).
10.

Temple, 1962 I.C.J. at 34.

11. VCLT, supra note 3, at art. 62, 2(a); Schwelb,
Circuwnstances, 29 Za6RV 55 (1969); Aust, supra note 4, at 242.

Fundamental Change of

12. G.M. Kelly, The Temple Case in Historical Perspective, 1963 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.
470; The Jaworzina Boundary, 1932 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 8, at 274, available in World Court
Reports.
13. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, 4, 4-108 (Sept. 7); H.
Lauterpacht, Restrictive Interpretationand the Principlesof Effectiveness in the Interpretationof

Treaties, 1949 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 58; River Oder Case (Gr. Brit. et. al. v. Pol.), 1929 P.C.I.J.
(ser.A) No.23, at 26 (Judgment); Kronprins Gustaf Adolf and Pacific (Swed. v. U.S.), 2
R.I.A.A. 1239 (1932); I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 636 (1998).
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3. The boundary has not moved according to customary
international law.
Under customary international law, slow and gradual accretion in a
boundary river alters the boundary, whereas avulsion-a sudden and
substantial shift- leaves the respective boundary in place.14 The total extent
of the shift, its duration and the violent nature of the causal event
determine such an avulsion. 15 The principal arm shifted at least 50nm
southwards, the entire length of the Alma Shoals, resulting from three
consecutive hurricanes within only four years-a substantial shift for a
delta which saw its last hurricane in 1901. Hurricanes are of a violent
nature. Thus, the shift was a prime example for avulsion and therefore the
boundary has not moved.
4. It is contrary to the principle of good faith to assume that the
boundary has moved.
The principle of good faith is a general principle of international
lawl6 protecting reliance of States on the effectiveness of statements made
under certain attending circumstances by one State to another. 17 In 1947
Erebus only claimed the land up to Pigeon Rock. This statement about an
issue as important as territory made during bilateral negotiations,
disqualifies-as not acting in good faith- the present claim seeking to
establish the border as far south as the present course of the river, south of
Pigeon Rock.
For all these reasons, the boundary has not changed and the Alma
Shoals still lie in Merapi's EEZ. Accordingly Merapi has the right to
exclude Erebians from fishing there.

14. Nebraska v. Iowa, 143 U.S. 359, 361 (1892); Kansas. v. Missouri, 322 U.S. 213, 215

(1944); New Jersey v. New York, 523 U.S. 767 (1998); Dipla, Les r~gles de droit international
en matirede ddliminationfluviale: Remise en question?, 89 R.G.D.I.P. 611s (1985); WATTS &
JENNINGS, supra note 9, at 665; BROWNLIE, supra note 13, at 150.

15. Arkansa v. Tennessee, 246 U.S. 162, 173-177 (1918); L.J. Bouchez, The Fixing of
Boundaries inInternational Boundary Rivers, 12 THE INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 810 (1963).
16. Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253, 268 (Dec. 20); G.A. Res. 2625(XXV),

U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 21, at U.N. Doc. A/8019 (1970-71); Hugh Thirlway, The
Law and Procedureof the International Court of Justice, 62 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 17(1992).
17. Nuclear Tests (N.Z.v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 457, 474 (Dec.20); Eastern Greenland Case,

1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No.53, 71(Judgmen).
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B. Merapins Have The Right To Fish The Alma Shoals Under
Customary InternationalLaw Even If The Boundary Has Moved
1. Merapi has historic rights to fish the Alma Shoals.
Historic rights of States over certain land or maritime areas are
recognized under international law." They emanate from acquiescence,
over a reasonable period of time 9 of States directly affected. 2 Merapin
citizens have been fishing the Alma Shoals continuously and
uninterruptedly, long before Merapi claimed an EEZ. Erebus tolerated
Merapi's fishing, whereas Merapi acted in reliance on this situation.
Therefore, even if the Court holds that the Alma Shoals are within the
EEZ of Erebus, Erebus is precluded from claiming fishing rights
neglecting Merapi's historic title.
2. Merapi's economic dependence on fishing establishes the right to
fish.
Economic dependence of a State on vital commodities creates certain
rights under international law, particularly fishing for coastal States.21 A
developing State even has the right to fish another State's EEZ in order to
satisfy its basic needs. Merapi is a small developing coastal State. Over
half of its GDP comes from the fishing industry. Merapi's economy is thus
highly dependent on fishing the Alma Shoals, contributing 10% to its
GDP. By contrast, the Erebian economy is highly developed, with only a
minor fishing sector, and therefore not dependent on fishing. Hence,

18. Continental Shelf, 1985 I.C.J. at 74; Fitzmaurice, supra note 5, at 31; BROWNLIE,
supra note 13, at 163; Y. BLUM, HISTORIC TITLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 38 (1965); cf.
Grisbadarna, supra note 5, at 161.
19. Temple, 1962 I.C.J. at 23; Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116, 152 (Dec.
18); Venezuelan PreferentialCase, 9 REP. INT'L ARB. AWARDS 103 (1904); Fitzmaurice, supra
note 5, at 30.
20. Temple, 1962 I.C.J. at 23; Right of Passage, supra note 5, at 39; Sovereignty Over
Certain Frontier Land (Beig. v. Neth.), 1959 I.C.J. 209, 250 (June 20) (Armand-Ugon, J.
dissenting); Island of Palmas (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 Rep. Int'l Arb. Awards 830, 869 (1928); The
Legal Status of the Gulf of Fonseca, 11 AM. J. INT'L L. at 700 (1917); Chamizal Tract, supra
note 14, at 329; 1. C. Macgibbon, Customary InternationalLaw and Acquiescence, 1957 BRrr.
Y.B. INT'L L. 115; Fitzmaurice, supra note 5, at 31.
21. UNCLOS, supra note 2, at art. 70, 2; Fisheries Jurisdiction (Gr. Brit. & N. Ir. v.
Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 3, 26, (July 25); id. at 120 (Waldock, J., sep. op.); Grisbadarna,supra note
5, at 161; DOUGLAS M. JOHNSTON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FISHERIES: A FRAMEWORK
FOR POLICY-ORIENTED INQUIRIES 283 (1965); LEO J. BOUCHEZ, THE FREEDOM OF THE HIGH
SEAS: A REAPPRAISAL 45 (L. J. Bouchez & L. Kaijen ed. 1973); Continental Shelf, 1985 I.C.J.
at 78.
22. UNCLOS, supra note 2, at art. 62, 3.
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Merapi has a prevailing right to fish the Alma Shoals to the extent of
satisfying its basic needs.
C. Merapi Requests The Court To Declare That The Proposed
Seabed Mining OperationIs In Violation Of InternationalLaw
1. The seabed mining operation is in violation of Erebus'
obligations under the 1958 convention on the High seas.
Merapi and Erebus are parties to the 1958 Geneva Convention on the
High Seas [hereinafter CHS], and therefore bound by its provisions.
According to Art.2 CHS the freedoms of the high seas shall be exercised
"with reasonable regard to the interests of other States." 3Reasonableness
must incorporate equitable principles.24 Any use which by its very nature
25
completely excludes a parallel use by another State is not reasonable.
Furthermore, subsistence fishing enjoys preferential treatment in
international law.2
Erebus' announcement of the proposed seabed mining operation was
met with harsh criticism by prominent scientists indicating that the
underwater pollution caused by the operation would severely endanger
most fish stocks in the Grand Basin. Fishing from this area contributes
40% to Merapi's GDP, constituting Merapi's main source of subsistence.
Erebus, by contrast, is not dependent on the seabed mining, since
manganese, cobalt, nickel and copper are also available on the world
market. Erebian mining would harmfully affect fish stocks, as ascertained
by aforementioned scientists, and is therefore not a reasonable use because
it would exclude Merapi from its legitimate use of the Grand Basin. This
would also not be equitable given Merapi's dependence on fishing.
Therefore, the seabed mining operation is in violation of international law.

23.

Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 11; Bos, La liberti de la

Haute Mer: Quelques Probl mes d'actualiti,12 N.I.L.R. 346s (1965); cf Fisheries Jurisdiction
(F.R.G. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 175, 198 (July 25).
24. Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Gr.Brit.), 1974 I.C.J. 3, 29 (July 25); GEORGE
SCHWARZENBERGER, THE DYNAMICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 57 (1976); M. D. Blecher,
EquitableDelimitation of Continental Shelf, 73 AM. J. INT'L L. 60, 83 (1979).
25. Tiewul, InternationalLaw and Nuclear Test Explosions on the High Seas,8 C.I.L.J. 47
(1974); Emanuel Margolis, The Hydrogen Bomb Experiments and InternationalLaw, 64 YALE
L.J. at 636 (1955); Bouchez, supra note 21, at 29; WOLFGANG GRAF VrrZTHUM, DER
RECHTSSTATUS DES MEERESBODENS 282 (1972).
26. JOHNSTON, supra note 21, at 283; cf. Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 708 (1900); C.
JOHN COLOMBOS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 474 (3d ed. 1954); CHARLES
ROUSSEAU, LE DROIT DES CONFLITS ARMts [THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT] 290 (A.. Pedone
Ed. 1983) (1957).
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2. The seabed mining operation is in violation of customary
international environmental law.
Every State is under a fundamental obligation not to endanger or
damage the environment beyond its national jurisdiction. 2 Additionally,
every State has a good faith obligation to consult with and notify other
States who might be affected by possible damage impending on them.2
These principles, constituting customary international law, are codified in
Part XII of the UNCLOS." Construction had already begun on the seabed
mining facility, prior to announcement in April 2000. One part of the
recently developed mining process Erebus will use, the hydraulic system,
is known to have the effect of destroying marine ecosystems and food
chains, e.g. killing fish larvae.10 Thus Erebus' extraction process would
severely damage the marine environment beyond Erebian jurisdiction.
Furthermore, by not informing Merapi of its plans as soon as they
materialized, Erebus disregarded Merapi's right to consultation, since
Merapi's fishing is highly affected by the killing of fish larvae in the Grand
Basin. For these reasons, the proposed seabed mining operation is in
violation of international law.
3. The seabed mining operation contravenes the principle of the
common heritage of mankind.
3
The seabed and subsoil thereof are the common heritage of mankind. '
This general principle is embodied in several conventions on areas beyond
27. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. art. 29 (July 8);
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 41 (Sept. 25); Stockholm
Declaration on the Human Environment, Principle 21, Jan. 1972, 11 I.L.M. 1420 (adopted June
16, 1972); Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Principle 2, July 1992, 31 I.L.M.
874, 876 (adopted June 14, 1992); ); P. SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 190s (1995); Vessey, The Principleof Preventionin InternationalLaw, 3
A.R.I.E.L. 189 (1998); Alan E. Boyle, Marine Pollution Under the Law of the Sea Convention,

79 A.J.I.L. 347, 366 (1985).
28. Rio Declaration, supra note 27, at principle 19; SANDS, supra note 27, at 607, Boyle,
supra note 27, at 367; International Law Ass'n, /HA Draft Rules of Int'l Law on Transfrontier
Pollution, arts.7, 9 in ILA REPORT OF THE 59TH CONFERENCE 547s (1980); cf Fisheries

Jurisdiction, supra note 24, at 33; Lac Lanoux (Fr. v. Spain), 24 I.L.R. 101 (Arb. Trib. 1957).
29. UNCLOS, supra note 2, at arts. 194, 2, 198; Vignes, supra note 1, at 639; Moore,
The Rule of Law in the Oceans, in SECURITY FLASHPOINT$ 471 (M. Nordquist & J. Moore eds.,

1998).
30. E. BROWN, 2 SEABED ENERGY AND MINERAL RESOURCES AND THE LAW OF THE
SEA: THE AREA BEYOND THE LIMITS OF NATIONAL JURISDICTION 11.9 6s (1986); Richard A.
Frank, EnvironmentalAspects of DeepseaMining, 15 VA. J. INT'L L. 815, 818 (1974-75).

31. GA-Res.2749 (XXV), Declaration of Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and the Ocean
Floor, and the Subsoil Thereof, Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, 25 UN-GAOR,
Supp. No. 28, 24 art. 1, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971) [hereinafter Seabed Principles Declaration];
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the limit of national jurisdiction. 32 Accordingly appropriation of the seabed
is prohibited, its use must be peaceful, and in accordance with an
institutional regime. 33 Furthermore, activities shall be carried out for the
benefit of mankind as a whole, taking into particular consideration the
interests and needs of developing states.3' This shall be achieved by active
transfer of technology"s and equitable sharing of the benefits.6 States shall
pay reasonable regard to the environment.,, All States currently preparing
for seabed exploitation, even non-signatories of UNCLOS, have
incorporated this principle into their domestic legislation. 8 Since Erebian
seabed mining serves a military end, the operation solely pursues Erebus'
national interest. Erebus has not registered with the International Sea-Bed
Authority, nor contributed any revenue or technology to developing States.
UNCLOS, supra note 2; at art.136; GA-Res.3281(XXIX), Charter of Economic Rights and
Duties of States, 29 UN-GAOR, Supp. No. 31, 50 art.29, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975) [hereinafter
CERDS].
32. UNCLOS, supra note 2, part XI; Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of
States in the Exploration and Use of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, art. 1, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 (Jan. 27, 1967); Agreement
Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, art. 11, 1363
U.N.T.S. 22, 25 (Dec. 5, 1979); Preamble to The Antarctic Treaty, 402 U.N.T.S. 72 (Dec. 1,
1959).
33. Seabed Principles Declaration, supra note 31, at arts. 2, 4, 5, 9; UNCLOS, supra note
2, at arts. 137, 141; CERDS, supra note 31, at art. 29; G.A. Res. 2574, U.N. GAOR, 24th
Sess., 9 I.L.M. 417, 418, (reproduced from U.N. Gen. Assy. Doc. A/RES/2602 (XXIV) of Jan.
21, 1970).
34. Seabed Principles Declaration, supra note 31, art. 7; UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 140
1; CERDS, supra note 31, at art. 29.
35. Wolfrum, The Principle of the Common Heritage of Mankind, 43 Za6RV 323 (1983);
UNCLOS, supra note 2, at art. 144; Brown, supra note 30, at 49; R. CHURCHILL & A.. LOWE,
THE LAW OF THE SEA 249 (3d ed. 1999).
36. UNCLOS, supra note 2, at art. 140; CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 35, at 229;
Paolillo, The InstitutionalAspects for the InternationalSea-Bed and theirImpact on the Evolution
of International Organizations,188 Rd.C 209s (1984-V); A HANDBOOK ON THE NEW LAW OF
THE SEA 582 (Ren-Jean Dupuy & Daniel Vignes eds., 1991).
37. Seabed Principles Declaration, supra note 31, at art. 11; UNCLOS, supra note 2, at
art. 145; cf. CERDS, supra note 31, at art. 30.
38. United States Dep't of Commerce Nat'l Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin. Regulations
on Deep Seabed Mining, §§ 970.204, 970.519, 20 I.L.M. 1228, 1238, 1244 (Sept. 15, 1981);
France: The Exploration and Exploitation of Mineral Resources of the Deep Seabed, arts. 4, 9,
14, 21 I.L.M. 808 (Dec. 23, 1981); Italy: Law on the Exploration and Exploitation of the
Mineral Resources of the Deep Seabed, arts. 3, 7, 15, 24 I.L.M. 983, 984, 986, 991 (Feb. 20,
1985); Union of Soviet Soc. Republics: Edict on Provisional Measures to Regulate Soviet
Enterprises for the Exploration and Exploitation of Mineral Resources, arts. 8, 14, 18, 21 I.L.M.
551, 552, 553 (Apr. 17, 1982); United Kingdom: Deep Sea Mining (Temporal Provisions) Act
1981, arts. 5, 1, 10, 6, 20 I.L.M. 1217, 1221-23 (1981); Federal Republic of Germany: Act
of Interim Regulation of Deep Seabed Mining, secs. 1, 13, 20 I.L.M. 393, 393, 395, 396 (Aug.
22, 1980).
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Furthermore, the operation poses a serious threat to the environment. For
these reasons, the Erebian seabed mining operation does not respect the
principle of the common heritage of mankind and is therefore in violation
of international law.
4. The Erebian seabed mining operation contravenes the Security
Council's presidential statement.
In order to prevent an aggravation of a situation which the Security
Council [hereinafter SC] has determined to be a threat to international
peace and security, the SC may, under Chapter VII, demand the parties
concemed to take provisional measures, 9 which are binding.' 0 Such a threat
to international peace and security may consist in a humanitarian crisis" or
by a possible extension of a conflict to other states'4 e.g., caused by a
massive flow of refugees .4 The Charter does not prescribe any specific
form for such decisions by the SC, which enjoys procedural autonomy."
Beside the traditional form of Resolutions, the SC has also increasingly
made use of Presidential Statements for at least twenty years.3 State
39.

UNITED NATIONS CHARTER art.40.

40. UNITED NATIONS CHARTER art. 25; SYDNEY BAILEY & S. DAWS, THE PROCEDURE
OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL 19 (1998); Weller, Enforced Negotiations: The Threat and Use
of Force to Obtain an International Settlement for Kosovo, 5 INT. PEACEKEEPING 4 (1999);
Frowein, Article 39 in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 620s (B. Simma, ed. 1995); K.
Skubiszewski, Use of Force by States. Collective Security. Law of War and Neutrality, in
MANUAL OF PUB. INT'L L. 739 (Max Sorenson ed., 1968); Leonard C. Meeker, Defensive
Quarantine and the Law, 57 AMER. J. INT'L L. 515, 520 (1963); F. SEYERSTED, UNITED
NATIONS FORCES INTHE LAW OF PEACE AND WAR 140, (1966); L. GOODRICH & E. HAMBRO,
THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 306 (1969).
41. SC Res. 794 (1992), 47 U.N. SCOR 63, U.N. Doc. S/INF/48 (1993); SC Res. 733
(1992), 47 U.N. SCOR 55, U.N. Doc. S/INF/48 (1993); Jean-Marc Sorel, L'elargissementde la

notion de menace contre la paix, in LE CHAPITRE VII DE LA CHARTE DES NATIONS UNIES 41
(Socidt6 Francaise pour le Droit International ed., 1995); Gaja, Rfflexions sur le ROle du Conseil
de SVcurit4 dans le Nouvel Ordre Mondial, 97 R.G.D.I.P. 304s (1993).
42.

Frowein, supra note 40, at 611; Sorel, supra note 41, at 42; Gaja, supra note 41, at

304.
43. SC Res. 688 (1991), 46 U.N. SCOR 32, U.N. Doc. S/INF/47 (1993); U.N. Doc.
SIRES/918 (1994); 49 UN-SCOR 6, UN-Doc.S/INF/50(1996).
44. UNITED NATIONS CHARTER art. 30; Benedetto Conforti, The Legal Effect of NonCompliance with Rules of Procedure in the U.N. General Assembly and Security Council, 63
AMER. J.INT'L L. 479, 482 (1969); BAILEY & DAWS, supra note 40, at 390, 410.
45. See, e.g., Statement by the 'President of the Security Council on Afghanistan,
S/PRST/1997/55, available at www.un.org/docs/sc/statements/1997/prst9755.htm (last visited
Sept. 17, 2001); Statement by the President of the Security Council on Namibia,40 U.N. SCOR
10, U.N. Doc. S/INF/41 (1986); Statement by the President of the Security Council on the

Hijacking of Commercial Aircraft, 27 U.N. SCOR 18, U.N. Doc. S/INF/28 (1973); BAILEY &
DAWS, supra note 40, at 63s.
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practice shows that a decision using the term "demands" is held to be
binding by States." The proposed seabed mining operation would have the
effect of death and starvation on a massive scale by destroying the basis of
subsistence for many Merapins. This humanitarian crisis threatens to
prompt an exodus of refugees thus destabilizing the whole region. The SC,
acting under Chapter VII, has therefore rightfully determined, by the
Presidential Statement of Aug.15,2000, the potential environmental
catastrophe due to the seabed mining operation to be a threat to
international peace and security and demanded Erebus to delay the
commencement of the operation. Consequently this SC decision is valid,
and binding on Erebus. Erebus has to abort the seabed mining operation
and any act of proceeding with it is in violation of international law.
5. Merapi did not violate international law regarding the destruction
of the Seabed Mining Facility.
a. The private action of the Aqua Protectorsis not attributableto Merapi.
A government is not responsible for any acts of private individuals it
does not directly control, because such acts are not considered as occurring
on its behalf.41 As the ICJ held in the Nicaragua Case, direct control is
lacking even where a government is "preponderant or decisive in the
financing, organizing, training, supplying and equipping [the perpetrators],
the selection of [their] military or paramilitary targets and the planning of
the whole of [their] operation."8 Merapi's mere financial contribution and
knowledge of the operation does not amount to direct control of the Aqua
Protectors. Therefore, Merapi is not responsible for the destruction of the
seabed mining facility.
b. Even if the Court decides that Merapi is responsible, the action is
justified under the SC PresidentialStatement.
Under international law a doctrine has emerged allowing forcible
measures by States under circumstances where the SC is incapable of
responding adequately to a security crisis, especially where a threat to, or
breach of international peace and security has been determined and specific
46. SC Res. 598 (1987), U.N. SCOR, 5th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/INF.43 (1988); Protto Res.
598, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2750 16, 21, 27, 61 (1987); Frowein, supra note 40, at 621.
47. Miliatary and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27);
United State Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehron (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3; cf.
INTERNATIONAL L. COMMN, Draft Articles on State Responsibility, Second Reading, art.6[8]
available at http://www.law.cam.ac.uk/rcilILCSR/index.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2001)
[hereinafter DraftArticles on State Responsibility].
48.

Nicara Miliatary and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar.v.U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
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measures demanded by the SC were not complied with." Erebus, in a
diplomatic note, has expressly denied to comply with the SC's demand to
delay the operation. The SC has been unable to agree on any further
measure. Since a peaceful solution was precluded by Erebian behavior,
Merapi, as the immediately affected State, carried out the Presidential
Statement, to prevent the devastating consequences on the Merapin
population. Hence, the operation was justified under international law.
c. Even ifthe Court decides that no authorizationby the SC existed, the
action was justified by a state of necessity.
Necessity- a fundamental principle of customary international lawprecludes the wrongfulness of an otherwise illegal act.w A State is under a
state of necessity where an act not in conformity with an international
obligation is the only means of safeguarding an essential interest against a
grave and imminent peril.' Furthermore, necessity may not be invoked if
the act impairs an essential interest of another State.n Seabed mining was
to commence in a few days, imminently threatening Merapi. Saving its
population from the danger of starvation is an essential interest to Merapi
in order to safeguard its own existence, whereas seabed mining is not
essential to Erebus. Furthermore, the Aqua Protectors' operation was
carried out early in the morning, as a precaution to avoid injury to persons.
Therefore, a state of necessity justified the action under international law.
D. Merapi Requests The Court To Declare That ItIs Not Required
By International Law To Surrender The Members Of The Aqua

49. See generally Antonio Cassese, Ex iniuria is oritur: Are We Moving Towards
International Legitimation of Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World
Community?, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 23 (1999); Simma, NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal
Aspects, 10 EUR. J.INT'L L. 1 (1999); Wedgwood, Unilateral Action in the UN System,. 11 EUR.
J. INT'L L. 349 (2000); F. Abiew, THE EVOLUTION OF THE DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE OF
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 100s (1999); Bartram S. Brown, Hwnanitarian Intervention at a

Crossroads, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1726 (2000); cf. Lewis Henkin, Kosovo and the Law of
"HumanitarianIntervention, "93 AM. L. INT'L. L. 828 (1999).
50. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 47, at art. 26[33]; MN "Saiga" No.
2 (St. Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea), 1999 I.T.L.O.S. No. 2 (July 1), available at
http://www.un.org/Depts/losITLOS/ITLOSproc.htm [hereinafter M/V "Saiga']; 1997 I.C.J. at
37; Yankov, State Responsibility, II Y.B.I.L.C., Part Two 39 (1980).
51. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 47, at art. 261331/1(a), GabcikovoNagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 40 (Sept. 25); M/V "Saiga," supra note
50; S.P. Jagota, State Responsibility: Circumstance Precluding Wrongfulness, 16 NETHERLANDS
Y.B. INT'L L. 16, 269 (1985); Brown, The Lessons of the Torrey Canyon, 21 C.L.P. 129s
(1968).
52. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 47, at art. 26[331/1(b).
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Protectors To Erebus For Prosecution, Or To Release The Six

Fishing Vessels
1. Merapi is not required to surrender the members of The Aqua
Protectors for prosecution.
In the absence of a treaty obligation there exists no duty to extradite
alleged criminals under international law. 3 In such cases, extradition
usually is effected by non-binding considerations of reciprocity and
comity.14 Since there is no treaty obligation between Merapi and Erebus to
extradite wanted fugitives, Merapi's surrendering of fugitives in the past
was based on comity and thus has created no obligation for the present
case. Therefore, Merapi is under no duty to extradite.
The only crimes that might cause the obligation to extradite under
customary international law are international crimes," such as genocide,
crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggressions These
crimes, if wide-spread and systematic, are of concern to the international
community as a whole. 7 The Aqua Protectors disabled the Seabed Mining
Facility to prevent grave pollution of the marine environment. This single,
limited act unfortunately resulted in six casualties and property damage,
but was not wide-spread or systematic, and was not directed against
humanity as a whole. It cannot therefore be considered an international
crime. Consequently, Merapi is under no obligation to extradite the Aqua
Protectors.

53. Questions of Interpretation and Application of 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from
Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Lib. v. U.K.), 1992 I.C.J. 3, 24 (April 14); WATrS & JENNINGS,
supra note 9, at 950; Wise, The Obligation to Extradite or Prosecute,27 [SR. L. REv. 282
(1993); Best Swart, Refusal of Extradition, NETHERLANDS YEARBOOK INT'L L. 23, 214 (1992);
Stein, Rendition of Terrorists:Extradition versus Deportation,ISR'L YEARBOOK INT'L L. 79, 282
(1989); BROWNLIE, supra note 13, at 318; cf. M. BASSIOUNI, A Policy-OrientedInquiry into the
Different Forms and Manifestations of 'International Terrorism,' in LEGAL RESPONSES TO
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM xlvi (1988).

54. Bassiouni, Reflections on International Extradition, in FESTSCHRIFT FOR OTTO
TRIFFFERER 727 (K.Schmoller, ed. 1996). Cf. William Hannay, InternationalTerrorism and the
Political Offence Exception to Extradition,18 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 383 (1979).
55. BROWNLIE, supra note 13, at 318; Bassiouni, supra note .54, at 729.
56. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 37 I.L.M. 999, arts. 5, 6, 7, 8
(1998) [hereinafter ICC]; Secretary-General's Report on Aspects of Establishing An International
Tribunal for the Prosecutions of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law Commited in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, 32 I.L.M. 1159, arts.
4, 5 (1993); Security Counsel Resolution Establishing the International Tribunal for Rwanda, 33
I.L.M. 1598, arts. 2, 3 (1994); CHARTER OF THE NUREMBERG TRIBUNAL, art. 6, available at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/avalon.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2001).
57. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 56, at prmbl.
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Moreover, Merapi submits that it does not have to extradite political
offenders or its nationals. Under customary international law, political
offences are exempted from the obligation to extradite owing to their
overall political motivation.5 Extradition treaties and conventions show
that it is up to the requested State whether to consider an offence as
political or not. 9 An offence is political if the political motivation is
predominant over the criminal ones and if it is directed against a State.6'
The state-owned mining facility was disabled to prevent famine in Merapi,
not for private gain. Since Merapi reasonably considers this act as
predominantly politically motivated, it does not have to extradite.
Furthermore, under customary international law, States do not have to
extradite their own nationals.' 2 This is evidenced by the fact that many
States have provided not to extradite their own citizens in their
constitutions and national legislations'3 and by inclusion of a clause
allowing to deny extradition of nationals in international legal
instruments." Therefore, Merapi is under no obligation to extradite the
alleged offenders of Merapin nationality.
58. GEOFFREY FREESTONE, COOPERATION AGAINST TERRORISM in TERRORISM AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 46 (R.Higgins et. al. eds., 1997); Geoffrey Gilbert, Terrorism and the

PoliticalOffence Exception Reappraised, 34 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 696, 700 (1985); Abraham D.
Sofaer, Terrorism and the Law, 64 FOREIGN AFFAIRS at 906 (Spring 1986); Manuel R. GarciaMora, The Nature of PoliticalOffences, 48 VA. L. REV. 1226 (1962); Hannay, supra note 54, at
411; BROWNLIE, supra note 13, at 319; WATITS & JENNINGS, supra note 9, at 959; In re
Castioni,1 Q.B. 148 (1891) reprinted in 5 BRIT. INT. L. CASES 558 (1967); In re Kavic, 19
I.L.R. 373 (1952).
59. European Convention on Extradition, Council of Europe, 359 U.N.T.S. 278, art. 3/1
(Dec. 13, 1957) [hereinafter ECE]; Inter-American Convention on Extradition, 20 I.L.M. 724
(Feb. 25, 1981); Extradition Treaty Between United States of America and United States
Mexico, 17 I.L.M. 1061, art.5/1(a) (May 4, 1978); Extradition Treaty (Can.-India), 27 I.J.I.L.
279 (Feb. 6, 1987); Extradition Treaty (U.K.-U.S.), 5 A.I.L.C. 408, art.V/1(c)(i) (2nd Ser. 2,
1992) (Jun. 8, 1972); Model Treaty on Extradition, G.A. Res. 45/116, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess.,
U.N. Dec., A/RES/45/116 (Dec. 14, 1990), available at http://www.un.org.
60. In re Nappi,19 I.L.R. 375 (1952); In re Ockert, 7 ANN. DIG. PUB. INT'L L.
CASES 370 (1933-4); In re Kavic, 19 I.L.R. 373 (1952), In re Kaphengst, 5 ANN. DIG. PUB.
INT'L L. CASES 293 (1929-30).
61. In re Giovanni Gatti, 14 ANN. DIG. PUB. INT'L L. CASES 145 (1947); In re
Meunier, 2 QB 415 (1894); cf In re Abu Eain, 529 F. Supp. 695 (1980); Wassilief Case, quoted
in: Manuel R. Garcia-Mora, The Present Status of Political Offences in the Law of Extradition
andAsylum, 14 U. PIlT. L. REV. 378 (1953)(quoting from Wassilief Case).
62. Geoffrey Freestone, Cooperation Against Terrorism, in TERRORISM AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 46 (R. Higgins et. al. eds., 1997); Vieira, L'Evolution R4cente de
l'Extraditiondans le Continent Amtricain, 185 Rd.C. 236ss (1984-I).
63.

IVAN ANTHONY SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 102, (1971);

Vieira, L'Evolution Ricente de l'Extradition dans le Continent Amrricain,185 Rd.C. 236, 238
(1984-I); WAT-rS & JENNINGS, supra note 9, at 955 (1992).
64. ECE, supra note 59, at art.6/1(a); Treaty Concerning Extradition (Beig.-Lux.-Neth.),
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Finally, according to the principle aut dedere autjudicare,a State not
extraditing an accused person, has to "submit the case to its competent
authorities for the purpose of prosecution."" Since nothing in the
Compromis points to Merapi's unwillingness to investigate or to prosecute,
Merapi has the option to prosecute and is under no obligation to extradite.

2. Merapi requests the Court to declare that it is not required by
international law to release the six fishing vessels.
a. The Erebian ship owners have not exhausted local remedies.
Under customary international law a State may not afford diplomatic

protection to its nationals unless said nationals have exhausted local
remedies." Since proceedings on Erebian vessels are still pending before
Merapin courts, local remedies are not exhausted. Consequently, Erebus
cannot claim diplomatic protection and Merapi need not release the six
fishing vessels.
b. Merapi need not release the vessels accordingto customary
internationallaw.

Under customary international law coastal States are allowed to take
measures- including

seizure,

detention and judicial proceedings- to

ensure compliance with their sovereign rights within their EEZ. 6' The
Alma Shoals lie in Merapi's EEZ. Despite the announcement by the
Merapin Prime Minister that any Erebian fishing vessel found fishing the
available at http://www.consilium.eu.int/ejn/ (Jun. 27, 1962); Treaty on Extradition (U.S.Mex.), available at http://www.yale.edullawweb/avalon/avalon.htm (Dec. 11, 1861); Model
Treaty on Extradition, art.4(a), G.A.Res. 45/116, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., U.N. Dec.,
AIRESI45116 (1990), available at http://www.un.org (Dec. 14, 1990); Inter-American
Convention on Extradition, 20 I.L.M. 724, art. 7 (Feb. 25, 1981); Stein, supra note 53, at 330.
65. G.A. Res. 39/46, 39; U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51 at 197, U.N. Doc.
A/39/51 (1985); cf. Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Bassouni, supra note 54, at 726; Antonio Cassese, The
InternationalCommunity's 'Legal' Response to Terrorism, 38 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 593 (1989).
66. Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. Gr. Brit.), 1939 P.C.I.J. (ser.A.) No.
2, at 12 (date); Interhandel (Switz. v. U.S.), 1959 I.C.J. 6, at 26 (March 21); E. Borchard,
Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad 332(1922); cf. Draft Articles on State Responsibility,
supra note 47, at art.45[22].
67. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 73/1; United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
1982, 794 (S. Nandan & S. Rosenne eds. 1993); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 514 cmt. (1987); Nor.: 8, Act. No. 91 of Dec.17,
1976 Relating to the Economic Zone of Norway, United Nations, National Legislation and
Treaties Relating to the Law of the Sea, UN/STILEG/Ser.B/19 242 (1980); Bah.:art. 13,
Fisheries Resources (Jurisdiction and Conservation) Act, 1977, id. 185s; N.Z.:art. 24, Tokelau
(Territorial Sea and Fishing Zone) Act, 1976, id. 75s; Myan./Burma:Art.22, Territorial Sea and
Maritime Zones Law, 1977, id. 11.
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Alma Shoals would be seized, six Erebian vessels fished there in violation
of Merapi's sovereign rights. Therefore seizure and detention pending
proceedings are lawful and Merapi need not release the vessels.
The UNCLOS provides for prompt release of detained vessels upon
the posting of a reasonable bond or other security." However, no treaty
creates a right for a third State unless the States Parties so intend, and such
an intention cannot be lightly presumed."9 Since Erebus is not a party to the
UNCLOS, it may not rely on the UNCLOS to claim prompt release of the
vessels from Merapi.
Even if the Court decides that Erebus may claim prompt release of the
vessels upon the posting of a reasonable bond or other security, no such
security has been posted by the Erebian ship owners. Therefore, Merapi
need not release the vessels.
E. Merapi Requests The Court To Enjoin Erebus From Starting Up
Its Seabed Mining Operation Until It Is Either Upgraded Or
Relocated To Ensure The Safety Of The Marine Life Off The
Coast Of Merapi
1. Merapi requests the court to indicate provisional measures of
protection.
The Court has the power to indicate provisional measures to ensure
that no action is taken which might prejudice the disputed rights of either
party, notwithstanding whatever decision on the merits the court may
render. 7° They may be awarded if there is urgency that such prejudicial
action might infringe upon these disputed rights before the final decision is
given 7' and if irreparable damage would otherwise be caused. Such
provisional measures have been indicated by the Court, e.g. to protect-a
State's fishing right, considering the possible effects on its fishing
68. UNCLOS, supra note 2, at 292, art. 73/2.
69. VCLT, supra note 3, at arts. 34, 36/1; Free Zones of Savoy and the District of Gex,
1932 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 46, at 147; Luke Lee, The Law of the Sea Convention and Third
States, 77 AM. J.INT'L L. (1983).
70. A Passage Through the Great Belt (Fin. v. Den.), 1991 I.C.J. 12, at 17; Fisheries
Jurisdiction (U.K., Fr. v. lee.), 1972 I.C.J. 12, at 15, 17, 35; Nuclear Tests (Aus., N.Z. v.
Fr.), 1973 I.C.J. 99, at 133.
71. 1991 I.C.J. at 17; 1973 I.C.J. at 140s; Pakistani Prisoners of War (India v. Pak.),
1973 I.C.J. 330 (Order).
72. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 257 (Apr. 9);
Convention for Prevention and Punishment on Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo.),
1993 I.C.J. 19 (April 8); Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K., Fr. v. Ice.), 1972 I.C.J. 12 at 16, 34;
1973 I.C.J. at 103, 139.
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industry," as well as to protect the environment against pollution."7
Irreversible injury threatens the marine environment beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction, affecting all States. Regarding Merapi, the need for
provisional measures derives from the fact that the lives of Merapin
citizens and the health and progress of Merapi's. economy are highly
endangered, thus posing a threat of irreparable harm. It would be
unacceptable to wait and then let Erebus compensate for loss of human
lives and massive sea pollution. There is urgency inasmuch as the date of
commencement of the operation is not clear and possibly very close and a
final decision on the pertinent case is uncertain. Once the operation has
started, marine pollution cannot be undone and would render any decision
on the merits ineffective. Therefore, the Court should indicate provisional
measures to enjoin Erebus from starting up its seabed mining operation.
Even if the Court decides that protection of specific rights is not
required, provisional measures may be indicated to prevent any
aggravation or extension of the dispute." Considering the devastating
consequences to Merapi's economy and the threat to many lives, it cannot
be denied that starting the mining operation would severely aggravate the
present dispute. Therefore, Merapi requests the Court to indicate
provisional measures.
2. Erebus has to either upgrade or relocate the mining facility under
international law.
a. Erebus must upgrade or relocate the mining facility, accordingto
customary internationalenvironmental law.
States must protect and preserve the marine environment by taking all
appropriate measures to prevent, reduce and control pollution resulting
from installations for the exploitation of the seabed. This is well
recognized under customary international law as evidenced by numerous
conventions,' 6 resolutions," and national legislations.78 Furthermore,
73. 1972 I.C.J. at 34; Jimenez de Arechaga, InternationalLaw in the Past Third of a
century, 159 Rd.C. 159 (1978-I); Thiriway, Indication of Provisional Measures by the
International Court of Justice, in INTERIM MEASURES INDICATED BY INTERNATIONAb COURTS
11 (R. Bernhardt ed. 1994); J.Elkind, INTERIM PROTECTION, A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 115

(1981).
74. 1973 I.C.J. at 141; de Ar6chaga, supra note 73, at 159.
75. Convention for Prevention and Punishment on Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v
Yugo.), 1993 I.C.J. 19 at 23 (April 8); Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v.
Nig.), 1996 I.C.J. 13 at 22 (March 13); Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 9;
1972 I.C.J. at 16, 35; Oda, The InternationalCourt of Justice Viewed from the Bench (19761993), 244 Rd.C. 72 (1993-VII).
76. UNCLOS, supra note 2, at arts. 192, 194/1,3(c); Convention on the Protection of the
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according to the precautionary principle lack of full scientific certainty
shall not be used as a reason for postponing measures to prevent
environmental degradation where there are threats of serious damage.79
Erebus will use a recently developed hybrid process for its seabed mining,
already criticized by prominent scientists, which contains the hydraulic
system. Since said system is harmful to the environment, danger from the
hybrid process as a whole cannot be ruled out. Due to its recency,
computer simulation cannot give sufficient information about its potential
environmental impact and data from other seabed mining sites can only
give information about already tested technology. Hence, there is a lack of
full scientific certainty about the impacts of the hybrid process. Therefore,
Erebus has not taken all appropriate measures to prevent pollution and is
obliged to upgrade the mining facility by using environmentally safe
technology. Furthermore, since this untested technology can lead to an
environmental catastrophe threatening the plentiful fish stock in the
resource-rich Grand Basin, Erebus at least has to relocate the mining
facility in order to prevent pollution of this area of special ecological
value.

Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area, art. 10, Mar. 22, 1974, reprinted in
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-MULTILATERAL TREATIES, 974:23 (1995); Protocol for
the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution Resulting from Exploration and
Exploitation of the Continental Shelf and the Seabed and its Subsoil, art. 3, Oct. 14, 1994,
reprinted in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-MuLTILATERAL TREATIES 976:13/E
(1995); Convention for the Protection of the Marine and Coastal Environment of the West and
Central African Region, art. 8, Mar. 3, 1981, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW-MULTILATERAL TREATIES 981:23 (1995); Convention for the Protection of the Marine
Environment of the Wider Caribbean Region, art. 8, Mar. 24, 1983, reprinted in
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-MULTILATERAL TREATIES 983:237 (1995); Convention
for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic, art. 5, Sept. 22, 1992,
reprinted in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAw-MULTILATERAL TREATIES 992:71 (1995).
77. Seabed Principles Declaration, supra note 31; G.A. Res. 2467, U.N. GAOR Dec. 21,
1968, 8 IL.M. 203 (1969).
78. 20 I.L.M. at 1228 et seq. (§§ 970.204, 506, 701); 20 I.L.M. at 1221-23 (art. 5, 1
and art. 10, 6); 21 I.L.M. 808 et seq. (arts. 8, 14); 21 I.L.M. 551 et seq. (art. 8); 20 I.L.M.
393 et seq. (§§ 1, 8)
79. 31 I.L.M. at 876; SANDS, supra note 27, at 212s; olyan, The General Obligation to
Prevent Transboundary Harm and its Relation to Four Key Environmental Principles, 3 ARIEL
211 (1998); Communication on the Precautionary Principle, EC-Commission, COM (2000)1final; Convention for the Protection of the Marine and Coastal Environment of the West and
Central African Region, supra note 75, at art. 3/3; Convention on Biological Diversity, prmbl.,
reprinted in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-MULTILATERAL TREATIES, 992:42 (1995)
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b. Erebus has to upgrade or relocate the mining facility, accordingto
Merapi's historic rights to exploit the resources of the GrandBasin.
Historic rights are recognized under international law. On the high
seas, they emanate from acquiescence of the international community."
The citizens of Merapi have been fishing the Grand Basin for hundreds of
years uninterruptedly, and exclusively for at least half a century. Erebus,
being technologically advanced, had the possibility to exploit the area off
the coast of Merapi. But it remained inactive and Merapi thus validly
trusted this given state of affairs. Deprivation of these rights would result
in unequal hardship for Merapi due to the consequence of starvation and
death on a massive scale. Therefore, Merapi has established a historic right
to fish the Grand Basin and Erebus is under the obligation to respect this
right and consequently to upgrade or relocate its mining facility.
c. Erebus has to upgrade or relocatethe mining facility, according to the
InternationalLaw of Development.
According to the right to development, developing States are to be
treated in a favorable, preferential manner by creating such conditions as
to enable them to compete with more developed States.81 As it is a human
right, this is a common and shared responsibility of the entire international
community. 82 It has to be fulfilled in accordance with the concept of
sustainable development, thus not harming the environmental needs of
present and future generations.13 Erebus' mining operation endangers
Merapi's main source of subsistence-fishing the Grand Basin. In
destroying the basic pillar of Merapi's economy, Erebus is violating the
human right to development. Furthermore, the seabed mining greatly
endangers the marine environment in breach of the principle of sustainable
80. Fitzrnaurice, supra note 5, at 30; MacGibbon, supra note 20, at 122; 1951 I.C.J. at
139; cf. BLUM, supra note .18, at 315s.
81. Verwey, The Recognition of the Developing Countries as Special Subjects of International Law Beyond the Sphere of United Nations Resolutions, RdC 372s (1979); Ansbach,
Peoples and Individuals as Subjects of the Right to Development, in THE RIGHT TO

DEVELOPMENT ININTERNATIONAL LAW 155 (S.Chowdhury et al., eds. 1992).
82. G.A. Res. 41/128, U.N. GAOR 41st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/Res.41/128 (1986) available
at http://www.un.org; Roland Y. Rich, The Right to Development as a Principleof Human as an
Emerging Human Right, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 314 (1983); Ansbach, supra note 81, at 145; U.
Umozurike, THE AFRICAAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS 60 (1997).
83. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 78 (Sept. 25);
Beyerlin, The Concept of Sustainable Development, in ENFORCING ENVIRONMENTAL
STANDARDS 103 (R. Wolfrum ed., 1996); Canelas de Castro, The Judgment in the Case
Concerning Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, 8 Y.I.E.L. 28 (1997); 31 I.L.M. 874 (prin. 3);
Resource
Renewal
Institute,
Brundtland
Report
(1987),
art.
2,
available at
http://www.rri.org/envatlas/supdocs/brundt.html.
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development. Therefore, Erebus is under the obligation to upgrade or
relocate the mining facility.
F. Merapi Requests U.S.$ 1 Billion In Damages In Compensation
For The Losses It Has Sustained As A Result Of Erebus'
Occupation Of The Waters Surrounding The Alma Shoals
1. Erebus must compensate Merapi for the losses suffered by its
nationals.
An internationally wrongful act, i.e. an action or omission in breach
of an international obligation attributable to a State, entails the
responsibility of that State." The wrongdoing State incurs the obligation to
wipe out all consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the situation
which would have existed if the act had not been committed." Where
restitution is impossible or insufficient, the wrongdoing State must pay
compensation." Compensation is due for any financially assessable loss
which in the ordinary course of events would not have occurred if the
unlawful act had not been committed.," Where the damage suffered by
nationals is incidental to the direct injury to a State in its very quality,
which thus has a legal interest of its own, distinct from that of its nationals,
exhaustion of local remedies is not required." The Erebian military has
occupied the waters surrounding the Alma Shoals, forcing Merapin fishing
vessels to retreat from the area. Since Merapi, and not Erebus, is entitled
84. Cf. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 47, at arts.1 ,2 [3]; Corfu
Channel (Alb. v. U.K.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22, 23 (Judgment); 1980 I.C.J. at 41; Dupuy, Le Fait
Gn&rateurde la ResponsabilitiInternationaledes Etats, 188 RdC 26s (1984-V).
85. Factory at Chorz6w (Germany v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser.A) No.17, 47 (Judgment);
Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 47, at art. 36[43].
86. Cf. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 47, at art. 37[441; 1928 P.C.I.].
at 47; G. SCHWARZENBERGER, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURT
AND TRIBUNALS 660 (3d ed.,1957); F.A. Mann, The Consequences of an InternationalWrong
and National Law, 48 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 2 (1976-77); Jim~nez de Ar6chaga, International
Responsibility, in MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 565s (M. Sorensen ed., 1968).
87. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 47, at art.37/2[44]; Central Rhodope
Forests (Greece v. Bulg.), 28 AM. J. INT'L L. 804 (1934)(1933); Cape Horn Pigeon (U.S. v.
Russia), 9 REP. INT'L ARB AWARDS 51, 65 (1902); AMCO Asia Corp.v.Indonesia, 24 I.L.M.
1032, 1036 (Nov. 21, 1984); Spanish Zone of Morocco (Spain v. UK), 2 REP. INT'L ARB
AWARDS 658 (1925); C. WILLFRED, THE PROSPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 544
(1964); Garcia-Amador, State Responsibility, II Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N (1961); Arangio-Ruiz,
State Responsibility, II Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N, 19 (1989) (Part One).
88. Theodor Meron, The Incidence of the Rule of Exhaustion of Local Remedies, 35 BRIT
Y.B. INT'L L. 86; C. Amerasinghe, LOCAL REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 129 (1990);
Aerial Incident of 27 Jul. 1955 (Isr., U.S., U.K. v. Bulg.), 1959 I.C.J. PLEAD. 531, 589; MN
"Saiga," supra note 50, at 98.
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to exercise sovereign fishing rights in the Alma Shoals, the occupation by
Erebus was an internationally wrongful act. This violation of Merapi's
sovereign rights constitutes a direct injury to Merapi in its quality as a
State. Subsequently, it also caused loss of fishing yields to its nationals. As
this loss is incidental to the direct injury to Merapi, exhaustion of local
remedies is not required. Erebus has to reestablish the previous situation
by withdrawing its navy from the Alma Shoals. Merapin fishing yields
during the time of occupation would in the ordinary course of events have
accrued to U.S.$ 1 billion. These yields cannot be restituted in kind, thus
appropriate compensation is due to Merapi and Erebus has to pay
compensation for the loss of fishing yields.
2. Even if the Court does not hold Erebus responsible for damages
to Merapin nationals, the infringement on Merapi's sovereign rights
renders Erebus responsible.
Under international law compensation is due for the infringement of a
State's rights, independently of material damage, reflecting the gravity of
the breach."' The infringement of a State's sovereign rights is a grave
violation of international law.90 Erebus' occupation of the Alma Shoals
using armed force completely excludes Merapi from fishing its own EEZ
and infringes on its sovereign rights. Therefore Erebus has to pay
compensation.
3. Even if the court does not hold Erebus responsible for the
occupation Erebus is unjustly enriched.
The concept of unjust enrichment which is a recognized general
principle of international law" is based on the idea that no State should
enrich itself at the expense of another State without legal cause.9 Erebus is
89. The Rainbow Warrior Affair, 19 REP. INT'L ARB. AWARDS 202 (1986); The I'm
Alone (Can. v. U.S.), 3 REP. INT'L ARB. AWARDS 1618 (1949) (1933); Fitzmaurice, The Case
of the I'm Alone, 17 BRIT Y.B. INT'L L. 94, 109 (1936); M. Whiteman, DAMAGES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 628 (1937); Draft Articles of State Responsibility, art. 45/2(c), in Y.B.
INT'L L., PART TWO 61 (1996); G.A. Res, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/48/10 205
(1993).
90. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turk.), 1976 I.C.J. 10 (Order).
91. H. Lauterpacht, Lena Goldfields Arbitration, 5 ANN. DIG. PUB. INT'L L. CAS. 3
(1930); W. Friedmann, Some impacts of Social Organization on InternationalLaw, 50 AM. J.
INT'L L. 505 (1956); Rodrfguez-Iglesias, El Enriquecimiento sin Causa como Fundamento de
Responsabilidad Internacional,34 R.E.D.I. 387ss (1982); Shannon & Wilson, Inc. v. AEOI, 9
Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal REP 402 (1985-I); Schlegel Corp. v. NICIC, 14 Iran-U.S. Claims
Tribunal 180 (1987-I); McNair, The Seizure of Property and Enterprises, 6 N.I.L.R. 240 (1959).
92. Fombad, The Principleof Unjust Enrichment in InternationalLaw, 30 C.I.L.S.A. 129
(1997); Friedmann, General Course in Public InternationalLaw, 127 Rd.C. 155 (1969-I1).
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profiting from fishing the occupied Alma Shoals. Since the Alma Shoals
are part of Merapi's EEZ, this fishing is without legal title. Erebus is
therefore unjustly enriched and consequently must reimburse the profit
gained.
VI. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
May it therefore please the Court to:
1.

Declare that, notwithstanding the change in course of the principal
arm of the Krakatoa River, Merapi has the right under
international law to exclude vessels and persons of Erebian
nationality from fishing the Alma Shoals;

2.

Declare that the proposed Erebian seabed mining operation is in
violation of international law;

3.

Declare that Merapi is not required by international law either to
surrender the members of The Aqua Protectors to Erebus for
prosecution, or to release the six fishing vessels;

4.

Enjoin Erebus from starting up its seabed mining operation until it
is either upgraded or relocated to ensure the safety of the marine
life off the coast of Merapi;

5.

Award to Merapi U.S. $1 billion in damages to compensate it for
the losses it has sustained as a result of Erebus' occupation of the
Alma Shoals.
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